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Viewpoints on “the Other” Ryszard Kapuściński in Translation

*There are many wonderful things,
and nothing is more wonderful than man.*
[Sophocles, *Antigone*]

1. Introduction

In some circles, Ryszard Kapuściński enjoys the status of an icon. A reporter, journalist, traveller, photographer, and poet, he belongs to the most frequently translated Polish authors. His books, usually straddling the thin line between journalism and *belles-lettres*, tell stories of nations being born, dictators rising to power and collapsing, revolutions being ignited and squashed – but above all, they tell stories of people caught in the often merciless winds of history, braving the challenges that befell them. They also tell the story of the reporter himself, as he struggles

through situations, contexts, lands, geographical and political climates that, for the Polish reader, can only appear as exotic.

It is in those kinds of scenarios that Kapuściński strives to understand and portray the Other. The motif runs through most, if not all of the writer's works and is condensed in the book actually titled in English *The Other* [Kapuściński 2009], the Polish original of which, *Ten Inny*, appeared three years earlier [Kapuściński 2006]. This rather inconspicuous-looking volume is a collection of six lectures, three of which were delivered at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna in 2004, and three others delivered in various locations between 1990 and 2004. The book has been translated into English by Antonia Lloyd-Jones, one of the five translators of Kapuściński's work.¹ In this paper we look at how Kapuściński's Other has been reshaped (in a non-evaluative sense) by Lloyd-Jones, following the largely indisputable notion that translators act as authors and creators, rather than simple reproducers of the source text. Their actual or alleged "invisibility" (in the sense that translation does not "feel" or "read" like one) does not obviate their contribution to the meaning of the work they produce.

Translation, in the context of Kapuściński's writings, acquires a peculiar ring: the writer liked to refer to himself as *tłumacz kultur*, which in Polish is ambiguous, and can mean any of:

- 'someone who explains cultures',
- 'someone who translates *from* one culture *into* another', and
- 'someone who translates one culture *into* another'.

Because his own experience as a translator was insignificant, as the writer did admit himself, it is the first of these meanings that Kapuściński considered to be the essence of his mission. Yet, he skillfully played on the ambiguity:

By translating [pol. *tłumacząc*] a text, we open up a new world to the Others, we explain [*tłumaczymy*] it, and by explaining we bring it closer, we let others in and let them stay there, turn it into their own experience. How much,

¹ The other translators are: William R. Brand (*The Soccer War*), William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand (*Another Day of Life, The Emperor, The Shah of Shahs*), and Klara Glowczewska (*Imperium, The Shadow of the Sun, Travels with Herodotus*).

then, thanks to the effort of the translator [*tłumacz*], our horizons broaden, our understanding and knowledge deepen, our sensitivity rejuvenates!²

In his writings, Kapuściński on the one hand describes the diversity of cultures and the uniqueness of each of them, while on the other he seeks to identify the emotions and values common to all people. Kapuściński the humanist domesticates that which is foreign in the lives of individual people, Kapuściński the globetrotter and observer of cultures keeps his eyes open to diversity and to the world’s “oddities”. It is through accommodating this tension that he saw his role as an explainer of the Other, the latter notion being used “to distinguish Europeans, people from the West, whites, from [...] non-Europeans, non-whites, while fully aware that for the latter, the former are just as much ‘Others’” [Kapuściński 2009: 13].³ It is a prism through which Kapuściński lived throughout his career as a reporter and experiencer of cultures. It is also, perhaps, this kind of contrast that can be recognised as a dominant in the source text and therefore as something to be preserved in its English translation.⁴

The journalist’s discourse on the Other is mostly located at the individual level, the level of “me” vs. “the Other”, rather than “us” vs. “the Others”. This has a personalising effect: what is fundamentally a social problem nevertheless calls for individual reflection⁵ – it is as if the writ-

² Ryszard Kapuściński (June 3rd, 2005), *Tłumacz – postać XX wieku* (address at the 1st International Congress of Translators of Polish Literature, Kraków, 12 May, 2005), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, <<http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,2746460.html>>, visited on Sep 12, 2017 (transl. A.G. and A.T.).

³ This understanding of the Other is more specific than Husserl’s phenomenological Other as something that identifies a human being in contrast to the Self. It is also narrower than the Other as understood by Emmanuel Levinas, who did not restrict this notion to non-white non-Europeans. However, Levinas is an author important for and actually quoted by Kapuściński: for both authors the Other is not a threat but a chance for an enriching encounter.

⁴ For an exemplification of the dominant in translation, see Tabakowska [2017] on Polish translations of *Alice in Wonderland*.

⁵ Associated with it is a hope for a better future, which is rather aptly formulated by Neal Asherson in his Introduction to the English edition of Kapuściński’s book: “The world is merging and becoming multicultural, and Otherness is becoming not just a negative reaction between white Europeans and those they have dominated, but a positive encounter between liberated peoples on every continent” [in Kapuściński 2009: 9-10].

er were trying to compensate for a flaw in the early 20th c. philosophy, which, he claims, lacked a focus on “the individual, the specific person distinguished from the mass, the specific Self – and the specific Other” [2009: 67]. Having said that, the plural perspective is far from irrelevant and the singular vs. plural (or the individual vs. communal) contrast is nebulous: Kapuściński may oscillate between the two levels within a single sentence:

... in the eighteenth century there begins a gradual, admittedly partial, yet important change in atmosphere and attitude to **the Other**, to **Others**. [Kapuściński 2009: 23; emphasis added]

In what follows, we will track the tensions that arise in and between the Polish text and its English translation due to choices in diction that variously profile the concept of the Other.

2. Where we start from: the lexical choices in Polish

However, before we engage in analyses of specific translational decisions, we will sketch a map of the various shades of meaning and semantic relationships in the source text.

In the Polish original, there are three basic lexical options: *Inny*, lit. ‘the Different’, *Drugi*, lit. ‘the Second’, and *Obcy* ‘Stranger’. The most neutral term is *Drugi/drugi*, which is used as a nominal here, but in its basic function is an ordinal numeral that follows *pierwszy* ‘first’ in the sequence of natural numbers. It can also be an adjective, and in this function *drugi* contrasts with *jeden* ‘one’, *ten* ‘this (one)’, or *ten właściwy* ‘the proper one’. However, while it may express a qualitative contrast, difference, or opposition (e.g. *druga strona medalu* ‘the other side of the coin’), it need not do so (e.g. *drugi brzeg rzeki* ‘the other bank of the river’) and may even suggest similarity or substitution (*Była dla niego drugą matką*, lit. ‘She was a second mother to him’, i.e. ‘She was like a mother to him’ or ‘She made him a second mother’). It can also be a noun: *Jeden mówi to, drugi tamto*, lit. ‘One says this, the second says that’ – it is this nominal usage, the capitalised *Drugi* with a clear philosophical twist to it, that draws our attention in Kapuściński’s writings.

At the other end of the continuum there is *Obcy* ‘foreigner, stranger, alien’, the most heavily marked and the least neutral term. In its primary function as an adjective, it suggests an origin in a domain other than the

one where we originate from and where we feel secure: *obca kultura* ‘a foreign culture’, *obcy rząd* ‘a foreign government’, *obce zapachy* ‘unfamiliar smells’. When nominalised, *Obcy* has more negative connotations than the other terms, *Drugi* and *Inny*: it denotes someone who does not fit, whose otherness, weird behaviour, habits, customs, and thinking is disturbing. Contact with *Obcy* will not bring any good: even if it does not lead to conflict, it will certainly be unpleasant.

Inny is a pronoun that in its axiology can be situated somewhere in the middle between *Drugi* and *Obcy* and means ‘another, not this one’ (*pochodzić z innego miasta* ‘come from another city’), but may also suggest a difference (*inny niż wszystkie* ‘different from the rest’). As a nominal (cf. the very title of Kapuściński’s book, *Ten Inny*), it activates a notion more complex than *Drugi*, albeit one whose connotations are less negative than those of *Obcy*. *Inny* is another person who is unlike me; it is someone who does not fit but need not be viewed as hostile. Needless to say, this brief semantic characterisation of the three terms is a simplified picture that does not accommodate the tensions which come from context, both verbal and cultural.

It is against this background that we must now consider the English terms used in the translation, namely Other, foreigner, stranger, and alien. Interestingly, the verbal struggles of Kapuściński the author occasionally force him to resort to English terms in the Polish original, as in example (1):

(1)

Temat **Innego** – „**Stranger, Other**” – nurtuje mnie i pasjonuje od dawna. [2006: 43]

The theme of the ‘**Stranger**’ or ‘**Other**’ has obsessed and fascinated me for a very long time. [2009: 53; emphasis added]

By doing so, the author seems to suggest that the Polish term *Inny* is perhaps imprecise, perhaps too vague, or potentially too broad in that it embraces various semantic areas – hence the recourse to English. In translation, the foreignising effect of the Polish original is obviously lost.

Producing lists of near-synonyms, as if they were a request to the reader to either choose the proper ones or to combine their semantics into a complex notion, is a characteristic feature of Kapuściński’s style. The example above is unique in that the author switches to English for the purpose, but for Kapuściński to do so in Polish was by no means rare. In translation, such cases may suffer loss similar to the one just illustrated, i.e. a reduction

in the sheer number of words used in translation vis-à-vis its Polish original. A relatively short list of this kind can be identified in (2):

(2)

Kolejnym problemem w kontaktach My – Oni, **Drudzy**, **Inni** jest to, że wszystkie cywilizacje mają skłonność do narcyzmu, a im silniejsza cywilizacja, tym owa skłonność będzie wyraźniej występować. [2006: 36]

The next problem in contacts between us and them, **the Others**, is that all civilisations have a tendency towards narcissism, and the stronger the civilisation, the more clearly this tendency will appear. [2009: 44; emphasis added]

The author's two words, *Drudzy*, *Inni*, are rendered as one noun phrase: *the Others*. This decision is in a way forced by the lexical system of English, where a hypothetical unit that could accompany *the Others* in the list, e.g. **the Seconds* (in the sense intended), does not exist. *The Others* must suffice to meet the needs of the hesitant author, whose hesitation may be interpreted as an attempt to arrive at the intended meaning from various directions. As a result, the two filters, or lenses, proposed in the original Polish to look at “them” (as opposed to “us”) are reduced to one in translation, which downplays the complexity of the notion being contemplated. In what follows, we would like to capture that complexity in terms of three categories or viewpoints (or points of view, the terms being used interchangeably here):

- (i) viewpoint as distance or the degree of the “differentness” of the Other;
- (ii) viewpoint as evaluation;
- (iii) viewpoint as voice, specifically in cases of speaking voice shifts.

Before we venture into analysis and exemplification, we will briefly survey the major approaches to viewpoint in language (especially in discourse) as a necessary and useful backdrop.

3. Viewpoint: the theoretical basics

Viewpoint or point of view is generally understood as either (i) the position from which a situation is described or (ii) the speaker's attitude to the situation. However, Tabakowska (2004) points out that the original metaphor that gave rise to this concept does not exhaust its meaning. “Point” is not only, by analogy to a particular place on the geometrical plane, a “location”, and “view” is more than just a direct perception achieved with the

aid of sight. Interestingly, of the two definitions of *viewpoint* in the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*,⁶ it is the metaphorical one that comes first: “a particular way of thinking about a problem or subject [= point of view]”. The literal, “topographical” interpretation is treated as secondary: “a place from which you can see something”. Therefore, if Tabakowska talks about an extension from the physical understanding to a more figurative one, LDOCE presents the extended sense as having a more entrenched status than its concrete source.

To accommodate the richness of the notion of viewpoint, Bartmiński [2009] distinguishes between **point of view** and **perspective**, where the former is the standpoint from which a viewer (by extension: a conceptualiser) regards a scene, while the latter opens onto the field of vision and the object of seeing within it, embracing them together with the conceptualiser’s standpoint/viewpoint and the directionality of seeing. Bartmiński uses this complex notion of perspective as a conceptual and descriptive tool in his investigation of linguistic worldview.

Elsewhere, viewpoint is also an important category in narrative fiction. Paul Simpson defines it as generally referring

... to the psychological perspective through which a story is told. It encompasses the narrative framework which a writer employs, whether this be first person or third person, restricted perspective or omniscient perspective, and accounts for the basic viewing position which is adopted in the story. Narrative point of view is arguably the very essence of a story’s style, what gives it its ‘feel’ and ‘colours’. [Simpson 1993: 5]

One can thus say that a story (or generally a narrative) has a narrative point of view inherent to it (which, however, need not be the same as the narrator’s point of view). Simpson further divides point of view into four categories, mainly based on the five categories identified by Uspensky [1973].

The first is the **spatial** viewpoint, which “concerns the ‘camera-angle’ adopted in a text, whether this be a ‘bird’s eye’ view of events or the restricted viewpoint of a single observer” [Simpson 1993: 12]. The grammatical markers of spatial viewpoint are mainly deictic and locative expressions. The second category is the **temporal** point of view, which generally relates to “the impression which a reader gains of events moving

⁶ www.ldoceonline.com; visited on Aug 5, 2017.

rapidly or slowly, in a continuous chain or isolated segments” [Fowler 1986: 127]. This category of viewpoint is concerned with the chronology of the story and the signaling of time: whether there are any flashbacks or flash forwards, any gaps in time or several actions performed simultaneously by several characters. Considerations of this kind gave rise to the distinction between **diegesis** and **narrative** [Genette 1980]. The former stands for the linear story line, while the latter is “the means by which a story is told, the actual text with all its linguistic idiosyncrasies” [Simpson 1993: 31].

Simpson’s third category is point of view on the **psychological** plane, which “refers to the ways in which narrative events are mediated through the consciousness of the ‘teller’ of the story” [Simpson 1993: 11]. In other words, a story can be told in a way that can make us accept the viewpoint of the narrator without questioning it. A frequent use of this category of viewpoint as a kind of manipulation is made in the press (cf. Simpson 1993 for a thorough discussion, or Trofymczuk 2016 for recent examples).

Finally, Simpson mentions the **ideological** point of view, where ideology, in a broad sense, “describes the ways in which what we say and think interacts with society” [1993: 5]. Through language, those ways can, again, serve manipulation exercised by power groups, so that the larger public are “no longer aware of the hierarchies and systems which shape their social interaction” [1993: 6].

It is generally agreed among viewpoint researchers that people cannot function as cognitive and linguistic beings in ways other than viewpointed (or perspectivised). In other words, viewpoint is not an additional parameter of cognition or communication but its very essence. Eve Sweetser says: “[W]e never have experience of the world except as a viewpoint-equipped, embodied self among other viewpointed, embodied selves” [Sweetser 2012: 1]. If so, our viewpoints are dynamic and constantly subjected to modification under the pressure of the viewpoints of others.

The two most significant indicators of viewpoint in language are vocabulary and grammar. Simpson’s first two categories of point of view, spatial and temporal, are mainly manifested through deixis, such as deictic adverbs like *here* and *there*, the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that*, or the adverbs *now* and *then* as the most obvious examples. Psychological viewpoint is effected through a variety of linguistic categories (the use of modal verbs, tense, aspect, voice, and many others) that allow discourse (including works of literature) to have the forms and meanings it does.

The last category, the ideological viewpoint, is perhaps best illustrated by Short [1996: 277] as “a generalised mind-set or outlook on the world” professed by the speaker. It is omnipresent in political discourse, the media, and all kinds of propaganda, as when the terms *terrorist* or *freedom-fighter* can be used in reference to the same individual by speakers with opposing worldviews.

Short [1996: 283-284] also mentions cases of underlexicalisation and overlexicalisation [following Fowler 1986]. In at least some cases these can be captured under the rubric of **conceptual** viewpoint, as when a name identifies the concept or concepts recognised by the speaker. An example may be what in language acquisition is usually called overextension: a child may refer to all four-legged animals as *doggie* for lack of the conceptual distinctions that are standard for adult speakers. A literary play on conceptual viewpoint can be found in a poem by Craig Raine, *A Martian Sends a Postcard Home* (1979), where a Martian visiting Earth refers to what are ordinary objects for us in very different terms (e.g. books are called *mechanical birds*). Conceptual viewpoint may also be what distinguishes lay orientation from expert knowledge. Consider an example from linguistics: an average European is likely to talk about the Chinese language, whereas linguists distinguish between Mandarin, Cantonese, and other Han languages of China – thus, for each side the other feels to be either underlexicalised or overlexicalised.

Finally, let us mention Elżbieta Tabakowska’s insight into how viewpoint is correlated with what she calls the **speaking voice**, also in the context of translation. Tabakowska identifies at least six voices in any standard translation:

[I]n translation, the translator (*qua* translator) listens to a polyphonic choir of other voices: especially that of the **author**, in assonance or dissonance with the **narrator** that he created as an element of the presented world. The narrator’s internal voice is in fact a choir of readers. There is thus **the reader of the original**, in the form envisaged by the author, but also **the reader of the translation**, as envisaged by the translator. Each comes in two versions: the “**ideal**” and the “**actual**” **reader**. [Tabakowska 2006: 19; transl. A.G., emphasis added]

One can in fact treat voice as the most fundamental category of viewpoint, the starting point for further analysis, because with it we first establish who is speaking (or at least we make an effort to do so, even if

unsuccessfully) for then to be able to proceed with where that voice is located spatially, temporally, psychologically, conceptually, and ideologically relative to other voices and elements of the scene being conceptualised. However, in our own analysis below, we will defer our exemplification of viewpoint as voice until the end, because, besides its fundamental nature, it also appears to be the most ambiguous: we are dealing with a dual perspective (cf. section 4.3, example 8).

This necessarily brief review of approaches to viewpoint in discourse should hopefully be sufficient for us to appreciate the way viewpoints are manifested in Kapuściński's *Ten Inny* vs. in its English translation, *The Other*.

4. Analysis: viewpoints in the original and in the translation

4.1. Category (i): viewpoint as distance and the degree of the “differentness” of the Other

This category of viewpoint may be approached as an extension of spatial point of view. If greater distance in space weakens the chances of grouping various elements into a set, then greater mental distance in non-spatial conceptualisation (or, in conceptual space) marks a greater difference between the elements of a scene.

We will illustrate this with examples that involve repetition, as in (3) and (4) below. In (3) the repetition is in the plural: we feel like Others, surrounded by **other Others** (*innych Innych*, Acc Pl), where the first *innych* is a modifier, the second *Innych* is the head of the noun phrase:

(3)

Można przeżyć całe życie nie myśląc, nie zastanawiając się nad tym, że jest się czarnym, żółtym, czy białym, dopóty, dopóki człowiek nie przekroczy granicy własnego obszaru rasowego. Od razu powstaje napięcie, od razu czujemy się **Inni** otoczeni przez innych **Innych**. [Kapuściński 2006: 44]

You can live your whole life without thinking, without wondering about the fact that you are black, yellow or white, until you cross the border of your own racial zone. At once there is tension, at once we feel like **Others** surrounded by *other Others*. [Kapuściński 2009: 54]

An analogous case is example (4), with a repetition in the singular: *inny Inny/another Other*:

(4)

Jednak ten, którego spotykamy i poznajemy w wielkich miastach Trzeciego Świata, to już jest **inny Inny** – produkt trudnej do zdefiniowania miejskiej kultury hybrydycznej, potomek różnych, sprzecznych ze sobą światów, twór niejednorodny, o płynnych, niestałych konturach i cechach. [2006: 26-27]

The person we meet and get to know in the big cities of the Third World is already **another Other** – the product of an urban, hybrid culture that is hard to define, the descendant of various contradictory worlds, a composite creature of fluid, impermanent contours and features. [2009: 33; emphasis added]

Both contexts are vague in that they involve an interplay of two senses of *Other*: (i) a neutral sense ‘not the same people’ as “we”, and (ii) a non-neutral, evaluative sense ‘not the same **kind** of people, people that are **different** from us’. In (3), the difference is that of skin colour, in (4) it has to do with the emergence of a new kind of Other, a previously non-existent, hybrid cultural “product”.

The translator’s choice to use *other Others* in (3) and *another Other* in (4), although preserving the repetitive effect of the original, unambiguously gravitates towards the neutral sense of *Other*. Another option would of course be to forgo that effect and emphasise difference by using expressions such as *different Others* and *a different Other*, respectively. Whichever decision is ultimately made in this *quid pro quo*, it will necessarily be subjective, depending on what the translator considers more worthy of preservation: the repetition of form or the focus on difference. That it has to be one of the two but not an interplay of both perhaps seems inevitable.

4.2. Category (ii): viewpoint as evaluation

Our second category, viewpoint as evaluation, is related to conceptual and ideological viewpoint (see above). Recall that conceptual viewpoint pertains to alternative ways of recognising and, as a consequence, naming concepts (*doggie* for all four-legged creatures, *mechanical birds* for books), while ideological viewpoint adds to this an element of evaluation (*terrorist* vs. *freedom-fighter*).

In the English rendering of Kapuściński’s book, the actual Other may be referred to as *a foreigner*, *a stranger*, or *an alien*. Each of these choices expresses a certain conceptual stance or ideological profiling and in that

sense they are treated here as evaluative terms. In other words, the non-innocent choice behind the use of a given lexeme involves, and actually results from, a particular judgement about the Other in a given context. Of the three, *foreigner* seems to be the most neutral and the least laden with evaluative overtones: it is defined in Merriam-Webster⁷ as “a person belonging to or owing allegiance to a foreign country”. In the examples below, we compare what we consider to be negative-valuation terms, *stranger* and *alien*.

Before looking at examples, however, it is instructive to compare a few basic meanings of the two lexical items listed in dictionaries.⁸ Naturally, the lexemes differ in their grammatical categories: *stranger* is a noun (whose meanings are not exactly parallel to the meanings of *strange*), whereas *alien* is predominantly an adjective and has a narrower range of nominal uses. However, this is secondary to our purposes: we are more interested in the respective portions of conceptual space activated by the two forms, regardless of the grammatical behaviour of those forms (incidentally, in Kapuściński’s book *alien* is used as a noun):

stranger, n.

- ‘a person one is not acquainted with’
- ‘a newcomer or outsider’
- ‘someone unacquainted with or unaccustomed to something’
- ‘someone who is not a member of a community, family, or group’

alien, adj.

- ‘coming from a foreign country’
- ‘ideologically or culturally different’
- ‘coming from space, extraterrestrial’

n.

- (legal) ‘a resident in a country who hasn’t acquired citizenship’⁹
- ‘an extraterrestrial’

⁷ www.merriam-webster.com; visited on Aug 7, 2017.

⁸ Adapted from www.dictionary.com, www.merriam-webster.com, and en.oxforddictionaries.com.

⁹ Recall Sting’s 1987 hit *Englishman in New York*: “Oh, I’m an alien, I’m a legal alien / I’m an Englishman in New York” (*Nothing Like the Sun*, A&M).

It should be clear from the comparison that *stranger* mostly connotes a lack of belonging or familiarity with someone or something, whereas *alien* is more radical in that it activates the notion of detachment, insurmountable difference, or – one has to be circular at this point – alienation. The notion of distance and detachment in fact links alien with the first category of viewpoint discussed above. If, however, in examples (3) and (4) we deal with textual manifestations of viewpoint-as-distance, in the case of *alien* the distancing comes with the use of the lexical item as such (also through comparison with e.g. *stranger*), that item also being evaluative. This is why examples (5) and (6) are discussed below under this rubric.

In (5), *stranger* is clearly negative through juxtaposition with *Other*:

(5)

[my, mieszkańcy Europy] Traktujemy **Innego** przede wszystkim jako **obcego** (a przecież **Inny** nie musi oznaczać – **obcy**), jako przedstawiciela odrębnego gatunku, a co najbardziej istotne – traktujemy go jako *zagrożenie*. [Kapuściński 2006: 47-48]

We [the citizens of Europe] treat **the Other** above all as **a stranger** (and yet **the Other** does not have to mean **a stranger**), as the representative of a separate species, but the most crucial point is that we treat him as a *threat*. [Kapuściński 2009: 58]

The Other as a category of person from outside Europe is portrayed here in a neutral manner, through a notion (*the Other – Inny*) that opens a range of possible options for further profiling. Unfortunately – the author seems to be saying – that range is usually limited to its negative side when the Other is treated as a stranger.

But *alien* in (6) rings an even more ominous tone:

(6)

Świat był dla mnie zawsze wielką wieżą Babel. Jednak wieżą, w której Bóg pomieszał nie tylko języki, ale także kulturę i obyczaje, namiętności i interesy, i której mieszkańcem uczynił ambiwalentną istotę łączącą w sobie Ja i nie-Ja, siebie i **Innego**, swojego i **obcego**. [2006: 49-50]

For me the world has always been a great Tower of Babel. However, it is a tower in which God has mixed not just the languages but also cultures and customs, passions and interests, and whose inhabitant He has made into an

ambivalent creature combining the Self and non-Self, himself and **the Other**, his own and **the alien**. [2009: 61; emphasis added]

The Other now becomes truly **alienated**, different to the extent of being like an extraterrestrial creature without chances to ever being able to fit in. The Tower of Babel is a caesura in this respect: as suggested by the very title of Steiner's [1975] famous book, nothing after Babel will ever be the same.

4.3. Category (iii): Viewpoint as voice

Of the three categories of viewpoint, this is the one that in fact seems to be the most basic in that it explicitly links what is said with the one who does the saying – and so, necessarily, with the location or position, in all senses of these terms, that that “voice” occupies.

Recall the six voices in a standard translation identified by Tabakowska [2006; cf. Section 3 above]. But there are more complex cases, such as Kapuściński's other book, *Travels with Herodotus* [2007], where the author/narrator reports on his travels and his simultaneous reading of Herodotus's *Histories*. In effect, at the very starting point there are already three voices: that of Kapuściński, that of Herodotus, and that of Herodotus being reported by Kapuściński. If one adds to this the two categories of reader – ideal and actual – plus Kapuściński in the capacity of a reader of Herodotus, there are six voices in the original. In translation, that number is doubled, not to mention the fact that Kapuściński reads Herodotus's *Histories* in two translations: Polish and English.¹⁰

In this light, let us reconsider example (5), repeated here for convenience as (7):

(7) (ex. 5 revisited)

[my, mieszkańcy Europy] Traktujemy **Innego** przede wszystkim jako **obcego** (a przecież **Inny** nie musi oznaczać – **obcy**), jako przedstawiciela odrębnego gatunku, a co najbardziej istotne – traktujemy go jako *zagrożenie*. [Kapuściński 2006: 47-48]

¹⁰ The Polish translation by Seweryn Hammer (published as *Dzieje* by Czytelnik in 1954) and the English one by Robin Waterfield (published as *The Histories* by OUP 1998) [cf. Kapuściński 2007: 11].

We [the citizens of Europe] treat **the Other** above all as a **stranger** (and yet **the Other** does not have to mean a **stranger**), as the representative of a separate species, but the most crucial point is that we treat him as a *threat*. [Kapuściński 2009: 58]

The category of viewpoint here involves a clash between what one can call the communal judgment by “us”, the citizens of Europe (the Other is a “stranger” and a “threat”), and the individual judgment of the author/narrator (“the Other does not have to mean a stranger”). The “we” can be inclusive, as when the narrator feels an obvious cultural bond with the community of Europeans that clings to negative sentiments he himself does not endorse. Or it can be a peculiar kind of exclusive “we”, whereby with his individualised perspective the narrator excludes himself from that community, not by considering himself a non-European, but by consciously rejecting the prevalent attitude to the Other.

Our final example will allow us to appreciate the gravity, for translation, of the category of viewpoint as voice. In focus is the nominal *Inny/an Other* in the last line:¹¹

(8)

Zwróćmy uwagę, że pojęcie „**Inny**” jest najczęściej określane z punktu widzenia białego, Europejczyka. Dziś jednak idę przez wieś w górach Etiopii, biegnie za mną gromada dzieci pokazujących mnie palcem, rozbawionych i wołających: Ferenczi! Ferenczi! To znaczy właśnie – **obcy, inny**. Bo to ja **dla nich** jestem **Inny**. [Kapuściński 2006: 70-71]

Let us note that the concept of ‘**the Other**’ is usually defined from the white, European point of view. Nowadays, however, as I walk through a village in the mountains of Ethiopia, a gang of children runs after me, pointing at me in amusement and shouting: ‘Faranji! Faranji!’ That means ‘**foreigner**’, ‘**other**’, because **to them** I am **an Other**. [Kapuściński 2009: 86; emphasis added]¹²

¹¹ We omit here another interesting problem, namely the use of *foreigner*, which strikes a different chord than *stranger* in example (5)/(7).

¹² *Faranji* or *ferenji* [‘farandʒ] is an Amharic word meaning ‘foreigner’. There are similar words in many other languages (*faranji* in Urdu and Hindi, *farangi* or *firanks* in Persian, *faranji* or *ferenji* in Arabic), possibly borrowings or adaptations of English *foreigner* or of *Franks*, which was once used in reference to any Europeans.

The nominal in question is *an Other*. The use of the indefinite article *an* with capitalised *Other*, a rather idiosyncratic choice, projects a dual perspective. The capitalisation marks the author-narrator's perspective: this is the categorial Other, the Other as an abstract category of person. But the prepositional phrase *to them*, in tandem with the indefinite article, mark the perspective of the Ethiopian children, who see a specific individual, the *farangi*.

Admittedly, the dual perspective is also present in the Polish original: the categorial *Inny* is the narrator's perspective, whereas *dla nich* 'to them' marks the children's perspective. But because Polish is an article-less language, we find this vaguer and less convincing than the English rendering.¹³ It sounds as if the categorial *Inny* were in fact ascribed to the children, which is obviously mistargeted: the children do not think in terms of categories and abstract notions but relate to the specific person they see. Therefore, the indefinite *an* in the English prose dissociates the two perspectives and allows for a clearer, less disorienting, more analytic construal of the scene. In order to achieve that, the translator decided to resort to a non-standard usage of the indefinite article with a categorial nominal – and this feat of resourcefulness brought a commendable result.

5. Conclusion

Throughout his work, Kapuściński performs a balancing act that involves the Other as neutrally **another** and as non-neutrally **different**: the balance can be sought between the two domains or can embrace them both. As one reads *The Other*, the tension seems to extrapolate onto the whole discourse of otherness: the otherness of people, peoples, cultures, and languages.

With a selection of examples, we have tried to classify the translator's decisions in this regard as indicative of three categories of viewpoint:

- (i) viewpoint as distancing and the degree of the "differentness" of the Other: is *inny Inny* (example 4) to be understood as *another Other* or as a *different Other*?

¹³ Another avenue of research would be to try and locate both the lexemes used in the Polish original and those used in the translation along the ambiguity – polysemy – vagueness continuum (for a discussion of the issue see Sowiński 2017). A comparison of the two continua might provide clues as to what happens to the words' meanings in the translation.

- (ii) viewpoint as evaluation, manifested through diction: the Other is portrayed as a *foreigner*, a *stranger*, or an *alien* (with the growing degree of alienness, in this order);
- (iii) viewpoint as voice, specifically when this involves a shift from one voice to another; this category is illustrated with the way in which dual perspective is handled in the original and in the translation: the translator disconnects the two viewpoints and yet presents them compactly in a single nominal phrase.

On a theoretical note, all three categories may be manifestations of what Simpson calls psychological viewpoint: “the ways in which narrative events are mediated through the consciousness of the ‘teller’ of the story” [Simpson 1993: 11]. The “teller’s” consciousness would thus embrace parameters such as (i) mental distance, (ii) evaluation, and (iii) identification with a speaking voice.

Additionally, the last category at large, and the last example in particular, allow us to draw an analogy between Simpson’s “tellers” and some of Tabakowska’s “voices” (and only some, as the ideal and actual readers of the original and of the translation do not really qualify as “tellers”). In example (8), these are: (i) the author/narrator in the original, (ii) the children in the original, (iii) the translator-as-narrator in the translation, and (iv) the children in the translation.

Finally, we have not explicitly dealt here with what seems to be rather obvious: namely that various categories of viewpoints, with their specific manifestations, operate jointly in various configurations, rather than being independent phenomena. This intuitive observation, a form of working hypothesis, could now be tested against more examples from Antonia Lloyd-Jones’s translation of Kapuściński’s book or against a different body of data.

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ABSTRACT

Throughout his career of a reporter, writer, and “translator of cultures”, Ryszard Kapuściński was preoccupied with the notion of “the Other”. He synopsised his views in a collection of lectures published in 2006 as *Ten Inny*.

It is instructive to look at how his portrayal of the Other (in Polish: *Inny*, but also *Drugi/drugi* or *obcy*) is rendered in Antonia Lloyd-Jones' translation of the book into English (*The Other*, 2009), where the range of lexical choices includes *Other*, *stranger*, *foreigner*, and *alien*. Through lexical choices, both the author and the translator effect points of view in several senses of the term: (i) who is looking at whom, (ii) where (in the social sense) the observer and the observed are located, and (iii) how the other side is judged or evaluated. An additional level of complexity results from the system of articles in English (but not in Polish), which means that, e.g., the choice between *the Other* and an *Other* proves crucial for the construction of text-internal viewpoints. Thus, the author and the translator can not only actualise points of view, but are in fact coerced into semantic tensions that arise through sheer application of the lexico-grammatical inventories of the two languages.

Key words: the Other, Ryszard Kapuściński, viewpoint, Antonia Lloyd-Jones, articles