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ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς, ὑμεῖς – Constructing Identity of a Speaker in Reference to His Audience in the Political Speeches of Demosthenes and the Political Writings of Isocrates

ABSTRACT: In this paper I would like to focus on the very basic philological question of frequency and context of utterances in the first person singular and plural as well as the second person plural in the deliberative speeches of Demosthenes and the political writings of Isocrates imitating deliberative speech. In this genre of oratory self-presentation of a speaker and the way he constructs his relationship with the audience seem crucial for the effectiveness of persuasion. In this respect, it is interesting to notice differences between Demosthenes and Isocrates. Both clearly mark their own positions as opposed to opinions of the others and eagerly employ verbs in the first person singular (or personal pronouns 'mine', 'my'), especially in the opening sections of speeches, but, when it comes to the analysis of past events, the deliberation of present condition or advice for the future, Demosthenes tends to speak in the second person plural standing literally and metaphorically *versus* the Athenians, while Isocrates chooses the first person plural as if he was trying to erase the division between himself and his audience.

This tendency might be explained by aesthetic preferences and individual dispositions of both orators, nevertheless I would like to argue that some less subjective reason could be taken into consideration.

KEYWORDS: Isocrates, Demosthenes, ancient Greek rhetoric, audience

The name of Demosthenes was put before the name of Isocrates in the title of this paper not by accident. Both are enumerated among the most eminent Greek orators, but only one of them represents the genuine experience of performing speeches in front of the audience. Demosthens took part in political life, whereas Isocrates confined his activity to writing and provided an excellent material for studying tension between textuality and orality in Athenian political culture; at the same time he raised issues of his own identity as a citizen and political commentator.

As Aristotle puts it: 'It is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character' (Aristot. *Rhet.* III.1, 1403b, transl. J.H. Freese). This remark, no matter how obvious it appears, encompasses the essence of persuasion: a speaker might say almost everything, also critical and unpleasant, provided he knows how to do it properly. Thus he[1] will fulfil the requirements of the genre and be able to succeed. This knowledge has been the subject of study for centuries; Jeanne Fahnestock in her book on the uses of language in persuasion, in the chapter discussing the speaker and the audience construction, refers to the frankness of speech (*licentia*) regarded as the license to remonstrate or criticise the audience. With references to the treatises of Cicero and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, she explains that according to the ancient theoreticians of persuasion the critical remarks should be counterbalanced by some sort of a compliment for the listeners.[2] Some of these critical remarks might have been in fact compliments, easily recognised and appreciated, sometimes perhaps subconsciously, even by a less sophisticated audience. Still, we should remember that in Athenian political rhetoric, aimed at practical goals, orators often touched difficult subjects and did not avoid criticising their fellow-countrymen. This remark refers to the eminent rhetors whose efforts focused on the long-run policy, designed to protect the interests of the Athenian people. Taking his place in front of the assembly, the speaker, who came out of the gathering of citizens, becomes a separate unit, even by the mere organisation of the public space while he is

[1] I am using pronoun 'he' consciously: I have to sadly admit that in antiquity speeches were delivered only by men.

[2] Fahnestock 2011: 296–297.

facing the audience, and he has to decide, whether and when to emphasise the gap between him and the listeners, or to make the gap disappear. Experienced speakers, as well as talented beginners, understood that creating a bond with the audience was crucial for success. Ancient speakers recognised the need of adaptation to the audience. This connection may be established by several means, conscious use of the first and second person should certainly be regarded as one of the most vital and effective ones.

In this paper I would like to focus on the very basic philological question of frequency and context of utterances in the first person singular and plural, and the second person plural in the deliberative speeches of Demosthenes and the political writings of Isocrates imitating deliberative speeches. In this genre of oratory the self-presentation of a speaker and the way he constructs his relationship with the audience seems crucial for the effectiveness of persuasion.[3]

The person category may be expressed by a verb or a pronoun; the extensive studies on both phenomena, resulted in a thorough and multifaceted research;[4] scholars focused on analysis and character of several kinds of discourse; politics, regarded as a discursive domain,[5] proved to be a specially interesting field of exploration.[6] In the analysis of political discourse all three deictic categories, personal, spatial and temporal, are equally important for the context of an utterance, since 'deictic expressions serve to anchor the speaker in relation to the surroundings and other participants',[7] and defining the position of a speaker in refer-

[3] Forensic speeches, due to the context of delivery, set slightly different demands: in the first place, the speaker has to define and emphasise his own position in reference to his opponent, and since the audience literally plays the role of judges, interpreting the utterances in the 1 person plural becomes more complex.

[4] Among several important studies, we should mention at least Benveniste 1971; Mühlhäusler, Harré 1990; Duszak 2002; Siewierska 2004; Helmbrecht 2004; Duszak, Okulska 2011; Pavlidou 2014; for the survey of the literature see: Helmbrecht 2004: 11–18; Pavlidou 2014.

[5] Van Dijk 2006: 732.

[6] For different approaches to the subject see: Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Geis 1987; Fairclough 1989; Fairclough 1995; Fahnestock 2011; Fairclough, Fairclough 2012; De Fina 1995; Urban 1988.

[7] Trask, Stockwell 2007: 66.

ence to the audience is being achieved by the deictic dimension of the person.[8]

It seems understandable that the complexity of the first person plural, 'we', has been attracting special attention.[9] The fact that, as Benveniste put it in his classical work, 'we is not a multiplication of identical objects but a *junction* between "I" and "non-I", no matter what the content of this "non-I" may be',[10] increases the referentiality of the first person plural.

Considering the constitutive role of 'I' in 'we', emphasised by Benveniste in the same passage,[11] describing the 'non-I' element and the character of the junction seem crucial for understanding the significance of the utterance. These statements provided the point of departure for further discussion of the first person non-singular references for Theodosia-Soula Pavlidou: in the introductory chapter to the volume *Constructing collectivity. We across languages and contexts* she points at the wide potential referential range of 'we', which, at least in some languages, may express all six persons in the appropriate context (e.g. pluralis modestiae = academic *we*, vel maiestatis, or 'nursery' *we* are used in English and Polish as well) and reflects on the group indexicality starting with Helmbrecht's fundamental remark: 'Speakers use "we" to define explicitly and publicly social groups vis a vis their interlocutors and state membership in these groups.'[12] Pavlidou also considers the diversity of groups, which may differ in size, duration, stability and number of members (from the speaker alone to the whole humanity) and acknowledges that 'to the extent that the speaker presents him-/herself as belonging to a group/collectivity, "we" also represents aspects of the *speaker's self or identity*, namely those referred to by social

[8] This remark comes from the first edition of Trask's definition dictionary, where the entry for 'deictic category' is a little longer that in the edition from 2007; the broader version was also quoted by A. Adetunji in the paper on inclusion and exclusion in the political discourse; see Trask 1999: 45; Adetunji 2006: 179.

[9] Benveniste 1971.

[10] Benveniste 1971: 202.

[11] Benveniste 1971: 202.

[12] Helmbrecht 2002: 42 quoted after Pavlidou 2014: 3.

psychologists as the "relational" and the "collective" self".[13] These remarks and further discussion of the fluidity of the 'non-I' element (the speaker identifies him-/herself as a member of a group and may point at his/her role in this group) bring us back to Benveniste's observation quoted above.[14]

Before starting the survey of the selected texts, we (pluralis modestiae) should explain several assumptions made for the purpose of this research: considering the political reality of Athens in the 4th century BC, with its direct democratic procedures, it may be assumed that the audience at the assembly is to be identified with the Athenians (that is the Athenian adult male citizens, the group in possession of full civic rights), therefore there is no need to make distinctions between the listeners, present at the moment of the deliverance of a speech, and all the Athenians. In the case of Isocrates' writings the issue does not exist, since his treatises were never delivered at public gatherings – his audience, by definition, is constituted by all the Athenians (at this point it is useless to discuss the real range of readership and the number of recipients, especially designed by the author himself). We also follow the most popular view, according to which the extant speeches of Demosthenes on the whole represent speeches really delivered in public.[15]

For Greek ancient rhetoric, and Demosthenes and Isocrates in particular, we may assume the basic indexicalities as follows:

a. we = the speaker and the audience (the Athenians) – inclusive[16]
b. we = the speaker and the third party – exclusive
c. we = the speaker = pluralis modestiae
d. we = the speaker = pluralis maiestatis
e. we = the whole humanity (including the speaker and his audience)
f. we = all the Greeks (including the speaker and his audience)

It might be added that the points e and f are often hard to discern, unless the speaker deliberately underlines the differences between the

[13] Pavlidou 2014: 5 with the reference to Brewer, Gardner 1996 and Sedikides, Brewer 2001.

[14] Pavlidou 2014: 6–8.

[15] Cf. Worthington 2013: 7, for the further discussion on the issue see: Adams 1912, and especially Trevett 1996.

[16] On basic definitions of 'clusivity', see introductory chapter in Filimonova 2005.

Greeks and the other peoples, or, on the contrary, he puts emphasis on the universality of an opinion or a phenomenon, common for the Greeks and the rest of the world. On the other hand, it should be remembered that for a Greek the Greek culture was the most obvious and sometimes the only important point of reference.

Sections c and d are rarely represented, at least in Demosthenes, since the orator does not hesitate to speak in the first person singular and does not hide himself behind modesty or honorific expression, whenever he recounts his actions. The majority of first person plural utterances belong to the section a.

The referent of the first person singular seems to be easy to define: I = the speaker.

The referential range of the second person plural might be more complex, but in the speeches of Demosthenes and Isocrates it would be hard to find utterances in the second-person plural which do not refer to the audience; hence 'you' = the audience = (in most cases mainly) the Athenians.[17]

Additionally, it should be said that although the category of the person can be rendered in different forms,[18] in ancient Greek, which was a highly inflectional language, pronouns in the nominative case usually bear emphatic significance, therefore should be treated separately.

Utterances comprising statements in the first singular and the second plural are also to be noted since it is significant and often provides a juxtaposition of opposing arguments, views and actions.

The table below comprises quantitative data referring to the use of utterances in the first person singular, and first and second person plural.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	1 sing. – verbs	1 sing. – pronouns	1 plur. – verbs	1 plur. – pronouns	2 plur. – verbs	2 plur. – pronouns
Demos-thenes						

[17] On the use of the second person, see: Helmbrecht 2002: 327–335, Siewierska 2004: 214–246, Kluge 2016.

[18] Pavlidou 2014: 1.

Olynthiac I	15	6	9	10	24	23
Olynthiac II	7	8	2	9	13	12
Olynthiac III	18	6	16	8	34	19
Philippic I	28	8	12	8	45	23
Philippic II	18	7	1	1	31	16
Philippic III	22	12	19	8	38	15
Philippic IV	26	8	18	9	60	39
Isocrates						
On the Peace	61	12	88	56	55	18
Areopagiticus	29	6	32	16	4	9
Panegyricus	20	3	32	75		

Sheer numbers might be misleading and provide no information, but the proportion of different types of utterances seem to be more elucidating. Together with the analysis of selected passages from the texts, providing rather typical samples of the authors' style, it might explain the impression that Isocrates is more inclined to speaking in the first person plural, much less prone than Demosthenes to stand in distinct opposition to his audience, and milder in the choice of words when it comes to criticise his fellow-countrymen.

It may be argued that both Demosthenes and Isocrates use the first singular in rather similar way, obviously emphasising their position in contrast to the other speakers, especially in the introductory parts of their speeches, and the audience. The way they use the first person plural seems less trivial – such utterances usually refer to the Athenians, Greeks, or humanity in general (respectively sections a, e, f);

occasionally they use pluralis modestiae or maiestatis (sections c, d). It also should be noted that for Demosthenes 'we' sometimes encodes him and other orators[19] (section b). Isocrates does not do that, he mentions other rhetors to underline differences between them and him.

The illustration of such expression is provided by the passage from the *Second Philippic* (Dem. 6.3): Demosthenes speaks openly about the reluctance of political speakers to give sensible advice which would be unkind to citizens (πρῶτον μὲν **ἡμεῖς οἱ παριόντες τούτων μὲν ἀφέσταμεν** καὶ γράφειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν, **τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν ὀκνοῦντες**, οἷα ποιεῖ δ', ὡς δεινά, καὶ τοιαῦτα διεξερχόμεθα). He also reproaches citizens that they themselves can decry justice but they are incapable of taking any action (**ἔπειθ' ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι,** ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκεύασθε, ὡς δὲ κωλύσαιτ' ἂν ἐκεῖνον πράττειν ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὧν ἐστι νῦν, παντελῶς ἀργῶς **ἔχετε)**.

ἡμεῖς οἱ παριόντες τούτων μὲν ἀφέσταμεν refers to fellow orators, the expression emphasised by the use of the personal pronoun in the nominative plural; this exclusive 'we' is opposed to the second person plural, 'you', also strengthened by the emphatic use of the personal pronoun, **ὑμεῖς,** followed by a series of verbs in the second person plural. The sense is, however, favourable for the audience since the critique is addressed to Demosthenes and his colleagues. Exclusivity in the first sentence turned out to be employed to express a high opinion on the Athenians and introduce a mild critique of their idleness.

Few paragraphs later, Demosthenes reunites both referents in the most natural fashion (Dem. 6.5): εἰ δ' ὅπως τὰ παρόντ' ἐπανορθωθήσεται δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ προελθόντ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω λήσει πάνθ' **ἡμᾶς**, μηδ' ἐπιστήσεται μέγεθος δυνάμεως πρὸς ἣν οὐδ' ἀντᾶραι δυνησόμεθα, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος ὅσπερ πρότερον τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ **τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅπασι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑμῖν** τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ τὰ σώσοντα τῶν ῥᾴστων καὶ τῶν ἡδίστων προαιρετέον.

The beginning of the sentence is based on the impersonal statement (English translation provides an excellent sample of the referential range and generic use of the second person, unfortunately absent in the Greek text), but 'us', **ἡμᾶς,** and the verb in the first person plural

[19] For identifying the rhetor with the politician, see: Ober 1989: 105–107.

δυνησόμεθα comprise the speaker and his audience (inclusive 'we'); the expression with the use of the dative **τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅπασι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑμῖν** […] προαιρετέον cleverly combines the third party (**τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅπασι**), referring here to the rhetors, Demosthenes included, and the second person plural encoding the Athenians.

The passage from the *First Olynthiac* (Dem. 1.8–9) offers an excellent example of the critique expressed in such a way that it does not alienate the criticising speaker from the criticised audience: Demosthenes urges them not to squander the opportunity and to risk the losses they once suffered (**πεπόνθατε**). He recalls that they once undertook a successful expedition to the aid of Euboea (**ἦκομεν** Εὐβοεῦσιν βεβοηθηκότες […] **κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν**), and points out that had they taken similar action against Amphipolis and other cities, Athenians would have less trouble (τὴν αὐτὴν **παρειχόμεθ' ἡμεῖς** ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν ἥνπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἶχετ' ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἦτ' ἀπηλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων) and Philip would have had to relent to a greater extent (εἰ τότε τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν **ἐβοηθήσαμεν** αὐτοί, ῥᾴονι καὶ πολὺ ταπεινοτέρῳ νῦν ἂν **ἐχρώμεθα** τῷ Φιλίππῳ). Demosthenes states in strong terms: 'But as it is, by constantly abandoning the present and thinking the future will work out well on its own, we, men of Athens, have caused Philip to grow (**ηὐξήσαμεν**), and we have made him (**κατεστήσαμεν**) as powerful as no previous king of Macedon has ever been.' (transl. D. Phillips)

From the second line onwards Demosthenes carefully employs the inclusive first person plural and identifies himself with the rest of Athenians responsible for negligence in the politics towards Macedonia and its consequences.

Demosthenes is also quite self-assured when it comes to offering the advice (Dem. 2.11–13), when he calls for helping the Olynthians as soon as possible (**φημὶ** δὴ δεῖν **ἡμᾶς** τοῖς μὲν Ὀλυνθίοις **βοηθεῖν**, καὶ ὅπως τις λέγει κάλλιστα καὶ τάχιστα, οὕτως ἀρέσκει **μοι**), then advises sending a messenger to Thessaly and ensuring that messengers are able to point out actual actions of the Athenians (**σκοπεῖσθε** μέντοι τοῦτ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅπως μὴ λόγους ἐροῦσιν μόνον οἱ παρ' ἡμῶν πρέσβεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργον τι δεικνύειν ἔξουσιν **ἐξεληλυθότων ὑμῶν**

ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν), because a word that is not followed by action is futile: by using it, the Athenians do not inspire confidence (ὡς ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν, μάλιστα δ᾽ ὁ παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως: ὅσῳ γὰρ ἑτοιμότατ᾽ αὐτῷ **δοκοῦμεν** χρῆσθαι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπιστοῦσι πάντες αὐτῷ). The speaker demands that fellow citizens change their attitude and take concrete action (πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεικτέον τὴν μεταβολήν, εἰσφέροντας, ἐξιόντας, ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας ἑτοίμως, εἴπερ τις **ὑμῖν** προσέξει τὸν νοῦν. κἂν ταῦτ᾽ **ἐθελήσηθ**᾽ ὡς προσήκει καὶ δὴ περαίνειν, οὐ μόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ συμμαχικὰ ἀσθενῶς καὶ ἀπίστως ἔχοντα φανήσεται Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως κακῶς ἔχοντ᾽ ἐξελεγχθήσεται.

The passage begins with the first person singular statement **φημὶ,** but the rest of the sentence refers to the community (‘us’, **ἡμᾶς**). Demosthenes is not willing to stress his position as an advisor alienated from the group to which he is giving advice. The rest of the passage provides the combination of utterances in the second person plural (‘you did’) with less numerous expressions in the inclusive first person plural.

A comparable technique might be observed in the *Third Olynthiac* (Dem. 3.4–6): the speaker intends to remind citizens of what happened in the past (ἀναγκαῖον δ᾽ **ὑπολαμβάνω** μικρὰ τῶν γεγενημένων πρῶτον **ὑμᾶς ὑπομνῆσαι)**, asks whether they remember those events (**μέμνησθ**᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι), how they enacted sending of forty triers and a special tribute for war purposes (**ἐψηφίσασθε** τετταράκοντα τριήρεις καθέλκειν […] καὶ τάλανθ᾽ ἑξήκοντ᾽ εἰσφέρειν), but only after many months sent ten ships (μόγις μετὰ τὰ μυστήρια δέκα ναῦς **ἀπεστείλατ**᾽), and finally, on hearing of Philip’s illness, abandoned the expedition (**ἀφεῖτ**᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ἀπόστολον). Had the Athenians acted then without procrastination, Philip would not be giving them such trouble now (εἰ γὰρ τότ᾽ ἐκεῖσ᾽ **ἐβοηθήσαμεν**, ὥσπερ **ἐψηφισάμεθα**, προθύμως, οὐκ ἂν ἠνώχλει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ Φίλιππος σωθείς). Demosthenes adds that he recalled these events so that now the Athenians, when the time comes for another clash, will avoid another mistake (νῦν δ᾽ ἑτέρου πολέμου καιρὸς ἥκει τις, δι᾽ ὃν καὶ περὶ τούτων **ἐμνήσθην**, ἵνα μὴ ταὐτὰ **πάθητε)**. The speaker asks how they should use the previous experience and answers without playing with subtlety:

if they do not help, their plans may benefit Philip more than them (τί δὴ **χρησόμεθ**᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτῳ; εἰ γὰρ μὴ **βοηθήσετε** παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, **θεάσασθ**᾽ ὃν τρόπον ὑμεῖς ἐστρατηγηκότες πάντ᾽ **ἔσεσθ**᾽ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου).

These lines illustrate the most striking feature of Demosthenes' use of deictic elements: he combines the ability to stress his own position and the direct critique of his audience (utterances in the second person plural) with establishing the bond with the Athenians when the critique becomes really serious. Swift changes of the grammatical person of the subject (from the first singular to the first plural) are by no means accidental. They constitute a carefully considered strategy of persuasion. Reminding the audience of some past event, good or bad decisions, is a fairly common procedure in rhetoric. Speakers often refer to distant events in which the immediate audience could not have had any part, attributing these actions to them, but one can guess that the speaker metaphorically treats his audience as an emanation of the Athenian people, understood as a creation that transcends time. However, if we are dealing with references to contemporary events, or in any case covering a relatively small period, the metaphorical sense gives a way to the literal meaning.[20] The above passus falls into the latter category: Demosthenes is addressing citizens, many of whom must have remembered the events recalled; many of whom must have participated in assemblies where key decisions were made, the consequences of which Athens must now face. Richer by experience, they can avoid previous mistakes. The speaker's relationship with the audience in this case is one of the most direct, the arguments deal with matters of direct interest to those gathered. In this situation, the speaker, pointing out their previous mistakes, is not criticising some symbolic representation of the Athenian people, but the decisions of the flesh-and-blood people standing before him.

[20] I owe my reflection on references to the past and their literal or metaphorical meaning to the deliberations of Andrew Wolpert, who analyses the issue in relation to forensic oratory, while a discussion of the status of the Athenian ecclesia is presented by Greg Anderson in an article on defining the concept of the state in terms of modern categories in relation to ancient Athens; Wolpert 2003: 538–539; Anderson 2009: 10–16.

The most fascinating example of the speaker's boldness and his mastery in balancing between harsh words and encouragement, without losing either his own self-identity of an orator or his affinity with the group, may be found in the *Third Philippic* (Dem. 3.53–55), in which Demosthenes first emphasises that it is not enough to take action against Philip but it is still necessary to hate his supporters among the Athenian citizens. Then, in a passionate tirade, the speaker reproaches the Athenians for being stupid and indulging in their willingness to listen to these people: [54] **ὃ μὰ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οὐ δυνήσεσθ᾽ ὑμεῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοῦτ᾽ ἀφῖχθε μωρίας ἢ παρανοίας ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω (πολλάκις γὰρ ἔμοιγ᾽ ἐπελήλυθε καὶ τοῦτο φοβεῖσθαι, μή τι δαιμόνιον τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἐλαύνῃ, ὥστε λοιδορίας, φθόνου, σκώμματος, ἥστινος ἂν τύχηθ᾽ ἕνεκ᾽ αἰτίας ἀνθρώπους μισθωτούς, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀρνηθεῖεν ἔνιοι ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, λέγειν κελεύετε, καὶ γελᾶτε, ἄν τισι λοιδορηθῶσιν.** It is also disastrous in its consequences to provide them with freedom of action: [55] καὶ οὐχί πω τοῦτο δεινόν, καίπερ ὂν δεινόν· ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ πλείονος ἀσφαλείας πολιτεύεσθαι δεδώκατε τούτοις ἢ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγουσιν. καίτοι θεάσασθε ὅσας συμφορὰς παρασκευάζει τὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐθέλειν ἀκροᾶσθαι. The ending of this paragraph, which is also the introduction to the next part of the speech, seems particularly significant: λέξω δ᾽ ἔργα ἃ πάντες εἴσεσθε.[21]

In these lines almost nothing softens the words delivered in full consciousness by the orator standing in front of his fellow-countrymen.

[21] Since this passage is particularly important, I take the liberty of quoting its full translation: '[53] You must not only recognize these things and resist him with military operations; in addition, with your reasoning and judgment you must detest those who plead his case in the Assembly, keeping in mind that it is not possible to conquer the enemies of the city until you punish their underlings in the city itself. [54] Which, by Zeus and the other gods, you will not be able to do. You have sunk to such depths of idiocy or insanity or I don't know what to call it (it has often occurred to me to fear this too, that some supernatural power is driving our affairs) that, for the sake of reproach or envy or humor or whatever motive you happen to act upon, you demand speeches from hirelings, some of whom do not even deny their status, and you laugh when they insult people. [55] Awful though this is, it gets still worse: you have allowed these people to pursue their policies in greater safety than the politicians who speak for you! And yet look at how many disasters have been facilitated by your willingness to listen to this sort of people. I will state facts with which you will all be familiar.' (transl. D. Phillips).

The lenient inclusive 'we' is absent, and Demosthenes does not pretend to take the collective responsibility for the former unreasonable deeds of the Athenians.

His words seem unforgiving and uncompromising, but as a respected orator, active in the assembly and in the political life of his state, he probably could afford such a bold critique without jeopardizing his position of a loyal citizen in the democratic polis.

Isocrates, although also quite critical about Athenian politics, never decided to express his views in such a direct way. He never delivered his speeches in public, abstained from political career of his own will and confined himself to teaching and writing in private seclusion.[22] His views positioned him close to moderate oligarchs, but for all his long life he made an effort in presenting himself as a loyal citizen of the democratic city-state.[23]

His choice of words and phrasing reflect these efforts; the selection of the speech *On the Peace* will provide the appropriate illustration: [2] **ἥκομεν** γὰρ **ἐκκλησιάσοντες** περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἃ μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους ἄμεινον τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγεθος, ὑπὲρ ὧν **συνεληλύθαμεν**, τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν. The first person plural used in this introductory passage refers to the author and his audience. In the case of Isocrates, the question of audience is more complex than in the case of Demosthenes and other speakers addressing the assembly. In the case of orators, speaking at assemblies and court, a historical audience can be primarily defined. Andreas Serafim puts it clearly: 'the speaker delivers his speech at a specific moment in time, before real

[22] Isocrates explained that a weak voice and stage fright prevented him from embarking on a public career (*To Philip* 81–82), and while there is no reason to doubt the veracity of these words, it is hard to resist the impression that these weaknesses provided Isocrates with a convenient excuse not to take part in public discussions and disputes whose level was far from his expectations. On this matter, as before, I agree with the suggestions of Yun Lee Too and Ann N. Michelini: Lee Too 1995: 90–97; Michelini 1998: 115; Janik 2012: 132–133; Janik 2015: 192.

[23] I believe Isocrates sought to emphasise his loyalty to the Athenian state at every opportunity and went to great lengths to present his critical remarks as a voice 'from within' rather than an opinion delivered by someone who was fully conscious of distancing himself from a community of fellow citizens. I have written more extensively on this issue previously, e.g., Janik 2012: 142–143.

people, of specific age, nationality, social and economic status'; besides, to analyse these speeches one can use the concept of 'constructed audience', which according to Serafim includes 'all the strategies used by the speaker to alert the judges and onlookers to the role(s) that he wants them to play'.[24]

In the case of Isocrates, it is difficult to clearly define the historical audience. The author of the *On the Peace* did not speak in public, he gave his works the form of speeches and addressed the audience using phrases appropriate to the occasion, although it can be assumed that in reality his writings primarily reached a relatively narrow group of recipients. Isocrates himself was probably aware of this, just as he was aware of limitations that came with his choice of the medium – writing. Nevertheless, he probably did not intend to give up on a wider audience. It is not without reason that his work is referred to by scholars considering the concept of a universal audience.[25] W.R. Johnson, cited by David Douglas Dunlap, believes that psycho-physical limitations that prevented Isocrates from interacting with his audience in Athens directed him to an audience beyond the limitations of time and space.[26] The opening to audiences other than Athenians, mainly in the context of Panhellenism, is analysed in depth by Kathryn A. Morgan, who also draws attention to a subtle game Isocrates plays with the audience by conjuring them up and creating bonds between himself, the speaker, and the audience.[27]

The thought of a broader audience was probably in Isocrates' mind, but it should not be forgotten that in his treatises he considered current issues and wished to advise his fellow citizens. There is no doubt that he wanted to have some influence on the course of events and the decisions made by the Athenians. The two intentions are not mutually exclusive, but taking the second into account leads one to read the intentions of the author of *On the Peace* quite literally and consider the citizens of Athens as the primary target audience of the treatise. It was

[24] Serafim writes primarily about forensic oratory, but some of the remarks are general in nature and can also be applied to advisory speeches, see Serafim 2017: 20.

[25] For example: Perelman 1968; Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969.

[26] Dunlap 1993: 466–467; Johnson 1976: 224.

[27] Morgan 2003: 181–190, 203–207.

perhaps no less important that other recipients of the treatise perceive its author as a citizen speaking out with concern about issues important to his own country.

The fact that in reality Isocrates' statements could only reach a much narrower audience does not invalidate the intentions of the author who probably wished to be heard and well understood by the majority of his fellow citizens. One must realize, however, that – unlike Demosthenes – Isocrates does not see such an audience, nor does he have to deal with it. He does not stand before the Athenians at an assembly meeting, nor does he confront them in public debates.

In the passage above, the first person plural could be easily mistaken for the plural maiestaticum but the participle ἐκκλησιάσοντες seems to emphasise belonging to the community of citizens. The expressions used by the author are also undoubtedly intended to build a situational frame and create the impression that the speech is being delivered at an actual gathering.[28] It can be argued that Isocrates intended to reach with some of his concepts a wider audience than Athenian one, but here he clearly emphasises a connection to the citizens of his own city. The inclusiveness of the first person plural allows the author to emphasise his membership in the group.

The following sentences make us understand why Isocrates deploys phrases in the first person plural and emphasises his membership in the civic community. Paragraph 3 begins with a strong contrast between the speaker's persona and his audience: **ὁρῶ** δ' **ὑμᾶς** οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου τῶν λεγόντων τὴν ἀκρόασιν ποιουμένους – Isocrates, consistently using the second person plural, reproaches the Athenians for preferring speakers who flatter their listeners and for pressuring speakers to deliver opinions pleasing to their fellow citizens (paragraphs 3–5: διάκεισθε, πεποιήκατε, ἡσθήσεσθε). However, in paragraph 6, dealing with expectations of the audience towards the speakers advising on war and peace, the author neatly switches to the first person plural, standing in line with the rest of the citizens – 'you' changes to 'we': οἱ μὲν γὰρ προσδο

[28] It is worth noting that Demosthenes, in the speeches cited above, does not feel the need to make the situational framework of his speech so explicit; it is obvious to his audience (*Olynthiac* I–IV, *Philippic* I–IV).

κίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν ὡς καὶ τὰς κτήσεις τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι **κομιούμεθα**, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν **ἀναληψόμεθα** πάλιν, ἣν πρότερον ἐτυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες.

Isocrates continues speaking in the first person plural in paragraph 7, pondering the frailties of human nature, but starting in paragraph 9 he moves on to addressing the audience in the second person plural, speaking of their confusion and advising them to listen to speakers who preach views contrary to the expectations of a praise-hungry audience. In paragraph 12, Isocrates reverts to the first person plural, reminding the audience that the Athenians, of whom he himself is one, have always come out well from listening to the advice of speakers recommending peace: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων, εἰ μηκέτι μνημονεύ ουσι, καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀκηκόασιν, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τοὺς παραι νοῦντας ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲν πώποτε κακὸν **ἐπάθομεν**, διὰ δ ὲ τοὺς ῥᾳδίως τὸν πόλεμον αἱρουμένους πολλαῖς ἤδη καὶ μεγάλαις συμ φοραῖς **περιεπέσομεν**. ὧν **ἡμεῖς** οὐδεμίαν **ποιούμεθα** μνείαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτο ίμως **ἔχομεν,** μηδὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πράττοντες, τριήρεις πληροῦν καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν καὶ πολεμεῖν ο ἷς ἂν **τύχωμεν**, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντες.

Paragraph 13 is another transition to a phrase in the second person plural: Isocrates directly reproaches his fellow citizens for not seeking the advice of wise men in state matters, although they are able to seek such help in private matters. In paragraphs 14–18, Isocrates most directly emphasises his separateness from the audience: he will present his opinion, although he realises (**ἐγὼ δ᾽ οἶδα**) that this may draw resentment from his listeners – freedom of expression does not apply equally to everyone. For Isocrates' technique, paragraph 15 is symptomatic. Starting with a declaration in the first person singular, it ends with a shift to the first person plural.

[15] ὅμως δὲ καὶ τούτων ὑπαρχόντων οὐκ ἂν **ἀποσταίην** ὧν **διενοήθην**. παρελήλυθα γὰρ οὐ χαριούμενος **ὑμῖν** οὐδὲ χειροτονίαν μνηστεύσων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποφανούμενος ἃ τυγχάνω γιγνώσκων πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ὧν οἱ πρυτάνεις προτιθέασιν, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων: οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος ἔσται τῶν νῦν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης γνωσθέντων, ἢν μὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀρθῶς **βουλευσώμεθα**.

Subsequent paragraphs (especially 17–19) offer a similar blending of declarations and announcements in the first person singular with a smooth transition to the first person plural.

However, a passage containing a very strong criticism of the Athenians' actions is of particular interest for our brief study. It is one of Isocrates' most pointed comments on the policies of his home state. What is striking about the construction of this statement is the consistent use of the first person plural. Isocrates thus emphasises that he is not reproaching his countrymen from the position of someone superior, untainted by responsibility for bad and harmful decisions. Even if Isocrates never supported similar actions, he will not let his listeners feel such an attitude. Isocrates juxtaposes the famous deeds of his ancestors (third person plural, 'they') with the foolish actions of his Athenian contemporaries (first person plural, 'we'). With Wolpert's insights in mind,[29] we can assume that Isocrates is addressing his contemporaries as he recalls events of the preceding dozen years, most notably the war with the allies. This treatment certainly brings Isocrates closer to addressing a historical audience. In Isocrates' view, the contrast between the valour and sacrifice of previous generations and the deeds of contemporaries is vast: previous generations defended Hellenes against barbarians, contemporaries fight against other Hellenes with the help of barbarians (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμοῦντες διετέλεσαν, **ἡμεῖς** δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας τὸν βίον ποριζομένους ἐκεῖθεν ἀναστήσαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας **ἠγάγομεν**). having liberated other Greeks, previous generations were deemed worthy of leadership, contemporaries enslave other Greeks and act quite differently from their ancestors, but are outraged at the lack of respect **(**κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐλευθεροῦντες τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βοηθοῦντες αὐταῖς τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἠξιώθησαν, **ἡμεῖς** δὲ καταδουλούμενοι καὶ τἀναντία τοῖς τότε πράττοντες **ἀγανακτοῦμεν**, εἰ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τιμὴν ἐκείνοις **ἕξομεν)**. Contemporaries significantly deviate from the fame of previous generations, while those who abandoned their homeland fought for the rest of Hellada and won; their descendants do not take action even in their own interests (οἳ τοσοῦτον **ἀπολελείμμεθα** καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένων, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς

[29] Wolpert 2003: 538–539.

τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας τήν τε πατρίδα τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν, καὶ μαχόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνίκησαν, **ἡμεῖς** δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῆς **ἡμετέρας** αὐτῶν πλεονεξίας κινδυνεύειν **ἀξιοῦμεν**). They want to rule everyone, but do not intend to undertake military expedition, and while they declare war on everyone, they do not prepare themselves to fight but hire poor value mercenaries, ready to go to the side of the enemy for a higher salary (ἄρχειν μὲν ἁπάντων **ζητοῦμεν**, [44] στρατεύεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ **ἐθέλομεν**, καὶ πόλεμον μὲν μικροῦ δεῖν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους **ἀναιρούμεθα**, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον οὐχ **ἡμᾶς** αὐτοὺς **ἀσκοῦμεν**, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τοὺς μὲν ἀπόλιδας τοὺς δ᾽ αὐτομόλους τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων κακουργιῶν συνερρυηκότας, οἷς ὁπόταν τις διδῷ πλείω μισθόν, μετ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀκολουθήσουσιν). Isocrates angrily reproaches the Athenians for their willingness to take responsibility for crimes committed by these mercenaries (ὅμως οὕτως αὐτοὺς **ἀγαπῶμεν** ὥσθ᾽ ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν παίδων τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἰ περί τινας ἐξαμάρτοιεν, οὐκ ἂν **ἐθελήσαιμεν** δίκας ὑποσχεῖν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἁρπαγῆς καὶ βίας καὶ παρανομίας μελλόντων τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐφ᾽ **ἡμᾶς** ἥξειν οὐχ ὅπως **ἀγανακτοῦμεν**, ἀλλὰ καὶ **χαίρομεν** ὅταν **ἀκούσωμεν** αὐτοὺς τοιοῦτόν τι διαπεπραγμένους). The foolishness of the Athenians makes them fund mercenaries, hurt allies and rip off funds from them to pay common enemies (εἰς τοῦτο δὲ μωρίας **ἐληλύθαμεν**, ὥστ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐνδεεῖς τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐσμέν, ξενοτροφεῖν δ᾽ **ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν**, καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς **ἡμετέρους** αὐτῶν ἰδίους **λυμαινόμεθα καὶ δασμολογοῦμεν**, ἵνα τοῖς ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων κοινοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὸν μισθὸν **ἐκπορίζωμεν**). The ancestors declaring war themselves, although the treasury was full; contemporaries suffering from a shortage of finances send mercenaries into the field (ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰ πολεμεῖν πρός τινας ψηφίσαιντο, μεστῆς οὔσης ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ὅμως ὑπὲρ τῶν δοξάντων τοῖς αὐτῶν σώμασιν ὤοντο δεῖν κινδυνεύειν, **ἡμεῖς** δ᾽ εἰς τοσαύτην ἀπορίαν ἐληλυθότες καὶ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες ὥσπερ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας μισθωτοῖς **χρώμεθα** τοῖς στρατοπέδοις).

Even a cursory comparison of the texts of Demosthenes and Isocrates chosen as illustrations for this article shows that they both, though very different, have quite a bit in common: they move with equal fluency from emphatic declarations in the first person singular

to inclusive use of expressions in the first person plural, and they both are able to address their audiences equally directly in the second person plural. These seemingly obvious statements point to an ability to consciously form a relationship with the audience. Both authors have perfected it, but each in a slightly different context. The differences in the proportions of expressions in each person, captured in a simple table, indicate that Isocrates refers to the first person plural much more often, and uses the second person plural less often. It is difficult to insist that such a simple juxtaposition allows us to draw irrefutable conclusions, but based on it we may be tempted to make a working hypothesis: according to our knowledge about Isocrates' situation and views, we can surmise that he consciously exercised great caution in expressing critical opinions about his own state. Without intending to keep silent about what he considered wrong in the conduct of his fellow citizens, he found a way to foreground the most serious accusations and at the same time to avoid being called an enemy of democracy.

W.R. Johnson, not unreasonably, called Isocrates an 'orator without an audience',[30] but it is hard not to admit that the author of *On the Peace* made a constant effort to make the above statement incorrect.

It seems that, unlike Isocrates, Demosthenes could afford more freedom: standing in front of the fellow citizens, he did not have to continually emphasise his membership in their body, while his political activity proved that he was not afraid to take responsibility for the state. He stood opposite the Athenians at the rostrum and was not afraid to mark the distinctiveness of his opinion in his speech.

It is difficult to say authoritatively whether the differences in the propensity to use the inclusive first person plural really originated in a specific situation in which Isocrates found himself by choice, or whether the directness evident in Demosthenes' political speeches was characteristic of all speakers of the time, or perhaps flowed from the character of the politician in question, but these traits seem to be an interesting clue in interpreting the work of both authors.

[30] Johnson 1976: 224.

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