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The Fears of the Non-Slave States and How They Led to the Prosecution of the Civil War

The fundamental reason the non-slave states prosecuted the Civil War was their fear of the domination exhibited by the slave states, both economically and, especially, politically. Such anxieties stemmed from a perceived threat to their own freedoms and liberties, rather than a problem with racism against and oppression of the slaves. The political dominance led to fear that the slave states would overwhelm the non-slave states politically, even to the degree of totally eliminating them. A significant and vital illustration regarding the political dread was epitomized in the expression and fear of the “Slave Power”. It was feared that the “Slave Power” would destroy the rights and freedoms of white people just as it had done to Africans. The dread of economic hegemony led to a desire to destroy it before it destroyed the economies of the non-slave states. The non-slave states also had a trepidation of slavery expansion, for example into the new territories and even into other countries which would increase the overall sway of the slave states. The total impact of the above was that to prevent any of it from occurring, the non-slave states went to war.

Keywords: civil war, political dominance, economic dominance

1. Introduction

The fundamental reason that the non-slave states prosecuted the Civil War was that they were scared of the domination that the slave states exhibited both economically and especially politically. The non-slave states also had a trepidation of the expansion of slavery, the impact of which they were willing to go to war to prevent (Foner *Free Soil*, 54-55).

The aforementioned political dominance led to fear that the slave states would overwhelm the non-slave states politically, even to the degree of totally eliminating them. This was explicitly articulated by a variety of people over a substantial period. For example in July 1848 Senator John Niles of Connecticut proclaimed twelve reasons why slavery should be excluded from the territories. They included that slavery would give the slave states greater political control, change the government to an oligarchy with the slaveholders holding all the power, and that Mexico may also become slave territory, which would help the slave states politically (CG App 30C-1S, 1199-1200).¹ In June 1858, Lincoln said: "Either the *opponents* of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it ... or its *advocates* will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in *all* the States" (Basler, et al., 62).²

The articulation continued in October 1858 with Senator William Seward of New York affirming that the plan of the slave states was to increase in number, meaning that "the federal judiciary [will] nullify all state laws which shall interfere with ... commerce in slaves"; hence, eventually "slavery will be accepted by those states themselves" (Seward "Irrepressible Conflict", 294). In January 1861, Representative Ortis Ferry of Connecticut lamented that the goals of the leaders of the slave states were "the

¹ The other reasons for introducing slavery were that it would be "imitating the cruel and unnatural policy of England in planting slavery" in the Eastern colonies; slave labor tends to exhaust the soil; as to the territories, slavery "would retard their settlement, impede their growth and progress, depress commercial enterprise and blight their fairest prospects;" it would be against the will of those in the territories and "contrary to their laws;" slavery there would be against the will of a large majority, probably three-fifths, of the people of the United States; it would revive the slave trade, only this time on the Pacific coast; it would preclude free labor from the territories which "would be a monstrous wrong to free laborers of all the states; slavery is a "civil and political evil" and also "morally wrong;" and "slavery interposes a barrier to all progress and is hostile to the spirit of the age."

² The emphasis is in the original.

complete overthrow of democratic institutions and the establishment of an aristocratic or even monarchical government" (CG 36C-2S, 551).

The economic muscle of the slave states was likewise unambiguously elucidated by a diversity of individuals during a significant span of time. In 1838, politician William Harper of South Carolina (20) asserted that: "The products of slave labor furnish more than two-thirds of the materials of our foreign commerce," and: "The prosperity of those States, therefore, and the civilisation of their cities, have been for the most part created by the existence of slavery." Regarding the late 1850s, political economist Thomas Kettell showed that the slave states had the bulk of the nation's exports and, thus, their banks held a majority of the country's specie (Kettell, 73, 96).³ Even Senator Salmon Chase of Ohio presented evidence demonstrating that in 1854 the per capita production values of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Tennessee together were higher than those of the New England states by \$59.14 to \$33.82 (CG App 33C-1S, 133).⁴

2. The Political Power of the Slave States

The largest fear displayed by the non-slave states was the political supremacy of their rivals. The anxiety stemmed from a perceived threat to their own freedoms and liberties, rather than a problem with racism against the slaves and their oppression (Gara, 18). The apprehension began with a series of legislative defeats and executive decisions in favor of the slave states after the move west in the mid-1840s, along with the role it was thought that slavery interests played in them. Some instances included acquiring the potentially large slaveholding area of Texas (either as one or more states), the war with Mexico and the outcome of the Oregon question, which restricted the expansion of non-slave territory north of the forty-ninth parallel (Silbey, 16).

In addition, the non-slave interests believed the slave states had not lost a battle over slavery since the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (Cooper, 220); an idea portrayed in 1847 by the *Richmond Whig*: "Whenever the South shall be called upon to *act*, it will present an undivided, stern,

³ P. 73 for the South's proportions of the total exports (1857) 66.5% and (1859) 71.3%; p. 96 for the South's proportions of the specie values of (1857-60) 60.8%, 65.0%, 59.8%, 54.3%.

⁴ The evidence is in the form of a table labelled as "Avg amt per head (of all productions included in the census)."

inflexible front to its fanatical assailants" (Richmond *Whig* February 14, 1847 as quoted in Cooper, 222).⁵ One historian has deduced that unease in the non-slave states concerning the disproportionate political clout sprouted during the 1787 Constitutional Convention (Richards, 28-51).

An impact of said hegemony was an insistence by the slave states for slavery to be safeguarded by the federal government. In their 1860 party platform, slavery was specifically castigated by Republicans as a "dangerous political heresy" ... "subversive to the peace and harmony of the country." Further, the Republicans insisted that this insistence proved the Democratic party's "measureless subserviency to the exactions of their sectional interest" (American Presidency Project "Republican").

A gigantic and highly vital illustration of the dread that the non-slave states had of the slave states is epitomized in their expression and fear of the "Slave Power". One definition was: "...that control in and over the government which is exercised by a comparatively small number of persons ... bound together in common interest, by being owners of slaves" (Anon, 3). Along these lines the *Anti-Slavery Bugle* bemoaned that "the North is now the vassal of an OLIGARCHY, whose single inspiration comes from Slavery" which "dominates the Republic, determines its national policy, disposes of its offices, and sways all to its absolute will" (Sumner "An Address", 1).

The earliest reference explicitly to the "Slave Power" seems to be in 1839 when, at their Albany meeting, the National Convention of Abolitionists resolved that "the events of the last five or six years leave no room for doubt that the SLAVE POWER is now waging a deliberate and determined war against the liberties of the free states" ("Address Made", 1; *Proceedings*, 18, 30, 31, 32-33, 37; "Slave-holders Power", 2).

From the beginning, the alarm was that the Slave Power would destroy the rights and freedoms of white people just as it had done to Africans ("How Can It", 8-9; "Address Made", 1; "Letter", 1; "Address to the People", 1-2; "Mr Giddings", 1). A particular case manifesting this distress was the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which, upon its adoption, led the non-slave states to feel it had been subjected to a huge breach of faith. It was this treachery that led to the conclusion that the Slave Power would subjugate white people in the same manner as it had Africans (Wilson *Vol II*, 463).

As well as at the abovementioned convention, other non-politicians carped about the Slave Power. In 1857, the *Cincinnati Daily Commercial* chimed in with "there is such a thing as the SLAVE POWER. It has

⁵ The emphasis is in the original.

marched over and annihilated the boundaries of the states. We are now one great homogenous slaveholding community" (*Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, March 12, 1857, quoted in Nye *Fettered Freedom*, 298-99). Later in 1857, the *Atlantic Monthly* wrote "Once intrenched [sic] among the institutions of the country, this baleful power has advanced from one position to another ... establishing itself at each successive point more impregnably than before until it ... demand[s] the surrender of our rights, our self-respect, and our honor" ("Where Will", 242).

The trepidation over the Slave Power endured up until the dawn of the War. In 1859, Representative Nehemiah Abbott of Maine remarked that: "The national Government, and every branch of the national Government, is as fully under control of these few extreme men of the South, as are slaves on their plantations" (*CG App* 35C-2S, 190). Moreover, Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio declared that the Slave Power wanted slavery to "dominate over this great nation and ... prostrate every other interest" and that the Slave Power announced that "cotton is king" and consequently "had dictated this new code of morals" (*CG* 36C-1S, 143). In 1860, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts complained that the Slave Power had "achieved complete dominion" over the Federal Government and held it in "absolute subjugation" and in addition held the President "in the hollow of its hand" (*CG* 36C-1S, 599). In the same year, Senator Kinsley Bingham of Michigan revealed the horror that each branch of the Government — Executive, Legislative and Judicial — had come to be ruled by the Slave Power, which had "wielded so despotically" its impact "over the whole country" (*CG* 36C-1S, 2315).

In the 1840s, Representative Joshua Giddings of Ohio listed ten proofs of the strength of the Slave Power: 1) the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793; 2) the Creek and Negro troubles in Florida in 1815; 3) the Seminole War; 4) the preservation of slavery in the District of Columbia; 5) the refusal to recognise Haiti; 6) attempts to recapture runaways in Canada; 7) the suppression of petitions in the House after 1836; 8) attacks on free speech and the press along with the controversy over the mails; 9) the extension of slavery to the Southwest; 10) the agitation for reopening the slave trade (Giddings, 1-16). In 1855, Seward added: 1) the Missouri Compromise; 2) the annexation of Texas; 3) the war with Mexico; 4) the Kansas struggle; 5) the Compromise of 1850 (William Seward, speech given in Albany, in *Facts for the People*, November 1, 1855, quoted in Nye, *Fettered Freedom*, 298).

In 1855, editor and pastor William Goodell attempted to depict the origins of the Slave Power. He started with the view that the beliefs of communities determine their character and that this character determines the

destinies of the communities. Goodell listed the beliefs that led to the Slave Power as "'five points' of slaveholding supremacy" which "form ... so many flagging-stones of an inclined plane." Therefore, a community starting with the first will end up in the sixth, which allows for 347,000 slaveholders to impose their will on the rest of the country (Goodell, 4).⁶

Another perceived element of the Slave Power was that it was being aided by the Federal Government. According to Giddings (2), the initial instance was in August 1790 when the United States agreed to a treaty, the Treaty of New York, with the Creek Nation, which arranged for the delivery of Africans living in Creek territory. Then, continued Giddings (2), in June 1796, a second such treaty, the Treaty of Coleraine, was signed between the United States and the Creek Nation, and hence the "people of the free States [were] again involved in the expense and disgrace of sustaining slavery." Giddings (2-4) further related how an 1802 law resulted in Georgia slaveholders being enriched at the expense of Aborigines in a scheme that made "the people of the free States [being] involved in one of the grossest frauds ever practised upon an offending tribe of helpless Indians."

One more example, here grumbled by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, of the Federal Government helping the Slave Power occurred when he was not willing to acknowledge the Republic of Haiti. Haiti had just declared independence in 1804 by slaves who had revolted and won their freedom (Sumner *Slave Oligarchy*, 6-7). Sumner furthermore bewailed that the Federal Government was compelled by the Slave Power to attempt to negotiate for the return of runaways in other countries (Sumner *Slave Oligarchy*, 7).

An additional fervent adherent of the concept of the Slave Power was Chase. He began expounding this notion as early as 1844 in his speeches as the leader of the Liberty Party in Ohio and in 1847 with his national Liberty Party platforms by asserting that the Slave Power had converted the Constitution from the "safeguard of Liberty ... into a bulwark of slavery" (Foner *Free Soil*, 92). In March 1850, Chase perpetuated the idea by writing to Sumner that: 1) the original policy of the Government was that of slavery restriction; 2) under the Constitution, Congress cannot establish or

⁶ The "five points" are (1) slavery is not wrong *per se*; it is the abuse of slavery that leads to it being evil; (2) a slaveholder has the right to be such and (3) has property rights in held slaves which should be respected and protected by law; (4) slavery is one of the country's institutions and, thus, legal (5) as the Constitution must guarantee the country's institutions, slavery is constitutional.

maintain slavery in the territories; 3) the original policy of the Government had been subverted and the Constitution had been violated for the extension of slavery and the creation of the political omnipotence of the Slave Power (Chase "Letter", 205). Chase continued in 1855 when he explicated that it was impossible to "fail to observe the immense, not to say overpowering, influence which slavery exerts over almost every act of the Government" (CG 33C-2S, 877).

Following the theme of the Slave Power and the Constitution, in the 1846 Massachusetts legislature, then State Senator Henry Wilson of Natick⁷ decided that the reason Texas was annexed was to extend and propagate slavery. He related that the Slave Power had "won a brilliant victory in the acquisition of Texas", which was just one "in her series of victories over the constitution and liberties of the country" (electricscotland.com) and that this triumph would lead to more similar acquisitions (Wilson *Vol II*, 116).

Others conveyed the identical sentiment. Minister John Rankin of Ohio wrote in 1852 that "the Slave Power has already seized upon the General Government, and has overthrown the rights of the Free States" (Rankin, 1). Plus in 1854 Senator William Fessenden of Maine whined that there had not been a conflict between the slave and non-slave states where "the free States have not been obliged to yield in the end" (CG App 33C-1S, 320).

Indeed, in 1855, Seward related that the political might of the slave states was large enough that it seemed the President was simply "a deputy of the privileged, emptying the treasury and marshalling battalions and ships of war" to force the non-slave states to accept the whims of their slave brethren. In 1855, Seward also griped that the Vice President and Speaker of the House were "safe men" that the Slave Power could permanently trust. Furthermore, when the Slave Power was able to dismantle both the Missouri Compromise and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, it managed to convince Congress to designate the parts of them that were hostile as "unconstitutional usurpations of legislative power" (Seward "The Advent", 234-35).

One more critical aspect of the trepidation regarding the political muscle of the slave states was how they dominated the Government, Judiciary and other similar facets. In 1850, Representative William Bissell of Illinois pointed out that the President had been from the slave states for forty-eight of the previous sixty years, and likewise for more than half of foreign mission positions, almost half of all Cabinet positions and at least sixty percent

⁷ Wilson was also Vice President from March 1873 to November 1875, a United States Senator from January 1855 to March 1873 and a member of the Massachusetts Lower House from 1841 to 1842. He was born Jeremiah Jones Colbath.

of Army and Navy officers (CG App 31C-1S, 227). Additionally, in 1850, Chase explained that the score at March 4, 1853, would be fifty-two years for Presidents from the slave states to twelve for non-slave states, as well as, in numbers, fourteen versus five Secretaries of State, thirteen to twelve Supreme Court Justices and twelve compared with eight Speakers of the House (CG App 31C-1S, 473). He further noted that the slave states then, and always had, a majority of Supreme Court Justices such that they controlled each of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the government. Another trait was that five of nine circuit judges were from the slave states (CG App 31C-1S, 474). Representative John Van Dyke of New Jersey moreover commented in 1850 that at March 4, 1853, the slave states would have had "entire control of the government" for fifty-two years as opposed to twelve for the non-slave states (CG App 31C-1S, 325).

In later years, others prolonged the theme. Representative George Julian of Indiana, in a 1850 House speech, reiterated that a large preponderance of the Presidents, Secretaries of State, Chief Justices and Congressional Committee chairmen since 1789 had been Southerners. Julian cited that in the first sixty-one years, slaveholders had been president about forty-nine with some having provided "decided assurances" to the slave states. Also, of the nineteen Secretaries of State, fourteen had been slaveholders. Similarly, in the first sixty-one years, slaveholders had been the Speaker of the House thirty-eight and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court forty-one (Julian, 25).

In 1852, Representative Ephraim Smart of Maine affirmed that after Millard Fillmore's term (i.e. March 4, 1853), Presidents would have been from slave states for forty-nine years and from non-slave states for fifteen. Further, up until March 4, 1849, the score (in years) had been Chief Justices 48-11, Secretaries of State 40-20, Attorneys General 39-20 and Speakers of the House 37-23, all in favor of the slave states. In addition, the slave states had had a majority of Cabinet positions, Foreign Legations, Army and Navy officers, Presidents *pro tempore* of the Senate and members of the Judiciary. He then listed a plethora of minor positions that had been dominated by the slave states as well (CG App 32C-1S, 467).

In 1855, Sumner bemoaned that the "Slave Oligarchy" held "the keys of every office, from that of President down to the humblest postmaster, compelling all to do its bidding" and led both the Senate and the House, arranging all of their committees and "placing at their head only the servitors of Slavery" (Sumner *Slave Oligarchy*, 5). Moreover, Sumner proclaimed, the 1852 party platform for both the Whigs and Democrats exhibited "subserviency" to the Slave Power in that each advocated the Compromise of 1850,

especially the Fugitive Slave Act (American Presidency Project "Whig"; American Presidency Project "Democrat").

In 1856, Representative Henry Bennett of New York assessed that 346,000 slaveholders had commanded the American Republic for sixty years and that Presidents "bow[ed] down on [their] knees to [them]." He continued by lamenting that in the Senate "the rule of slavery has long been absolute" (CG 34C-1S, 700). Representative John Perry of Maine in 1860 concluded the slave states, with six million people, had over three-fifths of the essential offices, whereas the non-slave states, with thirteen million, had less than two-fifths. He listed nine of the most prominent offices and the number of years each had been occupied by inhabitants of the slave states versus the non-slave states. The key examples were President 48 to 26, President of the Senate *pro tempore* 62 to 11, Speaker of the House 45 to 25 and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 57 to 9. He went on to state that the slave states had dominated lower offices and that in the Senate all fourteen principal committees had chairmen from the slave states. The latter was particularly crucial because those "committees shape the whole legislation of the country" (CG 36C-1S, 1036-37).

As well, Perry stated that during the Buchanan administration (1857-61) all of the branches of the Government were in virtually total control of the slave states (Foner *Free Soil*, 100). Perry elucidated the specific case of the Thirty-Fifth Congress (1857-59) by carping that despite their smaller population, "Of the twenty-two important committees in the Senate, the slave States had the chairman upon sixteen, and the free States six. And of the twenty-five important committees of the House, the South had the chairman upon seventeen, and the North eight." Furthermore, he grumbled that this had always been the way in Congress (CG 36C-1S, 1037).

A fundamental issue regarding the political hegemony of the slave states involved the new territories that had been acquired from Mexico. The non-slave states were afraid that the slave states would increase their overall sway by forcing slavery into the territories. In 1848, Sumner protested that the "animating principle" of the Slave Power was "the perpetuation and extension of Slavery and the advancement of slaveholders" in a speech concerning the war with Mexico (Sumner "Union", 77), and in 1855, he complained that the Slave Power was lobbying to let slavery into all of the territories "and enjoy the protection of the national flag" (Sumner *Slave Oligarchy*, 7). In 1851, (then) newspaper editor Gamaliel Bailey added that "the sectional interest" had worked to procure Louisiana, Florida, Texas, New Mexico and California and expressed the anxiety that "the leading politicians and influences" of the slave states, which personified the Slave

Power, advocated converting New Mexico, Utah and southern California to slaveholding ("Dark Conspiracy", 2).

The objections continued for instance with the *National Era*, which wrote in 1856 that the slave states instigated the Mexican War in order to obtain "a nursery of slave States" to enter the Union "*pari passu* with the new free States" ("Few Significant", 2). In a 1857 speech in Detroit, Seward persisted by asking what was the "aggrandizement of the slave interest" and answered with the admission of Kansas, Nebraska and Utah, followed by the "incorporation of Cuba into the Republic" ("Slaveholding Class", 24).

Another feature of the slave states' campaign to expand slavery in the West was an effort to repeal the Missouri Compromise of 1820. In January 1854, Chase, along with Giddings, wrote the "Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United States", which condemned any bill that would achieve this as "a criminal betrayal of precious rights; as part and parcel of an atrocious plot" to extend slavery into the West (141).

In 1856, the *National Era* sustained the theme that the slave states overturned the Missouri Compromise to try to change at least part of slave territory into free. According to the paper, the idea was to bring Kansas in as a slave state to prevent the admission of more non-slave states at least until "the new slave State of Nicaragua is ready for annexation" or something promising eventuated elsewhere, e.g. Cuba or Texas ("Few Significant", 2).

A crucial attribute of the Slave Power being able to wield its influence in the territories was how it realised outcomes in its favor in several Western jurisdictions. In September 1849, the Oregon Territory banned the entrance of any non-slave Africans (Brooks, 736; Taylor, 157). In 1851, the New Mexico Territory recognized and established peonage (Shortridge), and Iowa forbade non-slave Africans from testifying in a court case (Brier, 243). In 1852, the Utah Territory allowed those bringing in slaves to use them as such (Bringham, 333; AN ACT, 160-62), and California passed a bill allowing slaves held when it was a territory to remain slaves, with the Fugitive Slave Act applying to them (Smith "Pacific Bound"; Wills; Smith "Remaking Slavery", 30-31, 49, 55; *Journal of the California Senate* 237, 257, 268-270, 274-285). Illinois joined in 1853 by disallowing non-slave Africans from entering (Gertz, 472; General Laws, 57-60).

Closely linked with the expansion of slavery into the territories was the even greater horror of extending it into the non-slave states. In 1854 the *American Jubilee* referred to an amendment to the Nebraska Territory bill regarding "popular sovereignty" which would have sanctioned the

territory legislature allowing slavery or not at any time. The fact that the amendment was rejected, said the *Jubilee*, showed that the Nebraska bill was truly designed to illustrate that the territories could not prohibit slavery. Using the idea of the Slave Power that the states and the territories have identical rights vis-à-vis slavery, the logical extension was that the states could not ban slavery.

Later in the same article, the *Jubilee* bewailed that the Slave Power had forced through the strengthened Fugitive Slave Act, which implied that the states could not prevent the return of runaways. This would eventually lead to the Federal Government being able to “claim and exercise the right to establish the entire slave code in all the States” (“Treason”, 21).

Another trait with respect to territory was the ambition of the slave states to expand into foreign territory, particularly Cuba and Mexico. An early manifestation of the accompanying fear was in 1851 when Bailey espoused that the slave states promoted annexing Cuba and colonising eastern St. Domingo in order to annex it. He also referred to overhearing a conversation “touching the acquisition of the isthmus of Panama” through colonization (“Dark Conspiracy”, 2).⁸

In 1854, Representative Samuel Parker of Indiana listed what he feared was a set of goals of the slave states backed by the Administration. They included procuring Cuba, conquering St. Domingo and the West Indies, forcing slavery on the inhabitants and reopening the Atlantic slave trade. Following this, Parker added that if the Missouri Compromise were repealed, slavery could emerge in Oregon, Washington, Minnesota, Utah and New Mexico, in addition to Kansas and Nebraska (*CG App 33C-1S*, 794).⁹

In the same year, Representative Lewis Campbell of Ohio deduced that “the slave States are seeking the acquisition of Cuba” as well as trying to repeal the Missouri Compromise in order to expand slavery into the “territories of Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, Utah and New Mexico.” The overall target was to “extend and strengthen” the omnipotence and reach of the slave states (*CG App 33C-2S*, 47). That same session had Campbell gripe that “the free States had never asked for the acquisition of new territories”, yet the Federal government had acquiesced to slave-state demands of annexing “Louisiana, Florida, Texas, California, Utah, and New Mexico,

⁸ Here, St. Domingo refers to the island of Hispaniola; therefore, the eastern part is the present-day Dominican Republic.

⁹ Parker also listed the ultimate ambitions of acquiring the Gulf of Mexico and all adjacent tropical regions, plus establishing slavery throughout all of North and South America. Here, St. Domingo refers to present-day Haiti.

and the Mesilla valley." It was all for "the purpose being to strengthen the political power of slavery" (CG App 33C-2S, 322).¹⁰

In May 1855, Sumner expressed his trepidation that the "Slave Oligarchy" was endeavoring to obtain a bigger area of Mexico along with the entire West Indies, especially Haiti, and "even ... the distant valley of the Amazon" (Sumner "An Address", 1). President James Buchanan gave further motive for alarm in his annual speech of December 1858. Therein he noted that ownership of Cuba "would be of vast importance to the United States" as it "commands the mouth of the Mississippi." Moreover, the "relations with Spain" would "always be ... in jeopardy" as long as it controlled Cuba (Teaching American).

1859 saw Senator Jacob Collamer of Vermont whine that attaining Cuba would culminate in the immediate importation of four hundred thousand slaves and that the slave states were trying to fool the other areas into believing that it would end the African slave trade. On the contrary, Collamer continued, annexing Cuba would facilitate bringing all the slaves that the slave states needed (CG 35C-2S, 1183). Moreover, he protested, the slave states were also trying to obtain Mexico which would permit the slave states to return "to an equal position in the Senate with the free States." Collamer additionally described how then-Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina expounded that the intent of procuring Texas was "officially announced" as being "to sustain and perpetuate the institution of slavery." He then summarized what he understood as the position of the slave states as taking Mexico to "make an equality of States" and Cuba as it was "already filled with slaves" with which to augment the slave state slave population. Collamer concluded his exposition by stating that, as in the past, the slave states asserted that attaining Louisiana necessitated doing likewise with Florida; they would insist that the two required taking Cuba which would then oblige procuring Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. The next acquisitions would soon after be all of the islands of the West Indies, Venezuela and all of Central America (CG 35C-2S, 1181-84, 1187).¹¹

Being of larger encompassment in 1859, Senator Nathan Hale of New Hampshire criticized that the entity of "manifest destiny" "was always travelling South" resulting in the country "continually traveling south

¹⁰ The Mesilla Valley is in modern-day southern New Mexico and far west Texas.

¹¹ Calhoun was also Vice President from March 1825 to December 1832, in the Cabinet from December 1817 to March 1825 and from April 1844 to March 1845, and in the House from March 1811 to November 1817.

for acquisitions". He further bemoaned that this southward focus was so great that the Administration sold part of the non-slave state of Maine (CG 35C-2S, 543). Hale was concerned enough about this apparent emphasis to concede that he "dissent[ed] from ... [the] American policy to be continually annexing foreign nations" (CG 35C-2S, 544).

Even just before the War, Wilson in 1860 displayed the anxiety that the slave states were "turning their lustful eyes to Cuba, Central America, and Mexico." The objective was to increase slave territory, which he demonstrated by conveying how Senator Albert Brown of Mississippi had declared "I want Cuba; I want Tamaulipas, Potosi, and one or two other Mexican States, and I want them all for the same reason, for the planting and spreading of slavery. And a footing in Central America will powerfully aid us in acquiring those other States. Yes, I want these countries for the spread of slavery I would spread the blessings of slavery" (CG 36C-1S, 571).

An added component of the political clout the slave states had was exemplified by the Supreme Court. A relatively early lament was in 1856 when Bennett carped that the Supreme Court was dominated by pro-slavery judges who ruled in favor of slavery (CG App 34C-1S, 700). In 1859 Hale reiterated this distress when he grumbled about a trial concerning the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Here a judge barred a juror evidently inclined to render a verdict with which the judge disagreed, an action sanctioned by the Supreme Court (CG 36C-1S, 8).

In 1860, Bingham concurred that the pro-slavery element had been able to "mold and fashion the Supreme Court, so as to bring it into complete subserviency to their interests" (CG 36C-1S, 2314). In the same year, Wilson bewailed that the Supreme Court "obey[ed] the imperative commands" of the Slave Power (CG 36C-1S, 569). Hale confirmed this dread in 1860 by proclaiming that it seemed to him that for the "last thirty years" the justices were appointed more for their partisan leanings than for their experience in the law (CG 36C-1S, 764).

One tangible consequence of this muscle, as Wilson complained, was that in 1854, the ban on slavery in Kansas and Nebraska was ended at the behest of the slave states (CG 36C-1S, 571). Another particular expression was the Lemmon case in New York. Here in 1852, eight slaves who were brought from Virginia to be shipped to Texas sued for their freedom. Upon appeal, both the New York Supreme Court in 1857 and the New York Court of Appeals in 1860 agreed that they had the status of being free, but Republicans were afraid that the United States Supreme Court would overturn that. The *New York Times* remarked, "judges are gradually giving way to the pressure of one side or other, and ceasing ... to administer the

law as they find it, ... in which the interests of slaveholders are involved" and that the "Supreme Court itself has not been exempt from [this] fate" ("Lemmon Case", 4). The fear was that such an overturn would establish that slaves in transit in non-slave states would still be slaves, which would then lead to slave markets being formed in non-slave states.¹²

A practical impact of the hegemony over the Supreme Court manifested itself in some key verdicts. Probably the most crucial of these was the Dred Scott Decision of 1857, where some thought that the Chief Justice simply followed the instructions of the Slave Power (Wilson *Vol II*, 527). One effect was that it further served slave state politicians who were instrumental in repealing the Missouri Compromise of 1820 when the Decision sanctioned their position (Foner *Free Soil*, 100). A much larger and more fundamental consequence was voiced by (then) Representative Francis Blair, Jr. of Missouri,¹³ who griped that "this decision of the Supreme Court" was one "which subverts the power of the people of a Territory, ... of a State, [and] the power of the people of the Union, to prohibit slavery." As well, Blair continued, it enabled a slaveholder to "walk into a State" "and by his single will establish slavery there, until the next day, or next week, or next year, [whenever] he sees fit to walk out again" ("Speech of Mr Blair", 2). Hence, Blair felt that the next step was that slavery would move into the non-slave states (Richards, 15). This conclusion was arrived at by many other Republicans who explained that as the Decision affirmed that the Constitution mandated that slavery could not be barred from the territories (Foner *Free Soil*, 97), it additionally protected slavery in the states -i.e. no state could bar slavery. This last piece would epitomize a complete, absolute, utter political victory of the slave states over the non-slave states.

One more characteristic of the omnipotence that the slave states held politically was their control of the Senate, where they could usually count on several non-slave state Senators for support (Richards, 88). For example, leading non-slave state Democrats supported the cause of dismissing the Wilmot Proviso, and the two California Senators supported the cause of slavery throughout the 1850s (Cooper, 223-28; Richards, 100).

A prominent specific instance was the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska bill. The vote passing the bill in the Senate illustrates how the slave states could dominate it. The vote was 37-14, with twenty-three of the yeas coming from the slave states and the additional fourteen from non-slave state

¹² The case was still pending before the Supreme Court at the outbreak of the War.

¹³ Blair, Jr. was also a senator from January 1871 to March 1873.

Democrats (govtrack.us. Senate Vote). Even in the House, the voting followed the equivalent pattern, with a total of 113-100, fifty-six of the yeas coming from the slave state Democrats and the further forty-four from non-slave state Democrats (govtrack.us. House Vote). In both cases, the latter group is significant, as the slave state Democrats controlled the party (Landis; ENCYCLOpedia.com). The hegemony here was due to the rule instituted by the party in 1832 requiring a two-thirds majority of national convention delegates to pass resolutions and party platforms, as well as to nominate a presidential candidate (Landis). The rule gave the minority slave state delegates a virtual veto power in setting party platforms and in choosing the nominee. Moreover, the slave state Democrat domination was enhanced by the three-fifths rule (Woods, 430; ENCYCLOpedia.com).

Another particular occasion was an 1855 bill "to give protection to Federal officers in executing the laws of the United States", which was principally geared towards protecting officers dealing with and/or endeavoring to return runaways (*CG App 33C-2S*). Chase whined that the bill was "framed in the interest of the ruling class". He also protested that the bill was designed to overthrow states' rights and create an omnipotent centralised Federal government that commanded the states (*CG App 33C-2S*, 211). Furthermore, Fessenden asserted the law was geared to override state courts in favour of Federal courts (*CG App 33C-2S*, 219). That nature of Federal government and the Federal court system could conceivably (or even probably) be controlled by the slave power.

The vote passing this bill in the Senate further reveals how the slave states could dominate it. The vote was 29-9 (*CG App 33C-2S*, 246)¹⁴ with eighteen of the yeas coming from the slave states and the other eleven from non-slave state Democrats.

3. The Economic Power of the Slave States

In addition to the political muscle, the economic affluence of the slave states was a problem for the non-slave states. Many contemporary writers acknowledged that the financial clout of the slave states was significant and increasing. For instance, in 1856, Baptist Pastor Thornton Stringfellow of Virginia compared six New England states to five slave states chosen as comparable because they: 1) are all on the Atlantic; 2) were all settled (nearly) simultaneously; 3) had a similar free population (Stringfellow, 111).

¹⁴ Additionally, Senator Pratt of MD paired off with Senator Walker of WI.

Among other things, Stringfellow deduced "that these five agricultural states, with slavery, have accumulated an excess of aggregate wealth over the amount accumulated in New England in the same time," by over four hundred million dollars. Another case was Kettell, who wrote that by 1858, in the official valuations, the total wealth of the South was \$4,621 million, contrasted with that of the North and West being \$3,426 million and \$2,111 million, respectively (Kettell, 4).¹⁵ Kettell also calculated that in the decade of the 1850s, the slave states had accumulated enormous capital; a contention that was supported by the capital assessments of banks growing by more than 7.5 times from 1830 to 1850 (Kettell, 23).¹⁶

Besides raw opulence numbers, there were other indications of the slave states being of higher means. Representative William Drayton of South Carolina determined that the non-slave states depended enough on slave labor that "should any disastrous occurrences disturb the institutions of the South" the outcome would be "decayed manufactures, shrunk commerce, and ruined prosperity of the North" (Drayton, 67) and the entire nation (Drayton, 283-84). Indeed, the slave labor of the slave states was lucrative enough that if there were a separation, the slave section would "find her sources of prosperity undiminished" while the other "would be unable to supply the loss of the South" and "would shrink into poverty" (Drayton, 284). In 1853, State Senator Edmund Ruffin of Virginia discussed how "Northern profits and wealth" came from the "tribute ... paid by Southern industry and capital, (and all derived from the products of negro slavery)" because "slave-labor is, in our circumstances, more profitable to the employer and to agricultural interests, than could be any possible substituted labor" (Ruffin, 23; Ruffin Appendix, 25). This dependence on the slave state economies boosted the horror of the non-slave states.

Further to total fortune, a telling factor of the larger prosperity of the slave states is exhibited by the regional per capita incomes. The values Stringfellow came to in 1856 were that the per capita affluence of the slave states was \$520 versus \$367 for the New England states. Additionally, Stringfellow shows how, when considering all of them, the individual slave states had much higher per capita wealth scores than did all of the individual non-slave states. For example, four slave states (South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia) had a higher score than the highest

¹⁵ The amounts grew from the 1850 US Census values of \$2,948 million, \$3,096 million and \$1,023 million. The 1858 numbers are from state censuses.

¹⁶ Kettell, *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits*, 23. Kettell has the worth as \$3,756,643, \$13,214,020, and \$28,707,841 for 1830, 1840 and 1850.

non-slave state (Massachusetts), and nine slave states had a higher score than the third highest non-slave state (Stringfellow, 132-34). Moreover, by 1860, seven of the eight richest states per white person were slave states, including the top four (Huston, 30).

Plus, in 1858, according to Kettell, the slave states had a bigger abundance per white person; around \$743 for the South as opposed to \$397 and \$431 for the North and West (Kettell, 145).¹⁷ According to Fogel and Engerman, in 1860 the South had \$150 and the North \$142. Furthermore, the latter duo quantified that between 1840 and 1860 the South experienced a higher growth of per capita income; 1.7 percent to 1.3 percent (Fogel and Engerman, 335; Fogel, 88).¹⁸ For the South, about forty percent of the latter was from their non-agricultural sector, illustrating that the South was not completely dependent on its cotton industry; hence, it was feasible that overall they could very easily not be overwhelmed by the non-slave state manufacturing sector (Fogel, 101, 87). Likewise, other authors appraised that between 1840 and 1860, the average income of free southerners remained roughly equal to the average income of those living in the northern states (Ransom and Sutch, 137; Silbey, 16). Indeed, in the second half of the 1850s, the South had a booming economy such that in 1860, if treated as a separate nation, it was more prosperous than all European countries except England (Cooper, 255).

Another signal that the slave section had more opulence was both portrayed by and manifested itself in the export volumes of the country as a whole, demonstrated by the fact that in each year from 1825 to 1860 more than thirty percent of the nation's exports were due to cotton (Chandler, Jr., 22 Table 3K).¹⁹ For thirty years, any number elucidated the dominance of the slave states regarding exports. In 1832, Professor Thomas Dew of Virginia wrote "that one-third of the states, and those slave-holding too, furnish[ed] two-thirds of the whole exports!!" (Dew, 36). Other writers continued with similar analyses in the 1830s. In 1839, the Southern Commercial Convention related that nearly seventy-five percent of exports

¹⁷ Kettell 145 has the 1859 white populations as follows: North: 8,626,852; West: 4,900,368; South: 6,222,418.

¹⁸ These values exclude both the population and incomes of slaves. The North consists of ME, NH, MA, RI, CT, NJ, PA, NY, VT, ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, MI, IL, IN and OH; the South of OK, AR, LA, TX, KY, TN, MS, AL, DC, DE, MD, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA and FL.

¹⁹ From 1825 to 1860, in total more than 48% of the nation's exports were due to cotton.

were produced by the slave states, but they received barely ten percent of imports (Wender, 31).²⁰

This was commented on into the 1840s. Publisher and statistician James De Bow chided the slave states for furnishing the “great aggregate of the exports of the country”, with Calhoun explicating in 1848 that “...our Customs Houses would afford us a revenue ample for every purpose ... the South now exports to the Northern States more than all the exports of the North” (De Bow, 407-08; Wilson and Cook, 18).²¹ In the 1850s, Kettell (40) recognized that in 1853 “the immense superstructure of wealth and power which is reared upon the foundation of American slave culture of cotton” and consequently “the United States trade is almost altogether based upon that industry.” In 1857, Senator James Hammond of South Carolina established that 66.3 percent of the nation’s exports were from the slave states and that the South had an annual surplus of at least \$220 million compared to about \$60 million for the North (*CG App* 35C-1S, 961).²² The decade ended with E. N. Elliott (267) conveying that the slave states were enriching the non-slave states by computing that the South exported more than \$193 million in 1859 as distinguished from the North’s \$45 million.

Emphasizing the lack of means in the non-slave states just before the War began in 1861. Lincoln received an evaluation from political advisor Thurlow Weed that the government could not get enough money to fight a war. Weed’s advice was that “if all those states go out, the Capitalists, Merchants, &c &c [i.e. of the non-slave states] will say ‘let them alone’” (Gunderson, 52).

One of the most notable occurrences exemplifying the economic supremacy of the slave states was the Panic of 1857. For commercial firms in general, a substantially higher proportion failed in the non-slave states than in the slave states. Looking at the averages for all the states in each of the two sections, in the non-slave section 3.18 percent of all businesses failed, whereas in the slave states only 1.47 percent went under. Perhaps

²⁰ Another example from the 1830s is William Drayton, who stated that “the South pays nearly one-third of the revenue of the government” and “nine-tenths [of the country’s exports] are raised by the South” (Drayton, 67).

²¹ Another example from the 1840s is an “Address to the Fair” in 1852, stating that for each year from 1846 to 1849, the slave states provided about seventy percent of the nation’s exports, which paid for the imports (“Address to the Fair”, 72). The export numbers quoted show that the slave states accounted for 73, 68, 74 and 75.5 percent of each year’s total.

²² The speech was given March 4, 1858. Hammond’s export values were \$185 million for the South of a total of \$279 million.

of greater prominence is that in the major urban areas of the non-slave states, Boston, Philadelphia and New York, the percentage was 5.39 percent, while in Baltimore it was only 3.38 percent (Calomiris and Schweikart, 814 Table 2).²³

Upon a failure, Calomiris and Schweikart (814 Table 2) measured the loss rate for the creditors of the enterprise as 0.98 percent for the slave section, with the equivalent being 1.94 percent for the non-slave section, virtually twice as much. For the urban areas, the estimated loss amounts were 2.50 percent and 3.48 percent; again, the non-slave states did not perform as well. Clearly, these differences would have been noticeable and motivating.

A further significant attribute of the financial muscle of the slave states was the value of the slaves. One aspect here is that the assessment was increasing rapidly. Ransom and Sutch, (149-51 Table A-1) quantified the 1840 capital worth of all slaves as \$997 million, in 1850 as \$1.286 billion and in 1860 as \$3.059 billion. These numbers correspond to approximately \$32.1 billion, \$48.1 billion and \$106.8 billion in 2024 dollars.²⁴ As they correspond to percentage increases of 50.1 percent and 121.8 percent per decade, it appears that the increase in value was large and accelerating. Another dual comparison was made by Goldin (73-74, 75) with 1850 and 1860 calculations of \$1.3 billion and \$2.7 billion. These equate to about \$48.7 billion and \$94.3 billion in 2024 dollars, thus also representing a significant increase of 93.7 percent. Schmitz and Schaefer (404) determined an 1850 appraisal of \$1.28 billion²⁵ with Baptist (352) estimating \$1.3 billion, thus aligning with the above computations and lending them all credibility. The 1860 evaluations further support this credibility as Rose (43) measured the worth for that year as \$3.68 billion,²⁶ while both Huston and Deyle estimated it at \$3 billion (27; 840).²⁷ Additionally, Deyle (840 *fn* 12) points out that the latter figure is conservative, as contemporary estimates typically ranged around \$4 billion.²⁸ Furthermore, excluding land, Deyle assesses that the value of the slaves was

²³ The non-slave states averaged are CT, IL, IA, IN, ME, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, VT and WI. The slave states averaged are AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NC, SC, TN, TX and VA.

²⁴ All such estimates in this paper use the average of 1) the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis calculation and 2) the calculation as from Political Science Department, Oregon State University.

²⁵ The assessment is about \$47.9 billion in 2024 dollars.

²⁶ The worth is about \$128.5 billion in 2024 dollars.

²⁷ The value is about \$104.7 billion in 2024 dollars.

²⁸ The amount is about \$139.6 billion in 2024 dollars.

substantial compared to that of any other investment in the country. Even the largest such investments paled in comparison, as in 1860 the worth of slaves was over 2.5 times that of each of the three next largest categories: railroads, livestock and manufacturing (842 Table 1).²⁹ Even higher estimates come from Huston (29), who calculated nearly fifty percent more than the combined total of the aforementioned three investments, and Baptist (352), who determined that, in 1850, the value of the slaves was one-fifth of the entire wealth of the country.

An additional feature of the economic structure of the Antebellum Period illustrating the superior position of the slave states was the tariffs. Much of the wealth acquisition of the non-slave states arose from the tariffs, which not only augmented their prosperity, but also drained that of the slave states. High tariffs led to the majority of the government's revenue being paid by the slave states, however it was spent in the non-slave states, thereby benefiting the latter rather than those paying it (DiLorenzo, 63, 125-27). Politician Muscoe Garnett (11) of Virginia³⁰ determined that, in total, the slave states paid more than \$711 million in duties versus only \$215 million for the non-slave states between 1791 and 1845, with the excess bankrolling developments including fisheries, lighthouses and canals in the latter (Majewski, 112). Also, in 1850, Kettell (41) quantified that seventy-four percent of the exports in that year were "articles from the South", demonstrating that non-slave states received profits from carrying the products of slave labor (i.e. exports) and moreover goods back to the slave states (i.e. imports).³¹ Cotton planter John Townsend of South Carolina (24) accentuated the point in 1850 by elucidating that secession "... would bankrupt almost every manufacturing establishment in the North, and would throw out of employment hundreds of thousands of their citizens." In early 1861, Representative John Reagan of Texas observed that slave state taxpayers were paying to Northern businesses "vast millions of tribute" and in general "navigation laws and fishing bounties" but the preponderance of the money was spent building up Northern cities, railroads and canals (CG 36C-2S, 391).³² The conclusion to be reached from the preceding is that a substantial portion of the total production of the

²⁹ The ratio using the conservative assessment is greater than 3.4 times.

³⁰ Garnett was a member of the Virginia State House from 1854 to 1857, the United States House from December 1856 to March 1861 and the Confederate States House from February 1862 to February 1864.

³¹ The profits came from "freights, insurance, exchange, commissions and wages."

³² The speech was given January 15, 1861.

non-slave states came directly from the slave states. The non-slave states realized this, adding fuel to the trepidation they had of the pecuniary command of the other section.

4. The Result is War

Overall it was their fear of both the economic and political power of the slave states that led to the dread of covert treachery on the part of the slave states to impose slavery on the whole nation, including the territories, and control the Federal Government (Stamp, 20). This alarm, not a remonstrance against racism and oppression (Foner *Fiery Trial*, 120), forced the non-slave states to prosecute the Civil War.

The anxiety over economic hegemony led to a desire to destroy it before it destroyed the economies of the non-slave states. One way this fear was expressed was through the emergence of northern sectionalism due to an attempt to make property rights in slaves national, which would have resulted in non-slave labor being in direct competition with slave labor (Huston, 86ff).

Most inhabitants of the non-slave states were afraid of political rule by the slaveholding interests because it could easily impinge on non-slave state economic interests. Educator Josiah Quincy,³³ (5, 17) in an address given on June 5, 1856, exhibited this distress by declaring that the method utilized by the slave states was cunning and the goal of the slave states was "to exclude the Free States from any share of power, except in subserviency to their views."

This political dominance of the slave states gave rise to an aspiration to eliminate it. As it was clear that this could not be accomplished by standard political means, the decision was made to do so by means of war. One author postulates that it is necessary to acknowledge this to understand how and why the Civil War occurred (Gara, 6, 17).

An additional component was that the non-slave states wanted to nationalize their way of thinking and implement their ideas. An example comes from Lincoln, who insisted on boundless loyalty to the Declaration of Independence (Towers, 255), leading to the fear that the supremacy of the slave states would result in their loyalty being elsewhere. The consensus in the non-slave states became that, undoubtedly, the only possible process of achieving the aforementioned nationalization, implementation and loyalty was by engaging in war (Woods, 429).

³³ Quincy was a politician and then President of Harvard University from 1829-45.

As well, non-slave state workers and farmers thought in terms of self-interest (Lasser, 112-13) and were afraid of what the slave system did (or threatened to do), for instance by impinging on or reducing their rights and liberties (Gara, 10; Foner *Free Soil*, 9, 100). Even the strengthened Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was perceived as more of a threat to the rights and liberties of the non-slave states than anything else (Gara, 15-16), as explained by Representative Orin Fowler of Massachusetts, who complained that it was "unwise and unjust" since it was designed to make slavery a responsibility of the entire nation (*CG App 32C-1S*, 398). Thus, to protect themselves from the above, the non-slave states were willing to go to war.

Another element was "Bleeding Kansas" which started due to the political liberties of anti-slavery advocates being threatened (Etcheson, 8). Hence, it is clear that they were enthusiastic about engaging in violent activities to prevent this threat (Gara, 9, 16). At the time, it was said that "[the Abolitionists] are Seeking time within which to get control of the army and navy and the power of the government" (Gunderson, 52) in order to do so.

The activities in Kansas were easily extended to the Civil War. One fact supporting this idea was the reaction of the people of the non-slave states to the attack on Fort Sumter, which shows that the fear of the omnipotence of the slaveholders stimulated the violent and conclusive answer of war (McClintock, 256-58).

5. Conclusion

The legislators and people of the non-slave states did everything they could think of to stop the expansion of slavery. The techniques used ranged from written and oral up to and including armed conflict. This, along with their attempts to prevent the implementation of the Fugitive Slave Act, demonstrates that they were afraid of the enormous and growing influence of the slave states.

The predominant aspect of any willingness of the non-slave states to wage war against the slave states was the fact that the latter were incredibly well-off economically and omnipotent politically. Politically, the slave states were winning almost every legislative pronouncement, mostly thanks to what the non-slave state inhabitants believed was the hegemony of the Slave Power. As the *Anti-Slavery Bugle* wrote in 1857, the conviction was that the Slave Power first "subdued the Executive government, second, the Legislative; and [then] the Judiciary" to the point that "the oligarchs"

had “*made Slavery National, Freedom Sectional*” (“Shall Slavery”, 1).³⁴ Additionally, the numbers holding the most essential political positions such as President, Supreme Court Chief Justices and Cabinet members vastly favored the non-slave states. This superiority manifested itself in highly crucial judgments, e.g. the Dred Scott Decision.

Economically, the slave states had greater wealth and higher per capita wealth. Moreover, the non-slave state economies were vastly dependent on those of the slave states in terms of exports and tariffs. The consequences of the Panic of 1857 further revealed the dominance of slave state economies.

These supremacies led to the fear and dread of their opposite number by the non-slave states. The terror was expressed through the prosecution of the Civil War. In 1860, Representative Charles Sedgwick of New York voiced it as “your aggressions forced the North into this contest ... to prevent the acquisition of territory ... for no purpose other than ... extending and perpetuating slavery ... [and] to defend the Territories from the curse of slavery” (CG App 36C-1S, 180). About ten years later, it was written that the “Slave Power, in their economic, social, moral, ecclesiastical, and political relations to the people and to the government ... finally culminated in a civil war” (Wilson Vol I, 2) to eliminate the resultant supremacies and the disadvantages in which they could potentially culminate.

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³⁴ The emphasis is in the original.

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