Classica Cracoviensia
XV, 2012

BOGDAN BURLIGA
(UNIVERSITY OF GDAŃSK)

DO THE KINGS LIE?
ROYAL AUTHORITY AND HISTORIAN'S OBJECTIVITY IN ARRIAN'S *ANABASIS*

KEYWORDS: kingship, virtues, truthfulness, ideology, Hellenistic monarchy, historiography

SUMMARY: Taking departure from Arrian's famous statement (*Anab*. 1, *Praef*. 2) that he mainly relied on Ptolemy Soter's account of Alexander the Great's history since Ptolemy was the king and lies should be avoided by him, the roots of the idea of the royal truthfulness are discussed. It is claimed that the Greek political thought about monarchy and the institution of kingship had a strong ethical flavor but the argument of the kings' veracity was not especially stressed out. Arrian, however, has found it both in Alexander the Great's ideology and the ideology of the royal court in Ptolemaic Egypt. Essentially, however, the origins of the truthfulness idea are to be sought in the royal Oriental (Achaemenid especially), official ethics, under the influence of which Alexander certainly remained. The novelty of Arrian the historian's decision should by thus appreciated. It does not mean that Arrian's account of Alexander's expedition is ideally objective but it certainly means that in his effort to give a possibly unbiased history of the Macedonian king's achievements, he tried to do his best.

1. INTRODUCTION

Explaining the reasons of his decision to rely on Ptolemy's account of the deeds of Alexander the Great, Arrian states in his famous (first) preface (*Anab.* 1, *Praef.* 2):

> ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ Πτολεμαῖός τε καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος πιστότεροι ἔδοξαν ἐς τὴν ἀφήγησιν (1), ὁ μὲν ὅτι συνεστράτευσε βασιλεῖ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, Ἀριστόβουλος, (2) Πτολεμαῖος δὲ πρὸς τῷ ξυστρατεῦσαι ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ βασιλεῖ ὄντι αἰσχρότερον ἢ τῳ ἄλλῳ ψεύσασθαι ἦν· (3) ἄμφω δέ, ὅτι τετελευτηκότος ἤδη Ἀλεξάνδρου ξυγγράφουσιν [ὅτε] αὐτοῖς ἥ τε ἀνάγκη καὶ ὁ μισθὸς τοῦ ἄλλως τι ἢ ὡς συνηνέχθη ξυγγράψαι ἀπῆν
>
> ("but in my view Ptolemy and Aristobulus are more trustworthy in their narrative, since **(1)** Aristobulus took part in king Alexander's expedition, and **(2)** Ptolemy not only did the same, but as he himself was a king, mendacity would have been more dishonourable for him than for anyone else; **(3)** again, both wrote when Alexander was dead and neither was under any constraint or hope of gain to make him set down anything but what actually happened"; ed. A.G. Roos & G. Wirth, Teubner; tr. P.A. Brunt, Loeb)[1].

Arrian's 'methodological' statement, partly alluding to Thucydides (1, 97, 2), is well notorious and much has been debated about the motivation for which the historian from Nicomedia chose the works of Ptolemy I Soter (*FGrH* 138) and Aristobulus of Cassandreia (*FGrH*

* I thank Professors Sabine Müller (Universität in Kiel), and Marek J. Olbrycht from Rzeszów University for the reading of an earlier draft of this article and their valuable remarks. I am also indebted to Dr. Agnieszka Fulińska (Jagiellonian University) for enabling me to consult her papers.

[1] The division of this passage in to the three segments is mine, so are the emphases and asterisks in the paper – B. B. In the new translation by Pamela Mensch (in: Romm 2010: 3) the sentence runs: 'it would have been more disgraceful for him to speak falsely than for another'; so is the older Penguin's rendering by Aubrey de Sélincourt (1978: 41) has: 'it is more disgraceful for a King to tell lies than for anyone else'.

139)[2] as his two main sources[3]. Of three causes given by Arrian, the first (autopsy) agrees with the remarks of Herodotus (1, 8, 2), Thucydides (1, 22, 2-3), or Polybius (12, 26d, 3 – 12, 27, 6); moreover, the superiority of Ptolemy and Aristobulus over other writers relied on their participation in the events (Polybius' claim: 12, 22, 6). In the third explication the argument runs that that both wrote voluntarily (that's, without any compulsion, ἢ ἀνάγκη), and behind their motives no respect for material prize (ὁ μισθὸς) stood[4]. By implication, here we are told, the two reports are free from the distortions caused by any actual restraints or obligations of the authors toward their employers[5]. But what about the second argument?[6]

The sentiment attracted less attention than it certainly deserves, although it remains perhaps the most interesting, if not intriguing[7]. At first glance it looks surprisingly as being totally opposite to the claims of Thucydides (and others). The Bithynian historian has us just to believe that king Ptolemy's book provided more trustworthy narrative on the ground because it was king's. When reading such claim, immediately impression arises that Arrian contradicts himself and abandons that proud Herodotean ideal of inquiry (ἱστορίη). In consequence, to many modern critics Arrian's point in his methodology is ingenuous; it also sounds awkwardly and even, some of the modern authorities

---

[2] Cf. Brunt 1974a: 65; Pearson 1960.

[3] However, there is a reasonable ground to maintain that Ptolemy was more important source for Arrian than Aristobulus (cf. *Anab*. 6, 2, 4), see Strasburger 1934: 8-9; Bosworth 1976: 117; Bosworth 1980: 43; cf. also Baynham 2003: 11-12; Rzepka 2006: 14; *pace* Stadter 1980.

[4] Bosworth 1980: 43, cites Lucian, *Hist. conscr*. 39, on the occasion blaming Ctesias for this; see Avenarius 1956: 46.

[5] Professor Bosworth (note 4, above) reminds that Alexander was supposed to have praised the truthfulness of Homer who also wrote his tale long after the events they happened (Lucian, *Hist. conscr*. 40). By the way, this arguments reminds Tacitus' famous claim of avoiding partiality, *studium.*

[6] Here I omit the probem of *axiophegetera* (deeds worthier narrating) in Arrian's arguing, important as it stands, also in other historians, cf. Burliga 2012; see Wiseman 1993: 135-136; with the reply of Bosworth 2003: 171.

[7] By the way, the fact that Arrian call Ptolemy 'the king' does not provide a secure evidence that Ptolemy composed his history of the Alexander's campaigns after 306, when, following the example of Antigonus the 'Monophtalmus', he also began to employ such a title.

add, preposterously. As far as it relies on author's *bona fides,* his argument should be interpreted as author's own creed, his *pium desiderium* at best[8], having nothing to do, in fact, with the pretensions to a serious historical inquiry[9].

The problem of why does Arrian confess a belief in king Ptolemy's veracity is far from simple, however, and the reason is obvious: it seems that here historian follows a conviction the Greeks expressed – occasionally (cf. note 60, below) – on the monarchs since the times of Diadochs: it was rooted in turn in the claim that the kings were regarded as moral authorities; representing higher ethical virtues (sometimes being also their physical incarnation: see Hekster, Fowler 2005: 9), they were seen as the guardians of just regimes (Roisman 1984: 373-385).

This observation allows us to infer that Arrian – certainly well acquainted with the flood of the older Greek political writings and Hellenistic kingship treatises – might have found among them a claim that kings' supreme position presupposes also telling truth, so, if such the case, writing truly[10], and then used it in his study of Alexander. Unsophisticated as it seems today to many scholars, the argument appears to be nevertheless a controversial novelty in Greek historical writing and it constitutes, I believe, Arrian's considerable 'methodological' contribution to the Greek theory of historiography (Marincola 1997: 285).

---

[8] See Cartledge 2004; Gorteman 1958: 258, note 3, quotes the severe judgement of Sir Ernest Barker 1946 who even saw in it a proof for Arrian's sense of humour; of the same opinion were Brunt 1983: 536, and Romm 2005: xx ('comically naïve'); but cf. Spencer 2003: 7. Indeed, favourable opinion Arrian had of Ptolemy's work may be seen in the very beginnings of the *Anabasis*: it looks like Ptolemy stood a commanding authority and a true engineer of the Arrian's work; cf. Hidber 2004: 167 (*pace* Stadter 1980). But Arrian's laudatory opinion of Ptolemy' history must be seen in comparison to other books on Alexander, cf. notes 66 and 70, below.

[9] Generally Fornara 1983: 47; see Marincola 1997.

[10] The case of *Anab.* 6. 11. 8 is revealing, where Arrian takes issue with Curtius (9. 5. 21), Plutarch (*Alex.* 63; with Hamilton's note 1969: 175f.) and Justin (*Epit.* 13, 4, 10; with the commentary of Heckel 1997: 264, *ad* 2, 10, 3). Arrian might have found such sentiments during his lecture of Xenophon's works, cf. note 60, below.

My aim in this paper is twofold: first, by looking at Greek literature on kingship[11] just to ascertain – as far as it is possible – what place took truthfulness-argument in it (section 2); secondly, by speculating what were Arrian's sources in juxtaposing this additional 'royal' argument in his *Preface*, to present a small rehabilitation – it is needed – of the Bithynian historian in this respect (section 3).

2. THEORIZING ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ, LOOKING FOR ἈΛΗΘΕΙΑ: A GREEK TALE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

It is by no means my purpose in this section to present something resembling a 'short outline' of the Greek monarchical thought: the subject is too vast and it has found its realization in several excellent modern treatments[12]. My goal is by far modest, but in order to try understanding Arrian's way of thinking, it would be necessary to make a few words about the kingship literature where claims about ruler's truthfulness eventually may be found. In doing so, a natural point of departure would be the character of this writing.

According to the well known entry Βασιλεία, inserted in the tenth century Byzantine encyclopedia of Suidas (the *Suda*)[13], kingship was gained by men who can command an army: οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδοῦσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου (ed. A. Adler)[14]. This explication looks as

[11] By 'theory' here I mean very broad category of writings: their common feature was pedagogical, instructive character; cf. Hornblower 2006: 151; on 'practical', that's, instructive meaning inherent in the Greek word *theoria* cf. Frank 2008: 177-178; generally: Turasiewicz 1986.

[12] Kaerst 1898; Goodenough 1928; Schubart 1937; Adcock 1953; Hadot 1972; Aalders 1968; Aalders 1975; Walbank 1984; Hahm 2000; Schultze 2001; Murray 2007; Eckstein 2009.

[13] Also in Austin 1981: no 37; Shipley 2000: 63-64 took it for granted that it came from a lost Hellenistic treatise on kingship; see also the remarks of Wipszycka, Bravo 2010: 143.

[14] Cf. Walbank 1984: 249.

a realist's credo (Smith 1988: 49)[15], as it provides no definition but reflection on common practice how powerful men become kings[16] – without detailed comments on the means used to achieve this goal[17]. Accordingly, the second part of the entry offers an illustration of this idea, explaining the ways the king Philip of Macedon and the commanders of Alexander captured power whereas the latter's legitimate son could not realize it (ὸν γὰρ υἱὸν κατὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν ἡ συγγένεια διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυναμίαν)[18].

Today the *Suda* entry is supposed to have been be excerpt from a lost Hellenistic work concerning kingship (Chaniotis 2005: 58)[19]. Although epitomator's interest focuses on the way the warlords access their royal status, the lost treatise probably contained much about the duties of absolute ruler(s). All of all, judging from the content of other Hellenistic writings on the topic, one may guess that royal virtues were its main subject-matter[20]. This in itself tells us much of the nature

---

[15] Cf. Schubart 1937: 1-26.

[16] Cf. Plutarch, *Fort. et virt. Alex.* B, 340c: 'Would you learn how it is that men come to the throne by choice of Fortune?' (tr. F.C. Babbitt, Loeb).

[17] See Shipley 2000: 64, rightly claiming that in this entry "the traditional idea of a hereditary kingship is subverted".

[18] That's, contrary to the royal power of the Achaemenid kings: see Plutarch, *Fort. et virt. Alex.* B, 340b; it is worth observing that according to Justin (*Epit.* 15, 2, 11), it was just Ptolemy who has gained the title of 'king' from his army (*Ptolomeus quoque, ne minoris apud suos auctoritatis haberetur, rex ab exercitu cognominatur*); on the figure of the king as commander see Beston 2000: 316; cf. also Chaniotis 2005 and Grabowski 2010: 49-50.

[19] On this occasion it is difficult to avoid the impression that the modern translations often confuse the meanings of the Greek nouns *basileia* and *monarchia*: the first Greek term points to the modern 'kingship' (French: *royaute*, *royaume*, cf. Chantraine 1968: 167), connoting also 'royal dignity' or 'the royal propriety' or the power which has been achieved by the wars; the second, dating back to the Greek classical theories, literally stresses out rule of one man. Neither of them should be connected with the modern notion of 'state' or 'territory', less 'government': regarding the kings, they may be embraced by modern term 'kingdom'; cf. Adcock 1953: 163, note 1 who thinks that the abstract term 'monarchy' indicates theoretical aspect of kingship.

[20] It seems justified to argue that the main subject of these treatises was not the way of acquiring the power or the methods of the ruling the monarchies. So is the case of the Suidas entry: after the sketching how the successors won their kingdoms, the next phrase confines enigmatically to how did they rule after becoming the kings: the χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς. There is an admirable study by Oswyn Murray (2007)

of Hellenistic writings about kingship. It will be no exaggeration to say that their essential feature was instruction of how the kings should be and rule (Gruen 1996). By the same, efforts to accept monarchical powers inevitably determined the character of the treatises; as they contained many advices to the rulers and stressed out not how the kings were but how should they be[21]; while constituting no genre, a treatise on virtue of a ruler became nevertheless a philosophical study in ethics (cf. Walbank 1984: 64)[22], something like an ancient predecessor of the medieval treatises in the type of John of Salisbury's *Policratus* (ca. 1160), Godfrey of Viterbo's *Speculum regum* (about 1180), *De monarchia* by Dante (probably 1312), or Robert de Gervais' *Speculum morale regium* from 1384 (cf. Bertelli 2001). How to explain this phenomenon? The frustrating presence of the absolute powers in the Greek world since 330 BC (and far beyond it) became reality for the next 300 years. Inevitably, royal ideology and royal representations of the Macedonian warlords dominated the horizon of Greek οἰκουμένη*e*, both geographically as well as mentally (Murray 2007: 14-17; Errington 2010: 73-79).[23] For the majority of the Greeks, up to this point free inhabitants of *poleis* and accustomed to decide about themselves by communal voting, it was a difficult, intellectual challenge to live under ἄνδρες βασιλικοί (Schubart 1937: 3; Morrow 1960: 521; Finley 1981: 33; Giovannini 1993: 268f.; Hahm 2000: 457-458; Eckstein 2009)[24]. With the installing and establishing of the monarchical systems in the Graeco-

---

where this leading British expert offers the reconstruction of a hypothetical treatise on monarchy.

[21] That's, according to Adcock's 1953 classification – political theory, not 'political thought'. Ch. Gill's 1995: 44 remark is here certainly suitable: 'Greek political theory overlaps significantly with ethical theory'.

[22] Cf. generally Goodenough 1928. Recently Ma 2008: 384 has reminded of 'the paradoxes of the relation between supra-local empire and local powers'.

[23] Cf. Shipley 2000: 63-70; see Eckstein 2009: 253.

[24] Walbank 1984: 64 put it excellently: "The new monarchies presented Greeks with an ideological problem. Wherever they lived, they had to adjust to a dominant royal power and to find an acceptable place for monarchy within their political philosophy without losing their self-respect and (as far as possible) without discarding their traditional commitment to freedom". This problem in itself may be understood as the most important in Greek ethical thinking, see Nussbaum 1990: 4. On the other hand, Malcolm Errington 2010 reminds us that many Greeks quickly accepted the new situation, seeking their fortunes and carreers on the royal courts of the Macedonian rulers.

Macedonian East and Egypt, they have found themselves in different political circumstances. Thus an obvious need arose to understand new situation, to explain and legitimize it (that's, justify; cf. Hammond 1951: p. 39f.). In a word, since the new monarchies were reality, the debates about them did not concern yet the questions of the choice which type of government would be the most proper, rather than personality of a ruler; from now on, it was character and qualities of the *basileis* that were at stake. The task of accustoming new political order fell thus on Greek intellectuals[25], usually the members of various, flourishing philosophical schools (Schubart 1937: 1; Tarn 1948: 409; Murray 1971; Billows 1994: 56-70; Gehrke 2003: 47; Habicht 2006: 31)[26]. In result, the Hellenistic age saw a flood of the kingship-literature, a true 'renaissance' of such literary production (Schofield 1999: 742--744)[27], to begin with the Cynics and Antisthenes' standard work *Cyrus or On Kingship* (Diogenes Laertius 6, 1; cf. Hoïstad 1948; Fears 1974b: 265; Głombiowski 1993: 226; Moles 1995; Dudley 2003: 1-16; Whitby 2012)[28]. As a perfect illustration of such approach may serve Plutarch's

[25] Strootman 2010: 32: "Philosophers elaborated the genre of the *Fürstenspiegel*"; cf. esp. Hadot 1972.

[26] This ethical dimension of the Greek monarchical thinking is particularly evident when comparing to some modern, analytical or historical approaches; for example, the sober objections by Mooren (1983: 208-209) are made on the historical grounds that "there never was such a thing as *the* Hellenistic monarchy"; accordingly, he claims that we should "investigate […] the nature of Hellenistic monarchy" (p. 209) by looking for "a number of characteristics of the Antigonid, the Seleucid, the Ptolemaic and other monarchies, characteristics that reveal identities, similarities and differences".

[27] In fact, such theories never did disappear; they were continued in the Roman empire and the presentation of the figures of the emperors, not to say of medieval epoch; cf. Kaerst 1898: 80-109; Rawson 1975; Wallace-Hadrill 1981; see Gruen 1984: 250f. (generally, on 'The Allure of Hellenism'); Austin 1985: 190; Nelson 1988: 217-218; cf. Coleman 2000b; Coleman 2011.

[28] Generally, the Cynics and the Epicureans are credited to have held negative views about monarchy, cf. Moles 1995 (*pace* Fears 1974a, dealing with the portrait of Alexander); see Hammond 1951: 44 and Erskine 2011. According to Murray (2007), the Peripatetic school's interest in monarchical regimes (here the works by Demetrius of Phaleron and Stra to are mentioned; cf. Plutarch, *Mor*. 185d) was antiquarian in its character, as was in the case of Theophrastus' treatises *On Kingship*. The Aristotelian authorship of the book on this topic, accepted, as it seems, by Walbank (1984: 77), is doubted by Murray 2007. Similar doubs arise with regard to the alleged letter of Aristotle *to Alexander*, found among the writings belonging to the *corpus Aristotelicum.*

later political' diatribes from his *Moralia* collection, certainly echoing earlier ways of thinking: *That a Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power* (*Mor*. 776a-779b) and *to an Uneducated Ruler* (*Mor.* 779c-782f). The point of departure in Plutarch's political credo was the question whether 'shall we avoid becoming intimate with powerful men and rulers, as if they were wild and savage?' (ἡμεῖς δὲ φευξούμεθα τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ἡγεμονικοῖς ὥσπερ ἀγρίοις καὶ ἀνημέροις γίγνεσθαι συνήθεις; cf. *Maxime cum princ.* 1 = *Mor*. 776c; tr. H.N. Fowler, Loeb). The answer he has proposed was obvious. Since he believes that δίκη μὲν οὖν νόμου τέλος ἐστί, νόμος δ' ἄρχοντος ἔργον, ἄρχων δ' εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος (*Ad princ. inerud.* 3 = *Mor.* 780e)[29], he was convicted that ὁ δ' ἄρχοντος ἦθος ἀφαιρῶν μοχθηρὸν ἢ γνώμην ἐφ' ὃ δεῖ συγκατευθύνων τρόπον τινὰ δημοσίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπανορθοῦται, ᾧ πάντες διοικοῦνται[30]. In consequence, Plutarch claims, 'philosophers who associate with rulers do make them more just, more moderate, and more eager to good, so that it is very likely that they are also happier' (*Maxime cum princ.* 33 = *Mor*. 778f; see also *Praec. rei publ. ger.* 4 = *Mor*. 800a-b)[31].

This being so, here second factor must must be recalled. For one fundamental reason the Hellenistic interest in kingship-literature was nothing new: suffice it to say that thematically this outburst of the 'royal' themes and issues rightly may be regarded as a modified continuation of the older, philosophical 'dialogue' (Kagan 1965; Long 1993: 299) concerning politics and communal life in *polis* as such (Stroheker 1953-1954: 381f.; Schofield 1999; Murray 2007)[32].

---

[29] 'Now the justice is the aim and end of law, but law is the work of the ruler, and the ruler is the image of God who orders all things'.

[30] *Maxime cum princ.* 3 = *Mor*. 778e-f: "he who removes evil from the character of a ruler, or directs his mind towards what is right, philosophizes, as it were, in the public interest and correct the general power by which all are governed".

[31] τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας οἱ συνόντες τῶν φιλοσόφων δικαιοτέρους ποιοῦσι καὶ μετριωτέρους καὶ προθυμοτέρους εἰς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν εἰκός ἐστι μᾶλλον; cf. Hadot 2000: 132.

[32] Goodenough 1928: 57 wrote somewhat poetically: "Then came Alexander, and the floodgates of Greece were opened to oriental and Egyptian political and religious conceptions". To put it more precisely, on the one hand, there was 'constitutional' theory, on the other – 'kingship' theory – see Grene 1965; Hahm 2000: 464; cf. Ryffel 1949 and von Fritz 1954; see Morrow 1960.

For the Greeks this dialogue has begun already in the archaic times and may be also detected in the writings from the classical era[33]. Thus, without falling in to overstatement, we can concede that philosophical, reflective thinking about various forms of government always was – less or more – present in Greek thought[34]. It goes back to the times of writing the Homeric poems and follows the emergence of *polis*-organization[35]. Here, like in other aspects of human life, Homeric and Hesiodic epics served as a point of departure[36], and the Greeks were perfectly aware of this[37]. It frequently appears in the fifth century BC, to recall Pindar[38], or Herodotus' constitutional debate in 3, 80-84 (Aalders 1975: 17; Irwin 1999: 345-346;)[39]. Longing for one ruler (which did not mean that it must have been a king) was also alive in the heyday of the Athenian democracy (Braund 2000)[40], although it must be pointed out that at that time the anti-monarchical voices

[33] Murray 2007: 21: "Hellenistic views of kingship were based on ideas common since the fourth century"; cf. Sinclair 1951.

[34] That's, regarding its subject-matter, it was was *politicial* thought (and so it is classified in modern works); but, as to the nature of those reflections, it belonged – according to Greek taxonomy – to ethical philosophy.

[35] One favorite example, often cited in this context, is that from the *Iliad* 2, 204-206. Having humiliated the *kakos* Thersites, Odysseus expresses the famous words that "No good thing is a multitude of lords" (οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη). He goes on to say the wish that "let there be one lord, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Cronos hath vouchsafed the sceptre and judgments, that he may take counsel for his people" (εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, / εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω / [σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνά σφισι βουλεύῃσι]; tr. A.T. Murray, Loeb). Regrettably, neither G.S. Kirk (1995: 137), nor M.M. Willcock (1984: 200) discuss the passage in details. The controversy whether the Homeric *basileis* were real kings, does not influence my argument; see on this van Wees 1992: 78f. and Carlier 2006: 101f. For my purposes more important is that for the later writers Homeric poems provided a basis for the discussions on the moral qualifications of the rulers (cf. *Od*. 19, 109f; also Hesiod, *Op*. 225f.); on Homeric kingship see Benveniste 1993: 310-326; cf. Drews 1983; Carlier 1984; Calier 1997.

[36] Hesiod's Zeus in *Theogony* 71-73 is called *basileus*, with the remarks of West 1966: 179-180; cf. Austin 1986: 457; esp. Carlier 1984.

[37] Morris 2003: 17; see also Osborne's paper in the same volume.

[38] Hornblower 2006: 152, 159.

[39] Cf. Plutarch, *De unius domin.* 3 = *Mor*. 826e; regarding Herodotus, see Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007: *ad loc.*; Cartledge 1998: 387.

[40] There are the figures of good kings in Greek tragedy, to remind Pelasgus and Theseus.

of course were louder (cf. Otanes' tirade against the evils of one man's rule: Herodotus 3, 80; cf. von Fritz 1954: 61-62; Mitchell 2013: 92)[41]. With a sense of great disillusionment after the collapse of the Athenian democracy's long imperial experiment (ca. 479-404 BC), ended with the loss of the Peloponnesian war, nostalgia for one man's rule received its new impetus in the fourth century BC[42] – to remind the works of Xenophon and Isocrates (cf. Barner 1889: 5; Mossé 1962: 375f.; Turasiewicz 1968; Tatum 1989: 10-12; Barcelo 1993: 248f.; Kuhrt 2001: 97; Gray 2000: 146; Gray 2011: 5). Save Xenophon, these writings did not constitute the *erga*-narratives on how did really the rulers or tyrants act (a domain of historical works; cf. Dillery 2010: 177f.) but a meditation on the nature of exercising power (to recall Paul Cartledge's 1990 exceptionally interesting paper) or – in a more concrete terms – on the types of government. Seen from this point, political writings of the fourth century BC are thus full of the advices, warnings and trivial (perhaps, too often) remarks about just ways of ruling and employing power. In this catalogue one should especially single out Xenophon, whose remarks in *Agesilaus* (1, 3; 7, 3; cf. Schultze 2001: 90), *Hiero* (11, 14; with Cartledge 1993: 105; cf. Gray 2007), *Memorabilia* (3, 2, 1; see Hadot 1972; Knauth, Nadjmabadi 1975: 7f.) or *Cyropedia* (8, 1, 1; cf. Nadon 2001), are relevant. The ethical dimension of these and other considerations is thus a feature inevitably embedded in (cf. Cartledge 2009: 111). If anywhere, it may be seen in Plato's remarks in *Politicus* (dealing with the virtues of a true statesman: 293e; 294a; 297b-c; 301d; Braund 2009: 24-27; see Reeve 1988: 191-195). Above all, it was Aristotle' *Politics*, Book III, that remains here a testimony particularly important, as the author –

[41] Seen also in Euripides' *Suppliant Women*; cf. Isocrates, *Or*. 5, 107 (*Philippus*): ἠπίστατο γὰρ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας οὐκ εἰθισμένους ὑπομένειν τὰς μοναρχίας, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους οὐ δυναμένους ἄνευ τῆς τοιαύτης δυναστείας διοικεῖν τὸν βίον τὸν σφέτερον αὐτῶν; cf. Hadot 1972: 574f.; see Barker 1947; Andrewes 1974: 20-26; Ogden 1997: 148-149; Balot 2006. Smith 2011: 21 rightly says that monarchy remained 'hypothetical possibility'.

[42] Walbank 1987: 366, insists that "Dem fünften Jahrhundert galt sie [die Monarchie – B.B.] als ferne, fremde Einrichtung", while in the fourth century it "rief eine deutlich ambivalente Reaktion hervor"; Murray 2007: 14 observes that is is a paradox that much more has been preserved on this topic from the classical age than from the times when monarchies flourished.

witnessing to (and knowing from autopsy) great achievements of the Macedonian kingdom under Philip – was especially keen on these issues. Aristotle's work remains thus a mark point in this respect, as it is the *Politics*, where the old moral disputes on good government, bad tyrants (Osborne 1996: 192-197) and so on, meet with separate discussion on monarchy (Kaerst 1898: 37). So, a few words about it.

As it is well known, Aristotle himself thought about politics in ethical terms (esp. *EN*, 1094a-b; Barker 1947; Lord 1978: 354; Phillips Simpson 1998: xx – xxi; Striker 2006: 127; Salkever 2009); in his 'political' considerations monarchy was *a priori* (so to speak) a good form of government , opposed naturally to its bad counterpart – tyranny (cf. also Cicero, *De re publ.* 1, 56; see Ryffel 1949: 136f.; Newell 1991: 198; Barcelo 1993: 258-259; Coleman 2000)[43]. Anyway, the ground for dividing the constitutions in various types were naturally ethical regards[44], so monarchy (βασιλεία) was when one exercised power for a good of the subjects, while tyranny for tyrant's exclusively (*Polit.* 1279a-b; cf. Plato, *Legg.* 680c: βασιλεία δικαιοτάτη ; Seneca, *De clem.* 1, 11, 4; Plutarch, *De unius domin*. 287f.; Marcus Aurelius, *Medit.* 1, 14)[45]. Such arguing is also evident in the philosopher's famous analysis how does monarchy come in to existence (*Polit.* 1284a; Robinson 1995: 47-48):

> εἰ δέ τις ἔστιν εἷς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι

[43] Also Polybius 6, 5, 9-10 saw a clear difference between μοναρχία and βασιλεία; what remarkable, the latter form of government, according to Walbank 1957: 653, is characterized by 'its ethical and social basis'; see especially a later definition in the *Suda, s. v.* 'Βασιλεὺς μέγας': διαφέρει δὲ βασιλεὺς τυράννου. βασιλεὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ προγόνων κατὰ διαδοχὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς λαβὼν πέρασι, τύραννος δὲ, ὃς βιαίως τὴν ἀρχὴν σφετερίζεται. χρῶνται δὲ ἀδιαφόρως ἑκατέροις ὀνόμασιν.

[44] See Plutarch, *De unius domin.* 1 (= *Mor.* 826c): σκεπτέον ἥτις ἀρίστη πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίοι πλείονες, ἔστι καὶ δήμου ἡ πολιτεία βίος· ὥστε λαβεῖν τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον.

[45] Aalders 1975: 19, on Pla to see Luccioni 1958: 12f.

καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος

("But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men"; ed. W.D. Ross; tr. H. Rackham, Loeb).

From this statement follows that in the eyes of his subjects – ideally, at least – monarchs should therefore excel by their virtue, that famous and desirable quality, called by the ancients thinkers ἀρετή (cf. Xenophon, *Mem*. 4, 3, 12; Bosworth 1988; Gray 2011). Virtue guaranteed that rulers could be thus an embodiment of law (cf. *Polit.* 1286a; see Aalders 1969: 315f.).[46] In effect, βασιλεία was taken to have meant to be an ὀρθὴ πολιτεία: φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην."we pronounce this to be one of the correct constitution" (1284b 36-38; cf. Russell 1975: 160). On the other hand, the Stagirite was perfectly aware that kingship often may take form of the so called παμβασιλεία ('Absolute Monarchy'; cf. Aalders 1975: 20; Carlier 1993; Bates Jr. 1997; Bates Jr. 2003: 163f.), 'under which the king governs all men according to his own will' (*Polit.* 1287a 9) – a concept found already in Aeschylus' *Supplices* 370-375 (written about 470 BC), and occasionally compared to the later famous, apocryphal dictum 'L'État, c'est moi' that was ascribed (but is not found in the sources) to *Le Roi Soleil*. This reminds of a later, similar difference by Polybius between μοναρχία , based on mere strength (6, 5, 9: ἰσχύς) and kingdom, embedded in τὸ καλόν and τὸ δίκαιον (6, 5, 11).[47] Klaus Bringmann also cites another revealing opinion of the same historian from 5, 11, 6, when dealing with the habits of the king Philip V of Macedon:

[46] So rightly also Hahm 2000: 460; cf. esp. Murray 2007: 23: "Thus the justification of monarchy was in terms of the virtue of the king, and the checks on monarchy were checks on morality inherent in the character of the king himself".

[47] Cf. Bringmann 1993: 7 and the excellent chapter by Koenen 1993: 29-30.

τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν ἀκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους· βασιλέως δὲ τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαπώμενον, ἑκόντων ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ προστατεῖν (ed. T. Büttner-Wobst)[48]. One cannot forget Dio Chrysostomus' excellent tale about 'Lady Monarchy' (μακαρία δαίμων Βασιλεία: §73) and 'Tyranny' (τὴν Τυραννίδα: §78), inserted in his first discourse on kingship. The former is accompanied by Justice (Δίκη), Civic Order (Εὐνομία), Peace (Εἰρήνην καλοῦσιν αὐτήν), Law (Νόμος), called also Right Reason (λόγος ὀρθὸς), Counsellor (σύμβουλος) or Coadjutor (πάρεδρος; 1. 74-75); the latter by: Cruelty (Ὠμότης καὶ καὶ καὶ), Insolence (Ὕβρις), Lawlessness (Ἀνομία), Faction (Στάσις), and Flattery (Κολακεία; 1. 82; ed. J. von Arnim; tr. J.W. Cohoon, Loeb). There is also another evidence.

Among the Greek writings coming from times of the Hellenistic era and Roman empire one may found an interesting list that collects the qualities characterizing a good despot (Murray 1996: 807): I mean a learned work that has appeared in the second century AD, called *Lexicon* (*Onomasticon*). Its author was Julius Pollux (Polydeukes). In the Book I (§§ 40-43; ed. E. Bethe), he enumerates the virtues of a ruler that are worth praising. For example, a king should be ἐπιεικής (reasonable), φιλάνθρωπος (loving mankind); δίκαιος (just) and φροντιστὴς τῶν ἀρχομένων (taking care of the ruled); ἐπιμελὴς τῶν ὑπηκόων (careful about the subjects) as well παιδευτικός (skilled in teaching), ἀρχικός (fit for rule), νομοθετικός (skilled in legislation), εὖ ποιεῖν πεφυκώς (natural for making good). But there is other side of coin, so the author gathers the adjectives which describe the faults of a bad ruler (ψέγων: 1, 42); in this list of the negative features we find: τυραννικός (tyrannical) ὠμός (crude), θηριώδης (savage), βίαιος (violent), πλεονέκτης (greedy), φιλοχρήματος (loving money), μισάνθρωπος (hating mankind), ἄδικος (wrongdoing), ὑβριστής (wanton), πολεμοποιός (bellicose), βαρύς (oppressive).

[48] 'It is indeed the part of a tyrant to do evil that he may make himself the master of men by fear against their will, hated himself and hating his subjects, but it is that of a king to do good to all and thus rule and preside over a willing people, earning their love by his beneficence and humanity' – tr. W.R. Paton, Loeb. Walbank 1957: 549 quotes the similar sentiments about tyranny in Plato's *Resp.* 417b, and Cicero, *Resp.* 2, 45.

Both in Aristotle's observation as in the *Suda* entry (quoted above), one can see that there was a clear difference between how did the monarchs rule and how they should – to simplify: between a gloomy 'reality' and wishful-oriented 'theory' (cf. Ross 1956: 255; Will 1975: 441; Smith 1988: 49)[49]. Reality was, as usually, harsh and brutal, as monarchs were not ideal Platonic kings-philosophers (Walbank 1984; cf. Eckstein 2009)[50]. Their courts were a place of intrigues (Weber 1995; Weber 1997; Ma 2011); their kingdoms were involved in ongoing wars and conflicts, what – otherwise – constituted a legitimization of their power; as the kings employed all possible means to win their enemies and conquer new territories, violence and despotism were matter of everyday experience (cf. Eckstein 2009: 249-250; also Roy 1998: 111; Schofield 1999: 743).Additionally, acording to Pollux, the king should be φιλοστρατιώτης, πολεμικὸς μὲν οὐ φιλοπόλεμος and such description agrees with the warrior representations of the Hellenistic rulers in art and on the coins (Davies, Kraay 1975: 13, 14, 17: portraits of Ptolemy I; cf. Wace 1905: 86-104; Smith 1993; Stewart 1993): the roots of such ideology goes back to Alexander whose favourite verse from the Iliad was βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής – "a noble king and valiant spearman" (3, 179: ed. T.W. Allen; tr. A.T. Murray; cf. Ritter 1965; Knauth, Nadjmabadi 1975: 129-143)[51]. Needless to say, a famous δορίκτητος χώρα – claim (Diodor 17, 17, 2; Justinus, Epit. 11, 5; cf. Arrian, Anab. 2, 4, with Mehl 1980–1981; Ma 2013: 341) was strictly connected to this ideology (Preaux 1976: 56; Gehrke 1982: 247f.; Virgilio 2003: 30f.; Hoekster, Fowler 2005: 27).

The Greek kingship-literature never was strictly homogenous, both formally as thematically (cf. Schultze 2001: 129f.). Mainly, it embraced treatises written by the representatives of the philosophical schools, but they might take the form of dialogues, biographies, letters (including royal letters, cf. Noreña 2011: 39), panegirycs (Mitsis 2011: 124). The same is true of its content but it seems that the most important part of them was devoted to the personal virtues of a king – constructing

[49] On this disrepancy see Plutarch, *Fort.et virt. Alex.* B (= *Mor*. 338c); see Adcock 1953: 177.

[50] An ideal realized by the reign of Marcus Aurelius (AD 161-180), cf. Rutherford 1991: 66.

[51] Stewart 2008: 280. See especially Adkins 1972: 13-16.

thus the figure of an ideal ruler. This, as it has been said, again was no novelty, since – to put it briefly – a portrait of such ideal monarch has replaced the earlier figures of an ideal citizen, speaker or commander (Adkins 1960: 244f.; Preaux 1976: 55-75)[52].

The collection of the royal qualities compiled by Pollux summarizes well the earlier, Hellenistic ideas about the king's virtues and vices[53]. To a great extent, it must have overlapped with similar catalogues', found in other treatises from that time. After Pierre Hadot's pathbreaking entry (Hadot 1972: 586f.) we may name the following choice of royal virtues: εὐσέβεια (piety), ἐγκράτεια (self control), μεγαλοψυχία ('greatness of soul', i.e. magnanimity), εὐνομία (good order), μισοπονηρία (hatred of evil), ἐπιείκεια (reasonableness), φιλοτιμία (love of honour, esteem), εὐνοία (goodwill), φιλανθρωπία (humanity, benevolence), ἔλεος (pity)[54]. Understandably enough, some

[52] Analyzing the Athenian inscriptions, Whitehead has enumerated in his valuable paper (Whitehead 1993: 65) virtues that were publicly praised at the end of the fourth century. He calls the democratic virtues 'a canon', to which belonged: *andragathia*, *arête*, *dikaiosyne*, *epimeleia*, *eunoia*, *eusebeia*, *eutaxia*, *philotimia*, *prothymia* and *sophrosyne*. Unsurprisingly, a major part of them has been later enlisted in the pack of the royal virtues; cf. Bringmann 2000; see Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 301.

[53] In a systematized way treated by the Stoics: Zeno (according to Diogenes Laertius, 7. 1. 6-9, making correspondence with Antigonus Gonatas), Cleanthes (an author of the treatise *On Kingship*: Diogenes Laertius, 7. 5. 175), Sphaerus (who also produced *On Kingship*: Diogenes Laertius, 7. 6. 178) and Persaeus (his book *On Kingship*, cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7. 1. 136, was dedicated to the king Antigonus Gonatas who famously was to have told that to reign meant 'glorious servitude', *endoksos douleia*: Aelian, *VH* 2, 20; see Goodenough 1928; Erskine 2011); see Schubart 1937; Walbank 1984: 76. To be sure, we do not know what was content of the Old Stoa writings on kingship but the fact that in that period of the school the classifications of the general Stoic virtues were compiled, helps us to infer that many of such virtues were 'borrowed' and transferred to the treatises on the king's qualities and duties. Such clear classification of virtues is found in Stobaeus' priceless *Florilegium* (*Anthology*): fundamental qualities are given at 2, 59, 4 (= von Arnim 1964: fr. 262), in a more extended version they are repeated at 2, 60, 9 (von Arnim 1964: fr. 264).

[54] Cf. Wipszycka, Bravo 2010: 145. The list embraces also bravery, ἀνδραγαθία (a highly 'competitive' value, cf. Adkins 1970: 74; see Bassi 2003: 50), whose possession enabled the king to be victorious (as the nicknames of the kings prove: 'Nicator', 'Nicephorus', 'Hierax', 'Callinicus' – an universal feature of a king, from Egypt, throughout Babylonia, Assyria and Persia; cf. Schubart 1937: 5; Smith 1988: 49; Hornung 2000: 367, 373; Chamoux 2002: 228f.; Waterfield 2011: xii; Ma 2013: 336) – a point often stressed out by Plutarch in his *Life of Demetrius*. The king must

of these features prominently figure in the famous kingship-treatises by the three mysterious authors, affiliated to the Pythagorean philosophy: Ecphantus, Diotogenes and Sthenidas, whose mysterious books were partly preserved in the fifth century AD by the industrious Macedonian compiler Stobaeus in his *Florilegium*[55].

Unsurprisingly, many of the qualities appear also in one of the most famous text concerning ancient royalty – that long letter by an 'Aristeas'' *to Philocrates* (διδαχή πρὸς τὸ βασιλεύειν; Will 1975: 443), written probably in Alexandria at the end of the second century BC (cf. Murray 1967: 337f.; Fraser 1972: 676-703; Hadot 1972: 587-589; Walbank 1984: 76f.; Hahm 2000: 461). Chapters 187-292 of this document constitute a kind of the Graeco-Egyptian instruction in education how to maintain royal power, as given by the Jewish scholars to the king Ptolemy II Philadelphus[56].

With this letter we pass to the problem of the royal ἀλήθεια[57].

---

also have been 'shepherd of people' – 'Soter' and 'Euergetes'; cf. Dio, *or*. 1, 13; see Goodenough 1928; von Soden 1994: 63-67. In this contamination some qualities today seem to be not 'ethical' as far as they do not refer directly to king's character: such is the claim about kings' wealth that should be (and was) one of his most important attributes, see Green 1990: 190. But to claim so, it would be a mistake: in fact, the contradiction was virtual as richness of a king is the result of his bravery. Bravery is juxtaposed in the catalogue of the general Stoic virtues (cf. note 54 , above). *Fortitudo* was also among the cardinal virtues of the Emperor Julianus the Apostate in Ammianus Marcellinus, 25, 4, 1: Julian, before himself became the emperor, addressed to Constantius a speech entitled *On the Deeds of the Emperor or On Kingship* (*Or.* 2); cf. Konstan 1997: 125

[55] The fragments are quoted in the Book IV of Stobaeus' immense *Florilegium*. Ecphantus: 4, 6, 22 and 4, 7, 64; Diotogenes: 4, 7, 61-61; Sthenidas: 4, 7, 63; Goodenough 1928 put these treatises on second century BC (cf. Burkert 1972: 220), but Delatte 1943, a most renowned authority on the topic, thought they should be dated on second century AD. Anyway, in the extant fragments the argument of king's truthfulness does not appear, although 'justice' is stressed out, as it is a basis for the concept of king as of embodiment of 'Animated Law'. There are strong religious and mystic tones in their imagines of royalty.

[56] Cf. Will 1975: 443; the literature on this letter is too vast to be recalled here; of the most recent studies, see Hunter 2010: 47f.

[57] Later on, Pliny the Younger contributed to this discussion in his speech addressed to the Emperor Trajan (*Paneg*. 84, 1: *tua veritas, tuus candor agnoscitur*; cf. Stadter 2002: 22; see Hadot 1972: 609). The bellicose Trajan was widely known as a ruler stylizing himself on 'new' Alexander, managing his great campaigns against the Parthians as an *anabasis*. As the four speeches on kingdom by the Bithynian Dio Chrysostomus, addressed to the emperor Trajan, prove (Hadot 1972: 597; Moles 1983:

Aristotle and others thinkers did not devote, remarkably, a special discussion to the veracity of the rulers. Nor is mention of it made in the alleged letter of Aristotle to Alexander, although here other virtue, nearest to it – justice – constitutes a substantial element in the repertoire of king's duties (§§ 6-7)[58]. It is difficult to decide whether the quality of ἀλήθεια was for those thinkers an obvious matter, although such possibility cannot be rejected: perhaps truthfulness remained a quality that has been included – so to speak – in 'a package' of the other qualities an ideal king should possess. But this 'perhaps' is in itself important here: we cannot prove that it was really present always or often. Before the letter *to Philocrates* we find such remark explicitly in another letter, that famous appeal of Isocrates, directed *to Nicocles* (*or.* 2, written about 370 BC). Here the speaker generally asserts that the kings are persons more qualified to rule than others (2, 6; 2, 14; cf. his 3, 15) but in one place (§ 22) a conspicuous remark occurs that Διὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὕτω φαίνου προτιμῶν ὥστε πιστοτέρους εἶναι τοὺς σοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων ὅρκους ("Throughout all your life show that you value truth so highly that your word is more to be trusted than the oaths of other men"; tr. G. Norlin, Loeb)[59]. This is somewhat surprising as an isolated case in the literature of the classical times, if a separate work is at stake, at least[60]. Addition-

---

251f); 'truth' is mentioned also in his several other speeches: 34, 30; 55a, 9; 74, 4; 77, 33; cf. Valdenberg 1927.

[58] So is in the case of Musonius Rufus, a famous Stoic philosopher from the first century AD and teacher of Epictetus. In his lost work *On Kingship* (in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4, 7, 67) he understands ruler in the terms of 'Animated Law' (*nomos empsychos*; cf. Aalders 1969), so the king should be honest and 'perfect in word' (Goodenough's 1928: 94 translation). This last claim seems to be very near to the ideal of the truthfulness.

[59] Ed. G. Mathieu and É. Brémond; see the commentary of Usher 1990: 117-118, 202-216; cf. Eder 1995: 155; also Hadot 1972: 574.

[60] Naturally, one can not miss the arguments Xenophon uses in his speech to the Thracian prince Seuthes, when demanding from him a mercenary pay (*Anab*. 7, 7, 22-24). Here the argument runs that, as Seuthes' ruling many people extends over a large territory, the king must be trustworthy in whatever he is saying. "For – Xenophon continues – I see that the words of untrustworthy men wander here and there without result, without power, and without honour; but if men are seen to practice truth, their words, if they desire anything, have power to accomplish, no less than force in the hands of other men" (ὁρῶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀπίστων ματαίους καὶ ἀδυνάτους καὶ ἀτίμους τοὺς λόγους πλανωμένους· οἳ δ' ἂν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκοῦντες, τούτων οἱ λόγοι, ἢν

ally, it leads us to the next question: how did the problem look in the later kingship-writings.

Given the fact that majority of the Hellenistic treatises has been lost, no authorative statement can be formulated about the frequency of the occurring of the term ἀλήθεια. But in the case of the Aristaeus' letter *to Philocrates* there is a glimpse of the ancient reflections in this respect. Here, at § 206, we are told that Ἐπαινέσας δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς (that is, Ptolemy Philadelphus) τοῦτον ἕτερον ἐπηρώτα· Πῶς ἂν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διατηροῖ. The answer given by the sage (Ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀπεκρίθη) is following: Γινώσκων ὅτι μεγάλην αἰσχύνην ἐπιφέρει τὸ ψεῦδος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, πολλῷ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν· ἐξουσίαν γὰρ ἔχοντες ὃ βούλονται πράσσειν, τίνος ἕνεκεν ἂν ψεύσαιντο; προσλαμβάνειν δὲ δεῖ τοῦτό σε, βασιλεῦ, διότι φιλαλήθης ὁ θεός ἐστιν (ed. A. Pelletier)[61]. This looks like an extended version of Arrian's later arguing from his *Preface* but what is the most intriguing here is the place where the leter was written down: it was Alexandria. Regarding this, one must recall the second, explicit statement about truthfulness of the rulers. It comes from Diodorus' of Sicily *Historical Library* 1, 70, 5-6 and was, as it seems, explicitly formulated in the Alexandrian environment. Recording an old royal custom, Didodrus reminds of the old pharaoh dynastic tradition practiced of this kingdom. It is this context, where ἀλήθεια of pharaoh appears :

> τἄλλα ἀγαθὰ πάντα τῷ βασιλεῖ διατηροῦντι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους δίκαια. ἀνθομολογεῖσθαι δ' ἦν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετὰς αὐτοῦ, λέγοντα διότι πρός τε τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡμερώτατα διάκειται· ἐγκρατής τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ δίκαιος καὶ μεγαλόψυχος, ἔτι δ' ἀψευδὴς καὶ μεταδοτικὸς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καθόλου πάσης ἐπιθυμίας κρείττων

τι δέωνται, οὐδὲν μεῖον δύνανται ἀνύσασθαι ἢ ἄλλων ἡ βία; ed. E.C. Marchant, OCT; tr. C.L. Brownson, Loeb). Later he also addresses the dynast that "you were trusted to carry out truthfully whathever you said". Given this evidence one might argue that there was among the Greeks an expectation of higher moral standard from elite men, not to say from men in power. By the same token, the evidence given by Isocrates and Xenophon are ambiguous; they do not prove that saying truth was a common expectation from the rulers; contrary – Bosworth 1980: 43.

[61] Cf. Fraser 1972: 696-703.

('it was the custom for the high priest to stand near the king, with the common people of Egypt gathered around, and pray in a loud voice that health and all the other good things of life be given the king if he maintains justice towards his subjects. And an open confession had also to be made of each and every virtue of the king, the priest saying that towards the gods he was piously disposed and towards men most kindly; for he was self-controlled and just and magnanimous, truthful, and generous with his possessions, and, in a word, superior to every desire, and that he punished crimes less severely than they deserved and rendered to his benefactors a gratitude exceeding the benefaction'; ed. F. Vogel; tr. C.H. Oldfather, Loeb).

According to Walbank (1984), in his Book I Diodorus relied on a history of Hecataeus of Abdera (cf. esp. Murray 2007), who was the author of a work *Aegyptiaca* (*FGrH* 264; Murray 1970: 141f.). This information is revealing in itself, as the two statements explicitly lead us to the Alexandrian court in the times of the Ptolemies. One may wonder, if it was not this royal entourage and old pharaonic tradition, revived in the intellectual disputes, where the argument about king's (that is, pharaoh's) truthfulness was especially recalled and specifically connected with the new Macedonian dynasty in Egypt. In this context, it is worth reminding a late source but containing exceptionally valuable information. It was the bishop Synesius of Cyrene (fourth/fifth century AD) who in his *jeu d'esprit, Praise of Baldness* (*Laudatio calvitii* 15-16; ed. N. Terzaghi = *FGrH* 138 F11) inserts the tale that Alexander ordered his troops to shave off their beards (cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 180b). The authority he relies on is Ptolemy (ὁ τοῦ Λάγου Πτολεμαῖος ξυνέγραφεν). But why was Alexander's former commander so valuable source (ἠπίστατο)? The answer seems to be simple. It was because (ὅτι) Ptolemy was present then (μὲν παρῆν τοῖς δρωμένοις); and since he wrote his work as the king, he did not lie (ὅτι δὲ βασιλεὺς ἦν, ὁπηνίκα συνέγραψεν, οὐκ ἐψεύδετο)[62]. What would we like to know is, whether was the argument of king's truthfulness formulated by Ptolemy himself in his lost history? Given the persistence of an old Egyptian tradition about the expectation that ruler should avoid lying, this cannot be re-

[62] See Sisti 2001: 303, *ad loc*; Synesius authored also a speech to the emperor Arcadius; traditionally, its title was *On Kingship* (*Peri basileias*).

jected (see Gorteman 1958: 256f.[63]). But it is equally possible that Synesius knew only Arrian's *Anabasis*, as his arguments resemble Arrian's way of arguing from the *Preface*. This second solution is in fact Lionel Pearson's (1960: 189) standpoint, who calls the mention 'puzzling' but states that 'it is unlikely that Synesius saw the actual text of Ptolemy'.

To sum up this section, it may be said that in the Greek tale of a good king there is relatively little stress put on his truthfulness; it seems that it only was a secondary argument, rarely used and raised occasionally. There seems to be beyond doubt that other good qualities by which a noble king (ruler) should excel, occupy a more higher, privileged position in the Hellenistic royal hierarchy of virtues. To be sure, the imperative of keeping truthfulness was sometimes formuated *expressis verbis*, but apparently – being most often included to the king's prerogatives concerning justice and the making of 'the right', *to dikaion* (Ps.-Aristeas, *to Philocrates* 189) – there was no need to single it out by placing it in a prominent spot. In consequence, the rarity of emphasizing such noble virtue is in itself telling – it did not belong to the king's cardinal virtues. By the same token, it is also a matter of logic that – as Luke Pitcher wrote recently (Pichter 2009: 7, 74) – ancient monarchy and lie did not stand in any sharp opposition[64].

---

[63] We know that for some time Synesius lived in Alexandria, so it may be speculated about his knowledge of Ptolemy's history.

[64] Space does not allow me to develop this topic but there seems to to have been a conflict in realizing such royal virtues as, e.g., 'to be valiant' and to 'tell the truth'. How could be so different ideals put in to practice by a king without falling in to moral conflict? Instead, it seems justifiable to assert that the argument and the demand of telling truth must have been, in fact, very confined: would it be possible to maintaing absolute power and remain by the same always truthful? If so, towards whom and in what circumstances? (cf. note 91, below). Naturally, such dilemmas were probably not serious in a king's calculation, as the royal ideology of bravery followed an older Greek ethical imperative of helping friends and harming enemies (see esp. Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1, 6, 27-32; cf. Dover 1974: 180-184). But by the same, this explicates, perhaps, a relatively rare appearance of the ἀλήθεια – argument in the Hellenistic and Roman imperial 'royal' thought. Such was the case of Dio Chrysostomus who in his first speech on kingship lists says of truthfulness (*or*. 1, 26) but it is evident that the claim is connnected with prudence (cf. also 1, 33). It looks as if the ancient thinkers knew of limited possibilities of employing this ideal; see also note 54, above.

3. ARRIAN'S TA PERI ALEXANDROU[65]: BETWEEN CYRUS THE GREAT AND PTOLEMY

Now, it is time to return to the question stated at the outset of this paper: does Arrian's 'confession of faith' in Ptolemy's royal truthfulness really contradict the established in the Greek historiography methodological assumptions? I am convicted that it does not, although it adds a new, substantial argument to them, in fact.

First and foremost, it should be remembered that trying to write truly (cf. *Anab*. 7, 30, 3: ἀληθείας τε ἕνεκα), Arrian – like all other historians – must have made a choice from numerous sources (*Anab. Praef.* 1; also 4, 14; 6, 28 etc.) as there was in his times plenty of the contradictory data on Alexander (cf. Kornemann 1935: 16; von Fritz 1974: 505; Baynham 1998: 60-62; Baynham 2003; Baynham 2010: 327-328)[66]. The decision was not easy and in the narrative he often cites other, unnamed sources. Arrian's heavy relying on Ptolemy's report was based on a careful *Quellenforschung*; all of all, it was Ptolemy himself who took a part in the memorable expedition (πρὸς τῷ ξυστρατεῦσαι) and since Herodotus autopsy or eyewitnesses (cf. Hdt, 1. 8; Marincola 1997: 69) was always highly estimated in Greek historiography (cf. Hammond, Walbank 1988: 28-30; Hammond 1993: 315;

[65] Arrian's history is traditionally (and universally) referred to as *Anabasis* but such title was apparently unknown to Photius (*Biblioth*., codd. 58, 91 and 93), cf. Bosworth 1980. There are serious grounds for claiming that originally the work was not called so and such title appears relatively late, in the sixth century AD: most probably there were in use two parallel 'titles';. An additional argument may be the title of the book that narrated the deeds after Alexander's death: *Ta met' Alexandrou*: it is possible that the two constituted a logical unity; see Simonetti Agostinetti 1993; cf. also Goralski 1989. Another problem is the date of issue of the book. If one follows Bosworth, the context of the work provided the Trajan's Parthian wars: perhaps Arrian – himself a participant of this war – was under a great impression of this emperor's large-scale campaigns against the old enemy and Rome and his great *anabasis* in to the East gave his opportunity to rewriting a true history of the Alexander' similar conquests.

[66] A point observed already by de St. Croix 1793: 34-35 (the French original has appeared in 1775).

Hornblower 1994b). Whatever great were Arrian's laudatory purposes in composing his work[67], it would be unfair to credit him a naivety suggested by some modern scholars (cf. note 8, above)[68]. So the modern objection as to whether his historical narrative might have been constructed on the acceptance of such doubtful and suspicious presupposition as someone's social and political status, may be weakened (or: refuted) by the fact that it was taken in to the consideration by earlier thinkers. For example, Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1356a, 4) appeals to speaker's character, often connected with his social status. [69]

[67] Roisman 1983-1984: 253-263; Marincola 1997: 34f.; cf. Baynham 2010: 327 – I agree with her statement that 'Veracity is Arrian's first priority'; this is, perhaps, a result of Arrian's Stoic affiliation: it is well known that veracity was important in Stoic ethics; for example Brunt 1974: 8 asserts that Marcus Aurelius 'nine times lists aletheia among other virtues' and that 'There are fourteen other texts in which he reminds himself of the duty of telling the truth'. The conviction is not to be taken as to mean that Arrian's report is without flaws, or – as Professor Bosworth showed many times (1976b and 2007) – that the Bithynian philosopher was indifferent to the rhetorical or stylistic effects, neglecting to present the data in a rhetorical, dramatic way. But, as G. Shepens points out (in his review of Bosworth's commentary, *Mnemosyne* 1985, 38, p. 418), the two things are not contradictory.

[68] See the more positive judgment of Dillery 2011: 182, citing also Plutarch, *Alex*. 46, 1-2. A test case might be the vehement, polemical digression from the *Anab.* 6. 11, where Arrian tries to establish a true account how did look like the fighting on the walls of the town of Malli (*Anab*. 6. 9-11). What is striking in this respect is the historian's pride of correcting many erroneous accounts of this event. The same is true about the controversies where was really the Alexander's last great battle fought? Arrian definitely rejects other reports and follows his two main sources that it was at Gaugamela. He also eagerly refutes those views that mistakenly explained Ptolemy's nickname 'Saviour'. Naturally, this example cannot serve as a generalization in proving that Arrian was always right when following or trusting Ptolemy. A recent trend among the scholars is rather different: to display Ptolemy's faults and bias which in consequence lead to more critical approach to Arrian's 'legend / fame' as the best Alexander-historian; cf. Bosworth 1976b; Olbrycht 2004: 333; Rzepka 2006: 14-15.

[69] There is exceptionally interesting suggestion was proposed by N.G.L. Hammond 1993: 315: he pays attention that Arrian might have rely on the passage from the *Iliad*, 2. 79-83. Here Nestor advices the Achaeans to accept 'truthfulness' of Agamemnon's famous dream: as Nestor argues, 'if any other of our countrymen had told us of a dream like this, we should have thought it false and felt anything but eagerness to exploit it. But as it is, the man who had the dream is our Commander-in-Chief; so I propose that we take steps at once to get the troops under arms' (εἰ μέν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἔνισπε ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον· νῦν δ' ἴδεν ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι· ἀλλ' ἄγετ' αἴ κέν πως θωρήξομεν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν; tr. E.V. Rieu, Pen-

Secondly, 'royal truthfulness' constitutes in Arrian's resoning only an additional argument. As Albert B. Bosworth aptly observes (see note 4, above), nowhere does the Bithynian insist that Ptolemy did not lie but only "merely suggest that he [i. e. Ptolemy – B.B.] would have been eager to avoid disgrace inherent in a detected lie". This of course makes a great difference. Even if Arrian's statement may seem to express a kind of a hope, it was hope based on a firm ground, as it was the result of the confronting Ptolemy's account with other conflicting reports (Baynham 1998: 67). This does not need to presuppose author's 'fascination' with Ptolemy's book: if anyone, it was certainly Arrian who knew that Alexander's old companion was not an ideal ruler[70], and regarding this suffice it to remind that it was Seleucus, not Ptolemy, who has been called by the Bithynian historian the best king after Alexander's death (*Anab*. 7, 22). In this respect it is really a great pity that we do not have the Bithynian's narrative of the turmoil period after the Alexander's death until the Triparadisus conference (see Shipley 2000: 42)[71]: had Arrian's *Events after Alexander* survived[72], one would easily get a more detailed story how did Ptolemy win his kingdom in Egypt by spear (Diodorus 18, 43, 1; cf. Rostovtzeff 1941: 267)[73], instead of relying on a mere summary of Photius, the learned patriarch of Constantinople (*Biblioth.* cod. 82 = *FGrH* 156F = Roos, Wirth 1967: F 1): "Ptolemy the son of Lagus was appointed to rule Egypt, Libya, and the parts of Arabia close to Egypt" (tr. W. Goralski)[74]. Be that as it may, it seems reasonable to infer that Arrian – like his contemporary,

guin). It must be added, however, that Nestor's words were athetized by Aristarchus, see Kirk 1995: 123.

[70] In this sense, I do not think that Errington (1969: 233) is right saying of 'Arrian's enthusiasm for Ptolemy'. Rather, being aware of Ptolemy's faults, Arrian estimated his work relatively higher than these of others; on Ptolemy see Berve 1927: 329-335, no. 668.

[71] Cf. Bingen 2007: 18-19; see also Bowman 1996: 22-23; Hölbl 2001: 13-15; Manning 2009. On the idea of royal justice see Walbank 1984: 83.

[72] Cf. Simonetti Agostinetti 1993: 12-13.

[73] See Ellis 1994: 28f.; Eckstein 2009: 249 strongly points out that Hellenistic monarchy was 'usurpatory in nature'. He also reminds of an enormous gap between the reality that stood behind the royal power and theory; cf. e.g. Herodian's severe judgment of the kings who ruled after Alexander: 1, 3.

[74] Goralski 1989: 86.

Pausanias – was perfectly aware that Ptolemy began his rule on the Nile by murdering the actual Greek governor of this province, Cleomenes of Naucratis (known also from Ps.-Aristotle's *Oec.* 1325a-b), appointed there by Alexander himself (cf. Pausanias 1, 6, 3; Seibert 1969: 110; Murray 1970: 141)[75]. Arrian also certainly knew of the details of somewhat mysterious 'persuading' (again, in Pausanias' words, 1, 6, 3) of the Macedonian escort carrying the corpse of Alexander from Babylon to Aegae to give it him – otherwise an exceptionally clever, cunning step (cf. Lucian, *Dial. mort*. 13. 3; generally Fulińska 2012: 389)[76]. So the beginnings of Ptolemy's reign were then not so innocent and glorious as a later fame that followed the reign of this dynast[77]. Nevertheless, I believe that saying of Ptolemy's veracity, Arrian took in to consideration the whole reign of Alexander's old companion. Additionally a great role played the popular, 'good' fame of this king who consequently and successfully created his own glorious self-image (Hazzard 2000: 25f., 154; Lloyd 2010: 1079-1081; Bearzot 2011: 60-63)[78], and has been remembered by posterity just as 'the Saviour' or, to quote also Diodorus' words (17, 103, 7)[79], who ἀγαπώμενος γὰρ ὑφ' ἁπάντων διά τε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς πάντας εὐεργεσίας, οἰκείας τοῦ φιλανθρώπου βοηθείας ἔτυχεν ("was loved by all because of his character and kindnesses to all, and he obtained a succour appropriate to his good deeds"; tr. C.B. Welles, Loeb; cf. Nock 1928: 39)[80].

---

[75] Errington 2010: 171.

[76] See Seibert 1969: 108-109; Erskine 2002: 167-168; Stewart 2003: 48.

[77] General outline in Adams 2006: 39-43.

[78] Davis, Kraay 1973: no. 13-14; cf. Stewart 1993; see Gruen 1985: 257-258, quoting Marmor Parium.

[79] Not to mention the laudatory hymns like that famous XVII[th] by Theocritus, written in honor of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Here figure of the father, Ptolemy I 'the Saviour', appears sitting in heaven (Zeus' house), together with Alexander himself (13-19), cf. R. Hunter 2003; also Theocritus' eclogue XV (*The Syracusan Women*), 46-50; see Q. Curtius Rufus' (9, 8, 33) famous verdict on this ruler; also a remarkable praise of Ptolemy I by his son, expressed in a letter to the Milesians (about 262 BC), is cited by Welles 1974: no. 14.

[80] Ed. K.T. Fischer; tr. C.B. Welles, Loeb; cf. also Justin, *Epit.* 16, 2, 7: *Fini to bello Ptolomeus cum magna rerum gestarum gloria moritur*. Welles, p. 6, reminds that no mention is made by Diodorus of Ptolemy as a historian, but since the Sicilian writer does not name any of his sources to Alexander story, it cannot be excluded he had Ptolemy's work in hands and made use of it. The same, idealistic memory of Ptolemy I

So, being aware of Ptolemy's prejudices or omissions in his history (a true 'ghost' – work for us[81]), Arrian considered it none the less a relatively worthier than others[82]. Now, the problem of the Ptolemy's truthfulness itself in Arrian's *Anabasis*.

Making comment upon Arrian, *Anab.* 1, *Praef.* 2, Bosworth (1980: 43) was of the opinion that the idea of 'just king' was already widespread, so Arrian only followed an old philosophical tradition – that's, mainly (but not exclusively) Stoic theory about the governments, rulers, and their subsequent duties[83]. On this occasion this eminent scholar dismissed the idea advanced by Claire Gorteman (cf. note 8, above) that 'the sentiment is taken from Ptolemy himself'[84]. Bosworth's view, perceptive as usual, opens an interesting question of Arrian's sources of inspiration: where did he take this claim from?

As I have previously mentioned, there was – after all probability (cf. the letter *to Philocrates* and Hecataeus' *Aegyptiaca*) – a strong Egyptian tradition that 'reminded' to a pharaoh his voluntarily duty of speaking truth (cf. Hornblower 1994b: 41, n. 91). This tradition might have been revived during the reign of the Ptolemaic dynasty both in their court as in the circles of the Alexandrian Greek intellectuals (on these latter cf. Meissner 1992: 117, 102-133, 466-475; see Fraser 1972); it seems that it has been adopted as a vital part of the official Ptolemaic royal ideology (Samuel 1993). Naturally, it cannot be decided if it was mentioned by Ptolemy I himself in his story of Alexander, for Arrian gives here no clear indication; but it seems very probable that as the idea was then 'in the air', so the Bithynian

---

as the Saviour was inscribed in the Rosetta Stone (196 BC); cf. Barker 1959: 98 = Dittenberg 1903: no. 90, p. 140-166.

[81] Cf. Pearson 1960: 189; Pedech 1984: 234f.; Zambrini 2007: 217; recently Pelling 2011: 14, speculates that partly it may have been biographical in its character.

[82] Opinions vary as to how objective was Ptolemy's history; some assume his work was distorted by numerous bias, e.g., against Perdiccas; see generally Pearson's (1960: 188-189) valuable treatment. To begin with, little is even known about its title: Bouché-Leclercq 1903: 134 thought it was 'Mémoires'; Strasburger 1934: 53 called it *Praxeis Alexandrou* (*Exploits / Deeds of Alexander*); see also Kornemann 1935: 39 and von Fritz 1974; cf. the remarks of Jacoby, *FGrH* 138; also Bosworth 1980, Stadter 1980 and Fornara 1988: 35.

[83] Cf. Hadot 1972; also Strootman 2010: 32.

[84] See generally Lendle 1992: 251.

historian, well acquainted with other allusions to 'truthfulness' – argument, might have paid a greater attention to it when studying Ptolemy's work. But irrespective of the Egyptian 'clue', there exists other, say, parallel explication of Arrian's pressure on ἀλήθεια in his methodological passage. This explication refers not so much to the adoption of the pharaonic tradition by Ptolemy but to his master and ideal from the campaign years, Alexander himself, who was also Arrian's literary hero. Given so, in the last part of this paper, I would like to suggest the following line of arguing: it was the figure of Alexander the Great who at first inspired in a substantial way Ptolemy, then it made a stamp on Arrian. 'Inspiration' does not mean, of course, that Alexander eagerly propagated the ideology of ἀλήθεια (on the contrary, see below), rather than that his adopting and relying on various other Achaemenid Persian manifestations of power (see generally Kuhrt 1984: 156f.), directed Arrian the historian's (and then the young Ptolemy's, possibly) attention to the principle of telling truth by a king.

At the outset we must acknowledge, however, the fact that according to Arrian it was Alexander himself who openly claimed (conspicuously, on that time only in the *Anabasis*) that the truth *is* a virtue of the kings. Here I mean the famous episode at Susa (*Anab*. 7, 5, 2), just after the description of that notorious Macedonian-Persian wedding ceremony, arranged on behalf of the great conqueror. Here it is stated that Alexander was to have confessed that οὐ γὰρ χρῆναι οὔτ' οὖν τὸν βασιλέα ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀληθεύειν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους ('the king, he said, must always speak the truth to his subjects'; cf. Sisti 2001: 303)[85].

[85] Trans. Brunt 1976: 215; cf. Mensch's 2010 rendering: 280: "king should speak nothing but truth to his subjects"; see de Sélincourt 1973: 355: "a King, he declared, is in duty bound to speak nothing but the truth"; cf. also Baynham 2003: 7-8. This claim remains exceptionally interesting, as it indicates that Alexander was perfectly aware of the old Achaemenid principle of avoiding lies: it was the industrious Plutarch, *Alex.* 47. 11, who has found the information that the Macedonian king made the difference between being in friendship with him as a man, privately (so Hephaestion was such *philalexandros*: Ἡφαιστίωνα φιλαλέξανδρον εἶναι) and in friendship with him as king, officially (so Craterus was *philobasileus*: Κρατερὸν φιλοβασιλέα); see Plutarch's *Reg. et imp. apopht.* 181d; also Diodorus, 17, 114, 2 (ἐπεφθέγξατο Κρατερὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φιλοβασιλέα, Ἡφαιστίωνα δὲ φιλαλέξανδρον) and Seneca, *Epist. mor*. 85. 35. This exceptionally fascinating but highly significant passage is quoted by Ernst Kantorowicz in his classical 1957 study (p. 498; cf. Bertelli 2001: 7) who additionally quotes

One cannot precisely determine where Arrian has found this remark. Was Ptolemy the source? It may be guessed that such sentiment, if really heard by Ptolemy, might have been inserted by him in his history – in effect Arrian simply quoted it[86]. This cannot be proven, however, with certainty. The statement sounds like a proverb; what more, it seems to fit well with the later views held in some intellectual circles where it was recognized that Alexander loved the truth. This last view was based on a conviction that the king was a 'practical' thinker, dealing with 'philosophy of deeds' (Plutarch, *Fort. et virt. Alex.* 331f.: ἠσχολούμην ἂν περὶ λόγους, εἰ μὴ δι' ἔργων ἐφιλοσόφουν; "If I did not actively practice philosophy, I should apply myself to its theorethical pursuit"; ed. W. Nachstädt; tr. F.C. Babbitt, Loeb), and as a philosopher, his soul was prepared to by imbued in the truth (331e: Φιλοσόφου τοίνυν ἐστὶ ψυχῆς σοφίας ἐρᾶν καὶ σοφοὺς ἄνδρας θαυμάζειν μάλιστα· τοῦτο δ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προσῆν ὡς οὐδενὶ τῶν βασιλέων; "Thus it is the mark of a truly philosophic soul to be in love with wisdom and

---

also Aristotle's *Polit.* 1287b; cf. also Hamilton 1969: 131. All of all, the sentiment certainly meant a step towards the distinguishing 'the institution' of kingship – likely in the agreement with the Oriental practices. In this context the pretensions Alexander directed to his soldiers demanding from them fidelity to his claims (Arrian, *Anab.* 7, 5, 2) become more understandable. It is a very probable thing to argue that in his methodological passus Arrian accepted this claim, but with a major restriction: as a Stoic thinker, he connected the old Oriental principle with Ptolemy, rather than with Alexander himself. The episode after the killing of Cleitus shows it convincingly. Bosworth (1995: 62f.) calls this remarkable passage in Arrian 'the great digression' and this is excellent characterization. Let us remind again: as Alexander fell in to despair after the murdering of his friend, Anaxarchus od Abdera, a famous sophist and flatterer (cf. Plutarch, *Alex*. 52, 3-7; *Maxime cum. princ.* 817b), presented the king a plausible explication that since Zeus the King had at his services the Goddess of Justice, all the deeds by great king are good and lawful. To accept such advice, rejected in the classical and Hellenistic political theory (see section 2, above), simply meant to accept tyranny: it was also eagerly rejected by Arrian. It seems that despite his admiration for Alexander' achievements, Arrian remembered well many examples when Alexander did not retain many of the noble principles that were expected from the kings. But it is possible that the historian has found them in realization when looking at the whole reign of Ptolemy who in comparison to the others has appeared a better ruler.

[86] It is believed that Ptolemy had at his disposal the famous *Royal Diaries* (*basilikai ephemerides – FGrH* 117); cf. Walbank 2003: 14; Hammond 1993; but see Pearson 1966.

to admire wise men most of all, and this was more characteristic of Alexander than of any other king")[87].

Be that as it may, however, one must say that if Ptolemy really recorded Alexander's claim at Susa, Arrian certainly did not take it at its face value[88]. When one takes in to the considerations the whole context of this episode, Alexander's dictum appears to reveal in fact something quite opposite: a deep lack of trust of his army in the king's alleged good will and his promise to cancel their debts (Badian 1962). In fact, then, the reverse was true and it is openly said by Arrian that not only often distrusted the king his subjects but completely scorned their voice (e.g.: 7, 8, 2: πολλάκις ἤδη ἐλύπει αὐτοὺς ἥ τε ἐσθὴς ἡ Περσικὴ ; "they had been vexed by his Persian dress"; cf. 4, 7, 4). In this light, the king's efforts to remind the army its duty of trusting their commander were a forced step (cf. 7, 5, 2: τὴν μὲν ἀπιστίαν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐκάκισεν; "he reproved the troops for not trusting him"); there is in Alexander's arguing much of menacing, in fact (7, 5, 2: οὔτε τῶν ἀρχομένων τινὰ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖν τὸν βασιλέα; "none of the subjects must ever suppose that the king speaks anything but the truth")[89]. This makes a fundamental difference in evaluating Alexander's imaginary 'love' for truth and remains telling in itself: what is Alexander expressing here is a hope how should be the sentiments among the soldiers toward his master, not a real state of things how did they look like. Here, as elsewhere, unmistakably a talk concerns a total obedience, not trust: one

[87] Cf. Camarotta 2000; Nawotka 2004.

[88] For Arrian Alexander, contrary to Plutarch's anti-Stoic resentments, never was thought to be ὁ φιλόσοφος. Generally, this tackles the problem of Arrian's judgement of Alexander: it was universally thought he was an admirer of the king's deeds. While to some extent this being true (*Anab*. 7, 28-30), it contains nevertheless only a half-truth: Arrian's admiration was of peculiar sort – to some degree it was a result of the genre convention. In the case of Alexander' truthfulness, Arrian was conscious that the reverse was true and the negative features of the ruler Dio of Prusa (*or*. 1, 12-13; Moles 1983) gives in his portrait of an ideal king, would here be more appropriate to be reminded. Dio' negative features of a king are such: "he is not to become licentious or profligate, stuffing and gorging with folly, insolence, arrogance, and all manner of lawlessness, by any and every means within his power, a soul perturbed by anger, pain, fear, pleasure, and lusts of every kind" (tr. J.W. Cohoon, Loeb). By the way, it would be interesting to ask why did Arrian not write – additionally – a treatise on kingship?

[89] Brunt 1983: 215 refers here to his 1974 paper on the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius (Brunt 1974b).

might even say that Alexander's attitude has much common with Caligula's later philosophy of *oderint, dum metuant* (Suetonius, *Calig*. 30, 1, citing Accius). If any of the Alexander-historians, it was certainly Arrian who – as a disciple of Epictetus and very careful addresse of his moralizing advices – was perfectly conscious of Alexander's numerous faults, typical for a stereotype of Oriental despot (Richter 2010: 261-262): king's lack of temperance, drunkenness and his dangerous, sometimes disastrous to others longing for fame (the tragic, in fact, march through Gedrosian desert); his obsessions and suspicions; his cruelty towards his own commanders and friends, to confine to these vices only (but cf. Briant 2010: 60-61). If Alexander was not for Arrian a good pattern to be followed, what about the meaning of the royal virtue of ἀλήθεια at 7, 5, 2?

As mentioned above, it is evident that the Hellenistic representations of the institution of monarchy were in a great part based on the way Alexander managed his royal art of ruling (a famous concept of *imitatio* and *aemulatio Alexandri*; Stewart 1993; Stewart 2003; cf. Chaniotis 2005: 58; Hölscher 2009: 67)[90]. Alexander himself, in turn, followed in many respects Oriental patterns and manifestations of the monarchical authority (Herman 1997: 208; Olbrycht 2004; Allen 2005; cf. Spawforth 2007: 82f.; Kuhrt 2007: 469f.; Müller 2011: 114; Coppola 2010: 139f.)[91], that presented in itself as an ritual or elaborated code of behavior, including the divine status of a ruler (Frankfort 1948; Price 1984: 25f.). The glimpses of it may be checked out today, e.g., on the inscriptions from Naqsh-i Rustam (the so called DNa 1-38: Kent

[90] Since it was in fact an amalgam of the Persian, Macedonian and Egyptian influences. This *imitatio Alexandri* did not confine to the Hellenistic kings but the Roman commanders and emperors as well, cf. Rawson 1975: 148f.; Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 32f.; Spencer 2003; Stewart 2003; Stoneman 2003; see note 66, above. Alexander 'the king' was also mentioned by Jewish sources, although here the tradition was ambiguous, cf. Klęczar 2012: 342.

[91] As to Philip, see Badian 1996: 18 on king's imitation of the Persian rulers' customs and manners (e.g., the organization of the court): Badian suggests that Philip, himself an educated man, read Herodotus and Xenophon, or the Aeschylean *Persae*, so the concept that the king is *isotheos* ('equal to the gods', 'god-like'), might have been of the Persian origin. It is not certain, however, whether assuming the title of βασιλεὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας (Plutarch, *Alex*. 34, 1) Alexander saw himself as a 'last Achaemenid' or someone greater, see Lane Fox 2007; cf. also Fredricksmeyer 2000: 165-166.

1953 = Kuhrt 2003: 676-677; see generally McEwan 1934; Cool Root 1979). This was, it is argued, also true about the conceptions and ideas concerning the nature kingship as such. For example, we are told that such virtues as χάρις (kindness, good will), πίστις (trustworthiness), παιδεία (education) had their origins in oriental ideology (Saggs 1973: 328; Masaracchia 1996: 175), so was with Oriental provenience of the heroic portrait of a noble Hellenistic king (McEwan 1934).

As Professor Amélie Kuhrt (2003: 676, 681) has convincingly shown, the Achaemenid royal ideology was absolute in its character: everyone must have been obedient to the king (Cook 1983; Brosius 2000; Briant 2003; Wiesehöfer 2006) who also remained the sole source of law. But simultaneously, the Persian ruler was expected to represent and held higher moral principles, being like incarnation of many positive features (cf. Kuhrt 2007: 469-474). And contrary to the Greeks, among the Achaemenid principles the truthfulness remained one of the most visible royal virtues (Tuplin 1991: 18; Tuplin 1994: 158; cf. Boyce 1988: 19). In order to prove this Kuhrt (2003) adduces a famous, trilingual Achaemenid inscription that has been preserved in the tomb of Darius I at Naqsh-i Rustam (referred to as DNb: Kent 1953 = Schmitt 2000; Root 2013: 51f.); among other solemn procalamations one may read that: "Says Darius (Xerxes) the king: by the favor of Ahuramazda I am of such a kind that I am a friend to what is right, I am not a friend to what is wrong"; "What is right, that is my wish"[92]; "I am not a friend to the man who is a follower of the lie".

[92] This last claim means a serious warning since it proves a fundamental feature in the Achaemeind conception of the truth: it was just identified with the king's supreme will. It may be seen in the scene of conspiration the seven Persian nobles raised against the usurper mag, Smerdis after the death of the 'mad' Cambyses: here the magnate Darius, son of Hyspastes, a future king (Herodotus 3, 71-72; cf. Waters 2004: 91; with Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007: 468), explains Otanes that it is a noble thing to lie if such the need; so, speaking truth (or not) depends on the circumstances and its ultimate goal is the king's personal interest and profit – such attitude seems to be quite close to the utilitarian philosophy prompted by the most famous Greek liar – *aner polytropos*, Odysseus (a topic discussed by Pla to in *Resp.* 381e-382d; cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993). Also Xenophon doubted in Persian truthfulness – conversely he perfectly knew of Tissaphernes the satrap's unscrupulous depravity (*Anab*. 2, 6, 1). But according to this writer, such deplorable situation was true in his own days, when the Persian empire under Artaxerxes was in 'decadence'. We must remember that it was the same Xenophon who conceded that in Cyrus the Great's days the kings avoided lies

The same words were repeated in the inscription of Xerxes at Gandj Nameh (XNb), published by Badri Gharib (1968). 'Truth' appears also in another famous inscription of Darius, that found at Behistun/Bisitun (DB IV = Kent 1953; Brosius 2007: 528f.; see Schmitt 1983; Root 2013: 36f.): "Darius the king says: You who shall be king hereafter, protect yourself vigorously from the lie; the man who shall be a lie-follower, him do you punish well".

Earlier on, this aspect of Persian kingship was well demonstrated by Wolfgang Knauth and Sejfoddin Nadjambadi (1975: 154). They saw the importance of truthfulness in three aspects: metaphysical, ethical and political, summarizing that: "Das altiranische Literatur is durchdrungen von Antithese Wahrheit – Lüge", as "Für die Iraner war das Ethos der Wahrhaftigkeit ein Hohziel". Kuhrt compares these epigraphical data to the Greek literary sources, especially plain in the virtues of the prince Cyrus the Younger in Xenophon's eulogy from the *Anabasis* 1, 9 (although truthfullnes does not figure in Xenophon's list; cf. also *Oec.* 4, 4-5, with Pomeroy 1994: 337f.). According to her (Kuhrt 2003: 682) this means that there was in the Achaemenid imperial ideology a firmly established collective of images concerning royal attributes, including the imperative of avoiding lies. This opinion may be supported by reminding other Greek testimonies. As the first there

(*Cyr*. 8, 8, 2-4). The problem, then, remains: was truth – despite the official proclamations known from the royal inscriptions – used instrumentally by the Persian absolute rulers? This simply we don't know. But it seems that although ideologically the truth was identified with the king's will, by the same it received the status of an universal virtue since the rule and power of the Persian kings were of divine origins; above all, the rulers reigned from Ahuramazda's will (cf. Boyce 1988). That, for the Greeks in turn – it is understandable enough – might have been a strange claim, as their gods acted sometimes as deceivers.On the other hand, the Greeks saw in Zeus an archetypal judge-king: it was the idea that appears already in Hesiod's *Theogonia*, 80-99, with West's 1966: 184f. commentary: West proves, *ad Theog.* 86 ('All the populace look to him as he decides disputes with straight judgments; and speaking publicly without erring, he quickly ends even a great quarrel by his skill' – tr. G.W. Most, Loeb), that the 'idea of truth is often associated with that of *asphaleia*'. The later observation by Clement of Alexandria also could be suitable here: τοῦ δὲ βασιλικοῦ τὸ μὲν θεῖον μέρος ἐστίν (*Strom*. 1. 24. 158. 2; ed. O. Stählin, L. Früchtel und U. Treu). Already Pythagoras (in Aelianus' *Varia historia*, 12. 59, ed. R. Hercher) was to have told that δύο ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν θεῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δεδόσθαι κάλλιστα, τό τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· καὶ προσετίθει ὅτι καὶ ἔοικε τοῖς θεῶν ἔργοις ἑκάτερον.

come the remarks of Herodotus: the most famous is that from 1, 132 and concerns Persian educational system, in which truth (ἀληθίζεσθαι) was highly estimated (cf. Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007: *ad loc.*); Herodotus repeats the same sentiment at 1, 138 (Αἴσχιστον δὲ αὐτοῖσι τὸ ψεύδεσθαι νενόμισται) and not differently matter presents in Strabo (*Geogr*. 15, 3, 18) and Plutarch (*Is. Osir*. = *Mor*. 369d-370c), where mention of the truth does also appear. In the story told at 3, 27 Herodotus narrates also tellingly on Cambyses' punishment of the Egyptian cheaters. On the Persian politics of the punishment of those who lie a valuable information was also preserved by Plutarch (*Artax*. 14, 4; cf. Mossman 2010). Above all, the tradition about condemnation and punishment of the impostors and deceivers is mentioned by Xenophon in his political and ethical testament – *The Education of Cyrus* (1, 6, 33; 3, 1, 19; cf. Tuplin 2013), the discussion of which I have purportedly postponed until now. This last work remains here the most crucial document, in fact, and this is for two reasons: first, for its outstanding importance for the history of the Greek kingship ideology that hardly could be overestimated at all (cf. Hoïstad 1947: 73-94); second, for our more specified, narrower dilemma of royal truthfulness in Arrian's *Preface*, 2.

It would be mere truism to repeat that the *Cyropaedia*, that famous – to remind here Cicero's immortal words (*Epist. ad Q. fr*. 1, 1, 8, 23) – *effigies iusti imperii* (cf. Hirsch 1985: 66-69; Głombiowski 1993; Reichel 2007) and first example of the 'mirror of princes' / 'Fürstenspiegel'-Literatur (Cizek 1975: 548-549; Tatum 1989: 10-12; Stoneman 1992: xv; Schultze 2001; Gray 2011), was one of the main sources for the development of the Hellenistic idea of royalty (Scharr 1919; Luccioni 1947; Delebecque 1957; Carlier 1978; Farber 1979; Due 1989; Gera 1993; Masaracchia 1996; Nadon 2001)[93]. Here, especially Joel Farber's investigation is telling: has has compared several good qualities occurring in the Hellensitic source material on royalty to those found in the ideal portrait of Cyrus – 'a righteous barbarian' (Cartledge's 1993 term; cf. Stadter 1991: 491). This is worth stressing out again: although controversies abound (Tuplin 2010: 205-227; see

[93] The *Cyropaedia* was a very popular work in the Hellenistic period (Farber 1978; Mitchell 2013: 93f.), as it was in the case of the whole literary output of Xenophon, see Cizek 1975; cf. the classical treatment of Münscher 1920; see also Fears 1974b.

Breebart 1983: 117-118) and some scholars doubt how much valuable source is *Cyropaedia* if looking for the Achaemenid realities (cf. Kuhrt 2003: 648; cf. Pomeroy 1994: 237-244), there is beyond dispute that, at least, many items of the royal Achaemenid ideology has been transmitted by Xenophon adequately. But what all that has to do with Arrian's pretensions to ἀλήθεια? What about 'royal the truth' in the *Cyropaedia* and its role in Arrian' historiographical inquiry?

Beside the two mentions quoted above that refer to the Achaemenid ideology of keeping the high moral standard of ἀλήθεια, a somewhat strange reflection emerges: as Christopher Tuplin (1994: 158) observes, "truthfulness is a common element in the texts on Persian education. Oddly it plays no part in formal statements of Persian *paideia* in *Cyropaedia* 1 2 or *Anabasis*, 1 9". This would be in accord with the above remarks (section 2, at the end) that references to this particular virtue of the kings are relatively rare in Greek political and philosophical writings, both in classical as well in the Alexandrian epoch. As P.A. Brunt (Brunt 1974: 8-9), 'Even among Greek moralists veracity is little discussed or commented'.

All of all, it seems that Arrian (cf. *Anab.* 7, 5, 2) did not believe especially in Alexander's pretensions to veracity: the young conqueror was not for him a half-mythical Cyrus – as far as the Persian king was known to the Greeks at that time thanks to Xenophon's portrait (Mallowan 1972: 14; Due 1989): by no means was the Nicomedian historian indifferent to Alexander's half-barbarian and half-tyrannical behavior (e.g., in *Anab*. 4, 7; cf. Billows 2000: 293)[94]. In writing so Arrian was a realist who narrated (or sought to narrate) of Alexander' deeds as the things were (according to Ranke's famous dictum: 'wie es eigentlich gewesen'), not as they should have been (cf. *Anab*. 7, 30). Nevertheless, the Bithynian perfectly knew that the Alexander's claims about his affiliation to Cyrus became in the time of the conquests a widerspread – so to speak – cultural and social phenomenon (see e.g.: Arrian, *Anab.*

[94] There is some irony in the fact that vices Plutarchs ascribes to the Hellenistic kings (*Fort. et virt. Alex*. B, 338c) may be equally attributed to Alexander himself. The biographer roars against the conceit of the Alexander's followers who called themselves 'Benefactors', 'Conquerors', 'Saviours', or 'the Greats', while wasting time with women like horses in a herd; cf. Nawotka 2004: 122.

3, 16; cf. Kuhrt 1987: 49)[95] – by the way of illustration a priceless information preserved by Strabo (*Geogr*. 11, 11, 4) tells us that Alexander later was remembered as 'an admirer of Cyrus' (a *hapaxlegomenon*: φιλόκυρος**,** *philocyrus*: καίπερ ὄντα φιλόκυρον; cf. Olbrycht 2010: 357; Müller 2011)[96]; anyhow, after Aristobulus Arrian himself reminds a long and touching episode of how careful was Alexander the Great in restoring Cyrus' devastated tomb in Pasagardae (*Anab*. 6, 29; cf. also 4, 11, 9; Bosworth 1988: 46f.). What consequences had it all for Arrian's methodological statement in the *Praef.* 2? I think it had although in no direct way: while the historian was far from accepting Alexander's aspiration to be an ideal king, he made some use of Alexander's constant efforts and pretensions to presenting himself as a second Cyrus. These pretensions became just for Arrian a source of inspiration in writing his own story: while not connecting the idea of king's truthfulness with the figure of Alexander himself, the Nicomedian historian nevertheless paid more attention to its importance in Oriental royal ideology. In other words, for Arrian, Alexander's merit was the reminding of the truthfulness-argument and influencing thus Πτολεμαῖος ὁ βασιλεύς.

To sum up: if one ask what should we do with Arrian's second argument from his *Preface* to the *Anabasis* when regarding Greek theory of historiography, answer is not so straightforward. It could not be. On the one hand, the argument sounds strangely enough; but on the other, as I am convinced, it should be taken seriously, as such was certainly Arrian's deep intention. Whatever reservation may appear when reading this point of Arrian' persuading in his introduction

---

[95] Plutarch, *Fort. et virt. Alex.* 2. 12 (*Mor*. 343a), informs us that Alexander had even φρόνημα μὲν τὸ Κύρου ('the high spirit of Cyrus'). To the same extent as everyone knew of Alexander's imitation of the other heroes – Hercules and Homeric Achilles – e.g. Arrian, *Anab*. 1, 11; 5, 20 (cf. Brunt 1976: 464-466; Hölscher 2009). Sometimes a controversy is whether did Alexander read (know) *Cyropaedia*? I assume that, after all probability, Alexander (and Ptolemy as well) was was acquainted with Xenophon's *le grand oeuvre* (cf. Badian 1982: 39; Lund 1992; Ma 2003; see note 91, above). There may be something truth in the later, pretty apocryph, preserved in the fourth century AD, that without the lectures of Xenophon' works, Alexander could not have been 'the Great' – ὁ γοῦν μέγας Ἀλέξανδρος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο μέγας, εἰ μὴ Ξενοφῶν (Eunapius, *Vit. soph*. 1, 1, 2; ed. J. Giangrande).

[96] Also Onesicritus' work of Alexander's deed was modelled on the *Cyropaedia* – Diogenes Laertius 6, 84; see Pearson 1960; cf. Whitby 2012.

to *Anabasis*, the historian's desision was not a kind of the fool's naïve reasoning. Obligation (or: expectations, at least) put on the rulers to tell the truth was in Arrian's times an old, official cliché, so the writer might have felt himself to be justified for using it. In fact, given the ways the ancient historians tried to adopt in order to reach the truth and provide authority for their narratives, Arrian's decision was innovative in its character. On the margin, it may be added that there is a lot of irony in the fact that it was not Alexander who was for Arrian an ideal of a just, truthful monarch. Although the young warrior-king was admired by the writer for his many exceptional achievements (*Anab*. 7, 30; cf. Giovannelli-Jouanna 2011: 62), it was not the old virtue of truthfulness among them[97]. Otherwise, little wonder, as the reign of Alexander meant, strictly speaking, a period of ten years of continuous wars and conquests, rather than administration in a proper sense of this word when his 'good' talents might have appeared. It looks as if Alexander – so often safely guided by the gods in battlefields – has received from them no opportunity to display his truthfulness in the times better suitable to this.

From the controversy concerning the royal truthfulness there emerges perhaps another lesson for the modern reader. This lesson takes its beginning in the question, why still is royalty so attractive topic now, in the era when democracies – officially, at least – had won and an alleged end of history came?[98] As Professor Roger Scruton (2002: 222) has remarked (ironically, as it may be supposed), a constant allure and interest the old institution of monarchy receives nowadays is a result of the fact that recently it hardly has any real power (Mitchell, Melville 2013: 1). To a great extent this statement is right, but provides, however, only a part of the explanation of a persistent phenomenon of an royal allure. An equally obvious reason here might be adduced. It is trivial, of course, but refers to a natural for mankind longing or search (although very often turned in to a wishful thinking). To put it briefly, it is a longing for social order, stability and justice that

[97] To a great extent, Arrian's judgment overlaps with Justin' accent laid on the invicibility of the king, cf. Yardley, Wheatley, Heckel 2011: 49.

[98] This was of course F. Fukuyama's notorious claim. Attractive for some as such, today it remains neverthless one of the most explicit voices that can be attributed to the modern utopia political philosophy.

can be quaranteed not so much by 'constitution' but nobility of mind and character (a question that has been begun by Plato, especially in his famous *Gorgias*; see Rutherford 1995: 143f.). In such inquiry, man's *ethos*, that's, character (cf. Schwartz 1957: 14-17; all of all, was a decisive factor: for the ancient thinkers it was an *Ursache* of the phenomenon that resulted in the Hellenistic 'renaissance' of the Greek royal 'pedagogy' (cf. Lee Too 1998).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aalders G.J.D., 1968, *Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung im Altertum*, Amsterdam.

Aalders G.J.D., 1969, 'Nomos Empsychos', [in:] P. Steinmetz (hrsg.), *Politeia und Respublica. Beitrage zum Verstiindnisvon Politik, Recht und Staat in der Antiken zum Andenken R. Starks gewidmet*, Wiesbaden, p. 315-329 (*Palingenesia* 4).

Aalders G.J.D., 1975, *Political Thought in Hellenistic Times*, Amsterdam.

Adams W.L., 2006, 'The Hellenistic Kingdoms', [in:] G.W. Bugh (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Cambridge, p. 28-51.

Adcock F.E., 1953, 'Greek and Macedonian Kingship', *Proceedings of British Academy* 39, p. 163-180.

Adkins A.W.H., 1960, *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values*, Oxford.

Adkins A.W.H., 1970, *From the Many to the One. A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs*, London.

Adkins A.W.H., 1972, *Moral Values & Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece*, London.

Allen L., 2005, 'Le roi imaginaire: an Audience with the Achemenid King', [in:] O. Hekster, R. Fowler (ed.), *Imaginary Kings. Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*, Stuttgart, p. 39-62 (*Orient et Occidens* 11).

Andrewes A., 1974, *The Greek Tyrants*, London.

Arnim J. von, 1964, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vol. 1-4, Leipzig (reprinted).

Asheri D., Lloyd A.B., Corcella A., 2007, *A Commentary on Herodotus, Books I-IV*, Oxford.

Austin M.M., 1981, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation*, Cambridge.

Austin M., 1985, 'The Age of the Kings from Alexander to the Roman Conquest' [in:] R. Browning (ed.), *The Greek World. Classical, Byzantine and Modern*, London, p. 185-200.

Avenarius G., 1956, *Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung*, Meisenheim am Glan.

Badian E., 1962, 'Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power', *Journal of Australasian Universities Language & Literature Association* 17. p. 80-91.

Badian E., 1981, 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', [in:] H.J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, Thessaloniki, p. 27-71.

Badian E., 1982, 'Greeks and Macedonians', [in:] B. Barr-Sharrar, E. Borza (ed.), *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, Washington, p. 33-51.

Badian E., 1996, 'Alexander the Great Between Two Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme', [in:] A. Small (ed.), *Subject and Ruler*: *The Cult of the Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity*, Ann Arbor, p. 11-26 (*JRA Supplement* 17).

Balot R.K., 2006, *Greek Political Thought*, Malden–Oxford 2006.

Barcelo P., 1993, *Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zu Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft in vorhellenistischen Griechenland*, Stuttgart (*Historia Einzelschrift* 79).

Barker E., 1947, *Greek Political Theory*. *Pla to and His Predecessors*, London.

Barker E., 1959, *From Alexander to Constantine. Passages and Documents Illustrating the History of Social and Political Ideas, 336 B. C.-A. D. 337*, Oxford.

Barner G., 1889, *Comparantur inter se Graeci de regentium hominum virtutibus auctores*, Marpurgi 1889.

Bassi K., 2003, 'The Semantics of Manliness in Ancient Greece', [in:] R.M. Rosen and I. Sluiter (ed.), *Andreia. Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity*, Leisen–Boston 2003, p. 25-58 (*Mnemosyne Supplement* 238).

Bates Jr. C.A., 1997, 'The Rule of Law or *Pambasileia*: Competing Claims for Rule in Aristotle's *Politics*', [in:] L.G. Rubin (ed.), *Justice v. Law in Greek Political Thought*, Lanham–Oxford, p. 195.

Bates Jr. C.A., 2003, *Aristotle's "Best Regime". Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law*, Baton Rouge.

Baynham E., 1998, *Alexander the Great. The Unique History of Curtius Rufus*, Ann Arbor.

Baynham E., 2003, 'The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great', [in:] J. Roisman (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden–Boston, p. 3-29.

Baynham E., 2010, ‘Appendix A: Arrian’s Sources and Reliability’, [in:] J. Romm (ed.), *The Landmark Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Anabasis Alexandrou*, tr. P. Mensch, New York, p. 325-332.
Bearzot C., 2011, ‘Royal Autogiography in the Hellenistic Age’, [in:] G. Marasco (ed.), *Political Autobiographies and Memoirs in Antiquity. A Brill Companion*, Leiden–Boston, p. 87-120.
Benveniste E., 1993, *Indoeuropaische Institutionen. Wortschatz, Geschichte, Institutionen*, Frankfurt–New York–Paris.
Bertelli S., 2001, *The King’s Body. Sacred Rituals of Power in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, University Park (PA).
Berve H., 1926, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, Bd. 2, München.
Beston P., 2000, ‘Hellenistic Military Leadership’, [in:] H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, London, p. 315-335.
Billows R.A., 1994, *Kings & Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*, Leiden–Boston–Köln.
Billows R., 2000, ‘Polybius and Alexander Historiography’, [in:], A.B. Bosworth, E.J. Baynham (ed.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford, p. 286-306.
Bingen J., 2007, *Hellenistic Egypt: Monarchy, Society, Economy and Culture*, Berkeley – Los Angeles.
Bosworth A.B., 1976a, ‘Errors in Arrian’, *Classical Quarterly* 26, p. 117-139.
Bosworth A.B., 1976b, ‘Arrian and the Alexander Vulgate’, [in:] E. Badian (ed.), *Alexandre le Grand*: *Image et réalité*, Vandoeuvres Genève, p. 1-33 (*Fondation Hardt* 22).
Bosworth A.B., 1980, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander*, vol. 1, Oxford.
Bosworth A.B., 1988, *From Arrian to Alexander. Studies in Historical Interpretations*, Oxford.
Bosworth A.B., 1995, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander*, vol. 2, Oxford.
Bosworth A.B., 2003, ‘Plus ça change Ancient Historians and Their Sources’, *Classical Antiquity* 22, p. 167-197.
Bosworth A.B., 2002, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, Oxford.
Bosworth A.B., 2007, ‘Arrian, Alexander, and the Pursuit of Glory’, [in:] J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, vol. 2, Malden–Oxford, p. 447-453.
Bouché-Leclercq A., 1903, *Historie des Lagides*, t. 1, Paris.
Bowman A.K., 1996, *Egypt after the Pharaohs 332 BC – AD 642. From Alexander to the Arab Conquest*, Berkeley–Los Angeles.

Boyce M., 1988, ‘The Religion of Cyrus the Great’, [in:] A. Kuhrt, H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (ed.), *Achaemenid History* III. *Method and Theory*, Leiden, p. 5-31.
Braund D., 2000, ‘Friends and Foes: Monarchs and Monarchy in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy’, [in:] R. Brock, S. Hodkinson (ed.), *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, Oxford, p. 103-118.
Braund S., 2009, *Seneca, De clementia*, Oxford.
Breebart A.B., 1983, ‘From Victory ot Peace: Some Aspects of Cyrus’ State in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*’, *Mnemosyne* 36, p. 117-134.
Briant P., 2003, *From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire*, Winona Lake.
Briant P., 2010, *Alexander the Great and His Empire. A Short History*, Princeton.
Bringmann K., 1993, ‘The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism’, [in:] *A.* Bulloch, E.S. Gruen, A.A. Long, A. Stewart (ed.), *Images and Ideologies. Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford, p. 7-24.
Bringmann K., 2000, *Geben und nehmen. Monarchische Wohltatigkeit und Selbstdarstellung im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, Berlin.
Brosius M., 2000, *The Persian Empire from Cyrus II to Artaxerxes I*, London (*Lactor* 16).
Brosius M., 2007, ‘The Inscription of Darius at Bisitun’, [in:] D. Asheri, A.B. Lloyd, A. Corcella, *A Commentary on Herodotus, Books I-IV*, Oxford.
Brunt P.A., 1974a, ‘Notes of Aristobulus of Cassandria’, *Classical Quarterly* 24, p. 65-69.
Brunt P.A., 1974b, ‘Marcus Aurelius in His *Meditations*’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 64, p. 1-20.
Brunt P.A., 1976, ‘Appendix IV. Alexander and the Heroes’, [in:] Arrian, *Anabasis Alexandri*, vol. 1: *Books I-IV*, Cambridge–London 1976.
Brunt P.A., 1983, ‘Appendix XXVIII. The Date and Character of Arrian’s Work’, [in:] Arrian, *Anabasis Alexandri*, vol. 2: *Books V-VII. Indica*, Cambridge–London 1983, p. 534-572.
Burkert W., 1972, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge.
Burliga B., 2012, ‘Polyainos (639)’, [in:] I. Worthington (ed.), *Brill’s New Jacoby*, Leiden [www.brillonline.nl].
Carlier P., 1978, ‘L‘idée de monarchie impériale dans la Cyropédie de Xénophon’, *Ktéma* 3, p. 133-163.
Carlier P., 1984, *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre*, Strasbourg.
Carlier P., 1993, ‘La notion de pambasileia dans la pensée politique d’Aristote’, [in:] M. Pierart (ed.), *Aristote et Athènes*, Fribourg, p. 103-118.

Carlier P., 1997, 'Basileus', [in:] H. Cancik, H. Schneider (hrsg.), *Der Neue Pauly*, Bd. 2, Stuttgart–Weimar, p. 462-468.
Carlier P., 2000, 'Homeric and Macedonian Kingship', [in:] R. Brock, S. Hodkinson (ed.), *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, Oxford, p. 259-268.
Carlier P., 2006, 'Anax and basileus in the Homeric Poems', [in:] S. Deger-Jalkotzy, I.S. Lemos (ed.), *Ancient Greece: From the Mycenean Palaces to the Age of Homer*, Edinburgh, p. 101-110 (*Edinburgh Leventis Studies* 3).
Chamoux F., 2000, *Hellenistic Civilization*, Malden (MA) – Oxford.
Chaniotis A., 2005, *War in the Hellenistic World. A Social and Cultural History*, Malden–Oxford.
Cammarota M.R., 1998, *Plutarco, La fortuna o la virtu di Alessandro Magno. Seconda orazione*, Napoli.
Chantraine P., 1968, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Historie des mots*, Paris.
Cartledge P., 1993, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford.
Cartledge P., 1998, 'Writing the History of Archaic Greek Political Thought', [in:] N. Fisher, H. van Wees (ed.), *Archaic Greece*: *New Approaches and New Evidence*, London, p. 379-399.
Cartledge P., 1990, 'Herodotus and „the Other": A Meditation on Empire', *Echos du Monde Classique / Classical Views* 9, p. 27-40.
Cartledge P., 2004, *Alexander the Great. The Hunt for a New Past*, Cambridge.
Cartledge P., 2009, *Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice*, Cambridge.
Chaniotis A., 2005, *War in the Hellenistic World. A Social and Cultural History*, Oxford.
Cizek A., 1975, 'From the Historical Truth to the Literary Convention: the Life of Cyrus the Great Viewed by Herodotus, Ctesias and Xenophon', *L'Antiquité Classique* 44, 531-552.
Coleman J., 2000a, *A History of Political Thought*, vol. 1: *From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity*, Malden–Oxford.
Coleman J., 2000b, *A History of Political Thought*, vol. 2: *From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, Oxford.
Coleman J., 2011**,** **'**Medieval Political Theory, c. 1000-1500', [in:] G. Klosko (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, Oxford, p. 180-205.
Cook J.M., 1983, *The Persian Empire*, New York.
Cook J.M., 1985, 'The Rise of Achaemenids and Establishment of Their Empire', [in:] I. Gershevitch (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 2, Cambridge, p. 200-291.

Coppola A., 2010, 'Alexander's Court', [in:] B. Jacobs, R. Rollinger (hrsg.), *Der Achämenidenhof / The Achaemenid Cort*, Wiesbaden, p. 139-154 (*Classica et Orientalia* 2).
Davis N., Kraay C.M., 1973, *Hellenistic Kingdoms. Portrait Coins and History*, London.
St. Croix Baron de, 1973, *A Critical Inquiry in to the Life of Alexander the Great by the Ancient Historians*, London.
Delatte S., 1942, *Les traités de la royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas*, Louvain.
Delebecque E., 1957, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon*, Paris.
Dillery J., 2011, 'Hellenistic Historiography', [in:] A. Feldherr, G. Hardy (ed.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing. Beginnings to AD 600*, Oxford, p. 171-218.
Dittenberg W., 1903, *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* I, Leipzig.
Dover K.J., 1974, *Greek Popular Morality in the Times of Pla to and Aristotle*, Oxford.
Drews R., 1983, *Basileus. The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece*, New Haven–London.
Dudley D.R., 2003, *A History of Cynicism. From Diogenes to the 6th Century AD*, 2nd ed., London.
Due B., 1989, *The Cyropaedia. Xenophon's Aims and Methods*, Aarhus.
Dyroff A., 1897, *Die Ethik der alten Stoa*, Berlin (*Berliner Studien für classische Philologie und Archaeologie* 2).
Eder W., 1995, 'Monarchie und Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Die Rolle des Fürstenspiegels in der athenischen Demokratie', [in:] W. Eder (hrsg.), *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, Stuttgart, p. 153-174.
Eckstein A.M., 2009, 'Hellenistic Monarchy in Theory and Practice', [in:] R.K. Balot (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Malden–Oxford, p. 247-265.
Ellis W.M., 1994, *Ptolemy of Egypt*, London–New York.
Errington R.M., 'Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander', *Classical Quarterly* 19.
Errington R.M., 2010, *Historia świata hellenistycznego 323-30 p.n.e.*, tr. A. Gąsior-Niemiec, Kraków 2010.
Erskine A., 2002, 'Life after Death: Alexandria and the Body of Alexander', *Greece & Rome* 49, p. 163-179.
Erskine A., 2011, *The Hellenistic Stoa. Political Thought and Action*, 2nd ed., London.
Fairman H.W., 1958, 'The Kingship Rituals of Egypt', [in:] S.H. Hooke (ed.), *Myth, Ritual and Kingship. Essays in Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and in Israel*, Oxford, p. 74-104.

Farber J.J., 1979, 'The *Cyropaedia* and Hellenistic Kingship', *American Journal of Philology* 100, p. 497-514.
Fears J.R., 1974a, 'The Stoic Views of the Career and Character of Alexander the Great', *Philologus*, p. 112-130.
Fears J.R., 1974b, 'Cyrus as Stoic Exemplum of the Just Monarch', *American Journal of Philology* 95, p. 265-267.
Finley M.I, 1981, 'Politics' [in:] M. I. Finley (ed.), *The Legacy of Greece. A New Appraisal*, Oxford, p. 22-36.
Fornara Ch.W., 1983, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London.
Frank J., 2008, 'Political Theory of Classical Greece', [in:] J.S. Dryzek, B. Honig, A. Phillips (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, Oxford, p. 175-192.
Frankfort H., 1948, *Kingship and the Gods. A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature*, Chicago.
Fraser P.M., 1972, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, vol. 1, Oxford.
Fredricksmeyer E., 2000, 'Alexander and the Kingship of Asia', [in:] *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, p. 136-166.
Fritz K. von, 1954, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas*, New York.
Fritz K. von, 1974, 'The Influence of Ideas on Ancient Greek Historiography', [in:] P.P. Wiener (ed.), *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, New York, p. 499-511.
Fulińska A., 2012, 'Oriental Imagery and Alexander's Legend in Art: Reconnaissance' [in:], R. Stoneman, K. Erickson, I. Netton (ed.), *The Alexander Romance in Persia and the East*, Groningen, p. 383-404 (*Ancient Narrative Supplement* 15)
Gehrke H.-J., 1982, 'Der siegreiche König. Überlegungen zur hellenistischen Monarchie', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 64, p. 247-277.
Gehrke H.-J., 2003, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, 3rd ed., München.
Gera D.L., 1993, *Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Style, Genre and Literary Technique*, Oxford.
Gharib B., 1968, 'A Newly Found Inscription of Xerxes', *Iranica Antiqua* 8, p. 54-69.
Gill Ch., 1995, *Greek Thought*, Oxford *(Greece & Rome New Surveys in Classics* 25).
Giovannelli-Jouanna P., 2011, 'Arrien de Nicomédie', [in:] D. Lenfant (sour la dir.), *Les Perses vus par les Grecs. Lire lessources classiques sur l'empire achéménide*, Paris, p. 48-65.
Giovannini A., 1993, 'Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth' [in:] *Images and Ideologies*, p. 265-286.

Głombiowski K., 1993, *Ksenofont. Żołnierz i pisarz*, Wrocław.
Goodenough E.R., 1928, 'The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship', *Yale Classical Studies* 1, p. 55-102.
Goralski W., 1989, 'Arrian's *Events after Alexander*. Summary of Photius and Selected Fragments', *Ancient World* 19, p. 81-108.
Gorteman C., 1958, 'ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΦΙΛΑΛΗΘΗΣ', *Chronologie d'Egypte* 23, p. 256-267.
Goukowsky P., 1975, 'Alexander et la conquête de l'Orient', [in:] E. Will, C. Mosse, P. Goukowsky, *Le monde grec et l'Orient*, t. 2: *Le IV*e *siècle et l'époque hellénistique*, Paris.
Grabowski T., 2010, *Ostatni triumf Ptolemeuszy. Czwarta wojna syryjska (221-217 p.n.e.)*, Kraków.
Gray V.J., 2000, 'Xenophon and Isocrates', [in:] Ch. Rowe, M. Schofield (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Cambridge, p. 151-154.
Gray V.J., 2011, *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes. Reading the Reflections*, Oxford.
Grene D., 1965, *Greek Political Theory. The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato*, Chicago.
Green P., 1990, *From Alexander to Actium. The Hellenistic Age*, London.
Gruen E.S., 1984, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, vol. 1-2, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London.
Gruen E.S., 1985, 'The Coronation of the Diadochi', [in:] J.W. Eadie, J. Ober (ed.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, Lanham, p. 257-258.
Gruen E.S., 1996, 'Hellenistic Kingship: Puzzles, Problems, and Possibilities', [in:] P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pedersen, L. Hannestad and J. Zahle (ed.), *Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship*, Cambridge, p. 16-25.
Habicht Ch., 2006, 'The Ruling Class in the Hellenistic Monarchies' [in:] *The Hellenistic Monarchies. Selected Papers*, Ann Arbor, p. 26-40.
Hadot P., 1972, 'Fürstenspiegel', [in:] T. Klauser (hrsg.), *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, Bd. 8, Stuttgart, p. 555-632.
Hadot P., 2000, *Czym jest filozofia starożytna?*, tr. P. Domański, Warszawa.
Hahm D.E., 2000, 'Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories', [in:] Ch. Rowe, M. Schofield (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Cambridge, p. 457-476.
Hamilton J.R., 1969, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary*, Oxford.
Hamilton J.R., 1978, *Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander*, tr. A. de Sélincourt, Harmondsworth.
Hammond M., 1951, *City-State and World-State in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus*, Cambridge.

Hammond N.G.L., Walbank F.W., 1988, *A History of Macedonia*, vol. 3, Oxford.
Hammond N.G.L., 1993, *Sources for Alexander the Great. An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou*, Cambridge.
Hazzard R.A., 2000, *Imagination of Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda*, Toronto–Buffalo–London (*Phoenix Suppl.* 37).
Heckel W., Yardley J.C. (tr.), *Justin, Epitome of the Phillipic History of Pompeius Trogus*, vol. 1: *Books 11-12*, Oxford 1997.
Hekster O., Fowler R., 'Imagining Kings: From Persia to Rome', [in:] O. Hekster, R. Fowler (ed.), *Imaginary Kings. Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*, Stuttgart, p. 9-38 (*Orient et Occidens* 11).
Herman G., 1997, 'The Court Society of the Hellenistic Age', [in:] P. Cartledge, P. Garnsey, E. Gruen (ed.), *Hellenistic Constructs. Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, p. 199-211.
Hidber T., 2004, 'Arrian', [in:] I. de Jong, R. Nünlist, A. Bowie (ed.), *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in the Ancient Greek Literature*, Leiden––Boston 2004: 165-174 (*Mnemosyne Supplement*).
Hirsch S., 1985, '1001 Iranian Nights: History and Fiction in Xenophon's Cyropaedia' [in:] M.H. Jameson (ed.), *The Greek Historians. Literature and History. Papers Presented to A.E. Raubitschek*, Saratoga , p. 65-85.
Hölbl G., 2001, *A History of the Ptolemaic Empire*, London–New York.
Hölscher T., 2009, *Herrschaft und Lebensalter. Alexander der Große: Politisches Image und anthropologisches Modell*, Basel (*Jacob Burckhardt-Gespräche auf Castelen* 22).
Hoïstad R., 1948, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King. Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man*, Uppsala.
Hornblower S., 1994, 'The Sources and Their Uses', [in:] D.M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower, M. Ostwald (ed.), *The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition*, vol. 4: *The Fourth Century B.C.*, Cambridge, p. 1-23.
Hornblower S., 1994b, 'Introduction' [in:] S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography*, Oxford, p. 1-72.
Hornblower S., 2006, 'Pindar and Kingship Theory', [in:] S. Lewis (ed.), *Ancient Tyranny*, Edinburgh, p. 151-163.
Hornung E., 2000, 'Faraon', [in:] S. Donadoni (red.), *Człowiek Egiptu*, tr. B. Ostrowska, Warszawa, p. 342-375.
Hunter R., 2003, *Theocritus, Encomium of Ptolemy Philadelphus*, Berkeley––Los Angeles.
Hunter R., 2011, 'The Letter of Aristeas', [in:] A. Erskine, L. Llewellyn-Jones (ed.), *Creating a Hellenistic World*, Swansea, p. 47-60.
Irwin T., 1999, *Classical Philosophy*, Oxford (*Oxford Readers*).

Kaerst J., 1898, *Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begrüdung der Monarchie im Altertum*, München–Leipzig 1898 (*Historische Bibliothek* 6).
Kagan D., 1965, *The Great Dialogue. History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius*, New York.
Kantorowicz E., 1957, *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton.
Kent R.G., 1953, *Old Persian. Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, 3rd ed., New Haven.
Kirk G.S., 1995, *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume I: Books 1-4*, Cambridge.
Klęczar A., 2012, 'The Kingship of Alexander the Great in the Jewish Versions of the Alexander Narrative', [in:] *Alexander Romance in Persia and the East*, p. 339-348
Knauth W., Nadjmabadi S., 1975, *Das altiranische Fürstenideal von Xenophon bis Ferdousi nach den antiken und einheimischen Quellen*, Wiesbaden.
Koenen L., 1993, 'The Ptolemaic King as a Religious Figure', [in:] *Images and Ideologies. Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World, p. 25-115.*
Konstan D., 1997, 'Friendship and Monarchy. Dio of Prusa's Third Oration on Kingship', *Symbolae Osloenses* 72, p. 124-143.
Kornemann E., 1935, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios von Aegypten. Versuch einer Rekonstruktion*, Berlin.
Kuhrt A., 1984, 'The Achaemenid Concept of Kingship', *Iran* 22, p. 156-160.
Kuhrt A., 1992, 'Usurpation, Conquest and Ceremonial: from Babylon to Persia' [in:] D. Cannadine, S. Price (ed.), *Rituals of Royalty. Power and Ceremonial in Tradional Societies*, Cambridge, p. 20-55.
Kuhrt A., 2001, 'The Achaemenid Persian Empire (c. 550 – c. 330 BCE): Continuities, Adaptations, Transformations', [in:] S.E. Alcock et al. (ed.), *Empires. Perspectives from Archaeology and History*, Cambridge, p. 93-124.
Kuhrt A., 2003, *Ancient Near East c. 3000 – 330 BC* II, London–New York.
Kuhrt A., 2007, *The Persian Empire. A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period*, London–New York.
Lane Fox R., 2007, 'Alexander the Great: «Last of Achaemenids?»', [in:] Ch. Tuplin (ed.), *Persian Responses. Political and Cultural Interaction with (in) the Achaemenid Empire*, Swansea, p. 267-312.
Lee Too Y., 1998, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: Disfiguring the Pedagogical State', [in:] Y. Lee Too, N. Livingstone (ed.), *Pedagogy and Power. Rhetorics of Classical Learning*, Cambridge, p. 282-302.
Lendle O., 1992, *Einführung in die griechische Geschichtsschreibung. Von Hekataios bis Zosimos*, Darmstadt.
Lloyd A.B., 2010, 'The Reception of Pharaonic Egypt in Classical Antiquity', [in:] A.B. Lloyd (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Egypt*, vol. 2, Malden––Oxford, p. 1067-1085.

Long A.A. 1993, 'The Philosophical Life: Introduction', [in:] *Images and Ideologies*, p. 299-302.
Lord C., 1978, 'Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's *Politics*', *Hermes* 106, p. 336-357.
Luccioni J., 1947, *Les idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon*, Paris.
Luccioni J., 1958, *La pensée politique de Platon*, Paris.
Lund H.S., 1992, *Lysimachus. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, London––New York.
Ma J., 2003, 'Kings', [in:] A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to Hellenistic World*, Malden–Oxford, p. 177-195.
Ma J., 2008, 'Paradigms and Paradoxes in the Hellenistic World', [in:] B. Virgilio (a cura di), *Studi Ellenistici XX*, , Pisa–Roma, p. 371-386.
Ma J., 2011, 'Court, King, and Power in Antigonid Macedonia', [in:] R.J. Lane Fox (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC – 300 AD*, Leiden–Boston, p. 521-544.
Ma J., 2013, 'Hellenistic Empires', [in:] P. Fibiger Bang, W. Scheidel (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the State in Ancient Near East and Mediterranean*, Oxford, p. 324-360.
Mallowan M., 1972, 'Cyrus the Great (558 – 529 B.C.)', *Iran* 10, p. 1-17.
Manning J.G., 2009, *The Last Pharaohs. Egypt under the Ptolemies, 305--30 BC*, Princeton.
Marincola J., 1997, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography*, Cambridge.
Masaracchia E., 1996, 'La *Ciropedia* di Senofonte e l'ideologia imperiale persiana', *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 54, p. 163-194.
McEwan C.W., 1934, *The Oriental Origin of Hellenistic Kingship*, Chicago.
Mehl A., 1980-1981, 'Doriktetos Chora: kritische Bemerkungen zum "Speererwerb" im Politik und Völkerrecht der hellenistische Epoche', *Ancient Society* 11-12, p. 173-212.
Meissner B., 1992, *Historiker zwischen Polis und Königshof. Studien zur Stellung der Geschichtsschreiber in der griechischen Gesellschaft in spätklassischer und frühhellenistischer Zeit*, Göttingen.
Miller D. 1993, 'Cyrus and Astyages – an Ancient Prototype for 'dei-gratia' Rule', *Zeitschrift fur Kunstgeschichte*, 56, p. 545-553.
Mitchell L., Melville Ch., 2013, ' "Every Inch a King". Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds', [in:] L. Mitchell, Ch. Melville (ed.), *Every Inch a King. Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*, Leiden, p. 1-22 (*Rulers & Elites* 2).
Mitchell L., 2013, 'Alexander the Great: Divinity and the Rule of Law', [in:] L. Mitchell, Ch. Melville (ed.), *Every Inch a King. Comparative Studies*

on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, Leiden, p. 91-108 (*Rulers & Elites 2*).
Mitsis P., 2011, 'Hellenistic Political Philosophy', [in:] G. Klosko (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy*, Oxford, p. 120-141.
Moles J., 1983, 'The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom', *Classical Antiquity* 2, p. 251-278.
Moles J., 1995, 'The Cynics and Politics', [in:] A. Lacks, M. Schofield (ed.), *Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*, Cambridge, p. 129-158.
Mooren L., 1983, 'The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy', [in:] E. Van't Dack, P. van Dessel, W. van Gucht (ed.), *Egypt and the Hellenistic World*, Leuven, p. 205-240 (*Studia Hellenistica* 27).
Morris S., 2003, 'Imaginary Kings: Alternatives to Monarchy in Early Greece', [in:] K.A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, Austin, p. 1-24.
Morrow G.R., 1960, *Plato's Cretan City. A Historical Interpretation of the Laws*, Princeton.
Mossé C., 1962, *La fin de la démocratie athénienne. Aspects sociaux et politiques du déclin de la cité grecque au IV*e *siècle av. J.-C.*, Paris.
Mossman J., 2010, 'A Life Unparalled: *Artaxerxes*' [in :], N. Humble (ed.), *Plutarch's Lives: Parallelism and Purpose*, Swansea, p. 145-167.
Most G.W., 2006, *Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia*, Cambridge–London.
Müller S., 2011, 'Die frühen Perserkönige im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Makedonen und in der Propaganda Alexanders des Grossen', *Gymnasium* 118, p. 105-133.
Münscher K., 1920, *Xenophon in der griechisch-römischen Literatur*, Leipzig (*Philologus Supplement* 13).
Murray O., 1967, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', *Journal of Teological Studies* 18, p. 337-371.
Murray O., 1970, 'Hecataeus of Abdera and Pharaonic Kingship', *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 56, p. 141-171.
Murray O., 1971, *Peri Basileias*: *Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic World* [D. Phil. thesis], Oxford.
Murray O., 1996, 'Kingship', [in:] S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth (ed.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., Oxford, p. 807.
Murray O., 2007, 'Philosophy and Monarchy in the Hellenistic World', [in:] T. Rajak et al. (ed.), *Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, p. 13-28.

Nadon Ch., 2001, *Xenophon's Prince. Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*, Berkeley–Los Angeles.
Nawotka K., 2004, *Plutarch, O szczęściu, czy dzielności Aleksandra*, Wrocław.
Nelson J., 2007, 'Kingship and Empire', [in:] J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450*, Cambridge, p. 211-251.
Newell W.R., 1991, 'Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's Politics', [in:] C. Lord, D.K. O'Connor (ed.), *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford, p. 197-211.
Nock A.D., 1928, 'Notes on Ruler-Cult, I-IV', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 48, p. 21-43.
Noreña C.F., 2011, *Imperial Ideals in the Roman West. Representation, Circulation, Power*, Cambridge.
Nussbaum M.C., 1990, *The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge.
Ogden D., 1997, *The Crooked Kings of Ancient Greece*, London.
Olbrycht M.J., 2004, *Aleksander Wielki i świat irański*, Rzeszów.
Olbrycht M.J., 2010, 'Macedonia and Persia', [in:] J. Roisman, I. Worthington (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Malden–Oxford, p. 342-369.
Osborne R., 1996, *Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC*, London–New York.
Osborne R., 2003: 'Changing the Discourse', [in:] K. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny*, p. 251-272.
Pearson L., 1960, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, London–Beccles (*The American Philological Association*).
Pearson L., 1966, 'The Diary and the Letters of Alexander the Great', [in:] G.T. Griffith (ed.), *Alexander the Great. The Main Problems*, Cambridge–New York, p. 443-455.
Pedech P., 1984, *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre. Callisthène, Onésicrite, Néarche, Ptolémée, Aristobule*, Paris.
Pelling Ch., 2011, *Plutarch, Caesar*, Oxford.
Pitcher L., 2009, *Writing Ancient History*, London–New York.
Pomeroy S.B., 1994, *Xenophon, Oeconomucus. A Social and Historical Commentary*, Oxford.
Prandi L., 1985, *Callistene. Uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedoni*, Milano
Préaux C., 1976, 'L'image du roi de l'époque hellénistique', [in:] F. Bossier et al. (ed.), *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought. Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata*, Leuven, p. 53-75.
Price S.F.R., 1984, *Rituals and Power. The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*, Cambridge.

Rawson E., 1975, ‘Caesar’s Heritage: Hellenistic Kings and Their Roman Equals’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 65, p. 148-159.
Reeve C.D.C, 1988, *Philosopher-King. The Argument from Plato’s Republic*, Princeton.
Reichel M., 2007, ‘Xenophon als Biograph’, [in:] M. Erler, S. Schorn (hrsg.), *Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit*, Berlin–New York, p. 25-43.
Richter M., 2010, ‘Despotism, Oriental’, [in:] A. Grafton, G.W. Most and S. Settis (ed.), *The Classical Tradition*, Cambridge–London, p. 261-262.
Ritter H.-W., 1965, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft. Untersuchungen zu Zeremonien und Rechtsgrundlagen des Herrschaftsantritts bei den Persern, bei Alexander dem Großen und im Hellenismus*, München (*Vestigia* 7).
Robinson R., 1995, *Aristotle, Politics, Books III and IV*, Oxford.
Roisman J., 1983-1984, ‘Why Arrian Wrote the *Anabasis*’, *Rivista Storica dell’Antichità* 13-14, p. 253-263.
Roisman J., 1984a, ‘Ptolemy and His Rivals in His History of Alexander’, *Classical Quarterly* 34, p. 373-385.
Rollinger R., ‘The Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond: The Relations between the Worlds of the “Greek” and “Non-Greek” Civilizations’, [in:] K.H. Kinzl (ed.), *A Companion to the Classical World*, Malden–Oxford 2006, p. 197-226.
Rollinger R., 2009, ‘Near Eastern Perspectives on the Greeks’, [w:] G. Boys-Stones, B. Graziosi, P. Vasunia (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies*, Oxford, p. 32-47.
Romm J., 2005, ‘Introduction’, [in:] J. Romm (ed.), *Alexander the Great. Selections from Arrian, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius Rufus*, tr. P. Mensch, J. Romm, Indianapolis–Cambridge, p. xii-xxi.
Rostovtzeff M., 1941, *Social and Economical History of the Hellenistic World*, vol. 1, Oxford.
Root M.C., 1979, *The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art. Essays on the Creation of an Iconography of Empire*, Leiden (*Acta Iranica* 19).
Root M.C., 2013, ‘Defining the Divine in Achaemenid Persian Kingship: a View from Bisistun’, [in:] L. Mitchell, Ch. Melville (ed.), *Every Inch a King. Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*, Leiden, p. 23-66 (*Rulers & Elites 2*).
Ross W.D., 1956, *Aristotle*, London.
Roy J., 1998, ‘The Masculinity of Hellenistic King’, [in:] L. Foxhall, J. Salmon (ed.), *When Men Were Men. Masculinity, Power, and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, London–New York, p. 111-135.
Russell B., 1975, *Power. A New Social Analysis*, London.
Rutherford R.B., 1991, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. A Study*, Oxford.

Rutherford R.B., 1995, *The Art of Plato. Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation*, London.
Rzepka J., 2006, *Monarchia macedońska. Zgromadzenie i obywatelstwo u schyłku epoki klasycznej i w okresie hellenistycznym*, Warszawa.
Ryffel H., 1949, *Metabole politeion. Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen*, Bern.
Saggs H.W.F., 1973, *Wielkość i upadek Babilonii*, tr. J. Nowacki, Warszawa.
Salkever S., 2009, 'Reading Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* as a Single Course of Lectures: Rhetoric, Politics, and Philosophy', [in:] S. Salkever (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought*, Cambridge, p. 209-242.
Samuel A.E., 1993, 'The Ptolemies and the Ideology of Kingship', [in:] P. Green (ed.), *Hellenistic History and Culture*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, p. 168-191.
Sancisi-Weerdenburg H., 1993, 'Political Concepts in Old-Persian Royal Inscriptions', [in:] K. Raaflaub (hrsg.), *Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike*, München, p. 145-163.
Schmitt R., 1983, 'Achaemenid Dynasty', [in:], *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (www.iranicaonline.org)
Schmitt R., 2000, *The Old Persian Inscriptions of Naqsh-i Rustam and Persepolis*, vol. I, part 1 Chicago (*Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum*).
Scharr E., 1919, *Xenophons Staats- und Gesellschaftsideal und seine Zeit*, Halle.
Schubart W., 1937, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri', *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete* 12, p. 1-26.
Schofield M., 1999, 'Social and Political Thought', [in:] K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, Cambridge, p. 39-770.
Schulte J.M., 2001, *Speculum regis. Studien zur Fürstenspiegel-Literatur in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, Münster.
Schwartz E., 1957, *Die Ethik der Griechen*, Stuttgart.
Scruton R., 2002, 'Monarchia', [in:] R. Scruton, *Słownik myśli politycznej*, tłum. T. Biedroń, Poznań, p. 222.
Seibert J., 1969, *Untersuchungen* zur *Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.*, München.
Shipley G., 2000, *The Greek World after Alexander 323-30 BC*, London–New York.
Simonetti Agostinetti A., 1993, *Flavio Arriano, Gli eventi dopo Alessandro*, Roma.
Phillips Simpson P.L., 1998, *A Philosophical Commentary on The Politics of Aristotle*, Chapel Hill–London.
Sinclair T.A., 1951, *A History of Greek Political Thought*, London.

Sisti F., 2001, *Arriano, Anabasi di Alessandro*, vol. 1, Roma.
Smith J., 2011, *Christ the Ideal King. Cultural Context, Rhetorical Strategy, and the Power of Divine Monarchy in Ephesians*, Tübingen.
Smith R.R.R., 1988, *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*, Oxford.
Smith R.R.R., 1993, 'Kings and Philosophers', [in:] *A.* Bulloch, E.S. Gruen, A.A. Long, A. Stewart (ed.), *Images and Ideologies. Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World,* Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford, p. 202-211.
Soden von W., 1994, *The Ancient Orient. An Introduction to the Study of the Ancient Near East*, Grand Rapids.
Spawforth A.J., 2007, 'The Court of Alexander the Great between Europe and Asia', [in:] A.J. Spawforth, *The Court and Society in Ancient Monarchies*, Cambridge, p. 82-120.
Spencer D., 2003, *The Roman Alexander. Reading a Cultural Myth*, Exeter.
Stadter P.A., 1980, *Arrian of Nicomedia*, Chapel Hill–London.
Stadter P.A., 1991, 'Fictional Narrative in the Cyropaideia', *American Journal of Philology* 112, p. 461-491.
Stadter P.A., 2002, 'Plutarch and Trajanic Ideology', [in:] P.A. Stadter, L. van der Stockt (ed.), *Sage and Emperor. Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan*, Leuven, p. 241-277.
Stewart A., 1993, *Faces of Power. Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London.
Stewart A., 2003, 'Alexander in Greek and Roman Art', [in:] *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, p. 31-66.
Stewart A., 2008, *Classical Greece and the Birth of Western Art*, Cambridge.
Stoneman R., 1992, 'Introduction and Notes', [in:] Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus*, tr. H.G. Dakyns, London–Rutland, p. i-xxi and 273-288.
Stoneman R., 2003, 'The Legacy of Alexander in Ancient Philosophy', [in:] *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, p. 325-345.
Strasburger H., 1934, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, Leipzig (= [in:] *Studien zur Alten Geschichte*, Bd. 1, Hildesheim–New York 1982, p. 83-148).
Striker G., 2006, 'Aristotle's Ethics as Political Science', [in:] B. Reis, S. Haffmans (ed.), *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*, Cambridge 2006, p. 127-141.
Stroheker K.F., 1953-1954, 'Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik', *Historia* 2, p. 381-412.
Strootman R., 2010, 'Literature and the Kings', [in:] J.J. Clauss, M. Cuypers (ed.), *A Companion to Hellenistic Literature*, Malden–Oxford, p. 30-45.
Tarn W.W., 1948, *Alexander the Great*, vol. 2: *Sources and Studies*, Cambridge.
Tatum J., 1989, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction. On The Education of Cyrus*, Princeton.

Tuplin Ch., 1991, 'Persian Decor in *Cyropaedia*: Some Observations', [in:] H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, J.W. Drijvers (ed.), *Achaemenid History*, vol. 5: *The Roots of the European Tradition*, Leiden, p. 17-29.

Tuplin Ch., 1994, 'Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia*', [in:] A. Powell, S. Hodkinson, *The Shadow of Sparta*, London–New York, p. 127-182.

Tuplin Ch., 2010, 'Xenophon and Achaemenid Courts: A Survey of Evidence', [in:] B. Jacobs, R. Rollinger (hrsg.), *Der Achämenidenhof / The Achaemenid Court*, Wiesbaden, p. 189-230 (*Classica et Orientalia* 2).

Tuplin Ch., 2013, 'Xenophon's *Cyropedia*: Fictive History, Political Analysis and Thinking with Iranian Kings', [in:] *Every Inch a King*, p. 67-90.

Turasiewicz R., 1968, *Życie polityczne w Atenach w V i IV w. p.n.e. w ocenie krytycznej współczesnych autorów ateńskich*, Wrocław.

Turasiewicz R., 1986, 'Politycze oblicze literatury greckiej V i IV wieku p.n.e.', *Meander* 41, p. 357-374.

Usher S., 1990, *Isocrates, Panegirycus and to Nicocles*, Warminster (*Greek Orators* III).

Valdenberg V., 1927, 'La théorie monarchique de Dion Chrysostome', *Revue d'Etudes Grecs* 40, p. 142-162.

Virgilio B., 2003, *Lancia, diadema e porpora. Il re e la regalità ellenistica*, 2nd ed., Pisa (*Studi Ellenistici* 14).

Wace A.J.B., 1905, 'Hellenistic Royal Portraits', *Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 25, p. 86-104.

Walbank F.W., 1957, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1, Oxford.

Walbank F.W., 1984, 'Monarchy and Monarchic Ideas', [in:] F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen and R.M. Ogilvie (ed.), *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 7, part 1: *The Hellenistic World*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, p. 62-85, 587-591.

Walbank F.W., 1987, 'Könige als Götter. Überlegungen zum Herrscherkult von Alexander bis Augustus', *Chiron* 17, p. 365-382.

Walbank F.W., 2003, *Świat hellenistyczny*, tr. G. Muszyński, Warszawa.

Wallace-Hadrill A., 1981, 'The Emperor and His Virtues', *Historia* 30, p. 298-323.

Wallace-Hadrill A., 1982, 'Civilis Princeps: between Citizen and King', *Journal of Roman Studies* 72, p. 32-48.

Waterfield R., 2011, *Dividing the Spoils. The War for Alexander the Great's Empire*, Oxford.

Waters M., 2004, 'Cyrus and the Achaemenids', *Iran* 42, p. 91-102.

Weber G., 1995, 'Herrscher, Hof und Dichter. Aspekte der Legitimierung und und Repräsentation hellenistischer Könige am Beispiel der ersten drei Antigoniden', *Historia* 44, p. 283-316.

Weber G., 1997, 'Interaktion, Representation und Herrschaft. Der Könighof im Helenismus', [in:] A. Winterling (hrsg.), *Zwischen "Haus" und "Staat". Antike Hofe im Vergleich*, München, p. 27-71.
Wees van H., 1992, *Status Warriors. War, Violence and Society in Homer and History*, Amsterdam.
Welles C.B., 1974, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Times*, Chicago.
West M.L., 1966, *Hesiod, Theogony* (ed. with Prolegomena and Commentary), Oxford.
Whitby M., 2012, 'Onesikritos (134)', [in:] *Brill's New Jacoby* [www.brillonline.nl].
Whitehead D., 1993, 'Cardinal Virtues: the Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44, p. 37-75.
Wiesehöfer J., 2006, *Ancient Persia*, London.
Will E., 1975, 'La royauté hellénistique', [in:] E. Will, C. Mosse, P. Goukowsky, *Le monde grec et l'Orient*, t. 2: *Le IV*e *siècle et l'époque hellénistique*, Paris, p. 421-444.
Willcock M.M., 1984, *The Iliad of Homer. Books I-XII*, London.
Wipszycka E., Bravo B., 2010, *Historia starożytnych Greków* III. *Okres hellensityczny*, 2nd ed., Warszawa.
Wiseman T.P., 1993, 'Lying Historians: Seven Types of Mendacity', [in:] Ch.Gill, T.P. Wiseman (ed.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, Exeter, p. 122-146.
Zambrini A., 2007, 'The Historians of Alexander the Great', [in:] J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, vol. 1, Malden––Oxford, p. 210-220.
Yardley J.C., Wheatley P., Heckel W., 2011, *Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, vol. 2. *Books 13-15: The Successors to Alexander the Great*, Oxford.