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DESCRIPTIVE CRITERIA OF NOMINAL INFLECTIONAL CATEGORIES IN ANCIENT GREEK GRAMMAR

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SUMMARY: The present paper analyses the methodology adopted in the ancient Greek grammatical tradition to define and describe the nominal inflectional categories, *i.e.* gender, number, and case. The main source for the said analysis is the treatise *Tekhne grammatike* attributed to Dionysius Thrax, but references are also made to the works of Aristotle and some other authors. The research shows that semantic (functional) criteria played the principal part in describing the nominal inflectional categories, and especially that of the case. This does not mean, however, that the formal factor was completely absent: Aristotle's determination in searching for formal criteria of gender classes of nouns is noteworthy in this respect, as well as the attempt to associate the number category with some formal factors, evidenced in the *Tekhne*.

It is a well-known fact that one of the most essential achievements of the Greek grammatical tradition was the identification and classification of basic inflectional categories which include words inflected in the Greek language (and other Indo-European languages). It is also known that the systematics of inflectional categories created by the Greeks, despite theirs imperfections, had the greatest impact on modern grammatical theories. Until the end of the 19th century, the description of inflectional systems of languages, which were within European linguists' range of interest, was based almost exclusively on

theoretical concepts created by the Greeks. It was not until the emergence of structuralism in the 20th century that considerable modifications of this model of description were introduced. Even then, however, the terminological apparatus adopted from the Greeks was not rejected, but rather expanded, made more accurate, and adapted to the standards of modern science.

Modern structuralist linguistics identifies the phenomenon of inflection category as the basis of a systemic, formal and functional, opposition, whose subjects are word forms that represent the same lexeme. This perspective is associated with a postulate to include in the description of the inflectional mechanism the fundamental opposition of the function (semantic and/or syntactic) and form (exponent of a given function). Greek linguistics was primarily focused on the semantic aspects of described language facts and was quite successful in this field. Formal analysis, however, was undoubtedly its weak point. Yet, while describing specific phenomena associated with word inflection, a simple reference to the meaning often turns out to be impossible, or at least insufficient. In the present paper I put forward an analysis of a method of describing inflectional categories which was adopted in Greek grammatical theory. The selection of description criteria will be taken into consideration and the scope of analysis will be limited exclusively to nominal categories.

The treatise Τέχνη γραμματική, which is traditionally attributed to Dionysius Thrax,[1] will be the primary source for the said analysis, since this very text constitutes the final codification of Greek word grammar. But this treatise, as other grammatical texts, provides no general definition of inflection or inflectional category, as such. The specific inflectional categories were, however, described as particular 'accidences' (παρεπόμενα), which accompany specific word classes (parts of speech).[2] Nominal categories were described in the chapter dealing with the 'name' (ὄνομα), i.e. with a word class that includes

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[1]   Uhlig G. (ed.), 1883.

[2]   It should be noted, however, that the status of 'accidences' (παρεπόμενα) is attributed not only to the inflectional categories, but also to the categories of word-formation, i.e. to the category of εἶδος ('form'), which is based on the opposition between the primary form (εἶδος πρωτότυπον) and the derivative one (εἶδος παράγωγον), and to the category of σχῆμα ('structure') which is based on a tripartite opposition of

nouns, adjectives, numerals, and pronouns (except personal, posses-
sive, and relative pronouns). Γένη, that is 'genders', were first singled
out 'accidences' (παρεπόμενα) that characterize ὄνομα. They were de-
scribed in the following way:

(D.T. 24, 8 – 25, 2): Γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσι τρία· ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν,
οὐδέτερον.

ἔνιοι δὲ προστιθέασι τούτοις ἄλλα δύο, κοινόν τε καὶ ἐπίκοι
νον, κοινὸν μὲν οἷον

ἵππος κύον, ἐπίκοινον δὲ οἷον χελιδών ἀετός.

"There are three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter. Some
add to these two other genders: the common and super-common; the
common, as for example a *horse* or a *dog*, and the super-common, as
a *swallow* or an *eagle*".[3]

In the first part of the cited passage, three basic 'noun genders'
(γένη ὀνομάτων), i.e. three values of the 'gender' (γένος) category,
are distinguished, that is 'masculine' (ἀρσενικόν), 'feminine' (θηλυκόν)
and 'neuter' (οὐδέτερον) genders. The specified 'genders' were not de-
fined in any way. However, they are characterized in a certain way by
the terminology used, which, as one may guess, refers to the natural
gender, i.e. the sexes of the objects named. Thus, this category was
assigned a specific semantic function. This, however, does not mean
that the 'gender' (γένος) specified in the treatise should be interpreted
as a category which remains in an exclusive and unequivocal rela-
tion to the natural gender (or its lack) of the objects named by nouns
(ὀνόματα). In the text of the Τέχνη, the terms ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and
οὐδέτερον generally identify values of 'gender' conceived as a strictly
grammatical category.[4] This is confirmed by the fact that in other sec-
tions the author lists such words as ἕλιξ 'coil' and λαῖλαψ 'storm' (aside

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non-complex structure (σχῆμα ἁπλοῦν), complex structure (σχῆμα σύνθετον) and the
structure derivative from complex (σχῆμα παρασύνθετον).

[3]   If not stated otherwise, all source text citations were translated by the author.

[4]   Cf. Hilgard A. (ed.), 1901, pp. 18-22:

Τὰ γένη ἐξ ἀκριβείας κατὰ γραμματικοὺς οὐ λαμβάνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῆς
συντάξεως καὶ τῆς συμφωνίας τῶν ἄρθρων συνταττομένων διαφόροις τοῖς ὀν
όμασιν· ἐκεῖνο γάρ ἐστιν ἀρσενικόν, ᾧ συντάττεται τὸ ὁ ἄρθρον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ θη

from Μοῦσα, Ἑλένη, Κλειώ, χελιδών, μήτηρ, Θέτις) as examples of feminine nouns (θηλυκῶν ὀνομάτων).[5]

Nevertheless, the procedure of linking the grammatical genders of names with natural genders of their *designata* was usual and deeply rooted in the Greek grammatical tradition. Evidence for this fact is provided not only by established terminology, but also by the second part of the cited passage, in which the author talks about 'common' (κοινόν) and 'super-common' (ἐπίκοινον) genders. In reality, these terms do not identify any other separate values of the gender category (other than ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον), but rather describe how this category functions in relation to nouns, whose *designata* are living creatures of both masculine and feminine sexes. Based on the included examples, it can be concluded that the term (γένος) κοινόν refers to a method of functioning of the gender category, in which its value depends on the sex of the object, which is identified by the given noun. As a result, a noun may have both masculine (in the case when its *designatum* has a masculine sex, e.g. ὁ ἵππος 'stallion', or ὁ κύων 'dog') and feminine gender (in the case when its *designatum* has a feminine sex, e.g. ἡ ἵππος 'mare', or ἡ κύων 'bitch').[6] The term (γένος) ἐπίκοινον, in turn, characterizes a functioning of the gender category, in which its value is constant in reference to a given noun and is independent of the sex of this noun's *designatum* (like ἡ χελιδών 'swallow'- both male and female, or ὁ ἀετός 'male eagle'/'female eagle').[7] Thus, the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον characterize the category of 'gender' from the point of view of the relation existing between the gender values

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λυκόν, ᾧ συντάττεται τὸ ἡ, καὶ οὐδέτερον τὸ ἔχον τὸ τό. See also ibid. 361, 12; 524, 30 sqq.; 553, 4 sqq.

[5]   D.T. 15, 3 – 16, 1.

[6]   *Cf.* Schol. D.T. 218, 18-22: Κοινὸν μέν ἐστι ὃ τὰς μὲν πτώσεις ἔχει τὰς αὐτάς, ὑποτάσσεται δὲ ἄρθροις διαφόροις, ἵππος βοῦς λίθος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· λέγο μεν οὖν ὁ ἵππος καὶ ἡ ἵππος, ὁ βοῦς καὶ ἡ βοῦς, ὁ λίθος καὶ ἡ λίθος, καὶ ἐν ἁ πάσαις ταῖς πτώσεσιν ὁμοφωνοῦσι, μόνων τῶν ἄρθρων ἀλλασσομένων.

[7]   *Cf.* Schol. D.T. 218, 22-24: Ἐπίκοινον δέ ἐστιν ὃ διὰ μιᾶς λέξεως τὸ ἀρσε νικὸν καὶ τὸ θηλυκὸν σημαίνει, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν ἄρθρων προκατειλημμένον, ἤτοι ἀρσενικῷ ἢ θηλυκῷ.

adopted by some specific nouns and the sex of the objects identified by these nouns.

Therefore, the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον designate concepts whose status differs from the concepts denoted with the terms ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον which essentially exhaust the characteristics of the oppositional structure of the gender category (cf.: Γένη μὲν οὖν εἰσι τρία). This differentiation is indicated by the fact that the terms κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον were not mentioned in one row with ἀρσενικόν, θηλυκόν and οὐδέτερον, but separately, and were preceded by an expression of a certain reserve: ἔνιοι δὲ προστιθέασι τούτοις ἄλλα δύο, which also reflects the notional distance that separates the *designata* of the terms listed in both rows. However, the very fact that the description of the gender category was complemented with γένος κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον confirms the above-mentioned notion of a relation existing between the grammatical genders of names and natural genders (sexes) of their *designata*. It is noteworthy that the cited passage from Τέχνη is not the first Greek attempt to capture and theoretically describe the grammatical category of gender. On the contrary, it seems that gender was the first category recognized by the Greeks among all categories included in the Greek inflectional system. According to Aristotle,[8] the sophist Protagoras of Abdera (approx. 481-411 BC) "distinguished name genders" (τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει) dividing them into 'masculine' (ἄρρενα), 'feminine' (θήλεα), and 'names of things' (σκεύη). The adopted nomenclature suggests that the proposed division was based precisely on characteristics of the nouns' *designata*. Additionally, this fact is also reflected by the sophist's postulate to assign masculine gender to the (feminine) nouns μῆνις 'wrath' and πήληξ 'helmet'. This information was provided by Aristotle in his treatise "On Sophistical Refutations".[9] It is most probable that this postulate resulted from a conviction that things and features, which are naturally attributed to males, should have a masculine gender in their language representation.

However, apart from their mentioned semantic aspect, all these kinds of nouns, i.e. 'masculine names', 'feminine names' and 'names

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8   *Rhetorica* III, 5, 1407b 6.
9   *Sophistici elenchi* 14, 173b 17-25.

of things', were also associated with a specific formal shape. One can learn about this from a parodic fragment of Aristophanes' "Clouds" (verses 658-679). As is well known, the stage portrayal of Socrates represents not so much himself (i.e. the historical Socrates) as the common image of a sophist in this comedy. Because the opinions presented on the stage by this figure about the proper usage of language suit Protagoras' attitude towards linguistic issues very well, the majority of scholars associate them with just this sophist.[10] In the above mentioned fragment of the comedy, Socrates first advises his interlocutor Strepsiades to call a rooster ἀλεκτρυών, and then a hen suggests the artificial word ἀλεκτρύαινα, which he created. In the latter part of the conversation, Socrates convinces Strepsiades that he should not use the form ἡ κάρδοπος for a wooden bowl, because this way he calls something feminine as if it were of the masculine gender (τὴν κάρδοπον ἄρρενα καλεῖς θήλειαν οὖσαν). Instead, he proposes a nonexistent noun, ἡ καρδόπη, as similar to the feminine name ἡ Σωστράτη ('Sostrata'). Thus, because there is no clear relation of the *designatum* of the word ἡ κάρδοπος with the natural gender, the formal aspect must have played the fundamental role in this case, that is, the association of the specific noun genders with particular articles, and with typical noun endings, which cooccur with those articles.

However, the co-occur a formentioned section 14, 173b 17-25 of Aristotle's "On Sophistical Refutations" points towards the association of individual gender values with yet another type of formal factor. In this passage, the Philosopher expresses his ironical attitude towards Protagoras who claimed that the nouns (of feminine gender) μῆνις ('wrath') and πήληξ ('helmet') are characterized by masculine gender, and that people who use the (feminine) adjectival form οὐλομένη instead of (masculine) οὐλόμενος in relation to the noun μῆνις commit solecism. This passage demonstrates that in the case of nouns the individual values of the gender category were also asociated with specific formal variants of an (atributively used) adjective. In other words, the gender differentiation of nouns was shown here from the syntactic perspective, that is, from the perspective of syntactic congruence of nouns and adjectival forms:

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[10] See e.g. Murray G., 1948, p. 177; Levin S., 1983, p. 42.

Sophistici elenchi 14, 173b 17-25:

Σολοικισμὸς δ᾽ οἷον μέν ἐστιν εἴρηται πρότερον. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πήληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σολοικίζει. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κἂν τέχνῃ τις τοῦτο δύναιτο ποιεῖν· διὸ πολλοὶ τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμὸν φαίνονται συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις.

„We have said before[11] what kind of thing 'solecism' is. It is possible both to commit it, and to seem to do so without doing so, and to do so without seeming to do so. Suppose, as Protagoras used to say, that μῆνις ('wrath') and πήληξ ('helmet') are masculine: according to him a man who calls wrath a 'destructress' (οὐλομένην) commits a solecism, though he does not seem to do so to other people, whereas he who calls it a 'destructor' (οὐλόμενον) commits no solecism though he seems to do so. It is clear, then, that any one could produce this effect by art as well: and for this reason many arguments seem to lead to solecism, which do not really do so, as happens in the case of refutations".[12]

It is clear that the cited text demonstrates not only Protagoras' opinion about word genders, but also that of Aristotle. From the above quotation one can infer that the Philosopher was convinced about the lack of clear correlation (which was advertised by Protagoras) between the grammatical gender of nouns and their semantic characteristics. This opposition to Protagoras' concept of gender, which was based on the semantic criterion, prompted Aristotle to search for other determinants of this category. The following fragment of the *Poetics* demonstrates that he found them primarily in the formal shape of noun endings (in nominative singular):

Poetica 21, 1458a 9-17:

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[11]   I.e. in chapter 3.
[12]   Translation by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in: Ross W. D., 1928.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ δὲ μ
εταξύ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ Ν καὶ Ρ <καὶ Σ>, καὶ ὅσ
α ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ

δύο, Ψ καὶ Ξ), θήλεα δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἴς τε τὰ ἀε
ὶ μακρά, οἷον εἰς Η καὶ

Ω, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς Α· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει πλήθ
η εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα· τὸ γὰρ Ψ καὶ τὸ Ξ <τῷ Σ>
ταὐτά ἐστιν. Εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα

τελευτᾷ, οὐδὲ εἰς φωνῆεν βραχύ. Εἰς δὲ τὸ Ι τρία μόνα, μέλι
κόμμι πέπερι. Εἰς δὲ

τὸ Υ πέντε. Τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ Ν καὶ Σ.

„Among nouns, some are masculine, others feminine, and still others neuter. The masculine nouns are those that end in 'n', 'r', 's' and two clusters with 's', i.e. 'ps' and 'ks'. The feminine nouns are those that end in one of the long vowels, such as: 'e', 'o' (eta and omega) and with an extended 'a' (alfa). Thus, the number of sounds, in which feminine and masculine nouns end, is the same, because in endings 'ps' and 'ks' the last sound is 's'. No nouns, however, end with a silent sound or short vowel. There are only three nouns that end in 'i': μέλι ('honey'), κόμμι ('rubber'), πέπερι ('peper'); five end in 'y'. The neuter gender nouns end in precisely these vowels and also in 'n' and 's'".

The rules of gender classification of nouns that were formulated in the *Poetics* obviously cannot be considered correct, because the word-ending criterion adopted in that work is not appropriate to identify the grammatical gender of nouns in the Greek language. Essentially, the grammatical gender category of Greek nouns, which is a lexically determined property and has a classificatory (selective) character, is based on the differences between individual nouns occurring in their syntactic congruity with specific inflectional forms of adjectives, for which this category has an inflectional and syntactically dependent character. Thus, gender serves a purely syntactic function in the Greek language. It constitutes one of the co-exponents of the syntactic attributive congruence, and the value index of the noun gender category is located in the syntactically subordinate element (adjective). Even though the

formal shape of the noun ending, as mentioned by Aristotle, is not the clear determinant or exponent of the value of the gender category, the reference to this criterion seems, at least partially, justified because of the evident (especially within declension I and II) correlation (still not exact correspondence) between the noun ending and the noun gender. Additionally, the very fact that Aristotle terminated the gender classification of nouns from the semantic criterion and made an attempt to found this classification on a purely formal criterion, deserves to be appreciated, even though his attempt proved not fully successful and consistent.[13]

It is also noteworthy that Aristotle, despite having adopted a purely formal criterion for the gender classification of nouns, preserved Protagoras' terminology in reference to the nouns of the first two gender classes, i.e. masculine (ἄρρενα) and feminine (θήλεα). However, in relation to the third class, the Philosopher used the term μεταξύ (literally 'between'), thereby replacing Protagoras' term σκεύη ('names of things'). The reasons for which Aristotle decided to introduce the term μεταξύ in place of Protagoras' σκεύη can be seen in the following fragment of *On Sophistical Refutations*. In this passage, the Philosopher addressed the problem once more, this time in the context of false conclusions from apparent solecisms:

Sophistici Elenchi 14, 173b 31 – 174a 5

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θήλεος διαφέρουσιν αἱ πτώσεις ἅπασαι, τοῦ δὲ

μεταξὺ αἱ μὲν αἱ δ' οὔ. Δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο, συλλογ ίζονται ὡς εἰρημένου

τοῦτον·· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην πτῶσιν ἀντ' ἄλλης. Ὁ δὲ παρα λογισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τὸ

κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλειόνων πτώσεων· τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο σημ αίνει ὁτὲ μὲν οὗτος ὁτὲ

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[13]   In this context, it should be pointed out that Aristotle in *Sophistici elenchi* 14, 173b 17-25 protests against ascribing masculine gender to the nouns μῆνις ('wrath') and πήληξ ('helmet') even though they end in Σ thus satisfying the criterion of the masculine nouns defined in *Poetics* 21, 1458a 9-17. Thereby, he confirms that these nouns belong to the feminine noun class, despite the fact that they do not "end in one of the long vowels".

δὲ τοῦτον. Δεῖ δ' ἐναλλὰξ σημαίνειν, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ ἔστι τὸ οὗτος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτον, οἷόν »ἐστι Κορίσκος«, »εἶναι Κορίσκον«. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων

ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν.

Ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾷ, ταῦτα μόνα σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν, οἷον ξύλον,

σχοινίον, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, οἷον

ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοὔνομα, κλίνη δὲ θῆλυ. Διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ

ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι διοίσει.

„All cases of masculine and feminine [words] differ from each other, but regarding the [cases of] a neuter gender [word], some differ from each other and some do not. If, for example, we are given τοῦτο, it is often treated as if one said τοῦτον (*scil. accusativus*); and this is similar with other cases which are mistaken for one another. Thus, one makes a false conclusion because τοῦτο is common for more cases: τοῦτο sometimes has the meaning of οὗτος (i.e. has the value of the nominative), and other times has a meaning of τοῦτον (i.e. has the value of the accusative). Therefore, it must be assumed that it has alternate meanings: in connection with ἔστι, it has a meaning of οὗτος (i.e. occurs in the nominative), whereas in connection with εἶναι, it has a meaning of τοῦτον (i.e. occurs in the accusative), as for example [the word Κορίσκος in expressions] »ἐστι Κορίσκος« (»[this] is Koriskos« – *nominativus*) and »εἶναι Κορίσκον« (»[I say that this] is Koriskos« – *accusativus* as part of the syntactic structure of *acc. cum inf.*). This also happens in the case of feminine gender nouns, and in the case of the so-called 'names of things' that have the form of a name of a female or a male creature. For only those that end with ο and ν, have the form of a name of a thing, for instance ξύλον ('wood'), σχοινίον ('rope'); those, however, that do not end in this way have the form of a masculine or feminine noun. Nevertheless, some of them are counted among the names of things, for example the word ἀσκός ('goatskin'), which is a masculine noun, or κλίνη ('bed'), which is a feminine noun. For that

reason, these nouns also differ depending on whether they occur in connection with ἔστι or εἶναι".

In the first part of the cited argument, Aristotle points out that – in contrast to the words of masculine and feminine gender – not all case forms of the neuter gender words formally differ from each other. As a result, one form is taken for an other (homonymic), and, due to this, false conclusions arise. However, it should be stated that the very concept of an inflectional form (as such) was not identified by Aristotle in an exact way, that is, this concept was not correlated with an adequate technical term. The Philosopher uses an ambiguous term, πτῶσις, which may designate many different functional variances of words. However, in this case, the context and the attached exemplification remove any doubts and clarify that Aristotle is talking about inflectional variants based on the case category. When he writes that the neuter pronoun τοῦτο in connection with ἔστι has the meaning of οὗτος, while in connection with εἶναι that of τοῦτον, this means that in the context of ἔστι the pronoun possesses a value of a nominative, and in the context of εἶναι (i.e. within the syntactic structure of *accusativus cum infinitivo)* has a value of an accusative. Because of the lack of appropriate terminology, the usage of non-homonymous forms of the nominative and accusative (masculine) pronoun οὗτος was the only linguistic means available to Aristotle to refer to these values of the case category. In order to prove the fact that the pronoun τοῦτο, which occurs in both contexts, does not represent the same πτῶσις (case), the Philosopher points to the (masculine) noun Κορίσκος, which in each context acquires a different form, i.e. ἔστι Κορίσκος, but εἶναι Κορίσκον. This formal difference (Κορίσκος vs. Κορίσκον) is to prove *per analogiam* that the pronoun τοῦτο also does not represent the same case when used in both contexts. This way Aristotle recognized the phenomenon of syncretism (homonymy) of particular case forms (πτώσεις) of the pronoun τοῦτο, and correctly associated this phenomenon with the neuter gender (μεταξύ).

In the second section of the discussed passage, Aristotle makes a more general attempt to determine the relationship between the division of nouns into gender classes on the one hand, and the formal and

semantic properties of nouns and characteristics of their inflectional case forms (πτώσεις) on the other. Here, the Philosopher directly refers to the gender classification that was introduced by Protagoras and points out the inapplicability of the classification's criterion, which is reflected in the adopted nomenclature. What he meant was that the Protagorean word division into 'masculine', 'feminine', and 'names of things', which was based on the semantic criterion, does not take into account strictly linguistic properties of the respective words. Aristotle points out that the nouns classified as σκεύη ('names of things') based on this criterion do not constitute a uniform group from the point of view of their linguistic properties, because some of them, in connection with ἔστι and εἶναι (i.e. in the nominative and accusative), are represented not by homonymic, but rather by non-homonymic word forms (πτώσεις), i.e. forms that differ in their phonetic shape. Yet, he identified this property as characteristic for masculine (such as Κορίσκος) and feminine nouns. Thus, he identifies the group of nouns that signify things in a way that clearly suggests a departure from Protagoras' systematics, describing them as "so-called 'names of things'" (τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν). For his part, Aristotle characterizes them as „having the form of a name of a female or a male creature" (ἐχ όντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν) and contraposes them to those nouns that "have the form of a name of a thing" (σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν) and are characterized by the homonymy of their πτώσεις, i.e. to actual grammatical neuters.

The division of names of things into those "having the form of a name of a female or a male creature" and those "having the form of a name of a thing" proves that Aristotle was aware that noun semantics (i.e. the specificity of their *designata*) is not the criterion that determines their strictly linguistic (grammatical) properties. In this respect, Aristotle's claim that the property in which the form (πτῶσις) of a noun is different depending on whether it occurs in connection with ἔστι or with εἶναι, refers not only to the strictly masculine (e.g. Κορίσκος) and feminine nouns, but also to the "so-called names of things" that have the form of a masculine or feminine name (...οἷόν "ἔστι Κορίσκος", "εἶναι Κορίσκον". Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος

κλῆσιν), is particularly important. As an example of the "so-called names of a thing" nouns, which have the form of a masculine and feminine noun (τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν), Aristotle mentions ἀσκός 'goatskin' and κλίνη 'bed'. In reference to these names, he once again emphasizes that, as in the case of Κορίσκος, their πτώσεις will formally differ depending on whether they occur in connection with ἔστι or with εἶναι, i.e. in nominative and accusative, respectively (διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι διοίσει). Distinguishing the „names of things" (σκεύη) based on a semantic criterion and contraposing them with masculine and feminine nouns (ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα) was thus presented as irrelevant from the point of view of strictly linguistic properties of all nouns. Instead, homonymy of certain case forms (πτώσεις) was (implicitly) pointed out as a distinctive feature that characterizes nouns that are different than masculine and feminine nouns (and different than "so-called names of things, which have a masculine or a feminine noun form"). As mentioned before, the nouns that are characterized by this homonymy were described by Aristotle as "having the form of a name of a thing" (σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν). Their examples are: ξύλον 'wood' and σχοινίον 'rope'. Clearly Aristotle attempted to point out certain intra-linguistic and non-semantic properties of nouns other than masculine and feminine. And the fact that he favored a more neutral term μεταξύ for naming this third noun-class, instead of the confusing and inadequate σκεῦος, is yet another characteristic manifestation of his refusal to accept the then-present systematics based on semantic criteria. However, as mentioned before, he did not oppose calling the nouns of the two remaining classes masculine and feminine.[14]

Thus, we may conclude that Aristotle correctly identified the grammatical neuters invoking the formal criterion consisting in the homonymy of their nominative and accusative forms. Of course, that does not mean that Aristotle solved all problems related to the grammatical gender of nouns. It is obvious that, although the formal property pointed out by Aristotle is sufficient for a correct discrimination of nouns of neuter gender, it does not enable the distinction between masculine and feminine nouns. However, one should bear in mind that the discussed

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[14]   Cf. Robins R. H., 1951, pp. 22-23.

passage treats the problem of word genders exclusively in connection with the question of the apparent solecisms, which is the principal subject of this fragment of Aristotle's disquisition. In this context, pointing out the homonymy and connecting it to the specific gender class of nouns is quite legitimate and appropriate. The fact that Aristotle did not restrict himself to defining the syncretism of πτώσεις as a distinctive property of neuter gender nouns, but in addition invoked the phonetic shape of these nouns (ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾷ, ταῦτα μόνα σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν, οἷον ξύλον, σχοινίον, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος), is, however, a certain drawback of his argument. As previously mentioned, the form of the word ending does not determine the gender of a Greek noun. Furthermore, the rule presented in this passage not only does not include all Greek neutral nouns, but also excludes some of those that were listed in the systematics put forward in the above cited fragment of the *Poetics*. The nouns that end in-ον, which are mentioned here by Aristotle (i.e. ξύλον and σχοινίον), do belong to the class of neuter gender nouns, but by no means exhaust the list of nouns belonging to this class.

Returning to the characteristics of gender found in the treatise Τέχνη γραμματική, we notice that the information referring to this category draws to a large extent on a tradition (of describing this category) that was formed earlier. The terms ἀρσενικόν and θηλυκόν, which name masculine and feminine genders, constitute variants of Protagoraen and the Aristotelian ἄρρεν and θῆλυ. Only the term οὐδέτερον, describing the neuter gender, is an innovation that replaces the Protagorean σκεῦος and the Aristotelian μεταξύ. Associating this category with the natural gender is, in addition to nomenclature, another element of the inherited tradition. It is reflected by both the adopted terminology and the concepts of (γένος) κοινόν and ἐπίκοινον. In spite of Aristotle's attempts to break away from practice of associating the gender category with semantics, no tradition was developed to apply formal criteria to describe this category. Similarly, the difference of how this category functions in relation to nouns and adjectives was not taken into account. This fact is undoubtedly related to the lack of a terminological and notional distinction between nouns and adjectives which hinders the entire Greek grammatical theory.

Neither do we find any changes in the method of treatment of the gender category in the grammatical treatises of Apollonius Dyscolus. This author also distinguishes γένος ('gender') ἀρσενικόν ('masculine'),[15] θηλυκόν ('feminine')[16] and οὐδέτερον ('neuter') and interprets the meaning of the name of the latter as a "negation of the two previous ones" (i.e. masculine and feminine: τὸ τούτων ἀποφατικόν).[17] The term κοινόν 'common' also appears in Apollonius' work, but it no longer refers directly to a gender as such, as in the Τέχνη, but rather to a specific type of nouns, which – depending on the natural sex of their *designata* – may be characterized by both masculine or feminine grammatical genders: τὰ [...] κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἐν γένει, λέγω ἐπὶ τῶν προσηγορικῶν [...], ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππος ἢ ἄνθρωπος - „ the so-called common in gender - I mean common [names] [...], as in the case of the words: ἵππος 'horse' and ἄνθρωπος 'human being'".[18] Hence, this is no longer κοινὸν γένος, but κοινὰπροσηγορικὰ (ὀνόματα). The term ἐπίκοινον was not used by Apollonius. However, he used the expression τὸ γένος ἐπικοινεῖ when writing about the fact that some nouns, while having a specific (constant) value of the grammatical gender category, may refer to both male and female *designata*, as opposed to articles, which do not possess this property.[19]

Numbers (ἀριθμοί) constitute the second inflectional category (παρεπόμενον) that is ascribed to 'name' in the Τέχνη. Their characteristics are presented in the following way:

(D.T.30,5–31,4): Ἀριθμοὶ τρεῖς· ἑνικός, δυϊκός, πληθυντικός· ἑνικὸς μὲν ὁ Ὅμηρος, δυϊκὸς δὲ τὼ Ὁμήρω, πληθυντικὸς δὲ οἱ Ὅμηροι. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες ἑνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, οἷον δῆμος χορός ὄχλος· καὶ πληθυντικοὶ κατὰ ἑνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν, ἑνικῶν μὲν ὡς Ἀθῆναι Θῆβαι, δυϊκῶν δὲ ὡς ἀμφότεροι.

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15   E.g.Uhlig G. (ed.), 1910, (= *Synt.*) I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4); 137 (113, 1).
16   *E.g. Synt.* I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4).
17   *E.g. Synt.* I, 13 (16, 2); 22 (24, 4).
18   *Synt.* II, 26 (146, 1-3).
19   *Cf. Synt.* I, 88 (75, 13-14): τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὀνόμασιν ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε καὶ τὸ γένος ἐπικοινεῖ, οὐ μὴν τοῖς ἄρθροις. See also Adv. 201, 12.

"There are three numbers: singular, dual, plural; singular: *Homer*, dual: *two Homers*, and plural: *Homers*. However, there are certain singular forms that are also used in reference to multiple [objects], for example, *people, choir, crowd*, and plural forms that are used in reference to singular or dual [objects]; the example for singular could be *Athens* or *Thebes* and *both* is an example of dual.

In this passage, the author identifies and gives examples of three numbers, that is, 'singular' (ἑνικός), 'dual' (δυϊκός) and 'plural' (πληθυντικός), which are identifiable with the three values of the grammatical (inflectional) category of number. Although the distinguished 'numbers' are not defined in any way, it is easy to determine that some semantic function is attributed here to the specified individual 'numbers'. Apart from the terminology itself, this attribution can be clearly identified in the second section of the cited passage, in which the author points out certain disproportions that occur between the suggested semantic functions of the individual 'numbers' and the number-related semantic aspect of certain words that are characterized by these 'numbers'. The fact that the author highlights these disproportions also proves that he binds the specific values of the number category with certain formal factors, which constitute one of the subjects that co-form these disproportions. Regarding this question, the expressions ἑνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι, and πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτῆρες] κατὰ ἑνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν [λεγόμενοι] are especially noteworthy, since these expressions present an extremely interesting terminological and notional distinction between words treated as formal structures that are associated with specific values of the number category (ἑνικοὶ/πληθυντικοὶ χαρακτῆρες) and the functional range of these words (κατὰ πολλῶν / κατὰ ἑνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν λεγόμενοι), that is, between formal properties of a word and its functional characteristics. Of course, this distinction was made from the perspective of the perceived inconsistency which occurs between the two confronted elements, that is between the word form, associated with the given 'number', and its

"systemic" meaning on the one hand, and the "real" meaning of the word on the other.[20]

At this point, one may recall the above-cited passage from *Sophistici Elenchi* (i.e. 14, 173b 31 – 174a 5), in which Aristotle, while describing masculine and feminine nouns that do not denote either male or female creatures but things, wrote that they "have the form of a name of a female or a male creature" and added that "some of them, though, are counted among the names of things, for example the word ἀσκός ('goatskin'), which is a masculine noun, or κλίνη ('bed'), which is a feminine noun" (ἔχει κλῆσιν [...] ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, οἷον ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοὔνομα, κλίνη δὲ θῆλυ). Thus, the Aristotelian phrase κλῆσις ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος has a relatively close (*mutatis mutandis)* parallel in the expression ἑνικὸς/πληθυντικὸς χαρακτήρ in the Τέχνη. Both terms, κλῆσις and χαρακτήρ, demonstrate that the specific values of grammatical categories were associated not only with a specific meaning, but also with some formal properties. It seems, however, that Aristotle did not discuss the formal aspect of the number category and made only one reference to it (*Poetica* 20, 1457a 18–23) as to one of the πτώσεις (ὀνόματος) based on the semantic criterion (ἡ δὲ [πτῶσις] κατὰ τὸ ἑνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος).

It is also notable that there exists an essential difference between the toponymic *pluralia tantum* words Ἀθῆναι and Θῆβαι, which exemplify the πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτῆρες] κατὰ ἑνικῶν [λεγόμενοι], and the words δῆμος, χορός, which illustrate ἑνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι in the Τέχνη. Although the words δῆμος, χορός in the singular denote a specific plurality, it is also possible to use them in the plural (δῆμοι 'peoples', χόροι 'choirs', ὄχλοι 'crowds'). Similarly, the word that exemplifies πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτῆρες] κατὰ δυϊκῶν [λεγόμενοι], i.e. ἀμφότεροι, can be used also in the dual (ἀμφοτέρω) or even the singular (ἀμφότερος 'each of two'). It seems possible that the connective καί used in the phrase identifying

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20   See also Schol. D.T. 545, 7-9: Ἀριθμός ἐστι χαρακτὴρ λέξεως δυνάμενος διάκρισιν ποσοῦ ἀναδέξασθαι, ἢ χαρακτὴρ σημαίνων ⌜ποσότητα⌝ κατὰ ἀκολουθίας· Ibid. 21-22: ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ φωναὶ ἐναντίαι τοῖς σημαινομένοις· τοῦ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ μὲν τύπος ἑνικός, τὸ δὲ σημαινόμενον πληθυντικόν.

ἐνικοὶ χαρακτῆρες should be interpreted as reflecting just these differences that exist between the words exemplifying the very ἐνικοὶ χαρ ακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι and the *pluralia tantum* words exemplifying the πληθυντικοὶ [χαρακτῆρες] κατὰ ἐνικῶν [λεγόμε νοι]. However, a clear identification of the meaning of this connective appears difficult. On the one hand, the expression: εἰσὶ δέ τινες ἐν ικοὶ χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ πολλῶν λεγόμενοι can be understood as "there exist certain forms in the singular that also (= apart from singularity) express plurality". Invoking the language of examples, this would mean that, for instance, the word δῆμος ('people'), as opposed to the form δῆμοι ('peoples'), expresses singularity, but treated as such (i.e. *in abstracto*), expresses (also) plurality (multiplicity). Thus, we would deal with a certain „relative plurality" denoted by such words as δῆμος, χορός and ὄχλος, whereas the connective καί would suggest the possibility of expressing plurality also by plural forms of these words. On the other hand, the analyzed expression can also be understood as "there exist certain forms in singular that also (= as plural forms do) express plurality". Thus, it would mean that certain words (in the singular), for example δῆμος ('people'), also (= like plural forms) express plurality, that is, they have the same meaning as plural forms. In this case, forms like δῆμος, χορός and ὄχλος would be attributed with *sui generis* "absolute plurality", fully comparable with plurality expressed by words that occur in the grammatical plural. And this "absolute plurality" would be an exact equivalent of an "absolute singularity" that is expressed by words like Ἀθῆναι and Θῆβαι. Regardless of the adopted interpretation, it can be said that the analyzed passage demonstrates a perceived contradiction between the semantic function explicitly connected with particular values of the number category, and the formal shape of the word implicitly associated with these values.

Πτώσεις, i.e. 'cases', are the last inflectional category, which the Τέχνη ascribes to ὄνομα. They were presented in the following way:

(D.T. 31, 5 – 31, 1): Πτώσεις ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ πέντε· ὀρθή, γεν ική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, κλητική. Λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ ὀνομαστ ική καὶ εὐθεῖα, ἡ δὲ γενικὴ κτητική τε καὶ πατρική, ἡ δὲ δοτικη

`ὲ ἐπισταλτική, ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ † κατ᾽ αἰτιατικήν, ἡ δὲ κλητικὴ π
ροσαγορευτική.

"There are five cases: ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, κλη
τική. The case ὀρθή is also called ὀνομαστική and εὐθεῖα; the case
γενική [is also called] κτητική and πατρική; the case δοτική [is also
called] ἐπισταλτική; the case αἰτιατική † according to αἰτιατική, and
κλητική [is also called] προσαγορευτική".

Even though the listed and named πτώσεις were not either defined
or exemplified, it cannot be doubted that the author talks about the
grammatical cases. This results not only from the entire latter tradition,
which unequivocally identified the specified πτώσεις with grammati-
cal cases, but also from the fact that the status of πτώσεις as inflec-
tional cases corresponds to the status of other παρεπόμενα ὀνόματος,
which identify other morphological and semantic properties of words
belonging to this class, the remaining inflectional properties, i.e. gen-
ders (γένη) and numbers (ἀριθμοί), among them. In addition, πτώσεις
are also ascribed – as one of παρεπόμενα – to words that belong to
the class of ἄρθρον (articles and relative pronouns) and ἀντωνυμία
(personal and possessive pronouns), and the presented exemplification
clearly proves their identity with grammatical cases.[21]

Because of the absence of descriptive characteristics in the Τέχνη,
the only information regarding the identification criteria for this cat-
egory can be obtained from the applied nomenclature. In this respect,
it is noteworthy that the term πτῶσις, which denotes the case category
as such, has functioned in Greek linguistics for an extended period of
time. This term was a specific *terminus technicus* in the frame of the
conceptual and terminological system of both Aristotle and the Sto-
ics. However, this does not mean that the mentioned representatives
of philosophical schools used the term in the sense that strictly corre-
sponded to the grammatical category of the case.

In Aristotle's works, the notion, which is denoted with the term
πτῶσις, is associated with the formal and functional variance of
words that extends not only beyond the scope of declension, but also
beyond the scope of inflection at large. It seems that the Aristotelian

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[21]   See D.T. 62, 1 and 5; 64, 2; 67, 3-6.

term πτῶσις (ὀνόματος and ῥήματος) designates the notion of a word form, which is perceived as a textual secondary representative of a noun or verb lexeme, and remains in opposition to its primary representative, which is denoted by the term ὄνομα or ῥῆμα (respectively).[22] However, the basis for the dichotomies ὄνομα – πτώσεις ὀνόματος and ῥῆμα - πτώσεις ῥήματος is not strictly grammatical but logical and semantic, which is a result of the association of lexemes of both classes, i.e. nouns and verbs, with specific logical functions, i.e. the function of a predication subject exponent, and the function of a predication exponent, respectively. In the frame of the opposition ὄνομα – πτώσεις ὀνόματος, which is more essential from the point of view of the analyzed problems, the ὄνομα should be identified with word forms that function as exponents of a predication subject. The πτώσεις ὀνόματος, in turn, are to be identified with name forms perceived as predicate co-exponents. However, in Aristotle's works, not only the noun forms in oblique cases (which are morphologically determined to constitute the predicate co-exponent as complements of the verb predicate), but also nouns in the nominative case (when used in a sentence as predicatives)[23] and derivative (mainly adjectival and adverbial) formations,[24] have the status of πτώσεις ὀνόματος. Thus, it would be wrong to equate the Aristotelian concept of πτῶσις (ὀνόματος) with a grammatical (oblique) case, because it was distinguished mainly on the basis of a logical – not grammatical – criterion, and its linguistic actualizations are constituted by word forms, which – from the grammatical point of view – remain not only in an inflectional, but also in derivational and syntactic opposition with each other.[25] The establishment of the noun πτῶσις – a derivative of the verb πίπτειν 'to fall' – as a technical term denoting this concept presumably originated

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[22]   Cf. e.g. *De interpretatione* 2, 16a 32 – 16b 5; 3, 16b 16-18; *Poetica* 20, 1457a 18-23.
[23]   Cf. *Analytica priora* I, 36, 48b 39 – 49a 5.
[24]   Cf. e.g. *Categoriae* I, 1a 11-15; *Topica* I, 15, 106b 29-107a 2; II, 9, 114a 26-114b 8; *Rhetorica* II, 23, 1397a 20-23
[25]   On πτῶσις in Aristotle see *inter alia*: Belardi W., 1985; D'Avino R., 1975; Delamarre A. J.-L., 1980; Gallavotti C., 1986; Koller H., 1958; Montanari E., 1988, pp. 161-177, 216-236; Pagliaro A., 1955; Primavesi O., 1994; Thorp J., 1989.

in a metaphorical meaning of the "falling off" or "moving away" of a word from its primary, formal and functional, status.

Also, in the Stoic dialectics, although the term πτῶσις was no longer used with reference to verbal inflectional variants, it still did not denote the grammatical case, but rather the meaning of a noun (ὄνομα) viewed as an argument of the predicate (κατηγόρημα). This results from the fact that the concept, which is denoted by the term πτῶσις, belongs to that part of Stoic dialectics that deals with what is meant (signified) by language (τόπος περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων) and is always related to the predicate (κατηγόρημα), that is, to what is meant by a verb, with which it constitutes a proposition (ἀξίωμα) or other complete expressional content (λεκτὸν αὐτοτελές). Because of the hierarchical differentiation of the logical status of arguments implied by predicates, the Stoic philosophers also introduced the notion of a 'primary argument' or 'subject argument' of the predicate (ὀρθὴ πτῶσις) and the notion of 'secondary arguments' or 'non-subject arguments' (πλάγιαι πτώσεις).[26] It should be emphasized, however, that the opposition ὀρθὴ πτῶσις – πλάγιαι πτώσεις is not tantamount to the opposition *nominative form – oblique cases forms* (seen as an opposition based on a formal differentiation of the noun-forms acting as exponents of the first- and second-type arguments), since the primary argument (i.e. ὀρθὴ πτῶσις) can be designated not only by nouns in the nominative form (like Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ 'Socrates walks'), but also by noun-forms in the oblique cases, for example, Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, 'it is a regret for Socrates'. Regarding the terms γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική (πτῶσις), which occur in Diogenes Laertius' treatise,[27] it should be stressed that we cannot be certain whether these terms functioned at all in Stoic dialectics.[28] If, however, these terms did constitute part of Stoic nomenclature, they most probably referred to the diversity of the logical status of non-subject arguments (πλάγιαι πτώσεις) within a proposition; consequently, their relation to the inflectional properties (i.e. cases) of nouns that designate these arguments could have been only indirect and equivocal and therefore

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[26]   Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII, 43-44; 63-64. See also Frede M., 1978, p. 31; Frede M., 1994, pp. 13-24; Long A. A., 1971, pp. 105-106.

[27]   VII, 65.

[28]   See e.g. De Mauro T., 1965, p. 176, footnote 33.

must remain in the sphere of hypotheses or speculations which are difficult to prove.

In effect, the term πτῶσις did not identify a strict grammatical case category in the philosophical systems that predated the grammatical tradition. Moreover, we cannot ascertain who introduced the very concept of cases as strictly inflectional word variants into Greek science and assigned them the names that are listed in the Τέχνη. There is no doubt that the grammatical theory conceived in the circle of Alexandrian philology and reflected in the Τέχνη was shaped through the merging of influences of the Peripatetic and Stoic schools, and constituted to a large extend the result of adaptation and modification of the linguistic, conceptual and terminological, systems of both schools. Even though the term πτώσεις, and the terms ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, acquired the status of names of grammatical cases (*sensu stricto*) only in the Alexandrian circle, i.e. at the end of the 3rd or in the first half of the 2nd centuries BC, the Alexandrian mode of perception of this phenomenon, which is reflected in the adopted terminology, draws on some characteristics of the earlier philosophical way of viewing this phenomenon.

The characteristic feature of the nomenclature presented in the Τέχνη is the fact that it captures individual cases in their functional aspect, and identifies them with specific semantic functions. Besides, a certain kind of division of case names into primary or proper (πτώσεις ὀνομάτων εἰσὶ πέντε· ὀρθή, γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική, κλητ ικη) and secondary (additional), which are shown as alternative to the earlier ones (λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ ὀνομαστικὴ καὶ εὐθεῖα, ἡ δὲ γενικὴ κτητική τε καὶ πατρική etc.), is quite clearly noticeable in these systematics. It seems that these primary names, and the implied functional characteristic of their *designata*, for the most part constitute a reflection of the earlier, mainly Stoic, philosophical tradition. The majority of secondary names, in turn, seem to have originated in certain innovations in the circle of philologists and grammarians. These innovations were probably the result of specific re-interpretations – which were carried out in these circles – of functional characteristics of the individual cases.

Thus, the term (πτῶσις) ὀρθή was attributed to the first case (i.e. the nominative) as its primary name. This term certainly is connected with the homonymic Stoic concept of ὀρθὴ πτῶσις, that is, with the concept of the meaning of a noun, which constitutes the subject of predication within a proposition. Therefore, it can be said that the establishment of this term as a first case name resulted from 1) the general identification (carried out in the circle of Alexandrian grammarians) of the Stoic term πτῶσις, designating the noun meaning as a predicate argument, with the noun form constituting the exponent of this argument, and 2) the fact that the exponent of the subject argument is, most frequently, the nominative form. The secondary term (πτῶσις) ὀνομαστικη, in turn, reflects, as one may guess, the general sense of language users that the nominative form of a noun is the natural form for the name of a specific *designatum*; in other words, it reflects the conviction that the natural answer to a question of how something or somebody is called will not, for example, be forms Πλάτωνος ('Plato's') or Πλάτωνι ('to Plato'), but Πλάτων ('Plato').[29] Whereas, application of the term (πτῶσις) εὐθεῖα in the function of the name for the nominative case is ascribed to Aristotle by many scholars. These scholars point to *On Sophistical Refutations* 31, 181b 35 – 182a 6 and interpret the expression οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ᾽ εὐθύ, which occurs in this passage, as precisely referring to the usage of a noun in the nominative.[30] In our opinion, such interpretation is not justified, following a careful reading of the passage:

Aristoteles, *Sophistici elenchi* 31, 181b 35 – 182a 6:

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[29]   *Cf.* Schol. D.T. 231, 17-20: Λέγει δὲ τὴν εὐθεῖαν καὶ ὀνομαστικήν, καθὸ ὀνομάζειν τινὰ βουλόμενοι ταύτῃ κεχρήμεθα· εἰ γάρ τις ἔροιτο περί τινος, ὅτι οὗτος πῶς λέγεται; ἐρεῖ τῇ εὐθείᾳ χρησάμενος Πτάτων ἢ Σωκράτης. *Ibidem* 383, 28-31: Ὀνομαστικὴ λέγεται ἡ ὀρθὴ καὶ εὐθεῖα, ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτῆς τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιτί θεμεν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῆς ὀνομάζομεν· δι᾽ αὐτῆς γὰρ ὀνομάζεται τὸ ὑπο κείμενον, εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἴη τὸ ὑποκείμενον·

[30]   Cf. D'Avino R. 1975, p. 127: „Τὸ εὐθύ (poi *casus rectus*) è invero l'altro modo aristotelico di riferirsi al nominativo (*cf. Soph. el.* 182a 3)"; Pagliaro A., 1955, p. 36, footnote 1: „Aristotele [...] in *Soph. elench.* 31, 182a 3 si riferisce al nominativo con il nesso κατ᾽ εὐθύ"; Botas V. B., 1985 p. 196 – *sub voce* εὐθεῖα πτῶσις: „Arist. Ref. Sof. 182a 3: οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ᾽ εὐθύ: "en nominativo".

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς δι' ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουμένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ

χωρὶς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον. Τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινῇ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐπὶ

τοῦ σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ῥοικοῦ, προστιθέμενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῇ ῥινὶτὸ δὲ

τῷ σκέλει συμβαίνει· ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ τὸ σιμόν, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ῥαιβὸν σημαίνει· καὶ οὐδὲν

διαφέρει εἰπεῖν ῥὶς σιμὴ ἢ ῥὶς κοίλη. Ἔστι οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ' εὐθύ· ψεῦδος

γάρ ἐστιν. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σιμὸν ῥὶς κοίλη, ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς τοδί, οἷον πάθος, ὥστ' οὐδὲν

ἄτοπον, εἰ ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ ῥίς ἐστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα ῥινός.

"Regarding the terms that are predicated – as attributes – of [other] terms that are defined by them, it should be said that what these terms mean in isolation and what they mean as part of an expression [in which they occur as attributes associated with other terms] is not the same. Because, for example, the word 'crooked', when understood *in abstracto*, means [always] the same, [i.e. something that can be said of] both something that is turned up and something that is bent; however, in connection with a specific thing, it can have different meanings, of which one is appropriate for a nose and the other one for legs. For, in the first case, it means 'up-turnedness' and in the second 'bentness'. However, the expression 'turned-up nose' does not differ from 'crooked nose' in its content. Whereas, an expression that directly (i.e. non-attributively) captures this concept, cannot be regarded as identical with the previously mentioned ones, because such reasoning would be erroneous. This results from the fact that the '(nose) up-turnedness' is not the same as 'crooked nose' but to a certain extent constitutes a property of such a nose. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that a turned-up nose is a nose that possesses a crookedness, which characterizes this nose".

The sense of this argument can be summarized by saying that the expression 'turned-up nose' (ῥὶς σιμή), in its content, does not differ from the expression 'crooked nose' (ῥὶς κοίλη), but differs from

the expression '(nose) up-turnedness' (τὸ σιμὸν (ῥινός)), which was defined just as λέξις κατ᾽ εὐθύ. In other words, Aristotle contrasts the expression '(nose) up-turnedness' with the expression 'turned-up nose',[31] and defines it as λέξις κατ᾽ εὐθύ.

The term λέξις κατ᾽ εὐθύ, which characterizes the expression '(nose) up-turnedness' and at the same time captures the essence of its disparity compared to the expression 'turned-up nose', cannot then be linked with the case in which this expression occurs (i.e. the nominative), because both parts of the presented opposition, that is τὸ σιμὸν (ῥινός) '(nose) up-turnedness' and ῥὶς σιμή 'turned-up nose', occur in the nominative. Hence, the term λέξις κατ᾽ εὐθύ cannot be interpreted as an 'expression in the nominative', because the expression which is contrasted with it, i.e. 'turned-up nose' (ῥὶς σιμή), is also in the nominative. So, since the point is not to contrast the expression in the nominative with that in the oblique case, the term εὐθύ cannot be identified with the nominative. It can be inferred from the context that this term should rather be identified with a word that captures the denoted property "directly" (κατ᾽ εὐθύ), that is as a (noun) name of this property (τὸ σιμὸν 'up-turnedness') – in contrast to a word (i.e. adjective) that captures this property "indirectly", that is attributively (σιμός 'up-turned'). It seems, then, that the term εὐθεῖα (πτῶσις) acquired a technical meaning of the name of the nominative case only either among latter pupils of Aristotle[32] or in the circle of Alexandrian grammarians, in which it became a parallel term to the synonymous ὀρθὴ (πτῶσις).[33]

The term (πτῶσις) γενική is presented as a primary name of the second case. The adjective γενικός occurs in both Aristotle's and Stoic's works.[34] However, in these works this term does not acquire a grammatical (or linguistic, in general) meaning, but means simply 'regarding γένος'. At the same time, the term γένος denotes the concept of

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[31]   And, of course, with the expression 'crooked nose', as equivalent to 'turned-up nose'.

[32]   Cf. e.g. Ammonius, *In Aristotelis „De interpretatione" comm.* 42, 30 – 43, 16 = Von Arnim J. (ed.), 1903-1905, (= SVF), II, 164.

[33]   On the late ancient and Byzantine grammarian commentaries, which justify usage of the terms ὀρθή, εὐθεῖα, and πτῶσις in relation to the nominative, see Thorp J., 1989, pp. 317-324.

[34]   E.g. *Topica.* 5, 102a 36; 4, 101b, 18; SVF II, 28, 1.

a broadly understood type or class of objects (beings), which include narrower subclasses (species), i.e. εἴδη. In addition, meanings related to the 'origin', 'genesis', etc. are acquired by the adjective γενικός relatively late; earlier, they were attributes of such forms as γεννητικός or γονικός. Due to lexical reasons, then, the essence of the functional characteristic of the genitive case, which was initially ascribed to it by the Greeks and reflected in the name (πτῶσις) γενική, should be associated not with expressing the 'origin' or 'genesis', but rather with expressing something that is (as philosophically understood) 'generic'. Thus, the genitive would be a case that expresses γένος, i.e. a class including objects or concepts designated by words (nouns) that stand next to the noun in this case, for instance: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν

ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ   [...], κτλ., καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν   [...], τὰ δὲ [...], κτλ.35.

With time, the Alexandrian philologists probably reinterpreted the semantic function of this case, ascribing to it a role of an exponent of possession or affinity relations. This resulted in the occurrence of its secondary names in the form of the terms κτητική and πατρική (πτῶσις). In this respect, Appolonius Dyskolus is very instructive. The term πατρική was not used at all by him, whereas he employed the term κτητική exclusively in reference to possessive pronouns. However, while discussing pronouns he wrote: ἡ ἀπὸ τ οῦ ἐγώ γενικὴ ἐπὶ κτῆμα φέρεται, διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἐνίων κτητικ ὴ ἐκαλεῖτο – „the pronoun ἐγώ in the genitive is [often] associated with the object of possession; hence, some people generally call [this case] 'possessive'". (*Synt.* II, 117 (216, 12-13)). Although Apollonius consistently applies the term γενική (πτῶσις) to the genitive, he also ascribes a possessive function to this case: δι᾽ ἄλλης δὲ πτώσεως ο ὐκ ἐμφανίζεται κτῆσις ἢ διὰ μόνης γενικῆς – "possession cannot be expressed with any other case but the genitive" (*Synt.* I, 68 (59, 7-8)).36 Besides, he provides the (noun in) the genitive accompanied by

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35   Cf. Steinthal H., 1891: 302: „Wie nun ἐθνικὸν ὄνομα ein Name zur Bezeichnung des ἔθνος ist u.s.w, so ist πτῶσις γενική der Casus zur Bezeichnung der Gattung". Regarding interpretation of the meaning of the term πτῶσις γενική („casus generalis"); see also: Pohlenz M., 1939: 172-173; De Mauro T., 1965: 206-208; Calboli G., 1972, pp. 97-99; Allen W. S., Brink C. O., 1980, pp. 64-65.

36   See also *Synt.* 103 (86, 6-7).

a preposition ὑπό with a function of expressing an agent in the passive structures that express experiencing: κατὰ παθητικὴν σύνταξιν ἀνθ ὑπαγομένων [...] τῶν τε δρασάντων εἰς γενικὴν μετὰ τῆς ὑπό – „in the passive structure [...] the doer passes to the genitive with the preposition ὑπό" (*Synt.* III, 159 (405, 10-11)).[37]

The name of the dative, i.e. (πτῶσις) δοτική, is usually interpreted as a result of identification of this case function with the expression of 'a person who is given something'. The accuracy of this common view[38] is challenged by (at least) two circumstances. The first has a general linguistic character and results from the actual manner in which this case functions in the Greek language. Namely, the point is that on the basis of frequentative analysis, which can be conducted on any corpus of Greek texts, it is easy to prove that the usage of the dative in the function of an exponent of 'a person who is given something' occurs relatively rarely. This case much more frequently constitutes either an exponent of different kinds of adverbial functions (instrumental, locational, temporal, sociative, causative etc.), or the complement of verbs like μέλει, χράο μαι, ἕπομαι, ἀκολουθέω, δοκῶ etc.[39] Hence, the question arises: why should the very function of the dative, which is rarely actualized and is distributively limited to a small group of verbs meaning to 'give', 'offer', 'hand over', etc., have been perceived by the Greeks (and encoded in the name of this case) as central or fundamental.

The second circumstance that challenges the accuracy of the interpretation of the dative as a case expressing 'a person who is given something' has a terminological character, and refers to the structural semantic properties of a morphological formation constituted by the term δοτική. These properties would require that the derivative formation with the suffix (-τ)-ικός (like δοτικός) be provided with a general meaning, which should be defined rather as 'referring to what is given',

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[37]   *Cf.* also *Synt.* III, 170 (417, 6-7): τοῦ μέντοι πάθους ἐγγίζει ἡ κατὰ γενικὴν σύνταξις – "to express a sensation, the construction with the genitive is appropriate"; *Synt.* 186 (428, 13–129, 1): ἡ γενικὴ ἐμερίζετο εἰς παθητικὴν διάθεσιν – "the genitive was assigned to the passive".

[38]   See e.g. Pohlenz M., 1939, p. 171; Calboli G. (1972), p. 99; Allen W. S., Brink C. O. (1980), p. 64.

[39]   See De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 157-165. *Cf.* also. Schwyzer E., Debrunner A., 1950, pp. 137-168; Auerbach M., Golias M., 1952, pp. 174-179.

(or to 'the one who gives'), than 'referring to the one who is given'. Taking both arguments into account, it cannot be ruled out that the origin of the name (πτῶσις) δοτικη is related to the fact that Greeks originally perceived the dative as a case that expresses 'what is (in a sentence additionally) given', that is as a case that designates any additional "data" communicated in a sentence; "data" that would refer to time, location, manner, cause and other circumstances that accompany the predicate content of this sentence.[40] The advantage of this interpretation consists in the fact that it assumes that the dative function also was captured in a "philosophical" manner, congruent with how the functions of the other cases were perceived and reflected in their names, that is, the nominative as a case of predicate subject, the genitive as a case expressing affiliation (of the *designatum* of a co-occurring noun to the specific class), and the accusative as a case that designates a result or an object of the action expressed in a sentence (see below).[41] Now, the secondary name of the dative, that is (πτῶσις) ἐπισταλτική, probably results from the association of this case function with the epistolary formula of Κλέων᾽ Ἀθηναίοις χαίρειν type.

The accusative name (πτῶσις) αἰτιατική comes from the term αἰτιατόν which was used by Aristotle[42] to denote an effect that is the result of a specific cause – αἰτία. In the Peripatetic and Stoic circles, the semantic range of αἰτία ('cause') includes all actions or processes that change or modify reality, whereas the term αἰτιατόν denotes everything that was caused by these processes or subject to them. Thus, the fourth case, (πτῶσις) αἰτιατική, was terminologically defined as an exponent of this that constitutes an effect or a subject of action (designated by a verb) that has a causative character. In contrast to the dative, which expresses additional and external circumstances of the process communicated in a sentence by a predicative expression, the accusative has the status of the exponent of an element that constitutes an

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[40]   See De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 202-205 *et passim*.

[41]   *Ibidem*, pp. 199-200 gives special attention to the problem of interpretative coherence in relation to the original meanings of case names. He was the first to oppose the association of the name δοτική with a 'person who is given something', considering it incoherent with commonly accepted interpretations of the genitive and accusative names, which connect them with more general, semantic and philosophical, concepts.

[42]   *Anal. post*. I, 9, 76a; II, 16, 98a.

inherent and indispensable component of this process, that is, of an element that obligatorily complements and, at the same time, conditions this process.

Unfortunately, damages to the text of the Τέχνη make it hard to decipher and interpret the information about a possible second name of this case. The crucial section of the preserved text sounds almost like a tautology: ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ † κατ᾽ αἰτιατικήν – „(case) αἰτιατική [is also called] according to (?) αἰτιατική". Because of that, some commentators propose in this place the reading ἡ δὲ αἰτιατικὴ κατα ιτιατική, i.e. „(case) αἰτιατική [is also called] καταιτιατική", which points out the origin of associating the name of this case with 'accusing' (καταιτιάομαι 'I accuse', 'I blame'; cf. lat. *accusativus*).[43] However, we would like to point out that the verb αἰτιάομαι also has the meaning 'to accuse', and in common and non-philosophical usage the noun αἰτία also primarily meant 'accusation' and 'charge'. Therefore, the point of departure for the later interpretation of the accusative as a case connected with "accusing" can also be constituted by the very name (πτῶσις) αἰτιατική, which, actually, was commonly associated not with the philosophical term αἰτιατόν, but rather with the common meaning of the word αἰτία ('accusation,' charge').[44]

The name of the vocative (πτῶσις) κλητική alludes to the functional specificity of this case as a word form that is used as an appeal or call. The name (πτῶσις) προσαγορευτική conceives the vocative as a word form that functions commonly as an element of greeting (salutatory) or welcoming formulas.[45]

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[43] *Cf.* J. Lallot, 1989, p. 146.

[44] F. A. Trendelenburg, 1936 was the first to suspect that the Latin case names, at least partially, resulted from an erroneous interpretation of the corresponding Greek names. Particularly, he considered the term *accusativus* to be based on an erroneous conviction that the Greek term αἰτιατικὴ πτῶσις derives from the verb αἰτιάομαι 'I accuse', whereas, in fact, the name of this case originated from the term αἰτιατόν; hence, the appropriate Latin name would be *causativus*. On this subject, see also Pohlenz M., 1939, pp. 167-170; Calboli G., 1972, pp. 99-102.

[45] *Cf. e.g.* Schol. D. T. 384, 16-21:

Τὴν κλητικὴν εἶπε προσαγορευτικήν, ἐπειδὴ προσκαλούμενοί τινα καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι ταύτῃ χρώμεθα, ὅτι δι᾽ αὐτῆς, φησί, καλοῦμεν καὶ προσαγορεύομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες λέγοντες, καὶ πάλιν ⌊ὦ⌋ χαῖρ᾽, Ἀχιλεῦ, καὶ χαῖρέ (μοι),

To sum up, it can be said that the notional and terminological system that refers to grammatical cases was, to a high degree, shaped under the influence of Peripatetic and Stoic philosophers. The evidence for this fact is provided by the semantic characteristics of the basic case names. The majority of these names originated from concepts that were conceived in these circles and look at the individual case forms from the perspective of their general functional properties which are determined by their position in the structure of a statement. In other words, this terminology presents the cases as word forms that constitute the exponents of such general, logical and semantic, categories as predication subject ((πτῶσις) ὀρθή), class of objects ((πτῶσις) γενική), result or object of a causative process ((πτῶσις) αἰτιατική), and additional circumstances co-occurring with this process (πτῶσις) δοτική).

However, the understanding of logical and philosophical concepts, on which the case naming system was founded, disappears as a result of the emancipation of grammar science in the circle of Alexandrian philologists and the loosening of its ties to philosophy. This process was accompanied by the phenomenon of proposing concepts that were conceived in this circle and were related to the essence and characteristics of the individual case forms. This resulted in the semantic reinterpretation of the existing terminological system on the one hand, and in the occurrence of new, alternative names of the individual cases on the other. Both of these processes were signs of a certain trivialization of the way the case functions became perceived by the grammarians. Within grammatical theory, namely, the essence of particular cases were reduced to the indication of narrow and specific content elements, which in many cases were determined by the semantic structure of specific syntagms to which the individual cases were related.[46] Thus, the essence of the nominative, i.e. the exponent of predication subject (πτῶσις ὀρθή / εὐθεῖα), was reduced to a word form used for naming individual objects, that is, to a function that is actualized within the syntagm ὀνομάζεταί τις,[47] which, in turn, is reflected in the name

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ὦ Πάτροκλε κατὰ τὴν κλητικὴν πτῶσιν, ὡς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει χα
ῖρε, θεά. See also ibid. 232, 8-10, and Choeroboscus G., 1965 111, 22-24.

[46]   *Cf.* De Mauro T., 1965, pp. 193-194, 196-197.
[47]   See above, note 29.

(πτῶσις) ὀνομαστική. The generic function of the genitive was narrowed down to express family or possession relations, which resulted in both connecting the meaning of 'origin' with the term γενική, and the introduction of variant names πατρική and κτητικη.[48] The concept of the dative as a case that designates (additional) "data" that accompany the process described in a sentence, was replaced with a concept that is determined by either syntagm δίδωμί τινί (τι), which gives this case the status of an exponent of 'the person who is given something', or syntagm (τίς) τινι χαίρειν, which gives this case the status of an exponent of an addressee of an epistolary greeting formula ((πτῶσις) ἐπισταλτική).[49] Finally, the essence of the accusative as a case that

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[48]   Cf. e.g Choeroboscus, 1965, 111, 15-18:

Ἡ δὲ γενικὴ λέγεται κτητική τε καὶ πατρικὴ ἐπειδὴ δι'
αὐτῆς ποιούμεθα τὰ γένη, τὰ κτήματα καὶ τὰς πατρίδας, οἷον Ἀριστάρχου
υἱός, Ἀριστάρχου ἀγρός,
Ἀριστάρχου πατήρ, Ἀριστάρχου οἶκος. Cf. also Schol. D.T. 231, 28-30; 384, 1-7.

[49]   *Cf. e.g.* Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III, 177 (422, 7-8): ἅπαντα τὰ περιποίησιν δηλοῦντα [...] ἐπὶ δοτικὴν φέρεται ‧ „All verbs that express giving [...], adopt the dative". In another place (ibid. 186 (428, 13 – 429, 9)), the Alexandrian grammarian presents the dative as a case connoted by verbs meaning reciprocal action. According to De Mauro T., (1965, p. 154), the nowadays widespread view that Greeks gave the dative the name ⸢πτῶσις⸣ δοτική because this case designates a 'person who is given something', is a result of the same misunderstanding of original meanings of the Greek cases names, which was also shared by the (later) ancient grammarians, especially the Latin ones. Cf. e.g. Prisc., Inst. I, 185, 14 sqq. (Keil): „ [...] genetivus autem, qui et possessivus appellatur: genetivus [...] quod genus per ipsum significamus, ut genus est Priami […]; possessivus vero, quod possessionem quoque per eum significamus ut Priami regnum [...]; paternus etiam dicitur, quod per eum casum pater demonstratur, ut Priami filius [...]; post hunc est dativus, quem etiam commendativum quidam nuncupaverunt, ut do homini illam rem et commendo homini illam rem [...]; quarto loco est accusativus sive causativus: accuso hominem et in causa hominem facio". Similarly Isidorus, Etym. I 31, 32: "Nominativus casus dictus quia per eum aliquid nominamus, ut hic magister. Genetivus quia per eum genus cuiuscumque quaerimus, ut huius magistri filius vel quod rem [cuiuscumque] significamus, ut huius magistri liber. Dativus quia per eum nos dare alicui aliquid demonstramus, ut da huic magistro. Accusativus, quis per eum aliquem accusamus, ut accuso hunc magistrum. Vocativus, quia per eum aliquem vocamus, ut o magister". It is noteworthy, by the way, that Priscian's interpretation of the accusative name („accusativus sive causativus") seems to show a deeper understanding of the meaning of the term; the enclosed exemplification is, however, rather disappointing („accuso hominem et in causa hominem facio"). On this subject, see also W. S. Allen, C. O. Brink (1980), p. 69. The author of the treatise known as Ars Anony-

denotes τὸ αἰτιατόν (implied by a predicate) was reduced to the expression of a subject of an accusation (αἰτιάομαί τινα), which resulted from the reinterpretation of the meaning of the term (πτῶσις) αἰτιατική and connecting it with the term αἰτία and its common meaning of 'accusation'.

In conclusion, it should be said that semantic criteria played the principal part in describing the nominal inflectional categories, which were identified as specific παρεπόμενα ὀνόματος. This was reflected primarily in the adopted nomenclature. The gender category of nouns was clearly associated with the property of the natural sex of their *designata*, the number category with numeric quantification of the sets constituted by these *designata*, and the case category with the logical status of things denoted by nouns in individual cases. No consistent methodology was developed that would take into account the fact that individual inflectional categories can also be semantically empty and constitute an exponent of the intra-textual (syntactic) function (which, of course, pertains primarily – but not exclusively – to attributively used adjectival lexemes). This does not mean, however, that the formal factor was completely absent in the process of shaping Greek grammar theory. Aristotle's determination in searching for formal criteria of nouns' gender classes is noteworthy in this respect. On the one hand, this attitude prompted the Philosopher to formulate a strictly formal – but incorrect – noun gender classification, which was based on the formal shape of their ending (in the singular nominative). On the other hand, it produced an essential effect in the form of the discovery of specific case form syncretism, that is the syncretism of nominative and

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ma Bernensis (VIII–IX century A.D. – see Manitius M., 1911, pp. 468-469) presents doubts regarding the existing tradition of interpreting the names of the accusative and dative in a more clear way: „Sic dativus aliquid extrinsecus addi demonstrat, vel accedere, ut do huic viro. Accusativus vim accusandi habet et actum alterius declarat, quasi patiatur ab eo […] . Sed non recta ratione dicitur: si enim dicamus laudate dominum et magnificate eum nullam accusationem habet. Item si dicamus laudo hunc magistrum non habet accusationem. Rectius ergo ait grammaticus [scil. Virgilius Maro] »Accusativus dicitur hoc est activus casus«. Est enim verbum Graecum 'accuso', hoc est ago, cuius praeteritum participium est accusatus, genetivo accusati addita -vus syllaba fit 'accusativus', id est activus casus, eo quod verbo activo servit. Accusativus ergo, sicut diximus, activus casus dicitur, derivatus a verbo Graeco 'accuso', quod interpretatur ago" (p. 86 ed. Hagen).

accusative, as a characteristic formal property of neuter nouns. Besides, the number category was also associated with some formal factors. Evidence for this can be found in the Τέχνη, where the expression ἑνικοὶ / πληθυντικοὶ χαρακτῆρες, identifying word forms representing individual values of the number category, is contrasted with the expression κατὰ πολλῶν / κατὰ ἑνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊκῶν λεγόμενοι, which identifies the semantic properties of those forms.

In general, it cannot be doubted, however, that Greek grammar was characterized by a clear tendency to marginalize the formal aspect of inflection and to perceive this phenomenon mainly in its semantic aspect. The commentary of the author of the *scholia* to the Τέχνη provides peculiar evidence for this fact. Regarding the cases, the author states unequivocally that they belong to the realm of what is denoted by expressions, and not to the realm of the expressions themselves. Otherwise – says the grammarian – the name 'Atreides', for which he lists at least 4 different genitive forms, would have more than 5 cases. The scholia's author, however, did not distinguish between concepts that in modern grammar are identified as the formal and functional paradigm of a lexeme, or the inflectional form and the flecteme, and this prevented him from a more precise description of the problem. However, it is hard to blame the ancients for not being aware of these concepts.

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