SUMMARY: This article draws attention to the fact, often overlooked, that innovation is not foreign to the history of Indian philosophy. Three such episodes are briefly discussed (in reverse chronological order): (1) the innovations introduced by Raghunātha and his followers in the Nyāya school of thought (ca. 1500 CE); (2) the innovations that gave rise to satkāryavāda, pariṇāmavāda, śūnyavāda, anekāntavāda and other philosophical positions (early centuries CE); (3) the innovations responsible for the first manifestations of rational philosophy in India (ca. second century BCE). Raghunātha’s innovations are most instructive in that a great deal is known about his politico-cultural surroundings. Lessons drawn from these help us to understand the beginnings of Indian rational philosophy better.

KEYWORDS: innovation, Indian philosophy, Raghunātha, Navadvīpa, satkāryavāda, Kathāvatthu, recursive argument method

The history of Indian philosophy has its share of innovations. Its very beginning was an innovation of sorts, one to which I will turn at the end of this article. Other innovations followed, probably too many to enumerate. Some of these were more important, more drastic, than others. Among the more drastic ones one might mention the one that gave rise to a number of fundamental positions that came to underlie all the different schools of philosophical thought: satkāryavāda, pariṇāmavāda, śūnyavāda, anekāntavāda and others; I have dealt with it elsewhere (Bronkhorst 2011). Perhaps the most recent important innovation is
the subject matter of a book by Jonardon Ganeri: *The Lost Age of Reason* (Ganeri 2011). His discussion of this innovation is of particular interest because it is accompanied by an analysis of its socio-political context. This analysis will be used later in this article to look at earlier instances of innovation in Indian philosophy.

The particular innovation that Ganeri discusses in this book is inseparably connected with the name of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, who lived approximately from 1460 to 1540 CE. Raghunātha was a thinker in the Navya-Nyāya school of philosophy, but one who distinguished himself from most others by questioning the very principles of the school he represented. Indeed, Ganeri calls him the first modern philosopher, an epithet that he also applies to many of his followers.

What distinguishes Raghunātha from so many other Indian philosophers is that we know a fair amount about the circumstances of his life. Indeed, Ganeri points out that Raghunātha’s originality was not unconnected with these circumstances. He grew up and lived in Navadvīpa, a town in Bengal, roughly a hundred kilometres north of modern Kolkata. About this town,

> [c]omparison of the historical evidence with the preserved manuscript corpus strongly affirms a correlation between state or royal patronage, political stability, and degree of philosophical activity. Adequate fiscal support emerges as a crucial determinant of healthy scholarship, patronage that came initially from a liberal-Islamic sultanate and later from the regional Hindu kingdoms. (Ganeri 2011: 39–40)

Ganeri informs us of the continued promotion of Bengali literature and employment of Hindus in key positions under various sultans in the fifteenth century, and mentions the year 1493 in particular:

> In that year, Sultan ‘Alā’-ud-dīn Ḥusayn Shāh (r. 1493–1519), minister to the last Abyssinian king Muẓaffar Shāh, assumes the throne, and thus begins a period of rule under which brahminical scholarship flourishes and Navadvīpa emerges as the great centre for Navya Nyāya studies on the Indian subcontinent—the end result of an extended process of symbiosis in which Bengalification of the Islamic ran hand-in-hand with Islamicization of Bengalis. (ibid.: 41)
There is reason to think that there is a connection between Raghunātha’s socio-political context and his originality and independence as a philosopher. Ganeri thinks there is, and presents an analysis in a passage that I will quote in full:

Clearly, [Raghunātha] was fortunate in living in a highly accultured city at a time of relative calm and surrounded by many sources of intellectual inspiration. One text from the period concludes by saying that it was written in Navadvīpa in 1494, under the peaceful governance of Mājīsavarvaka, a place full of learning and learned men.1 Raghunātha, of course, would have been among them. On the basis of this document, D. C. Bhattacharya is—and in this he is, regrettably, unique among Navya Nyāya historians—willing to allow the importance of benign Muslim governance: The historical importance of this newly discovered information should not be overlooked. In the cultural history of Bengal, [Raghunātha] Śiromaṇi’s victory over Mithilā and his writing the Dīdhiti are unique events, and it is indeed interesting information, according to the new evidence, that behind the writing of the Dīdhiti was the unhesitating inspiration of Muslim kingly power.

The claim that there was an ‘unhesitating inspiration’ might well be an exaggeration, but there is little doubt that during Raghunātha’s lifetime Navadvīpa was a place of great scholarship and comparatively peaceful Muslim rule. This, though, does not in itself explain his originality, even if it is a sine qua non. One further consideration is Raghunātha’s relationship with the scholastic community in Mithilā. Both he, and before him his teacher Vāsudeva, went, it seems, to study in Mithilā before returning to Navadvīpa. There seems to be a clear sense in which one of the things Raghunātha is trying to do is to retrieve Gaṅgeśa from them, to recover a thinker lost in the mires of a conservative scholasticism. Another consideration is Raghunātha’s relationship with Vāsudeva, someone who taught the convert to Sufism, Sanātana Gosvāmi, the private secretary of Husain Shāh, who left Navadvīpa for Orissa, and wrote and taught both Navya Nyāya and Vedānta, and was the uncle of the well-connected Vidyānivāsa […] It would have worked to Raghunātha’s advantage that he was not himself a member of that powerful family, not having to bear the responsibility for the family’s prestige and wealth. Being on the periphery, he was able to benefit from a close association without the burden. I highlighted a particular intellectual virtue in his work, namely its provocative

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1 In a note, Ganeri refers to Mahādevācārya Siṃha’s commentary on Bhavabhūti’s Mālatīmādhava (Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā, p. 245; D. C. Bhattacharya 1952 [35]) [diacritics corrected].
playfulness, its lack of a certain sort of heaviness. I am suggesting that what
made this possible is his location in the *penumbra* of scholarly power, nei-
ther too remote nor too close. A final consideration is his exposure to other
very dynamic and engaging intellectual programmes in a culturally hybrid
city under the administration of the liberal Husain Shâh. Even if one is
not inclined towards syncretism or overt dialogue, the existence of alterna-
tive world-views as real lived possibilities exerts its own influence, and not
stifled in the conservative environment of Mithilā, Raghunātha had options
the Mithilā scholars did not have. (ibid.: 50–51)

I have quoted this passage at length, because it clearly shows how
Ganeri—following but also modifying the ideas of Quentin Skinner—
tries to situate philosophical innovation in its socio-political context.

Some of the elements that figure in this passage show up again where
Ganeri discusses Raghunātha’s successors (see ibid.: 74, 80–81, 87–88).
All these passages illustrate Ganeri’s view that

1) Raghunātha and certain of his followers/commentators were
original and (relatively) independent thinkers.

2) They could be original and independent because they were,
in some sense, situated in the periphery to established traditional
thinking.

3) They could, moreover, profit from very dynamic and engaging
intellectual surroundings.

This last point bears some emphasis. As Ganeri points out:

> It is […] of enormous significance that [the time of Raghunātha and his
followers] should be a period of strong Persiante influence and Islamicate
power. The problem is to square this fact with another: that one finds very
few direct traces, if any, of Islamic or Arabic ideas in the work of the Sanskrit
philosophers of the time. (ibid.: 7)²

We will refer back to this last sentence later on in this article.

Ganeri’s analysis of the historical situation in which Raghunātha
and his followers worked makes perfect sense, and raises the

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² This should not be taken to mean that no Sanskrit texts were produced
in response to, or even for, the Mughal court; see Truschke 2016: esp. ch. 2.
question whether there were philosophers before Raghunātha who found themselves in similar situations. Was he really the first to criticize and depart from the ancients, was he the first innovator? And if not, what do we know about the socio-political context of other innovators?

Before we turn to these questions, we need to be clear what is meant by “modern”. Can only those who live in the “modern period” be modern? Can a philosopher who lived in “pre-modern” times, or even in ancient times, be modern? Ganeri does not use the term in a chronologically limited sense. Indeed, in another publication he argues “that it is better and more correct to think […] of modernity as a happening potentially indigenous to any culture, irrespective of period or place” (Ganeri 2013: 349). This means that it is possible to ask whether there were modern thinkers before Raghunātha, or even in ancient India.

According to Ganeri, Raghunātha was not the first innovator. However, he may have been the first to criticize and depart from the ancients, and therefore the first who was modern. Among innovators preceding Raghunātha, Ganeri mentions Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (14th century) in particular. The innovations in analysis and terminology that we associate with Gaṅgeśa affected far more thinkers than those introduced by Raghunātha, because Gaṅgeśa’s innovations spread well beyond the limits of one school (Navya-Nyāya) and came to be adopted by several others (see, e.g., Bronkhorst, Diaconescu and Kulkarni 2013). In spite of this, Gaṅgeśa can be compared with Raghunātha and his followers only up to a point. This is how Ganeri explains the difference:

The context of these new philosophers [i.e., Raghunātha and his followers] is […] quite different from an earlier phase of renewal within the tradition. When Gaṅgeśa writes in the fourteenth century, he is responding to a variety of pressures internal to the Sanskrit world, critiques that had been gathering force for some time. (Ganeri 2011: 7–8)

Ganeri then explains what those internal pressures were, and concludes:

[Gaṅgeśa] writes to defend the ancient philosophy from rival critique rather than to channel its resources in the project of a new inquiry into the truth as such. (ibid.)
At the beginning of this article I mentioned the innovation that gave rise to satkāryavāda and related currents of thought. This was clearly a major innovation in Indian philosophy, one that covered all schools, but one that we can, unfortunately, not associate with any single individual. Nor are we in a position to say much about the socio-political situation in which this innovation arose. What is more, as far as we can tell, this innovation, too, responded to pressures internal to the Sanskrit world; we have no reason to think that external influence was at work. The thinkers involved were presumably not modern in Ganeri’s sense of the term.

Ganeri does not mention this innovation. However, in publications that have come out after The Lost Age of Reason, he expresses himself on another innovation, viz. the beginning of Indian philosophy. Strictly speaking, he claims “that the actual scientific method’s origins […] lie […] in a Buddhist text from Magadha, what is now central-eastern India” (Ganeri 2014: 399; my emphasis). Since the text concerned is the Kathāvatthu, which is commonly thought of as a philosophical text, this can be taken to mean that the origin of Indian philosophy, or at least Indian scientific philosophy (in a sense to be considered below), is to be looked for in this text. This may be interpreted to imply that the Kathāvatthu embodies a fundamental innovation in Indian philosophy, one that presumably introduced an altogether new method and might be looked upon as the very beginning of rational philosophy in India.

Ganeri does not stop at this. He also claims “that the Magadha Kathāvatthu is the actual origin of scientific method in the medieval world” (Ganeri 2014: 400). Here he draws inspiration from a book by Christopher Beckwith that came out in 2012: Warriors of the Cloisters: The Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval World. We will have occasion to inspect Beckwith’s opinions below. Here we note that Beckwith’s arguments are based on what he calls the recursive argument method. Ganeri claims that the Kathāvatthu is the first text to exhibit such a structure.

Several questions can be raised. In order to support the claim that the Kathāvatthu is the first text to exhibit this structure, we need
to know its date. According to Ganeri, its author was Tissa Mogaliputta (ca. 327–247 BCE), who supervised the Third Buddhist Council, held at Pāṭaliputra in 253 BCE (Ganeri 2014: 399). He continues:

The Council sought to establish concord by resolving disputed questions of doctrine between the Sthaviravāda and Sarvāstivāda sects. Mogaliputta composed a text whose analytical method took as its starting point such disputed questions and proceeded in a systematic manner to consider the arguments pro and contra. (ibid.)

To justify these dates, Ganeri says the following in a note: “For discussion of the precise dating of the Kathāvatthu see Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein, and Collett Cox, Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism (Leiden: Brill, 1997); and Akira Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism from Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna (Hawaii: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1990)” (ibid.: 90–91). Interestingly, the first of these two books gives altogether different dates: “the Kathāvatthu, a work that most likely dates from the latter half of the second century B.C.”; “Examining the content of the Kathāvatthu, one comes to realize that the work must have been composed more than a hundred years after the time of King Aśoka”; “only the most ancient parts of the Kathāvatthu may have been composed during the life-time of Aśoka”; “Hirakawa […]: ‘[…] It is doubtful that Moggaliputta-Tissa wrote the Kathāvatthu at this time’”; “If the Kathāvatthu was not composed during the time of King Aśoka, one has to reconsider the contention that it was written by Tissa Mogaliputta” (Willemen, Dessein, Cox 1997: 17, 58, 59). Also Hirakawa is worth quoting:

Since the Kathāvatthu was compiled within the Theravāda order, some sort of council must have been convened. However the council was held not during Aśoka’s reign, but approximately a century after Aśoka. Since the doctrines of the various schools of Nikāya Buddhism are examined and criticized in the Kathāvatthu, this text must have been compiled after these schools arose, probably during the last half of the second century B.C.E. (Hirakawa 1990: 91)

Clearly Ganeri has not checked the publications he refers to.

If, then, the Kathāvatthu belongs to the latter half of the second century BCE (rather than to the middle of the third century BCE), it is
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roughly contemporary with Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, a grammatical text that uses the recursive argument method, as I pointed out in another publication (Bronkhorst 2016a: 42–43). Both these texts are earlier than the *Aṣṭagrantha* and the *Vibhāṣā*, the two texts in which Beckwith believes to find the earliest expression of the recursive argument method.

There is a more serious problem with the *Kathāvatthu*. This text, as I pointed out many years ago (Bronkhorst 1993), is at least in certain cases quite ignorant of the opinions of its adversaries, and ends up with arguments that are mere exercises in logic at best, and nonsensical at worst. As I put it: “No direct confrontation with the upholders of the alternative doctrines, nor indeed any profound knowledge of these doctrines is [...] to be assumed on the part of the author or authors of the original *Kathāvatthu*” (ibid.: 59). The question is therefore: Should we accept that a text that barely (or not at all) knew (some of) the positions it was arguing against as representing the origin of the scientific method in India and beyond and, as I stated above, the origin of scientific/rational philosophy in India? This, of course, is bizarre.3

There is also a problem with the recursive argument method. As Beckwith presents it, it is primarily a stylistic feature, whose essence he describes as follows (Beckwith 2012: 89; cp. Bronkhorst 2016a: 41–42):

I. **Argument** (the Main Argument, Question, or Topic)

II. **Subarguments**, about the Argument

III. **Subarguments**1 about the **Subarguments**2 about the Argument4

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3 Ganeri wrote a paper on the *Kathāvatthu* in 2001, which confirms what I observed in 1993, viz. that much of its contents consists of exercises in logic, even if, as Ganeri argues, this was not only formal logic.

4 See also Beckwith 2012: 25–26: “The recursive argument is, minimally, an argument that is disputed by an argument that is disputed by an argument, or more simply (but in reverse order), an argument about an argument about an argument.”
Even if we assume, for argument’s sake, that Beckwith is right in maintaining that examples of the recursive argument do not occur in earlier texts, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, whether Asian or European, it will yet be hard to believe that this way of arguing was unknown before the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā. Is this stylistic expression not simply a literary reflection of oral disputation in which the different participants are given the occasion to present their arguments in full and to refute, point by point, those of their opponents? After all, the recursive argument “is at heart a way to examine a problem systematically, logically, and in great detail” (Beckwith 2012: 25). And do such oral disputations—systematic, logical, and detailed—not constitute the background against which Gandharan Abhidharma arose and could arise? If so, the literary feature to which Beckwith draws attention is no more and no less than the reflection of the real life situation that allowed Gandharan Abhidharma—and not just the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā—to arise.5

Richard Salomon, while describing the style of the Kathāvatthu and similar texts, comes to the same conclusion, calling it “a discursive

5 Beckwith emphasizes the difference between structure and content, but believes that the former can influence the latter (ibid.: 35–36): “The overt, explicit, formal structure of the recursive argument is its most crucial factor. It is not quite true that ‘the medium is the message’ in recursive method books, but because they typically consist exclusively of lists of recursive arguments, each of which contains many contrasting views on the same problem, they clearly did encourage scepticism and speculation by the authors. In that respect, therefore, it is true that the form of the recursive argument did have a significant indirect impact on the content of works written according to it. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the specific overt structure, per se, of a recursive argument is not directly or even implicitly connected, structurally or semantically, to its specific overt content or to the implicit logical structure of the internal content. In other words, in a recursive argument method, the way it is said has essentially nothing to do with what is said. It does, however, have a great deal to do with the general way the content is approached and understood […].”
written style that grew out of the experiences of oral debate, whereby the opponent becomes something of a straw man” (Salomon 2018: 325). And Michel Angot, more generally, says the following about the language of bhāṣyas: “cette langue du commentaire partage beaucoup de traits communs avec la langue des débats” (Angot 2017: 30).

We have seen that the Mahābhāṣya, and probably also the Kathāvatthu, are older than the texts mentioned by Beckwith (the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā), and that they, too, contain the recursive argument method. If the recursive argument method is no more than a stylistic feature inspired by oral disputations that existed before and independently of it, the age of these texts is without significance for the origin of scientific method. Other traditions may have followed the scientific method (whatever that is) without adopting this style. The claim that we have to look for the origin of scientific method in the Kathāvatthu, or in any other text displaying the recursive argument method, is therefore based on extremely weak foundations.

There is no need to deal in detail with Beckwith’s claim (accepted by Ganeri) that this particular stylistic feature travelled from Buddhist monasteries in Central Asia, through Islamic colleges (madrasas), to end up in the colleges of medieval Western Europe. Alex J. Novikoff, author of The Medieval Culture of Disputation (2013), makes clear in a review (Novikoff 2014) that Beckwith’s claims cannot be taken seriously. And this is but one example.6 It hardly matters. Even if this stylistic feature came to medieval Europe through the intermediary of Buddhist monasteries and Islamic colleges, this does not mean that the scientific method travelled with it; it certainly

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6 See also Lössl 2016: 39 (“hardly tenable”); Huff 2013: 83 (an overstated title that bears little resemblance to the historical record); Saliba 2015: 113 (“because of the zeal for what looks like an ideological commitment to make every important idea stem from the Central Asia plateau, the book is severely marred by short-sightedness, and more importantly, of ever-so-gently twisting facts to fit into the straight jacket that ideologies usually require”). See further Vovin and Sagart 2016.
does not imply that the scientific method needed the arrival of this style to arise. And the claim that it all came from the *Kathāvatthu* is beyond belief.

Ganeri makes no attempt to situate the innovation that he claims finds expression in the *Kathāvatthu* in its socio-political context, as he did in the case of Raghunātha and his followers (see above). We cannot blame him for this, for we know very little about the socio-political context of this text. It is true that Ganeri accepts the legendary account that links it to a Buddhist council under Aśoka, but we have seen that recent scholarship does not agree with this. If it was indeed composed in Magadha, as claimed, this does not help us either, for (as far as we can judge) Magadha was hardly the place where intellectual revolutions took place at that time.

However, there was another northern region of the Indian subcontinent where social, cultural and political factors *did* combine to give rise to an intellectual revolution. This was Greater Gandhāra, in the far north-west. In or around 185 BCE, at the collapse of the Maurya Empire, this region came under Greek political control. Soon after, Buddhism, which was strongly present in that region, systematized traditional thought in a manner that was completely new. It did not claim to be new, to be sure. It claimed to present the teaching of the Buddha, but it is more than clear that this new system of thought—the system of Abhidharma that is normally associated with the Sarvāstivāda school of thought—reinterpreted and modified elements of that teaching to such an extent that it is fair to speak of a radical innovation (Bronkhorst 2016b: § III.2&3).

(Interestingly, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma does not contain elements that have been recognizably borrowed from Greek thought. This reminds us of Ganeri’s [Ganeri 2011: 7] observation, cited above, that “one finds very few direct traces, if any, of Islamic or Arabic ideas in the work of the Sanskrit philosophers of the time [i.e., of Raghunātha and his followers]”. It appears that, even at times of intense cultural interaction, neither Islam nor Hellenistic culture determined the shape that Indian philosophical thought took under its influence.)
Let us now recall what was said above, following Ganeri, about Raghunātha and his followers:

1) They were original and (relatively) independent thinkers.

2) They could be original and independent because they were, in some sense, situated in the periphery to established traditional thinking.

3) They could, moreover, profit from very dynamic and engaging intellectual surroundings.

The Buddhist thinkers of Greater Gandhāra, too, were original and (relatively) independent (point 1). And we may assume that they, too, could profit from dynamic and engaging intellectual surroundings (point 3), for they were now confronted with Hellenistic culture, characterized by intellectual questioning and debate. The fact that their political rulers were now Greeks and no longer Mauryas allows us to assume that they had lost the intellectual security that Maurya support may have provided, so that they, too, had become in some sense peripheral (point 2).

There is no need to press these points at present. What counts is that these developments in Greater Gandhāra deeply influenced many if not all later schools of Indian philosophy. They influenced the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā—according to Beckwith, early representatives of the recursive argument method—but also the Kathāvatthu and the Mahābhāṣya (as I have argued in Bronkhorst 2016b: § III.3). In other words, the intellectual innovation that is Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma found expression in a number of texts, some of which adopted the stylistic feature that Beckwith calls the recursive argument method. Since all these texts give expression to an intellectual revolution that was based on and inspired by critical debate, it is hardly surprising that some of them are presented in a manner in which details of the underlying debate shine through, i.e. in the style of the “recursive argument method”. However, the texts exhibiting this style do not incorporate a new method, different from the ones that do not exhibit this style. All these texts are the result of a new method, they can all be taken
to present the results of profound rational debates, in which arguments, sub-arguments and sub-sub-arguments were discussed, even though only some of these texts show the traces of this procedure.

In the Introduction and Conclusion of his *The Lost Age of Reason*, Ganeri complains about the “standard history” of early modernity, which “served to exaggerate and dramatize the differences between India and Europe”. He is right in doing so. In his article from 2013 he argues that we should “think [...] of modernity as a happening potentially indigenous to any culture, irrespective of period or place” (Ganeri 2013: 349). Instead of science, which is often claimed to be a European invention, he proposes “well-ordered science”, also called “properly functioning inquiry”, which can be found elsewhere, too: “the point of departure is to avoid definitions that turn the privileging of Europe into a tautology”. We want a “polycentric history of science”, and to arrive at that, “we must begin with a definition that does not presume at the outset that science is in essence an originally European practice” (ibid.: 350). One can appreciate Ganeri’s opposition to the claim of European primacy, even though his proposition risks losing sight of the remarkable and relatively sudden developments that characterize the so-called Scientific Revolution in Europe.\footnote{See, e.g., Wootton 2015. No need to specify that the recursive argument method plays no role in Wootton’s account.}

Against this background, it is curious to notice that Ganeri, in his publication of 2014, eagerly grasps the opportunity to show that European science really came from India. We have seen that the arguments supporting this claim are extremely weak, and not worthy of serious attention. Why then should a scholar of Ganeri’s competence and stature fall prey to them? Is it possible that he has fallen into the same trap as the scholars he criticizes? Those scholars tried to exclude India from the intellectual history of the world. Does Ganeri take revenge, by claiming that the most important source of European intellectual history lay in India? I am not in a position to answer these questions, but like to use the occasion
to point out that emotional issues can easily blur the vision of even exceptional scholars.

Let me emphasize, by way of conclusion, that Indian philosophy has a history, that it is more than a list of timeless systems that existed side by side. In this history innovations and radical revisions took place. These innovations and revisions could have multiple causes, among them challenges internal to the tradition, confrontation with new ideas, and socio-political circumstances and events. Our sources do not always allow us to determine which factors played a role in specific philosophical developments, but recent studies show that more can be extracted from the sources than used to be customary. Ganeri’s attempts to situate such developments in a broader context cannot but be welcomed. However, his work also illustrates the risks that scholars of the history of Indian philosophy can be exposed to.

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