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**DESCRIPTIVE CRITERIA OF NOMINAL
INFLECTIONAL CATEGORIES
IN ANCIENT GREEK GRAMMAR**

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SUMMARY: The present paper analyses the methodology adopted in the ancient Greek grammatical tradition to define and describe the nominal inflectional categories, *i.e.* gender, number, and case. The main source for the said analysis is the treatise *Tekhne grammatike* attributed to Dionysius Thrax, but references are also made to the works of Aristotle and some other authors. The research shows that semantic (functional) criteria played the principal part in describing the nominal inflectional categories, and especially that of the case. This does not mean, however, that the formal factor was completely absent: Aristotle's determination in searching for formal criteria of gender classes of nouns is noteworthy in this respect, as well as the attempt to associate the number category with some formal factors, evidenced in the *Tekhne*.

It is a well-known fact that one of the most essential achievements of the Greek grammatical tradition was the identification and classification of basic inflectional categories which include words inflected in the Greek language (and other Indo-European languages). It is also known that the systematics of inflectional categories created by the Greeks, despite their imperfections, had the greatest impact on modern grammatical theories. Until the end of the 19th century, the description of inflectional systems of languages, which were within European linguists' range of interest, was based almost exclusively on

theoretical concepts created by the Greeks. It was not until the emergence of structuralism in the 20th century that considerable modifications of this model of description were introduced. Even then, however, the terminological apparatus adopted from the Greeks was not rejected, but rather expanded, made more accurate, and adapted to the standards of modern science.

Modern structuralist linguistics identifies the phenomenon of inflection category as the basis of a systemic, formal and functional, opposition, whose subjects are word forms that represent the same lexeme. This perspective is associated with a postulate to include in the description of the inflectional mechanism the fundamental opposition of the function (semantic and/or syntactic) and form (exponent of a given function). Greek linguistics was primarily focused on the semantic aspects of described language facts and was quite successful in this field. Formal analysis, however, was undoubtedly its weak point. Yet, while describing specific phenomena associated with word inflection, a simple reference to the meaning often turns out to be impossible, or at least insufficient. In the present paper I put forward an analysis of a method of describing inflectional categories which was adopted in Greek grammatical theory. The selection of description criteria will be taken into consideration and the scope of analysis will be limited exclusively to nominal categories.

The treatise *Τέχνη γραμματική*, which is traditionally attributed to Dionysius Thrax,¹ will be the primary source for the said analysis, since this very text constitutes the final codification of Greek word grammar. But this treatise, as other grammatical texts, provides no general definition of inflection or inflectional category, as such. The specific inflectional categories were, however, described as particular ‘accidences’ (*παρεπόμενα*), which accompany specific word classes (parts of speech).² Nominal categories were described in the chapter dealing with the ‘name’ (*ὄνομα*), i.e. with a word class that includes

¹ Uhlig G. (ed.), 1883.

² It should be noted, however, that the status of ‘accidences’ (*παρεπόμενα*) is attributed not only to the inflectional categories, but also to the categories of word-formation, i.e. to the category of *εἶδος* (‘form’), which is based on the opposition between the primary form (*εἶδος προτότυπον*) and the derivative one (*εἶδος παράγωγον*), and to the category of *σχῆμα* (‘structure’) which is based on a tripartite opposition of

nouns, adjectives, numerals, and pronouns (except personal, possessive, and relative pronouns). Γένη, that is ‘genders’, were first singled out ‘accidences’ (παρεπόμενα) that characterize ὄνομα. They were described in the following way:

(D.T. 24, 8–25, 2): Γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσι τρία· ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν, οὐδέτερον.

ἔνιοι δὲ προστιθέασι τούτοις ἄλλα δύο, κοινόν τε καὶ ἐπίκοινον, κοινὸν μὲν οἶον

ἵππος κύον, ἐπίκοινον δὲ οἶον χελιδῶν ἀετός.

“There are three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter. Some add to these two other genders: the common and super-common; the common, as for example a *horse* or a *dog*, and the super-common, as a *swallow* or an *eagle*”.³

In the first part of the cited passage, three basic ‘noun genders’ (γένη ὀνομάτων), i.e. three values of the ‘gender’ (γένος) category, are distinguished, that is ‘masculine’ (ἀρσενικόν), ‘feminine’ (θηλυκόν) and ‘neuter’ (οὐδέτερον) genders. The specified ‘genders’ were not defined in any way. However, they are characterized in a certain way by the terminology used, which, as one may guess, refers to the natural gender, i.e. the sexes of the objects named. Thus, this category was assigned a specific semantic function. This, however, does not mean that the ‘gender’ (γένος) specified in the treatise should be interpreted as a category which remains in an exclusive and unequivocal relation to the natural gender (or its lack) of the objects named by nouns (ὀνόματα). In the text of the Τέχνη, the terms ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον generally identify values of ‘gender’ conceived as a strictly grammatical category.⁴ This is confirmed by the fact that in other sections the author lists such words as ἔλιξ ‘coil’ and λαίλαψ ‘storm’ (aside

non-complex structure (σχῆμα ἀπλοῦν), complex structure (σχῆμα σύνθετον) and the structure derivative from complex (σχῆμα παρασύνθετον).

³ If not stated otherwise, all source text citations were translated by the author.

⁴ Cf. Hilgard A. (ed.), 1901, pp. 18-22:

Τὰ γένη ἔξ ἀκριβείας κατὰ γραμματικούς οὐ λαμβάνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς συντάξεως καὶ τῆς συμφωνίας τῶν ἄρθρων συνταπτομένων διαφόροις τοῖς ὀνομασιν· ἐκεῖνο γάρ ἐστιν ἀρσενικόν, ᾧ συντάπτεται τὸ ὄρθρον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ θη

from Μοῦσα, Ἐλένη, Κλειώ, χελιδών, μήτηρ, Θέτις) as examples of feminine nouns (θηλυκῶν ὀνομάτων).⁵

Nevertheless, the procedure of linking the grammatical genders of names with natural genders of their *designata* was usual and deeply rooted in the Greek grammatical tradition. Evidence for this fact is provided not only by established terminology, but also by the second part of the cited passage, in which the author talks about ‘common’ (κοινόν) and ‘super-common’ (ἐπίκοινον) genders. In reality, these terms do not identify any other separate values of the gender category (other than ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον), but rather describe how this category functions in relation to nouns, whose *designata* are living creatures of both masculine and feminine sexes. Based on the included examples, it can be concluded that the term (γένος) κοινόν refers to a method of functioning of the gender category, in which its value depends on the sex of the object, which is identified by the given noun. As a result, a noun may have both masculine (in the case when its *designatum* has a masculine sex, e.g. ὁ ἵππος ‘stallion’, or ὁ κύων ‘dog’) and feminine gender (in the case when its *designatum* has a feminine sex, e.g. ἡ ἵππος ‘mare’, or ἡ κύων ‘bitch’).⁶ The term (γένος) ἐπίκοινον, in turn, characterizes a functioning of the gender category, in which its value is constant in reference to a given noun and is independent of the sex of this noun’s *designatum* (like ἡ χελιδών ‘swallow’- both male and female, or ὁ ἀετός ‘male eagle’/‘female eagle’).⁷ Thus, the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον characterize the category of ‘gender’ from the point of view of the relation existing between the gender values

λυκόν, ᾧ συντάπτεται τὸ ἦ, καὶ οὐδέτερον τὸ ἔχον τὸ τό. See also *ibid.* 361, 12; 524, 30 sqq.; 553, 4 sqq.

⁵ D.T. 15, 3 – 16, 1.

⁶ Cf. Schol. D.T. 218, 18-22: Κοινὸν μὲν ἐστὶ ὃ τὰς μὲν πτώσεις ἔχει τὰς ἀυτάς, ὑποτάσσεται δὲ ἄρθροις διαφόροις, ἵππος βοῦς λίθος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· λέγομεν οὖν ὃ ἵππος καὶ ἡ ἵππος, ὃ βοῦς καὶ ἡ βοῦς, ὃ λίθος καὶ ἡ λίθος, καὶ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πτώσεσιν ὁμοφωνοῦσι, μόνων τῶν ἄρθρων ἀλλασσομένων.

⁷ Cf. Schol. D.T. 218, 22-24: Ἐπίκοινον δὲ ἐστὶν ὃ διὰ μιᾶς λέξεως τὸ ἀρσενικὸν καὶ τὸ θηλυκόν

σημαίνει, τῷ ἐτέρῳ τῶν ἄρθρων προκατειλημμένον, ἥτοι ἀρσενικῷ ἢ θηλυκῷ.

adopted by some specific nouns and the sex of the objects identified by these nouns.

Therefore, the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινων designate concepts whose status differs from the concepts denoted with the terms ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον which essentially exhaust the characteristics of the oppositional structure of the gender category (cf.: Γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσι τρία). This differentiation is indicated by the fact that the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινων were not mentioned in one row with ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον, but separately, and were preceded by an expression of a certain reserve: ἔνιοι δὲ προστιθέασιν τούτοις ἄλλα δύο, which also reflects the notional distance that separates the *designata* of the terms listed in both rows. However, the very fact that the description of the gender category was complemented with γένος κοινόν and ἐπίκοινων confirms the above-mentioned notion of a relation existing between the grammatical genders of names and natural genders (sexes) of their *designata*. It is noteworthy that the cited passage from Τέχνη is not the first Greek attempt to capture and theoretically describe the grammatical category of gender. On the contrary, it seems that gender was the first category recognized by the Greeks among all categories included in the Greek inflectional system. According to Aristotle,⁸ the sophist Protagoras of Abdera (approx. 481-411 BC) “distinguished name genders” (τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει) dividing them into ‘masculine’ (ἄρρενα), ‘feminine’ (θήλεα), and ‘names of things’ (σκεύη). The adopted nomenclature suggests that the proposed division was based precisely on characteristics of the nouns’ *designata*. Additionally, this fact is also reflected by the sophist’s postulate to assign masculine gender to the (feminine) nouns μῆνις ‘wrath’ and πῆληξ ‘helmet’. This information was provided by Aristotle in his treatise “On Sophistical Refutations”.⁹ It is most probable that this postulate resulted from a conviction that things and features, which are naturally attributed to males, should have a masculine gender in their language representation.

However, apart from their mentioned semantic aspect, all these kinds of nouns, i.e. ‘masculine names’, ‘feminine names’ and ‘names

⁸ *Rhetorica* III, 5, 1407b 6.

⁹ *Sophistici elenchi* 14, 173b 17-25.

of things', were also associated with a specific formal shape. One can learn about this from a parodic fragment of Aristophanes' "Clouds" (verses 658-679). As is well known, the stage portrayal of Socrates represents not so much himself (i.e. the historical Socrates) as the common image of a sophist in this comedy. Because the opinions presented on the stage by this figure about the proper usage of language suit Protagoras' attitude towards linguistic issues very well, the majority of scholars associate them with just this sophist.¹⁰ In the above mentioned fragment of the comedy, Socrates first advises his interlocutor Strepsiadēs to call a rooster *ἀλεκτρυών*, and then a hen suggests the artificial word *ἀλεκτρύαινα*, which he created. In the latter part of the conversation, Socrates convinces Strepsiadēs that he should not use the form *ἡ κάρδοπος* for a wooden bowl, because this way he calls something feminine as if it were of the masculine gender (*τὴν κάρδοπον ἄρρενα καλεῖς θήλειαν οὔσαν*). Instead, he proposes a nonexistent noun, *ἡ καρδόπη*, as similar to the feminine name *ἡ Σωστράτη* ('Sostrata'). Thus, because there is no clear relation of the *designatum* of the word *ἡ κάρδοπος* with the natural gender, the formal aspect must have played the fundamental role in this case, that is, the association of the specific noun genders with particular articles, and with typical noun endings, which cooccur with those articles.

However, the co-occur a formentioned section 14, 173b 17-25 of Aristotle's "On Sophistical Refutations" points towards the association of individual gender values with yet another type of formal factor. In this passage, the Philosopher expresses his ironical attitude towards Protagoras who claimed that the nouns (of feminine gender) *μῆνις* ('wrath') and *πίληξ* ('helmet') are characterized by masculine gender, and that people who use the (feminine) adjectival form *οὐλομένη* instead of (masculine) *οὐλόμενος* in relation to the noun *μῆνις* commit solecism. This passage demonstrates that in the case of nouns the individual values of the gender category were also associated with specific formal variants of an (attributively used) adjective. In other words, the gender differentiation of nouns was shown here from the syntactic perspective, that is, from the perspective of syntactic congruence of nouns and adjectival forms:

¹⁰ See e.g. Murray G., 1948, p. 177; Levin S., 1983, p. 42.

Sophistici elenchi 14, 173b 17-25:

Σολοικισμὸς δ' οἶον μὲν ἐστὶν εἶρηται πρότερον. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πῆληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν κατ' ἐκείνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ σολοικίζει. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κἂν τέχνη τις τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν· διὸ πολλοὶ τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμόν φαίνονται συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις.

„We have said before¹¹ what kind of thing ‘solecism’ is. It is possible both to commit it, and to seem to do so without doing so, and to do so without seeming to do so. Suppose, as Protagoras used to say, that μῆνις (‘wrath’) and πῆληξ (‘helmet’) are masculine: according to him a man who calls wrath a ‘deconstructress’ (οὐλομένην) commits a solecism, though he does not seem to do so to other people, whereas he who calls it a ‘destructor’ (οὐλόμενον) commits no solecism though he seems to do so. It is clear, then, that any one could produce this effect by art as well: and for this reason many arguments seem to lead to solecism, which do not really do so, as happens in the case of refutations”.¹²

It is clear that the cited text demonstrates not only Protagoras’ opinion about word genders, but also that of Aristotle. From the above quotation one can infer that the Philosopher was convinced about the lack of clear correlation (which was advertised by Protagoras) between the grammatical gender of nouns and their semantic characteristics. This opposition to Protagoras’ concept of gender, which was based on the semantic criterion, prompted Aristotle to search for other determinants of this category. The following fragment of the *Poetics* demonstrates that he found them primarily in the formal shape of noun endings (in nominative singular):

Poetica 21, 1458a 9-17:

¹¹ I.e. in chapter 3.

¹² Translation by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in: Ross W. D., 1928.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ δὲ μ
εταξύ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ <καὶ Σ>, καὶ ὅσ
α ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ

δύο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἷς τε τὰ ἀ
ἰ μακρά, ὄϊον εἰς Η καὶ

Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει πλήθ
η εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα· τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ <τῷ Σ>
ταῦτά ἐστιν. Εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα

τελευτᾷ, οὐδὲ εἰς φωνήεν βραχύ. Εἰς δὲ τὸ Ι τρία μόνα, μέλι
κόμμι πέπερι. Εἰς δὲ

τὸ Υ πέντε. Τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν καὶ Σ.

„Among nouns, some are masculine, others feminine, and still oth
ers neuter. The masculine nouns are those that end in ‘n’, ‘r’, ‘s’ and
two clusters with ‘s’, i.e. ‘ps’ and ‘ks’. The feminine nouns are those
that end in one of the long vowels, such as: ‘e’, ‘o’ (eta and omega)
and with an extended ‘a’ (alfa). Thus, the number of sounds, in which
feminine and masculine nouns end, is the same, because in endings
‘ps’ and ‘ks’ the last sound is ‘s’. No nouns, however, end with a silent
sound or short vowel. There are only three nouns that end in ‘i’: μέλι
(‘honey’), κόμμι (‘rubber’), πέπερι (‘peper’); five end in ‘y’. The
neuter gender nouns end in precisely these vowels and also in ‘n’ and
‘s’”.

The rules of gender classification of nouns that were formulated in
the *Poetics* obviously cannot be considered correct, because the word-
ending criterion adopted in that work is not appropriate to identify the
grammatical gender of nouns in the Greek language. Essentially, the
grammatical gender category of Greek nouns, which is a lexically de-
termined property and has a classificatory (selective) character, is based
on the differences between individual nouns occurring in their syntac-
tic congruity with specific inflectional forms of adjectives, for which
this category has an inflectional and syntactically dependent character.
Thus, gender serves a purely syntactic function in the Greek language.
It constitutes one of the co-exponents of the syntactic attributive con-
gruence, and the value index of the noun gender category is located
in the syntactically subordinate element (adjective). Even though the

formal shape of the noun ending, as mentioned by Aristotle, is not the clear determinant or exponent of the value of the gender category, the reference to this criterion seems, at least partially, justified because of the evident (especially within declension I and II) correlation (still not exact correspondence) between the noun ending and the noun gender. Additionally, the very fact that Aristotle terminated the gender classification of nouns from the semantic criterion and made an attempt to found this classification on a purely formal criterion, deserves to be appreciated, even though his attempt proved not fully successful and consistent.¹³

It is also noteworthy that Aristotle, despite having adopted a purely formal criterion for the gender classification of nouns, preserved Protagoras' terminology in reference to the nouns of the first two gender classes, i.e. masculine (ἄρρενα) and feminine (θήλεα). However, in relation to the third class, the Philosopher used the term μεταξύ (literally 'between'), thereby replacing Protagoras' term σκεύη ('names of things'). The reasons for which Aristotle decided to introduce the term μεταξύ in place of Protagoras' σκεύη can be seen in the following fragment of *On Sophistical Refutations*. In this passage, the Philosopher addressed the problem once more, this time in the context of false conclusions from apparent solecisms:

Sophistici Elenchi 14, 173b 31 – 174a 5

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θήλεος διαφέρουσιν αἱ πτώσεις ἅπασαι, τοῦ δὲ

μεταξύ αἱ μὲν αἱ δ' οὐ. Δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο, συλλογίζονται ὡς εἰρημένου

τούτων·· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην πῶσιν ἀντ' ἄλλης. Ὁ δὲ παραλογισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τὸ

κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλειόνων πτώσεων· τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο σημαίνει ὅτε μὲν οὗτος ὅτε

¹³ In this context, it should be pointed out that Aristotle in *Sophistici elenchi* 14, 173b 17-25 protests against ascribing masculine gender to the nouns μῆνις ('wrath') and πῆλιξ ('helmet') even though they end in Σ thus satisfying the criterion of the masculine nouns defined in *Poetics* 21, 1458a 9-17. Thereby, he confirms that these nouns belong to the feminine noun class, despite the fact that they do not "end in one of the long vowels".

δὲ τοῦτον. Δεῖ δ' ἐναλλάξ σημαίνειν, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ ἔστι τὸ οὔτος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτον, οἷον »ἔστι Κορίσκος«, »εἶναι Κορίσκον«. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων

ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλήσιν.

Ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾶ, ταῦτα μόνον σκεύους ἔχει κλήσιν, οἷον ξύλον,

σχοινίον, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, οἷον

ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοῦνομα, κλίνη δὲ θήλυ. Διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ

ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι διοίσει.

„All cases of masculine and feminine [words] differ from each other, but regarding the [cases of] a neuter gender [word], some differ from each other and some do not. If, for example, we are given τοῦτο, it is often treated as if one said τοῦτον (*scil. accusativus*); and this is similar with other cases which are mistaken for one another. Thus, one makes a false conclusion because τοῦτο is common for more cases: τοῦτο sometimes has the meaning of οὔτος (i.e. has the value of the nominative), and other times has a meaning of τοῦτον (i.e. has the value of the accusative). Therefore, it must be assumed that it has alternate meanings: in connection with ἔστι, it has a meaning of οὔτος (i.e. occurs in the nominative), whereas in connection with εἶναι, it has a meaning of τοῦτον (i.e. occurs in the accusative), as for example [the word Κορίσκος in expressions] »ἔστι Κορίσκος« (»[this] is Koriskos« – *nominativus*) and »εἶναι Κορίσκον« (»[I say that this] is Koriskos« – *accusativus* as part of the syntactic structure of *acc. cum inf.*). This also happens in the case of feminine gender nouns, and in the case of the so-called ‘names of things’ that have the form of a name of a female or a male creature. For only those that end with ο and ν, have the form of a name of a thing, for instance ξύλον (‘wood’), σχοινίον (‘rope’); those, however, that do not end in this way have the form of a masculine or feminine noun. Nevertheless, some of them are counted among the names of things, for example the word ἀσκός (‘goatskin’), which is a masculine noun, or κλίνη (‘bed’), which is a feminine noun. For that

reason, these nouns also differ depending on whether they occur in connection with ἔστί or εἶναι”.

In the first part of the cited argument, Aristotle points out that – in contrast to the words of masculine and feminine gender – not all case forms of the neuter gender words formally differ from each other. As a result, one form is taken for an other (homonymic), and, due to this, false conclusions arise. However, it should be stated that the very concept of an inflectional form (as such) was not identified by Aristotle in an exact way, that is, this concept was not correlated with an adequate technical term. The Philosopher uses an ambiguous term, πτώσις, which may designate many different functional variances of words. However, in this case, the context and the attached exemplification remove any doubts and clarify that Aristotle is talking about inflectional variants based on the case category. When he writes that the neuter pronoun τοῦτο in connection with ἔστί has the meaning of οὗτος, while in connection with εἶναι that of τοῦτον, this means that in the context of ἔστί the pronoun possesses a value of a nominative, and in the context of εἶναι (i.e. within the syntactic structure of *accusativus cum infinitivo*) has a value of an accusative. Because of the lack of appropriate terminology, the usage of non-homonymous forms of the nominative and accusative (masculine) pronoun οὗτος was the only linguistic means available to Aristotle to refer to these values of the case category. In order to prove the fact that the pronoun τοῦτο, which occurs in both contexts, does not represent the same πτώσις (case), the Philosopher points to the (masculine) noun Κορίσκος, which in each context acquires a different form, i.e. ἔστί Κορίσκος, but εἶναι Κορίσκον. This formal difference (Κορίσκος vs. Κορίσκον) is to prove *per analogiam* that the pronoun τοῦτο also does not represent the same case when used in both contexts. This way Aristotle recognized the phenomenon of syncretism (homonymy) of particular case forms (πτώσεις) of the pronoun τοῦτο, and correctly associated this phenomenon with the neuter gender (μεταξύ).

In the second section of the discussed passage, Aristotle makes a more general attempt to determine the relationship between the division of nouns into gender classes on the one hand, and the formal and

semantic properties of nouns and characteristics of their inflectional case forms (ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ) on the other. Here, the Philosopher directly refers to the gender classification that was introduced by Protagoras and points out the inapplicability of the classification's criterion, which is reflected in the adopted nomenclature. What he meant was that the Protagorean word division into 'masculine', 'feminine', and 'names of things', which was based on the semantic criterion, does not take into account strictly linguistic properties of the respective words. Aristotle points out that the nouns classified as σκεύη ('names of things') based on this criterion do not constitute a uniform group from the point of view of their linguistic properties, because some of them, in connection with ἔστι and εἶναι (i.e. in the nominative and accusative), are represented not by homonymic, but rather by non-homonymic word forms (ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ), i.e. forms that differ in their phonetic shape. Yet, he identified this property as characteristic for masculine (such as Κορίσκος) and feminine nouns. Thus, he identifies the group of nouns that signify things in a way that clearly suggests a departure from Protagoras' systematics, describing them as "so-called 'names of things'" (τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν). For his part, Aristotle characterizes them as „having the form of a name of a female or a male creature" (ἔχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλήσιν) and contraposes them to those nouns that "have the form of a name of a thing" (σκεύους ἔχει κλήσιν) and are characterized by the homonymy of their ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, i.e. to actual grammatical neuters.

The division of names of things into those "having the form of a name of a female or a male creature" and those "having the form of a name of a thing" proves that Aristotle was aware that noun semantics (i.e. the specificity of their *designata*) is not the criterion that determines their strictly linguistic (grammatical) properties. In this respect, Aristotle's claim that the property in which the form (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) of a noun is different depending on whether it occurs in connection with ἔστι or with εἶναι, refers not only to the strictly masculine (e.g. Κορίσκος) and feminine nouns, but also to the "so-called names of things" that have the form of a masculine or feminine name (...οἷόν "ἔστι Κορίσκος", "εἶναι Κορίσκον". Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος

κλησιν), is particularly important. As an example of the “so-called names of a thing” nouns, which have the form of a masculine and feminine noun (τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλησιν), Aristotle mentions ἄσκός ‘goatskin’ and κλίνη ‘bed’. In reference to these names, he once again emphasizes that, as in the case of Κορίσκος, their πτώσεις will formally differ depending on whether they occur in connection with ἔστι or with εἶναι, i.e. in nominative and accusative, respectively (διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι διοίσει). Distinguishing the „names of things” (σκεύη) based on a semantic criterion and contraposing them with masculine and feminine nouns (ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα) was thus presented as irrelevant from the point of view of strictly linguistic properties of all nouns. Instead, homonymy of certain case forms (πτώσεις) was (implicitly) pointed out as a distinctive feature that characterizes nouns that are different than masculine and feminine nouns (and different than “so-called names of things, which have a masculine or a feminine noun form”). As mentioned before, the nouns that are characterized by this homonymy were described by Aristotle as “having the form of a name of a thing” (σκεύους ἔχει κλησιν). Their examples are: ξύλον ‘wood’ and σχοινίου ‘rope’. Clearly Aristotle attempted to point out certain intra-linguistic and non-semantic properties of nouns other than masculine and feminine. And the fact that he favored a more neutral term μεταξύ for naming this third noun-class, instead of the confusing and inadequate σκεῦος, is yet another characteristic manifestation of his refusal to accept the then-present systematics based on semantic criteria. However, as mentioned before, he did not oppose calling the nouns of the two remaining classes masculine and feminine.¹⁴

Thus, we may conclude that Aristotle correctly identified the grammatical neuters invoking the formal criterion consisting in the homonymy of their nominative and accusative forms. Of course, that does not mean that Aristotle solved all problems related to the grammatical gender of nouns. It is obvious that, although the formal property pointed out by Aristotle is sufficient for a correct discrimination of nouns of neuter gender, it does not enable the distinction between masculine and feminine nouns. However, one should bear in mind that the discussed

¹⁴ Cf. Robins R. H., 1951, pp. 22-23.

passage treats the problem of word genders exclusively in connection with the question of the apparent solecisms, which is the principal subject of this fragment of Aristotle's disquisition. In this context, pointing out the homonymy and connecting it to the specific gender class of nouns is quite legitimate and appropriate. The fact that Aristotle did not restrict himself to defining the syncretism of πτώσεις as a distinctive property of neuter gender nouns, but in addition invoked the phonetic shape of these nouns (ὄσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾶ, ταῦτα μόνα σκεύους ἔχει κλήσιν, οἶον ξύλον, σχοινίου, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος), is, however, a certain drawback of his argument. As previously mentioned, the form of the word ending does not determine the gender of a Greek noun. Furthermore, the rule presented in this passage not only does not include all Greek neutral nouns, but also excludes some of those that were listed in the systematics put forward in the above cited fragment of the *Poetics*. The nouns that end in -ον, which are mentioned here by Aristotle (i.e. ξύλον and σχοινίου), do belong to the class of neuter gender nouns, but by no means exhaust the list of nouns belonging to this class.

Returning to the characteristics of gender found in the treatise Τέχνη γραμματική, we notice that the information referring to this category draws to a large extent on a tradition (of describing this category) that was formed earlier. The terms ἀρσενικόν and θηλυκόν, which name masculine and feminine genders, constitute variants of Protagoraen and the Aristotelian ἄρρεν and θῆλυ. Only the term οὐδέτερον, describing the neuter gender, is an innovation that replaces the Protagorean σκεῦος and the Aristotelian μεταξύ. Associating this category with the natural gender is, in addition to nomenclature, another element of the inherited tradition. It is reflected by both the adopted terminology and the concepts of (γένος) κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον. In spite of Aristotle's attempts to break away from practice of associating the gender category with semantics, no tradition was developed to apply formal criteria to describe this category. Similarly, the difference of how this category functions in relation to nouns and adjectives was not taken into account. This fact is undoubtedly related to the lack of a terminological and notional distinction between nouns and adjectives which hinders the entire Greek grammatical theory.

Neither do we find any changes in the method of treatment of the gender category in the grammatical treatises of Apollonius Dyscolus. This author also distinguishes γένος ('gender') ἀρσενικόν ('masculine'),¹⁵ θηλυκόν ('feminine')¹⁶ and οὐδέτερον ('neuter') and interprets the meaning of the name of the latter as a "negation of the two previous ones" (i.e. masculine and feminine: τὸ τούτων ἀποφατικόν).¹⁷ The term κοινόν 'common' also appears in Apollonius' work, but it no longer refers directly to a gender as such, as in the Τέχνη, but rather to a specific type of nouns, which – depending on the natural sex of their *designata* – may be characterized by both masculine or feminine grammatical genders: τὰ [...] κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἐν γένει, λέγω ἐπὶ τῶν προσηγορικῶν [...], ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππος ἢ ἄνθρωπος - ,, the so-called common in gender - I mean common [names] [...], as in the case of the words: ἵππος 'horse' and ἄνθρωπος 'human being'".¹⁸ Hence, this is no longer κοινὸν γένος, but κοινὰπροσηγορικὰ (δνόματα). The term ἐπίκοινον was not used by Apollonius. However, he used the expression τὸ γένος ἐπικοινεῖ when writing about the fact that some nouns, while having a specific (constant) value of the grammatical gender category, may refer to both male and female *designata*, as opposed to articles, which do not possess this property.¹⁹

Numbers (ἀριθμοί) constitute the second inflectional category (παρεπόμενον) that is ascribed to 'name' in the Τέχνη. Their characteristics are presented in the following way:

(D.T.30,5–31,4): Ἀριθμοὶ τρεῖς· ἐνικός, δυϊκός, πληθυντικός· ἐνικός μὲν ὁ Ὅμηρος, δυϊκός δὲ τὸ Ὀμήρω, πληθυντικός δὲ οἱ Ὀμηροί. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες ἐνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, οἷον δῆμος χορός ὄχλος· καὶ πληθυντικοὶ κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν, ἐνικῶν μὲν ὡς Ἀθηναὶ Θῆβαι, δυϊκῶν δὲ ὡς ἀμφοτέροι.

¹⁵ E.g. Uhlig G. (ed.), 1910, (= *Synt.*) I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4); 137 (113, 1).

¹⁶ E.g. *Synt.* I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4).

¹⁷ E.g. *Synt.* I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4).

¹⁸ *Synt.* II, 26 (146, 1-3).

¹⁹ Cf. *Synt.* I, 88 (75, 13-14): τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὀνόμασιν ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ τὸ γένος ἐπικοινεῖ, οὐ μὴν τοῖς ἄρθροις. See also Adv. 201, 12.

“There are three numbers: singular, dual, plural; singular: *Homer*, dual: *two Homers*, and plural: *Homers*. However, there are certain singular forms that are also used in reference to multiple [objects], for example, *people*, *choir*, *crowd*, and plural forms that are used in reference to singular or dual [objects]; the example for singular could be *Athens* or *Thebes* and *both* is an example of dual.

In this passage, the author identifies and gives examples of three numbers, that is, ‘singular’ (ἐνικός), ‘dual’ (δυϊκός) and ‘plural’ (πληθυντικός), which are identifiable with the three values of the grammatical (inflectional) category of number. Although the distinguished ‘numbers’ are not defined in any way, it is easy to determine that some semantic function is attributed here to the specified individual ‘numbers’. Apart from the terminology itself, this attribution can be clearly identified in the second section of the cited passage, in which the author points out certain disproportions that occur between the suggested semantic functions of the individual ‘numbers’ and the number-related semantic aspect of certain words that are characterized by these ‘numbers’. The fact that the author highlights these disproportions also proves that he binds the specific values of the number category with certain formal factors, which constitute one of the subjects that co-form these disproportions. Regarding this question, the expressions ἐνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, and πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτῆρες] κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν [λεγόμενοι] are especially noteworthy, since these expressions present an extremely interesting terminological and notional distinction between words treated as formal structures that are associated with specific values of the number category (ἐνικοὶ / πληθυντικοὶ χαρακτῆρες) and the functional range of these words (κατὰ πολλῶν / κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν λεγόμενοι), that is, between formal properties of a word and its functional characteristics. Of course, this distinction was made from the perspective of the perceived inconsistency which occurs between the two confronted elements, that is between the word form, associated with the given ‘number’, and its

“systemic” meaning on the one hand, and the “real” meaning of the word on the other.²⁰

At this point, one may recall the above-cited passage from *Sophistici Elenchi* (i.e. 14, 173b 31 – 174a 5), in which Aristotle, while describing masculine and feminine nouns that do not denote either male or female creatures but things, wrote that they “have the form of a name of a female or a male creature” and added that “some of them, though, are counted among the names of things, for example the word ἀσκός (‘goatskin’), which is a masculine noun, or κλίνη (‘bed’), which is a feminine noun” (ἔχει κλήσιν [...] ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἕνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, οἷον ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοῦνομα, κλίνη δὲ θήλυ). Thus, the Aristotelian phrase κλήσις ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος has a relatively close (*mutatis mutandis*) parallel in the expression ἐνικὸς/πληθυντικὸς χαρακτήρ in the Τέχνη. Both terms, κλήσις and χαρακτήρ, demonstrate that the specific values of grammatical categories were associated not only with a specific meaning, but also with some formal properties. It seems, however, that Aristotle did not discuss the formal aspect of the number category and made only one reference to it (*Poetica* 20, 1457a 18–23) as to one of the πτώσεις (ὀνόματος) based on the semantic criterion (ἢ δὲ [πτώσις] κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος).

It is also notable that there exists an essential difference between the toponymic *pluralia tantum* words Ἀθῆναι and Θῆβαι, which exemplify the πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτήρες] κατὰ ἐνικῶν [λεγόμενοι], and the words δῆμος, χορός, which illustrate ἐνικὸι χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι in the Τέχνη. Although the words δῆμος, χορός in the singular denote a specific plurality, it is also possible to use them in the plural (δῆμοι ‘peoples’, χοροὶ ‘choirs’, ὄχλοι ‘crowds’). Similarly, the word that exemplifies πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτήρες] κατὰ δυϊκῶν [λεγόμενοι], i.e. ἀμφοτέροι, can be used also in the dual (ἀμφοτέρω) or even the singular (ἀμφοτέρος ‘each of two’). It seems possible that the connective καί used in the phrase identifying

²⁰ See also Schol. D.T. 545, 7-9: Ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ χαρακτήρ λέξεως δυνάμενος διάκρισιν ποσοῦ ἀναδέξασθαι, ἢ χαρακτήρ σημαίνων ἴσότητά κατὰ ἀκοιουθίας Ibid. 21-22: ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ φωναὶ ἐναντία τοῖς σημαυόμενοις· τοῦ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ μὲν τύπος ἐνικός, τὸ δὲ σημαυόμενον πληθυντικόν.

ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες should be interpreted as reflecting just these differences that exist between the words exemplifying the very ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι and the *pluralia tantum* words exemplifying the πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτήρες] κατὰ ἐνικῶν [λεγόμενοι]. However, a clear identification of the meaning of this connective appears difficult. On the one hand, the expression: εἰσὶ δέ τινες ἐνικοί χαρακτήρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι can be understood as “there exist certain forms in the singular that also (= apart from singularity) express plurality”. Invoking the language of examples, this would mean that, for instance, the word δῆμος (‘people’), as opposed to the form δῆμοι (‘peoples’), expresses singularity, but treated as such (i.e. *in abstracto*), expresses (also) plurality (multiplicity). Thus, we would deal with a certain „relative plurality” denoted by such words as δῆμος, χορός and ὄχλος, whereas the connective καί would suggest the possibility of expressing plurality also by plural forms of these words. On the other hand, the analyzed expression can also be understood as “there exist certain forms in singular that also (= as plural forms do) express plurality”. Thus, it would mean that certain words (in the singular), for example δῆμος (‘people’), also (= like plural forms) express plurality, that is, they have the same meaning as plural forms. In this case, forms like δῆμος, χορός and ὄχλος would be attributed with *sui generis* “absolute plurality”, fully comparable with plurality expressed by words that occur in the grammatical plural. And this “absolute plurality” would be an exact equivalent of an “absolute singularity” that is expressed by words like Ἀθῆναι and Θῆβαι. Regardless of the adopted interpretation, it can be said that the analyzed passage demonstrates a perceived contradiction between the semantic function explicitly connected with particular values of the number category, and the formal shape of the word implicitly associated with these values.

Πτώσεις, i.e. ‘cases’, are the last inflectional category, which the Τέχνη ascribes to ὄνομα. They were presented in the following way:

(D.T. 31, 5 – 31, 1): Πτώσεις ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ πέντε· ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, κλητική. Λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ὀρθή ὀνομαστική καὶ εὐθεία, ἡ δὲ γενική κτητική τε καὶ πατρική, ἡ δὲ δοτική

ἡ ἐπισταλτική, ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ † κατ' αἰτιατικὴν, ἡ δὲ κλητικὴ πρῶσαγορευτικὴ.

“There are five cases: ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατικὴ, κλητικὴ. The case ὀρθή is also called ὀνομαστικὴ and εὐθεία; the case γενική [is also called] κτητικὴ and πατρικὴ; the case δοτικὴ [is also called] ἐπισταλτικὴ; the case αἰτιατικὴ † according to αἰτιατικὴ, and κλητικὴ [is also called] πρῶσαγορευτικὴ”.

Even though the listed and named πτώσεις were not either defined or exemplified, it cannot be doubted that the author talks about the grammatical cases. This results not only from the entire latter tradition, which unequivocally identified the specified πτώσεις with grammatical cases, but also from the fact that the status of πτώσεις as inflectional cases corresponds to the status of other παρεπόμενα ὀνόματος, which identify other morphological and semantic properties of words belonging to this class, the remaining inflectional properties, i.e. genders (γέννη) and numbers (ἀριθμοί), among them. In addition, πτώσεις are also ascribed – as one of παρεπόμενα – to words that belong to the class of ἄρθρον (articles and relative pronouns) and ἀντωνυμία (personal and possessive pronouns), and the presented exemplification clearly proves their identity with grammatical cases.²¹

Because of the absence of descriptive characteristics in the Τέχνη, the only information regarding the identification criteria for this category can be obtained from the applied nomenclature. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the term πτώσις, which denotes the case category as such, has functioned in Greek linguistics for an extended period of time. This term was a specific *terminus technicus* in the frame of the conceptual and terminological system of both Aristotle and the Stoics. However, this does not mean that the mentioned representatives of philosophical schools used the term in the sense that strictly corresponded to the grammatical category of the case.

In Aristotle's works, the notion, which is denoted with the term πτώσις, is associated with the formal and functional variance of words that extends not only beyond the scope of declension, but also beyond the scope of inflection at large. It seems that the Aristotelian

²¹ See D.T. 62, 1 and 5; 64, 2; 67, 3-6.

term πτώσις (ὀνόματος and ῥήματος) designates the notion of a word form, which is perceived as a textual secondary representative of a noun or verb lexeme, and remains in opposition to its primary representative, which is denoted by the term ὄνομα or ῥήμα (respectively).²² However, the basis for the dichotomies ὄνομα – πτώσεις ὀνόματος and ῥήμα – πτώσεις ῥήματος is not strictly grammatical but logical and semantic, which is a result of the association of lexemes of both classes, i.e. nouns and verbs, with specific logical functions, i.e. the function of a predication subject exponent, and the function of a predication exponent, respectively. In the frame of the opposition ὄνομα – πτώσεις ὀνόματος, which is more essential from the point of view of the analyzed problems, the ὄνομα should be identified with word forms that function as exponents of a predication subject. The πτώσεις ὀνόματος, in turn, are to be identified with name forms perceived as predicate co-exponents. However, in Aristotle's works, not only the noun forms in oblique cases (which are morphologically determined to constitute the predicate co-exponent as complements of the verb predicate), but also nouns in the nominative case (when used in a sentence as predicatives)²³ and derivative (mainly adjectival and adverbial) formations,²⁴ have the status of πτώσεις ὀνόματος. Thus, it would be wrong to equate the Aristotelian concept of πτώσις (ὀνόματος) with a grammatical (oblique) case, because it was distinguished mainly on the basis of a logical – not grammatical – criterion, and its linguistic actualizations are constituted by word forms, which – from the grammatical point of view – remain not only in an inflectional, but also in derivational and syntactic opposition with each other.²⁵ The establishment of the noun πτώσις – a derivative of the verb πίπτειν 'to fall' – as a technical term denoting this concept presumably originated

²² Cf. e.g. *De interpretatione* 2, 16a 32 – 16b 5; 3, 16b 16-18; *Poetica* 20, 1457a 18-23.

²³ Cf. *Analytica priora* I, 36, 48b 39 – 49a 5.

²⁴ Cf. e.g. *Categoriae* I, 1a 11-15; *Topica* I, 15, 106b 29-107a 2; II, 9, 114a 26-114b 8; *Rhetorica* II, 23, 1397a 20-23

²⁵ On πτώσις in Aristotle see *inter alia*: Belardi W., 1985; D'Avino R., 1975; Delamarre A. J.-L., 1980; Gallavotti C., 1986; Koller H., 1958; Montanari E., 1988, pp. 161-177, 216-236; Pagliaro A., 1955; Primavesi O., 1994; Thorp J., 1989.

in a metaphorical meaning of the “falling off” or “moving away” of a word from its primary, formal and functional, status.

Also, in the Stoic dialectics, although the term *πτῶσις* was no longer used with reference to verbal inflectional variants, it still did not denote the grammatical case, but rather the meaning of a noun (*ὄνομα*) viewed as an argument of the predicate (*κατηγορήμα*). This results from the fact that the concept, which is denoted by the term *πτῶσις*, belongs to that part of Stoic dialectics that deals with what is meant (signified) by language (*τόπος περὶ τῶν σημαينوμένων*) and is always related to the predicate (*κατηγορήμα*), that is, to what is meant by a verb, with which it constitutes a proposition (*ἄξιωμα*) or other complete expressional content (*λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές*). Because of the hierarchical differentiation of the logical status of arguments implied by predicates, the Stoic philosophers also introduced the notion of a ‘primary argument’ or ‘subject argument’ of the predicate (*ὀρθὴ πτῶσις*) and the notion of ‘secondary arguments’ or ‘non-subject arguments’ (*πλάγιοι πτώσεις*).²⁶ It should be emphasized, however, that the opposition *ὀρθὴ πτῶσις* – *πλάγιοι πτώσεις* is not tantamount to the opposition *nominative form* – *oblique cases forms* (seen as an opposition based on a formal differentiation of the noun-forms acting as exponents of the first- and second-type arguments), since the primary argument (i.e. *ὀρθὴ πτῶσις*) can be designated not only by nouns in the nominative form (like *Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ* ‘Socrates walks’), but also by noun-forms in the oblique cases, for example, *Σωκράτει μεταμέλει*, ‘it is a regret for Socrates’. Regarding the terms *γενικὴ*, *δοτικὴ*, *αἰτιατικὴ* (*πτῶσις*), which occur in Diogenes Laertius’ treatise,²⁷ it should be stressed that we cannot be certain whether these terms functioned at all in Stoic dialectics.²⁸ If, however, these terms did constitute part of Stoic nomenclature, they most probably referred to the diversity of the logical status of non-subject arguments (*πλάγιοι πτώσεις*) within a proposition; consequently, their relation to the inflectional properties (i.e. cases) of nouns that designate these arguments could have been only indirect and equivocal and therefore

²⁶ Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII, 43-44; 63-64. See also Frede M., 1978, p. 31; Frede M., 1994, pp. 13-24; Long A. A., 1971, pp. 105-106.

²⁷ VII, 65.

²⁸ See e.g. De Mauro T., 1965, p. 176, footnote 33.

must remain in the sphere of hypotheses or speculations which are difficult to prove.

In effect, the term ΠΤΩΣΙΣ did not identify a strict grammatical case category in the philosophical systems that predated the grammatical tradition. Moreover, we cannot ascertain who introduced the very concept of cases as strictly inflectional word variants into Greek science and assigned them the names that are listed in the Τέχνη. There is no doubt that the grammatical theory conceived in the circle of Alexandrian philology and reflected in the Τέχνη was shaped through the merging of influences of the Peripatetic and Stoic schools, and constituted to a large extent the result of adaptation and modification of the linguistic, conceptual and terminological, systems of both schools. Even though the term ΠΤΩΣΙΣ, and the terms ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, acquired the status of names of grammatical cases (*sensu stricto*) only in the Alexandrian circle, i.e. at the end of the 3rd or in the first half of the 2nd centuries BC, the Alexandrian mode of perception of this phenomenon, which is reflected in the adopted terminology, draws on some characteristics of the earlier philosophical way of viewing this phenomenon.

The characteristic feature of the nomenclature presented in the Τέχνη is the fact that it captures individual cases in their functional aspect, and identifies them with specific semantic functions. Besides, a certain kind of division of case names into primary or proper (πτώσεις ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ πέντε· ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, κλητική) and secondary (additional), which are shown as alternative to the earlier ones (λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ ὀνομαστικὴ καὶ εὐθεία, ἡ δὲ γενικὴ κτητικὴ τε καὶ πατρικὴ etc.), is quite clearly noticeable in these systematics. It seems that these primary names, and the implied functional characteristic of their *designata*, for the most part constitute a reflection of the earlier, mainly Stoic, philosophical tradition. The majority of secondary names, in turn, seem to have originated in certain innovations in the circle of philologists and grammarians. These innovations were probably the result of specific re-interpretations – which were carried out in these circles – of functional characteristics of the individual cases.

Thus, the term (πτῶσις) ὀρθή was attributed to the first case (i.e. the nominative) as its primary name. This term certainly is connected with the homonymic Stoic concept of ὀρθή πτώσις, that is, with the concept of the meaning of a noun, which constitutes the subject of predication within a proposition. Therefore, it can be said that the establishment of this term as a first case name resulted from 1) the general identification (carried out in the circle of Alexandrian grammarians) of the Stoic term πτώσις, designating the noun meaning as a predicate argument, with the noun form constituting the exponent of this argument, and 2) the fact that the exponent of the subject argument is, most frequently, the nominative form. The secondary term (πτῶσις) ὀνομαστική, in turn, reflects, as one may guess, the general sense of language users that the nominative form of a noun is the natural form for the name of a specific *designatum*; in other words, it reflects the conviction that the natural answer to a question of how something or somebody is called will not, for example, be forms Πλάτωνος ('Plato's') or Πλάτωνι ('to Plato'), but Πλάτων ('Plato').²⁹ Whereas, application of the term (πτῶσις) εὐθεία in the function of the name for the nominative case is ascribed to Aristotle by many scholars. These scholars point to *On Sophistical Refutations* 31, 181b 35 – 182a 6 and interpret the expression οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξι κατ' εὐθύ, which occurs in this passage, as precisely referring to the usage of a noun in the nominative.³⁰ In our opinion, such interpretation is not justified, following a careful reading of the passage:

Aristoteles, *Sophistici elenchi* 31, 181b 35 – 182a 6:

²⁹ Cf. Schol. D.T. 231, 17-20: Λέγει δὲ τὴν εὐθείαν καὶ ὀνομαστικὴν, καθὸ ὀνομάζειν τινα βουλόμενοι ταῦτη κεχρήμεθα· εἰ γὰρ τις ἔροιτο περὶ τίνος, ὅτι οὗτος πῶς λέγεται; ἐρεῖ τῇ εὐθείᾳ χρησάμενος Πάτων ἢ Σωκράτης. *Ibidem* 383, 28-31: 'Ὄνομαστικὴ λέγεται ἡ ὀρθὴ καὶ εὐθεία, ὅτι δι' αὐτῆς τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιτίθεμεν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ὀνομάζομεν· δι' αὐτῆς γὰρ ὀνομάζεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἴη τὸ ὑποκείμενον·

³⁰ Cf. D'Avino R. 1975, p. 127: „Tò εὐθύ (poi *casus rectus*) è invero l'altro modo aristotelico di riferirsi al nominativo (cf. *Soph. el.* 182a 3)”; Pagliaro A., 1955, p. 36, footnote 1: „Aristotele [...] in *Soph. elench.* 31, 182a 3 si riferisce al nominativo con il nesso κατ' εὐθύ”; Botas V. B., 1985 p. 196 – *sub voce* εὐθεία πτώσις: „Arist. Ref. Sof. 182a 3: οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξι κατ' εὐθύ: “en nominativo”.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς δι' ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουμένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ

χωρὶς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον. Τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινή μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐπὶ

τοῦ σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ροικοῦ, προστιθέμενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῆ ρινὶ τὸ δὲ

τῷ σκέλει συμβαίνει· ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ τὸ σιμόν, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ραιβὸν σημαίνει· καὶ οὐδὲν

διαφέρει εἰπεῖν ῥὶς σιμῆ ἢ ῥὶς κοίλη. Ἔστι οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ' εὐθύ· ψεῦδος

γὰρ ἔστιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ σιμόν ῥὶς κοίλη, ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς τοδί, οἷον πάθος, ὥστ' οὐδὲν

ἄτοπον, εἰ ἢ ῥὶς ἢ σιμῆ ῥὶς ἔστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα ῥινός.

“Regarding the terms that are predicated – as attributes – of [other] terms that are defined by them, it should be said that what these terms mean in isolation and what they mean as part of an expression [in which they occur as attributes associated with other terms] is not the same. Because, for example, the word ‘crooked’, when understood *in abstracto*, means [always] the same, [i.e. something that can be said of] both something that is turned up and something that is bent; however, in connection with a specific thing, it can have different meanings, of which one is appropriate for a nose and the other one for legs. For, in the first case, it means ‘up-turnedness’ and in the second ‘bentness’. However, the expression ‘turned-up nose’ does not differ from ‘crooked nose’ in its content. Whereas, an expression that directly (i.e. non-attributively) captures this concept, cannot be regarded as identical with the previously mentioned ones, because such reasoning would be erroneous. This results from the fact that the ‘(nose) up-turnedness’ is not the same as ‘crooked nose’ but to a certain extent constitutes a property of such a nose. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that a turned-up nose is a nose that possesses a crookedness, which characterizes this nose”.

The sense of this argument can be summarized by saying that the expression ‘turned-up nose’ (ῥὶς σιμῆ), in its content, does not differ from the expression ‘crooked nose’ (ῥὶς κοίλη), but differs from

the expression ‘(nose) up-turnedness’ (τὸ σιμὸν (ῥινός)), which was defined just as λέξις κατ’ εὐθύ. In other words, Aristotle contrasts the expression ‘(nose) up-turnedness’ with the expression ‘turned-up nose’,³¹ and defines it as λέξις κατ’ εὐθύ.

The term λέξις κατ’ εὐθύ, which characterizes the expression ‘(nose) up-turnedness’ and at the same time captures the essence of its disparity compared to the expression ‘turned-up nose’, cannot then be linked with the case in which this expression occurs (i.e. the nominative), because both parts of the presented opposition, that is τὸ σιμὸν (ῥινός) ‘(nose) up-turnedness’ and ῥίς σιμή ‘turned-up nose’, occur in the nominative. Hence, the term λέξις κατ’ εὐθύ cannot be interpreted as an ‘expression in the nominative’, because the expression which is contrasted with it, i.e. ‘turned-up nose’ (ῥίς σιμή), is also in the nominative. So, since the point is not to contrast the expression in the nominative with that in the oblique case, the term εὐθύ cannot be identified with the nominative. It can be inferred from the context that this term should rather be identified with a word that captures the denoted property “directly” (κατ’ εὐθύ), that is as a (noun) name of this property (τὸ σιμὸν ‘up-turnedness’) – in contrast to a word (i.e. adjective) that captures this property “indirectly”, that is attributively (σιμός ‘up-turned’). It seems, then, that the term εὐθεία (πτῶσις) acquired a technical meaning of the name of the nominative case only either among latter pupils of Aristotle³² or in the circle of Alexandrian grammarians, in which it became a parallel term to the synonymous ὀρθή (πτῶσις).³³

The term (πτῶσις) γενική is presented as a primary name of the second case. The adjective γενικός occurs in both Aristotle’s and Stoic’s works.³⁴ However, in these works this term does not acquire a grammatical (or linguistic, in general) meaning, but means simply ‘regarding γένος’. At the same time, the term γένος denotes the concept of

³¹ And, of course, with the expression ‘crooked nose’, as equivalent to ‘turned-up nose’.

³² Cf. e.g. Ammonius, *In Aristotelis „De interpretatione” comm.* 42, 30 – 43, 16 = Von Arnim J. (ed.), 1903-1905, (= SVF), II, 164.

³³ On the late ancient and Byzantine grammarian commentaries, which justify usage of the terms ὀρθή, εὐθεία, and πτῶσις in relation to the nominative, see Thorp J., 1989, pp. 317-324.

³⁴ E.g. *Topica*. 5, 102a 36; 4, 101b, 18; SVF II, 28, 1.

a broadly understood type or class of objects (beings), which include narrower subclasses (species), i.e. εἶδη. In addition, meanings related to the ‘origin’, ‘genesis’, etc. are acquired by the adjective γενικός relatively late; earlier, they were attributes of such forms as γεννητικός or γονικός. Due to lexical reasons, then, the essence of the functional characteristic of the genitive case, which was initially ascribed to it by the Greeks and reflected in the name (πτῶσις) γενική, should be associated not with expressing the ‘origin’ or ‘genesis’, but rather with expressing something that is (as philosophically understood) ‘generic’. Thus, the genitive would be a case that expresses γένος, i.e. a class including objects or concepts designated by words (nouns) that stand next to the noun in this case, for instance: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστίν

ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ [...], κτλ., καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν [...], τὰ δὲ [...], κτλ.³⁵

With time, the Alexandrian philologists probably reinterpreted the semantic function of this case, ascribing to it a role of an exponent of possession or affinity relations. This resulted in the occurrence of its secondary names in the form of the terms κτητική and πατρική (πτῶσις). In this respect, Apollonius Dyskolus is very instructive. The term πατρική was not used at all by him, whereas he employed the term κτητική exclusively in reference to possessive pronouns. However, while discussing pronouns he wrote: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγὼ γενική ἐπὶ κτῆμα φέρεται, διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐνίων κτητικὴ ἠέκαλεῖτο – „the pronoun ἐγὼ in the genitive is [often] associated with the object of possession; hence, some people generally call [this case] ‘possessive’”. (*Synt.* II, 117 (216, 12-13)). Although Apollonius consistently applies the term γενική (πτῶσις) to the genitive, he also ascribes a possessive function to this case: δι’ ἄλλης δὲ πτώσεως οὐκ ἐμφανίζεται κτήσις ἢ διὰ μόνης γενικῆς – “possession cannot be expressed with any other case but the genitive” (*Synt.* I, 68 (59, 7-8)).³⁶ Besides, he provides the (noun in) the genitive accompanied by

³⁵ Cf. Steintal H., 1891: 302: „Wie nun ἐθνικὸν ὄνομα ein Name zur Bezeichnung des ἔθνους ist u.s.w, so ist πτώσις γενική der Casus zur Bezeichnung der Gattung”. Regarding interpretation of the meaning of the term πτώσις γενική („casus generalis“); see also: Pohlenz M., 1939: 172-173; De Mauro T., 1965: 206-208; Calboli G., 1972, pp. 97-99; Allen W. S., Brink C. O., 1980, pp. 64-65.

³⁶ See also *Synt.* 103 (86, 6-7).

a preposition ὑπό with a function of expressing an agent in the passive structures that express experiencing: κατὰ παθητικὴν σύνταξιν ἀνθ υπαγομένων [...] τῶν τε δρασάντων εἰς γενικὴν μετὰ τῆς ὑπό – „in the passive structure [...] the doer passes to the genitive with the preposition ὑπό” (*Synt.* III, 159 (405, 10-11)).³⁷

The name of the dative, i.e. (πτῶσις) δοτική, is usually interpreted as a result of identification of this case function with the expression of ‘a person who is given something’. The accuracy of this common view³⁸ is challenged by (at least) two circumstances. The first has a general linguistic character and results from the actual manner in which this case functions in the Greek language. Namely, the point is that on the basis of frequentative analysis, which can be conducted on any corpus of Greek texts, it is easy to prove that the usage of the dative in the function of an exponent of ‘a person who is given something’ occurs relatively rarely. This case much more frequently constitutes either an exponent of different kinds of adverbial functions (instrumental, locational, temporal, sociative, causative etc.), or the complement of verbs like μέλει, χράομαι, ἔπομαι, ἀκολουθέω, δοκῶ etc.³⁹ Hence, the question arises: why should the very function of the dative, which is rarely actualized and is distributively limited to a small group of verbs meaning to ‘give’, ‘offer’, ‘hand over’, etc., have been perceived by the Greeks (and encoded in the name of this case) as central or fundamental.

The second circumstance that challenges the accuracy of the interpretation of the dative as a case expressing ‘a person who is given something’ has a terminological character, and refers to the structural semantic properties of a morphological formation constituted by the term δοτική. These properties would require that the derivative formation with the suffix (-τ)-ικός (like δοτικός) be provided with a general meaning, which should be defined rather as ‘referring to what is given’,

³⁷ Cf. also *Synt.* III, 170 (417, 6-7): τοῦ μέντοι πάθους ἐγγίζει ἢ κατὰ γενικὴν σύνταξιν – “to express a sensation, the construction with the genitive is appropriate”; *Synt.* 186 (428, 13-129, 1): ἡ γενικὴ ἐμερίζετο εἰς παθητικὴν διάθεσιν – “the genitive was assigned to the passive”.

³⁸ See e.g. Pohlenz M., 1939, p. 171; Calboli G. (1972), p. 99; Allen W. S., Brink C. O. (1980), p. 64.

³⁹ See De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 157-165. Cf. also. Schwyzer E., Debrunner A., 1950, pp. 137-168; Auerbach M., Golias M., 1952, pp. 174-179.

(or to ‘the one who gives’), than ‘referring to the one who is given’. Taking both arguments into account, it cannot be ruled out that the origin of the name (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) ΔΟΤΙΚΗ is related to the fact that Greeks originally perceived the dative as a case that expresses ‘what is (in a sentence additionally) given’, that is as a case that designates any additional “data” communicated in a sentence; “data” that would refer to time, location, manner, cause and other circumstances that accompany the predicate content of this sentence.⁴⁰ The advantage of this interpretation consists in the fact that it assumes that the dative function also was captured in a “philosophical” manner, congruent with how the functions of the other cases were perceived and reflected in their names, that is, the nominative as a case of predicate subject, the genitive as a case expressing affiliation (of the *designatum* of a co-occurring noun to the specific class), and the accusative as a case that designates a result or an object of the action expressed in a sentence (see below).⁴¹ Now, the secondary name of the dative, that is (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) ΕΠΙΣΤΑΛΤΙΚΗ, probably results from the association of this case function with the epistolary formula of Κλέων’ Αθηναίους χαίρειν type.

The accusative name (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) ΑΙΤΙΑΤΙΚΗ comes from the term αἰτιατόν which was used by Aristotle⁴² to denote an effect that is the result of a specific cause – αἰτία. In the Peripatetic and Stoic circles, the semantic range of αἰτία (‘cause’) includes all actions or processes that change or modify reality, whereas the term αἰτιατόν denotes everything that was caused by these processes or subject to them. Thus, the fourth case, (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) ΑΙΤΙΑΤΙΚΗ, was terminologically defined as an exponent of this that constitutes an effect or a subject of action (designated by a verb) that has a causative character. In contrast to the dative, which expresses additional and external circumstances of the process communicated in a sentence by a predicative expression, the accusative has the status of the exponent of an element that constitutes an

⁴⁰ See De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 202-205 *et passim*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 199-200 gives special attention to the problem of interpretative coherence in relation to the original meanings of case names. He was the first to oppose the association of the name ΔΟΤΙΚΗ with a ‘person who is given something’, considering it incoherent with commonly accepted interpretations of the genitive and accusative names, which connect them with more general, semantic and philosophical, concepts.

⁴² *Anal. post.* I, 9, 76a; II, 16, 98a.

inherent and indispensable component of this process, that is, of an element that obligatorily complements and, at the same time, conditions this process.

Unfortunately, damages to the text of the Τέχνη make it hard to decipher and interpret the information about a possible second name of this case. The crucial section of the preserved text sounds almost like a tautology: ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ † κατ' αἰτιατικὴν – „(case) αἰτιατικὴ [is also called] according to (?) αἰτιατικὴ”. Because of that, some commentators propose in this place the reading ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ καταϊτιατικὴ, i.e. „(case) αἰτιατικὴ [is also called] καταϊτιατικὴ”, which points out the origin of associating the name of this case with ‘accusing’ (καταιτιάομαι ‘I accuse’, ‘I blame’; cf. lat. *accusativus*).⁴³ However, we would like to point out that the verb αἰτιάομαι also has the meaning ‘to accuse’, and in common and non-philosophical usage the noun αἰτία also primarily meant ‘accusation’ and ‘charge’. Therefore, the point of departure for the later interpretation of the accusative as a case connected with “accusing” can also be constituted by the very name (πτῶσις) αἰτιατικὴ, which, actually, was commonly associated not with the philosophical term αἰτιατόν, but rather with the common meaning of the word αἰτία (‘accusation’, ‘charge’).⁴⁴

The name of the vocative (πτῶσις) κλητικὴ alludes to the functional specificity of this case as a word form that is used as an appeal or call. The name (πτῶσις) προσαγορευτικὴ conceives the vocative as a word form that functions commonly as an element of greeting (salutatory) or welcoming formulas.⁴⁵

⁴³ Cf. J. Lallot, 1989, p. 146.

⁴⁴ F. A. Trendelenburg, 1936 was the first to suspect that the Latin case names, at least partially, resulted from an erroneous interpretation of the corresponding Greek names. Particularly, he considered the term *accusativus* to be based on an erroneous conviction that the Greek term αἰτιατικὴ πτῶσις derives from the verb αἰτιάομαι ‘I accuse’, whereas, in fact, the name of this case originated from the term αἰτιατόν; hence, the appropriate Latin name would be *causativus*. On this subject, see also Pohlenz M., 1939, pp. 167-170; Calboli G., 1972, pp. 99-102.

⁴⁵ Cf. e.g. Schol. D. T. 384, 16-21:

Τὴν κλητικὴν εἶπε προσαγορευτικὴν, ἐπειδὴ προσκαλούμενοί τινα καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι ταύτην χρώμεθα, ὅτι δι' αὐτῆς, φησί, καλοῦμεν καὶ προσαγορεύομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες λέγοντες, καὶ πάλιν ἴω' χαῖρ', ἸΑχιλεῦ, καὶ χαῖρέ (μοι),

To sum up, it can be said that the notional and terminological system that refers to grammatical cases was, to a high degree, shaped under the influence of Peripatetic and Stoic philosophers. The evidence for this fact is provided by the semantic characteristics of the basic case names. The majority of these names originated from concepts that were conceived in these circles and look at the individual case forms from the perspective of their general functional properties which are determined by their position in the structure of a statement. In other words, this terminology presents the cases as word forms that constitute the exponents of such general, logical and semantic, categories as predication subject ((ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) ὀρθή), class of objects ((ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) γενική), result or object of a causative process ((ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) αἰτιατική), and additional circumstances co-occurring with this process (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ) δοτική).

However, the understanding of logical and philosophical concepts, on which the case naming system was founded, disappears as a result of the emancipation of grammar science in the circle of Alexandrian philologists and the loosening of its ties to philosophy. This process was accompanied by the phenomenon of proposing concepts that were conceived in this circle and were related to the essence and characteristics of the individual case forms. This resulted in the semantic re-interpretation of the existing terminological system on the one hand, and in the occurrence of new, alternative names of the individual cases on the other. Both of these processes were signs of a certain trivialization of the way the case functions became perceived by the grammarians. Within grammatical theory, namely, the essence of particular cases were reduced to the indication of narrow and specific content elements, which in many cases were determined by the semantic structure of specific syntagms to which the individual cases were related.⁴⁶ Thus, the essence of the nominative, i.e. the exponent of predication subject (ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ὀρθή / εὐθεία), was reduced to a word form used for naming individual objects, that is, to a function that is actualized within the syntagm ὀνομάζεται τις,⁴⁷ which, in turn, is reflected in the name

⁴³ Πάτροκλε κατὰ τὴν κλητικὴν πτώσιν, ὡς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει χαῖρε, θεά. See also *ibid.* 232, 8-10, and Choeroboscus G., 1965 111, 22-24.

⁴⁶ Cf. De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 193-194, 196-197.

⁴⁷ See above, note 29.

(πτῶσις) ὀνομαστική. The generic function of the genitive was narrowed down to express family or possession relations, which resulted in both connecting the meaning of ‘origin’ with the term γενική, and the introduction of variant names πατρική and κτητική.⁴⁸ The concept of the dative as a case that designates (additional) “data” that accompany the process described in a sentence, was replaced with a concept that is determined by either syntagm δίδωμί τινί (τι), which gives this case the status of an exponent of ‘the person who is given something’, or syntagm (τίς) τιμι χαιρειν, which gives this case the status of an exponent of an addressee of an epistolary greeting formula ((πτῶσις) ἐπισταλτική).⁴⁹ Finally, the essence of the accusative as a case that

⁴⁸ Cf. e.g. Choeroboscus, 1965, 111, 15-18:

Ἡ δὲ γενική λέγεται κτητική τε καὶ πατρική ἐπειδὴ δι’ αὐτῆς ποιούμεθα τὰ γένη, τὰ κτήματα καὶ τὰς πατρίδας, οἶον Ἄριστάρχου υἱός, Ἄριστάρχου ἀγρός,

Ἄριστάρχου πατήρ, Ἄριστάρχου οἶκος. Cf. also Schol. D.T. 231, 28-30; 384, 1-7.

⁴⁹ Cf. e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III, 177 (422, 7-8): ἅπαντα τὰ περιποίησιν δηλοῦντα [...] ἐπὶ δοτικὴν φέρεται ‘„All verbs that express giving [...], adopt the dative’’. In another place (ibid. 186 (428, 13 – 429, 9)), the Alexandrian grammarian presents the dative as a case connoted by verbs meaning reciprocal action. According to De Mauro T., (1965, p. 154), the nowadays widespread view that Greeks gave the dative the name (πτῶσις)δοτική because this case designates a ‘person who is given something’, is a result of the same misunderstanding of original meanings of the Greek cases names, which was also shared by the (later) ancient grammarians, especially the Latin ones. Cf. e.g. Prisc., *Inst.* I, 185, 14 sqq. (Keil): ‘„[...] genitivus autem, qui et possessivus appellatur: genitivus [...] quod genus per ipsum significamus, ut genus est Priami [...]; possessivus vero, quod possessionem quoque per eum significamus ut Priami regnum [...]; paternus etiam dicitur, quod per eum casum pater demonstratur, ut Priami filius [...]; post hunc est dativus, quem etiam commendativum quidam nuncupaverunt, ut do homini illam rem et commendo homini illam rem [...]; quarto loco est accusativus sive causativus: accuso hominem et in causa hominem facio’’. Similarly Isidorus, *Etym.* I 31, 32: “Nominativus casus dictus quia per eum aliquid nominamus, ut hic magister. Genetivus quia per eum genus cuiuscumque quaerimus, ut huius magistri filius vel quod rem [cuiuscumque] significamus, ut huius magistri liber. Dativus quia per eum nos dare alicui aliquid demonstramus, ut da huic magistro. Accusativus, quis per eum aliquem accusamus, ut accuso hunc magistrum. Vocativus, quia per eum aliquem vocamus, ut o magister’’. It is noteworthy, by the way, that Priscian’s interpretation of the accusative name (‘„accusativus sive causativus’’) seems to show a deeper understanding of the meaning of the term; the enclosed exemplification is, however, rather disappointing (‘„accuso hominem et in causa hominem facio’’). On this subject, see also W. S. Allen, C. O. Brink (1980), p. 69. The author of the treatise known as *Ars Anony-*

denotes τὸ αἰτιατόν (implied by a predicate) was reduced to the expression of a subject of an accusation (αἰτιόμαί τινα), which resulted from the reinterpretation of the meaning of the term (πτῶσις) αἰτιατική and connecting it with the term αἰτία and its common meaning of ‘accusation’.

In conclusion, it should be said that semantic criteria played the principal part in describing the nominal inflectional categories, which were identified as specific παρεμόμενα ὀνόματος. This was reflected primarily in the adopted nomenclature. The gender category of nouns was clearly associated with the property of the natural sex of their *designata*, the number category with numeric quantification of the sets constituted by these *designata*, and the case category with the logical status of things denoted by nouns in individual cases. No consistent methodology was developed that would take into account the fact that individual inflectional categories can also be semantically empty and constitute an exponent of the intra-textual (syntactic) function (which, of course, pertains primarily – but not exclusively – to attributively used adjectival lexemes). This does not mean, however, that the formal factor was completely absent in the process of shaping Greek grammar theory. Aristotle’s determination in searching for formal criteria of nouns’ gender classes is noteworthy in this respect. On the one hand, this attitude prompted the Philosopher to formulate a strictly formal – but incorrect – noun gender classification, which was based on the formal shape of their ending (in the singular nominative). On the other hand, it produced an essential effect in the form of the discovery of specific case syncretism, that is the syncretism of nominative and

ma Bernensis (VIII–IX century A.D. – see Manitius M., 1911, pp. 468-469) presents doubts regarding the existing tradition of interpreting the names of the accusative and dative in a more clear way: „Sic dativus aliquid extrinsecus addi demonstrat, vel accedere, ut do huic viro. Accusativus vim accusandi habet et actum alterius declarat, quasi patiatu ab eo [...]. Sed non recta ratione dicitur: si enim dicamus laudate dominum et magnificate eum nullam accusationem habet. Item si dicamus laudo hunc magistrum non habet accusationem. Rectius ergo ait grammaticus [scil. Virgilius Maro] »Accusativus dicitur hoc est activus casus«. Est enim verbum Graecum ‘accuso’, hoc est ago, cuius praeteritum participium est accusatus, genitivo accusati addita -vus syllaba fit ‘accusativus’, id est activus casus, eo quod verbo activo servit. Accusativus ergo, sicut diximus, activus casus dicitur, derivatus a verbo Graeco ‘accuso’, quod interpretatur ago” (p. 86 ed. Hagen).

accusative, as a characteristic formal property of neuter nouns. Besides, the number category was also associated with some formal factors. Evidence for this can be found in the Τέχνη, where the expression ἐνικοί/πληθυντικοὶ χαρακτήρες, identifying word forms representing individual values of the number category, is contrasted with the expression κατὰ πολλῶν /κατὰ ἐνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν λεγόμενοι, which identifies the semantic properties of those forms.

In general, it cannot be doubted, however, that Greek grammar was characterized by a clear tendency to marginalize the formal aspect of inflection and to perceive this phenomenon mainly in its semantic aspect. The commentary of the author of the *scholia* to the Τέχνη provides peculiar evidence for this fact. Regarding the cases, the author states unequivocally that they belong to the realm of what is denoted by expressions, and not to the realm of the expressions themselves. Otherwise – says the grammarian – the name ‘Atreides’, for which he lists at least 4 different genitive forms, would have more than 5 cases. The *scholia*’s author, however, did not distinguish between concepts that in modern grammar are identified as the formal and functional paradigm of a lexeme, or the inflectional form and the flecteme, and this prevented him from a more precise description of the problem. However, it is hard to blame the ancients for not being aware of these concepts.

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