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HERACLITUS' SENSE OF ΛΟΓΟΣ IN THE CONTEXT OF GREEK ROOT 'LEG-' IN EPIC POETS

SUMMARY: The following paper aims to explore some Heraclitus' fragments that could entail a personified conception of *logos*. The first part of the paper shows the analysis of the authentic sense of the Greek root 'leg-'. In this part I followed philologists (among others Chantraine, Narecki) and philosopher Heidegger, who was a great adherent of understanding the original sources of Heraclitus' philosophy. The closing part points to Heraclitus' fragments in which the term "logos" is used.

KEYWORDS: Heraclitus, Heidegger, *logos*, personalization, Greek

Heraclitus (Ἡράκλειτος, 540-480) was the first to raise the significant philosophical conception of λόγος. He wrote a treatise, known as *Περὶ φύσεως*,¹ about which there is no agreement among scholars if it was in fact a consistent lecture or just a gnomic collection of loose sentences. Even ancient Greeks believed that it was incredibly difficult to understand and obscure. Heraclitus received cognomens ἀνικτήs, "who speaks in riddles" and σκοτεινός, "obscure" (DL IX 6), hence since antiquity many have tried to interpret or comment on his writings (Reale 2008: 93). Heraclitus' λόγος could be interpreted in various ways and he lends new senses to it. That is why they coincide with such philosophical terms as *Ratio*, as *Verbum*, as Wisdom (τὸ σοφόν),

¹ This title was probably added later. Of the whole treatise only extant 126 fragments are accepted as authentic, and there are 15 whose authenticity is not confirmed (Reale 2008: 93).

as cosmic law, as intellect (γνώμη), as fire and ἄρχή, as Soul, as war, as justice, as the logical, as the necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason, etc. (Heidegger 1995; Reale 2008: 93-102) Although Heraclitus' philosophy gives ambiguous explanations of this term, he broadens earlier meanings and tries to clarify this by using verbs to describe. Simultaneously, the conception of λόγος became so broad-ranging that no other earlier term could comprise its meaning. In this paper I would like to endeavour to analyse some of Heraclitus' fragments that broaden the conception of *logos* on account of his adapting conception that describes the structure of the world as logical by the discourse of the philosopher (λόγος). In the beginning, let us look briefly at the historical literary context of Greek λόγος that could provide an etymological source for Heraclitus.

1. Literary examples of using λόγος

The original meaning of this word comes from Greek epic and lyric poems of Homer and Hesiod and then from the poetry from the 7th-6th century BC. The Polish researcher K. Narecki refers to the findings of French philologist H. Fournier who included them in his book *Les verbs 'dire' en grec ancien* (Fournier 1946). The latter showed that the Greek verb λέγειν originally meant "to collect, to gather" (*ramasser, recueillir*) and it corresponded to the Latin verb *legere*. This meaning refers to the distributive-rational function of the root *leg-*, related to the distribution, gathering, selecting and putting together. P. Chantraine made a similar observation in the *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots* where under the entry λέγω there are meanings "rassembler, cueillir, choisir" ("to collect, to count", to choose"), and then "trier" ("to select"), "lever une taxe" ("to levy a tax"), "faire attention à" ("to notice"), "compter, énumérer" ("to count"), "débiter des injures" ("to insult"), "discourir" ("to discourse"), "raconter, dire" ("to tell, to say") (Chantraine 1968-1980: 625). Generally speaking, the researchers (Fourier, Narecki, Fattal) divided the meanings of verb the λέγειν into two groups: I. distributive-rational authentic, original semantic content of the root *leg-* that meant (1) "to gather, to collect"

and the like as above, and also (2) “to choose, to count”; II. its other declarative-expressional value connected with “speaking”.

I. These are the following contexts in Homer’s epic poems of rational and distributive uses of the Greek verb λέγειν that are enumerated by Narecki and Fattal (Narecki 1999: 18-20; Fattal 2001: 10).² (1) First of all it means “to gather”, for example: gathering the young boys and old men round the city (*Il.* VIII 518-519: παίδας πρωθήβας πολικροτάφους τε γέροντας λέξασθαι περὶ ἄστῳ); gathering by the ships (*Il.* XIII 276: εἰ γὰρ νῦν πᾶρὰ νησὶ λεγοίμεθα πάντες ἄριστοι); gathering the white bones of Achilles (*Od.* XXIV 72: ἦῶθεν δὴ τοι λέγομεν λεύκ’ ὅστέ’, Ἀχιλλεῦ), of Patroclus (*Il.* XXIII 276: ὅστέα Πατρόκλοιο Μενoitιάδαο λέγομεν) or of Hector (*Il.* XXIV 793: ὅστέα λευκὰ λέγοντο κασίγνητοὶ θ’ ἔταροί τε); gathering something for walls (*Od.* XVIII 359: αἵμασιᾶς τε λέγων; XXIV 224: αἵμασιᾶς λέξοντες ἀλωῆς). (2) Then there are other uses connected with “choose”: “Achilles chose twelve youths alive out of the river” (*Il.* XXI 27: ζωοὺς ἐκ ποταμοῖο δωδέκα λέξατο κούρους), to “count”: Proteus counted the number of fatted seals, but men among creatures counted (*Od.* IV 450-451: εὔρε δὲ φώκας ζατρεφέας, πάσας δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπώχετο, λέκτο δ’ ἀριθμόν· ἐν δ’ ἡμέας πρώτους λέγε κήτεσιν) (What is interesting in this passage is that he namely “went over all” the seals and it means that he had to skim through them like during the reading); to “pick” the best men in the city (*Od.* XXIV 108: κρινάμενος λέξαίτο κατὰ πόλιν ἄνδρας ἀριστους).

II. On the other hand, the verb λέγειν in Homer means the activity of talking (especially the telling of stories), in which the result is λόγος, the word (Narecki 1999: 19). Λόγοι only in plural means “words” in sense of “a story”, “a tale”. The λόγοι usually implies the ambivalent meaning of telling a story by which someone could trick and deceive. In this meaning Patroclus alleviates the pain of wounded Eurypylos with delightful talk as a pain-relieving drug (*Il.* XV 392-394: τόφρ’ ὄ γ’ ἐνὶ κλισίῃ ἀγαπήνηρος Εὐρυπύλοιο ἦστό τε και τὸν ἔτερπε λόγοις, ἐπὶ δ’ ἔλκει λυγρῶ φάρμακ’ ἀκέσματ’ ἔπασσε μελαινώων ὀδυάων). In a similar way the nymph Calypso “with soft and wheedling words beguiles him that he may forget Ithaca” (*Od.* I 56-57: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι

² Mrówka follows Narecki, see: Mrówka 2004: 22-25.

καὶ αἰρῦλίοισι λόγοισιν θέλγει). She namely enchants, lures, and deludes Odysseus with her soft and wily words. Both examples reveal the conscious act of pseudo-true lying.

According to Narecki, the passing from “gathering” to “speaking” was possible because of the metaphorical use of λέγειν as “to follow or to run eyes over the list”, “to count” (Lac. *legere senatum*), “to note”, “to report”, relate the story” (Narecki 1999: 19). The double value of the verb λέγειν is comprised of both “synthetic” activity of gathering things as well as the “analytic” procedure of rationally selecting them by distinguishing some elements of the set (Narecki 1999: 19; Fattal 2001: 10). Then the sense evolved from this distributive-rational function of λέγειν into its declarative-expressional value connected with “speaking”.

Hesiod continues the Homeric tradition of using λόγος in his poems *Theogony* and *Works and Days* (Narecki 1999: 21). For the most part, λόγοι are attributed as false and deceitful: the Lying Words (*Theog.* 229-230: Νεΐκεά τε ψευδέας τε Λολους Ἀρφιλλογίας τε Δυσνορήν τ’ Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλησιν) are the offspring of goddess Eris together with (among others): Quarrels, Disputes, Lawlessness, and Ruin “all of one nature”. Next, in verse 890, λόγοι has Homeric epithet αἰμυλίοισι, in which Zeus “craftily deceived” his wife Metis “with cunning words and put her in his own belly” (*Theog.* 890: τὸτ’ ἔπειτα δόλω φρένας ἔξαπατήσας αἰμίλιοισι λόγοισιν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδῦν). He used the same words in *Works and Days* in combination with “sharp speech, lies, stealthy conversation”, that are ascribed to the boy born onin the sixth day (*Op. et dies* 789: φιλέοι δ’ ὄ γε κέρτομα βάζειν ψεύδεά θ’ αἰμυλίουσ τε λόγους κρυφίους τ’ ὄαρισμούς).

Moreover, Hesiod was the first who used λόγος in the singular and associated it with truth, namely a “well and skilfully” (or wisely) constructed story (*Op. et dies* 106: εἰ δ’ ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως). As Narecki argues the adverbial phrase has to highlight the verb’s meaning – ἐκκορυφώω could mean “to crown, come to a peak, to finish and to shape”, hence “to construct a story well and skilfully” (Narecki 1999: 22; Jurewicz 2000).³

³ There are some differences between entries in English and Polish dictionaries: when Jurewicz gives as above, for example Liddel-Scott is writing: *to bring to a head*,

According to Narecki, first and foremost λόγος gained both (1) rational and (2) declarative etymological sense of λέγειν, which is connected with a mental overview of the word's sequence to join them up together in one. Thus λόγος as a result of rationalized activity of speaking is a spoken word that forms a self-contained and harmonious whole as a sentence, a proposition, a statement, and then a speech, a story, a tale, and a narrative (Narecki 1999: 22).

The Greek lyric poets of the 7th-6th centuries added new meanings to the senses mentioned above (Narecki 1999: 24-51). For example, in Tyrtaeus it means *to esteem, to have a regard for somebody* (fr. 12, v. 1: ἐν λόγῳ τινα τιθέναι); in Stesichoros: *arguments* (fr. S 88, col. 2, v. 8: μηδέ λόγοις πειθώρεθ'), in Theogonis from Megara: *arguments* (Theog. 703-704: ὅστε καὶ ἐξ Ἀΐδεω πολυῖδρήρισιν ἀνήλθεν πείσας Περσεφόνην αἰμυλίοισι λόγοις), "like ῥήμα the thing spoken of the subject or matter of the λόγος" (LSJ λόγος A VIII) (Theog. 1055: ἀλλὰ λόγον μὲν τοῦτον ἐάσομεν, αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ σύ αὖλει καὶ Μουσῶν μνησόμεθ' ἀμφοτέροι); *a reckoning, account, bill or relation, proportion* (Theog. 417-418: ἐς βάσανον δ' ἐλθὼν παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολύβδῳ χρυσός, ὑπερτερίης δ' ἄμμιν ἔνεστι λόγος).

The use of λόγος is frequent in the lyric poet Pindar (518-438) – there are 65 examples. Here the main meanings are: "the *talk* which on occasions, Lat. *fama*, mostly in good sense, *praise, honour*" (LSJ: λόγος A III 3), described with enhancing epithets, for example: ἀγαθός (Pind. *N.* XI 17: ἐν λόγοις δ' ἀστῶν ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπαινέισθαι χρεών), ἐσλός (Pind. *Ist.* V 13: εἴ τις εὖ πάσχων λόγον ἐσλὸν ἀκούη), ἀβρός (Pind. *Nem.* VII 31-32: τίμα δὲ γίγνεται ὦν θεὸς ἀβρὸν αὖξει λόγον τεθνακόντων). Pindar also specifies the meaning that appeared in Theogonis, "the subject, matter" becomes "the essence" that brings a clue to a sentence and is a much more rational kind of keynote (Narecki 1999: 42). There are many other significant senses in Pindar, some of which are: "prose-writings, prose", more common "as Greek prose began with history" (LSJ λόγος A V 3; Pind. *Nem.* VI 30: by contrast with αἰοιδὰ); "a prophecy, divine revelation" (Pind. *Pyth.* IV 59-60); "oath" (Pind. *Ol.* II 90-92); "a justice, verdict, punishment" (Pind. *Ol.*

Pass. *rises with arching crest; kings are on the highest pinnacle*; the second meaning is similar: *to tell a tale summarily, state the main points* in both (Liddell and Scott 1996).

II 57-60). One of the strongest rational components of λόγος are in these semantic groups of “count, reckoning” (Pind. *Ol.* VII 86-87); of “a reason, ground, plea” (Pind. *Ist.* 59-62) (Narecki 1999: 43-47).

Although at the beginning the expressive element is much stronger than the rational one, the above-mentioned arguments show clearly enough that the rationalization process progressed and slowly evolved and passed from mythical to philosophical thinking (Narecki 1999: 38, 49; Mrugalski 2006: 28). The contrast between λόγος ἀληθής and ψευδῆς μῦθος is especially clear in Pindar’s First Olympian Ode (Pind. *Ol.* I 28-29). On the one hand, Pindar’s meanings retain the original etymological sense but sometimes the expressive element predominates over the rational one and on the contrary (Narecki 1999: 45). On the other hand, in the course of time the term became more and more semantically open for receiving new senses. In this context Fattal made a proposal for dividing philosophical conceptions according to the ability of revealing, first an analytic activity that divides and introduces division, then a synthetic activity that gathers and joins the respective meanings of λέγειν. In this way he included in the first group the critical and diairetic *logos* of Parmenides, Plato and Aristoteles and in the second – the joint *logos* of Heraclitus, Stoics, St. John and the Qur’an (Fattal 2001: 11-12). The following part of the article concerns λόγος of Heraclitus.

2. What does the λόγος of Heraclitus mean?

There is no agreement among scholars about which of the foregoing semantic groups the λόγος of Heraclitus belongs to. Some researchers interpret it in a declarative-expressional way relating its sense to *oratio*, the others in a distributive-rational manner referring to its sources of *ratio* (Narecki 1999: 54). Narecki agrees with the group that combines the opinions of both.⁴ The dispute of scholars is concerned

⁴ The details of discussion and its development is presented by Narecki (Narecki 1999: 54-60). To the first group belong among others: J. Burnet, O. Gigon, T. F. Gasson, T. M. Robinson; to the second: J. Adam, W. Jaeger, G. S. Kirk, M. Marcovich, D. M. McKiraham; to the third: A. Joja, E. L. Mirana, W. J. Verdenius, Ch. H. Khan.

with a question whether there is any doctrine of λόγος in Heraclitus' fragments, on which the first group casts doubts while the other maintains the opposite. Finally, the third group emphasises the ambiguous, gnomic and puzzling character of Heraclitus' λόγος fragments. These latter imply unceasing merging of different levels and senses of λόγος and consequently it appears simultaneously as the eternal principle reflected in the philosopher's thought. In this kind of expression Khan sees deliberate intent that "opens the possibility that the difficulty of deciding between them [the readings – M. W.] is itself the intended effect" (Kahn 1979: 97-98). He perceives this as significant because the complex relation between the surface and the deeper meaning shows the nature of the λόγος itself that is not merely the statement, but manifests the structure of the world and is itself hinted at in the words of the philosopher.

Martin Heidegger, the 20th century philosopher, was one of the first who remarked on the semantic differences in the original Greek λόγος (Mrugalski 2006: 24). He lectured on Heraclitus' fragments⁵ and appealed for a return to the authentic meaning of λόγος, for freeing "ourselves from the opinion that *logos* and *legein* originally and authentically mean thinking, understanding, and reason" (Heidegger 2000a: 130). While doing that, he refers to Homer's passage from the *Odyssey* (*Od.* XXIV 106-108), mentioned in the previous section, but also to Aristotle (*Physics* Q I 252a13: τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος) in translation: "but every order has the character of bringing together" (Heidegger 2000a: 132). However, he was aware of the term's ambiguity and transformation of the meaning:

Who would want to deny that in the language of the Greeks from early on λέγειν means to talk, say, or tell? However, just as early and even more originally – and therefore already in the previously cited meaning—it means what our similarly sounding *legen* means: to lay down and lay before. In *legen* a "bringing together" prevails, the Latin *legere* understood as *lesen*, in the sense of collecting and bringing

⁵ M. Heidegger lectured on Heraclitus' fragments e.g. in 1943-44 and 1966-67. The findings on Heraclitus' *logos* were presented by him in Bremen on 4th of May 1951: *Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)* (1951) (Heidegger 2000b: 211-234), English translation in Heidegger (1995), Polish translation in Heidegger (1998).

together. Λέγειν properly means the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others. The middle voice, λέγεσθαι, means to lay oneself down in the gathering of rest; λέκτος is the resting place; λόγος is a place of ambush [or a place for lying in wait] where something is laid away and deposited. (The old word ἀλέγω) (ἀ *copulativum*), archaic after Aeschylus and Pindar, should be recalled here: something “lies upon me”, it oppresses and troubles me.) (Heidegger 1995: 60).

According to Heidegger, the primary meaning of λόγος is “gathering” as “laying one thing next to another, bringing them together as one” in contrast with the other (Heidegger 2000a: 131). He gives arguments that it is the authentic sense that had been used by Heraclitus. The question is how did the changes of senses occur and how “to lay” passed into “to say” and “to talk” (Heidegger 1995; Heidegger 2000a: 132).

Heidegger faults Christianity, mainly the early Church Fathers, for misinterpretation of Heraclitus’ philosophy. According to him, they wrongly assumed that he was a predecessor of teaching on the *logos* in New Testament, precisely in the prologue to St. John’s Gospel, where *logos* is Christ (Heidegger 2000a: 133). He states that λόγος does not mean here the same as in Heraclitus: “Being of beings, the gatheredness of that which contends, but *logos* means *one* particular being, namely the Son of God” (Heidegger 2000a: 143). What is more, another connotation that stems from the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, means: “an order, a commandment”, but also is used in meanings: κήρυξ ἄγγελος, “the messenger, the emissary who transmits commandments and orders” (Heidegger 2000a: 143). This doctrine was developed by the Jewish philosopher Philo where λόγος was the conception of God’s mind directed to the act of creation (Osmański 2001: 47).⁶ Thus λόγος mediates in the creation. In a similar way Christ as the mediator is λόγος-μεσίτης and λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ, “the announcement of the Cross” (Heidegger 2000a: 143) Heidegger argues for an insurmountable gulf between λόγος of Heraclitus and of the Bible.

In the following part of the article I analyse selected fragments of Heraclitus, in which there are verbal descriptions of λόγος.

⁶ For more on Philo’s conception of creation see the detailed analysis of M. Osmański in *Logos i stworzenie. Filozoficzna interpretacja traktatu De opificio mundi Filona z Aleksandrii*.

3. Does *λόγος* of Heraclitus comprise any hints on personalised description?

First and foremost, as Mrówka noticed, *λόγος* seems to be the most important term of Heraclitus. It occurs eleven times in fragments: B1, B2, B 31, B 39, B 45, B 50, B 72, B 87, B 108, B 115 (Mrówka 2004: 22).

All of Heraclitus' fragments that survived to our times start with a description of *λόγος* (B1) that evidently opened the book (Sextus, Aristotle). He apparently followed early prose authors' tradition, who used to start their treatises with a reference to *λόγος* in the meaning of discourse (Kahn 1979: 97).

B1 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἕντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόδε ἀπίροισιν εἰκόασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 132

The fragment has plenty of contradictory interpretations, but at the same time is thought as the most significant one. First, there is a syntactic problem as Aristotle noticed in *Rhetoric* (*Rhet.* 1407b 11), precisely because of the lack of punctuation the word αἰεὶ (“always, forever”) construes either with the preceding words (“this *logos* is forever”) or with the following (“men always fail to comprehend”) (Kahn 1979: 93; Kirk 1962: 34). The modern interpreters argued for the first as well as for the second option.⁷ Khan proposes to take the adverb both ways,⁸ on account of Heraclitus common method of ambiguity and puzzles that makes him resemble the enigmatic Delphic Oracle (Mrówka 2004: 20). Khan suggests two interpretations: (1) ἕντος αἰεὶ was the common Homeric phrase for the gods (“everlasting, live forever”) that is con-

⁷ The former construction has been defended by e.g. Gigon, Guthrie, Fränkel, West, the latter Reinhard, Snell, Kirk, Marcovich, Bollack, Wismann (listings e.g. Kahn 1979: 93; Kirk 1962: 34)

⁸ The same position is represented by e.g. Robinson, Narecki, Mrówka.

firmed by parallel structure in fragment B 30 of the description of another Heraclitus concept of the “Fire” (πῦρ αἰείζωον).⁹ (2) what he calls “veridical use of the verb, where ἐστι or ἔδῶν (Attic ὄν) means ‘is true, is so’: ὁ ἔδῶν λόγος will be ‘the true report’, ‘an account which states the facts’”, in this case the sentence is: “Although this logos is true, men are forever incapable of understanding it” (Kahn 1979: 93-94). It is important if one assumes that it was the intended effect of philosophical significance. It results in understanding Heraclitus’ λόγος as “the eternal structure of the world” that “manifests itself in discourse” (Kahn 1979: 94).

According to Kahn, this ambiguity suggests that Heraclitus’ λόγος is somehow different from usual the “report” of Ionian preambles (Kahn 1979: 97). That λόγος is something more than simply philosophical “discourse” or “report” (even if it is such at the same time). It is something universal, eternal, divine and creative: things occur in accordance with it (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε), it is “common” (κοινός)¹⁰ or “shared” (ξυνός) by all:

B2 τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ζῆνου ζῶουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.

Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 133

Another theme that is alluded to in fragment B1 is “hearing” and “comprehending” that recur many times in the subsequent passages.¹¹ Heraclitus complains about deafness and mindlessness of his audience, and what is more surprising, he expects that they ought to listen to him even before “they have heard [his] discourse”, understand it before the words are uttered. Therefore, by virtue of what was said, λόγος has to represent “a truth that was there all along: if like a Fire, it always was and is and will be” (B 30) (Kahn 1979: 98), eternal and universal truth.

⁹ B 30 κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰείζωον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. (Clem., *Strom.* V 14,104,2)

¹⁰ There is a question of the authenticity of previous fragment, mentioned by Sextus, if it is his gloss (Diels, Kranz): διὸ δεῖ ἔπεσθαι τῷ [ξυνῷ τουτέστι τῷ]: κοινῷ. ξυνὸς γὰρ ὀκοινός. (Mrówka 2004: 34).

¹¹ B 34, B 55, B 101a, B 107, B 19, B 108, B 50 etc. (Kahn 1979: 98).

In the next sentence, as Kahn points out, Heraclitus contrasts the everlasting law with the mankind's incompetent response to the appeal of the λόγος. The tension between two senses of λόγος (the actual words and rational content) is even heightened. The inexperience of men embraces not only Heraclitus' words (ἔπεα), but also facts (ἔργα) that he explains, although he distinguishes 'all according to its φύσις (κατὰ φύσιν διαίρεων ἕκαστον) and tells 'how it is' (ὅκως ἔχει) (B 1). The general condition of mankind is characterised as if they were sleepers, who could not grasp the λόγος – by this the author expresses “the idea of cognitive alienation” and ignorance (Kahn 1979: 99). This is also the way in which Heraclitus sets boundaries of his doctrine or the framework of its understanding. What is more, from the very beginning, as was mentioned above, he describes the crowd as ἀξύνετοι, what appeals to their *mindlessness*: (ἀ-) ξὺν νόῳ. As Narecki noticed, Heraclitus probably admitted a double etymology of the notion (Narecki 1999: 63). The first meaning of ξὺν νόῳ is “according to the mind”, and the second meaning of ξυνός is “together, in common, shared” (as B2) (Kahn 1979: 29). The universality of the λόγος is imperceptible because of people's ignorance, ἀξύνετοι, those who could not comprehend what was explained. The *mindlessness* of the crowd is a contrast to λόγος that is *mindful* (rational) and common (κοινός as Sextus Empiricus transmit).¹² Mankind as a whole and every individual person should participate in the λόγος, the primordial, common and rational reality. As a result is received the next meaning of λόγος connected with the Mind and intelligence. In this case the universality of knowledge is a contrast to private beliefs and opinions (B2: ἰδίων ἔχοντες φρόνησιν). Because of that, “common” (ξυνός) means not only that the λόγος is shared by everything, not only the *public* or the *community* in contrast to the private, but also a “common consent” and a “common cause”, in the meaning of agreement and alliance which combine differences in one (Kahn 1979: 101). That is connected somehow in Heraclitus with the wisdom of listeners, where “common” (ξυνός) could mean “understanding” or “intelligence”, like in fragment B50. The sense of “consensus” lurks behind the notion ὁμολεγεῖν. Khan notices also in fragment B114 the phonetic echo of ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντες

¹² See the footnote 9.

in phrase τῶι νόφ πάντων, where is explicated that “what is common” is a base for “speaking with understanding”, because this is like the one and divine nomos (ένος τοῦ θείου).¹³ The individual does not distribute the wisdom, because the individual is not in possession of it, what could seem strange for our individualistic way of thinking. The private φρόνησις of the men’s claim in fragment B2 (that means ‘thinking’, ‘intelligence’, ‘good sense’, ‘practical wisdom’) dissonances with λόγος, is opposed to him. It ought to be remembered that the “community” of the λόγος expresses a structure of all things and, as Kahn writes “is therefore a public possession in principle available to all men, since it is ‘given’ in the immanent structure of their shared experience” (Kahn 1979: 101). The λόγος unifies the rationality of men, signifies “the exercise of intelligence as such, the activity of νοῦς or φρόνησις”, “itself the reflection of underlying unity of all nature” (Kahn 1979: 102). Khan notices that the rationality of the λόγος could be expressed not only in speech, but also in thought and action – the ideas comprised in classic Greek poetry (e.g. in Herodotus). According to him, “the conception of λόγος as self-subsistent power or principle is foreign to the usage of Heraclitus” (Kahn 1979: 102). Nevertheless, the λόγος seems to be something more than it was in Herodotus and closer precisely to the Stoic conception (in defiance of what Kahn writes): more divine and rational, more a kind of principle.

In the last section I will examine Heraclitus’ fragment B50:

B 50 οὐκ ἔμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστὶν ἔν πάντα εἶναι.

Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX 9

Again in this fragment there occurs the metaphor of hearing, having heard and in result of what appears ὁμολογεῖν, consensus of thinking and saying in agreement about πάντα, all things that are One.¹⁴

¹³ B 14: ζῖν νόμωι λέοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρῆ τῶι ζῖνωι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολλῖσχυροτέρως, τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ένδὸς τοῦ θείου κατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον. ὀκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἔξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. (Stobaeus, *Flor.* III 1,179 [III 129 Hense)

¹⁴ ἔν πάντα εἶναι is correction of Miller, accepted by Bywatera and Dielsa. The codex of Parisinus notes: ἔν πάντα εἰδέναι. (Mrówka 2004: 159).

Heidegger writes: "Heraclitus here considers a hearing and a saying. He expresses what the λόγος says: ἐν πάντα, all is One". This fragment seems to correspond to what was said above. Kahn and Mrówka notice that it is very likely that with this fragment Heraclitus returns to the *logos* theme at the end of the introductory section, which creates "a kind of ring composition" (Kahn 1979: 130).

Kahn writes: "listening to the *logos* will imply the conception of the world order as a meaningful language which one hears with more or less comprehension" (Kahn 1979: 130). Heraclitus appears here as a prophet of the λόγος who tries to make this discourse distinguishable. When λόγος is identified with human speech, that means distance was removed (Mrówka 2004: 158). A man became a revelation place of the λόγος, a place of true wisdom. Reality, so also a being, discourse, intelligence become the λόγος. In this case individuality represents what was "universal" and "common", the discourse of every soul that identifies with the λόγος. Hence the following statement "all things are one", according to which is wise ὁμολεγεῖν or ὁμο-λέγειν in the etymological meaning of "speaking together with, saying the same thing" (Kahn 1979: 130) and then comprehending. Unity between the common and the private, the "fitting of the private to the public, the personal to universal" (Kahn 1979: 131) means wisdom, σοφόν. Does an individual lose its individuality in public? The language functions as a unifying element of the world's structure. An individuality must suit the structure of the world, to agree with its personal interests with the public, in the meaning of some ideal, σοφόν.

The following words: ἐν πάντα εἶναι are the first dogma of Heraclitus' ontology, in which the λόγος claims that it is the one that gathers in one all things (Mrówka 2004: 159). The tension between isolation and community is strengthened until it has been abolished. "This is the earliest extant statement of systematic monism, and probably the first such statement ever made in Greece" (Kahn 1979: 131).¹⁵ As Mrówka says, the condition for that was the negation of the self that the philosopher did at the beginning by the statement: οὐκ ἔμοῦ. This is as if

¹⁵ Kahn notices that the Milesians' theories „must have provided the background for Heraclitus' thesis" (Kahn 1979: 131), but they were not monists in a strict sense.

intuition of later mystical thought with the negation of self that leads to finding the self at a higher level (Mrówka 2004: 160).

CONCLUSIONS

The notion of the λόγος gradually evolved its meaning from distributive-rational to declarative-expressional – a change which was necessary for such a philosophical conception as Heraclitus', where the λόγος is more rational and more fundamental for the structure of the world. The λόγος identified with the word of a philosopher gathers in one the structure of the world. Simultaneously, the place where the λόγος reveals itself is philosophical discourse. Rationality and declaration are two sides of the same coin. Heraclitus' philosophical conception was interpreted as preceding New Testament's λόγος, though modern scholars try to cleanse it from later misunderstandings. However, understanding Heraclitus' λόγος as it was personal could not be correct.¹⁶ One of the reasons is that at this point in time the ancients had not created the personal concept of the λόγος which Christianity later provided (Heidegger 2000a). W. Jaeger argued that "all Heraclitus' remarks about man's relation to God seek assiduously to keep God free from any human features" (Jaeger 1947: 126). Nevertheless, verbal activities of the λόγος could imply some coincidences. Especially when Heraclitus used the λόγος for describing the identity of his voice with the truth. So, it is not without reason that the early Church Fathers connected the λόγος of Heraclitus with Christ of the New Testament.

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¹⁶ In analysis of B50 Mrówka referred to Markovich, whose interpretation he rejected as if "Logos seems to be *personalized* here". Markovich writes: "In accordance with this personification the verb ἀκούειν seems to have some metaphorical meaning here ('hear the Logos from things around us')" (Mrówka 2004: 158; Markovich 1967: 114).

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