Agata KAŁABUNOWSKA ⓘD
Jagiellonian University in Kraków
a.kalabunowska@gmail.com

ON THE ROLE OF ANTI-GLOBALIST AND ANTI-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES IN EXTREME RIGHT IDEOLOGY

ABSTRACT   This paper aims at analysing attitudes towards globalization processes and the European Union among five German political groups commonly categorized as extreme or radical right. It tries to answer research questions focusing on the role of anti-globalist and anti-European attitudes in the wider radical right ideology. The presented research follows Michael Freeden's morphological approach to studying ideologies, with an attempt at finding the precise location of anti-globalist attitudes in the ideological structure of the political thought of the radical right. The author concludes that neither an anti-globalism nor an anti-European stance belong to the core of this ideology, but they rather play a secondary role.

Key words: extreme right, Germany, anti-globalism, Euroscepticism, anti-European attitudes

1. INTRODUCTION

As the date of 2019 elections to the European Parliament was approaching, the European public opinion seemed to become visibly concerned about the possibility of radical right parties gaining strength in EU politics. An illustration of the worry might be the scale of the public stir caused by a publication of the European Council on Foreign Relations a few months before the elections. It predicted that up to one-third of the seats in the European Parliament could be occupied after the May elections by Eurosceptics and in the vast majority of cases, Eurosceptics located on the right end of the political spectrum.[1]

The political groupings categorized as far or radical right are usually perceived as anti-European or at least reluctant towards strengthening the EU integration process. Despite the fact that there is already some scientific evidence that anti-European attitudes are common for both the extreme right and the extreme left[2] – with the political center also acting from time to time to their advantage in this matter – Euroscepticism is commonly ascribed to the groupings from the right fringes of the political scene. This explains the anxiety in public opinion before the European elections, as well as the widely expressed feeling of "relief" after the results were announced.[3]

In the long history of the post-war extreme right, Euroscepticism is a comparatively new phenomenon, especially in Eastern Europe.[4] On the other hand, being a political but also an economic union encouraging countries to cooperate closely, unify national legal systems and harmonize local procedures, the EU can also be considered as an exemplification of globalization. The anti-globalist attitudes of the radical right have – conversely – a long pedigree,[5] although we rather tend to intuitively ascribe anti-globalism to political actors from the left. For the purposes of this paper, I am analysing both the concept of EU and globalization as similar phenomena, or – more precisely – the EU as an embodiment of globalization in the European context.[6] The article focuses on their place within the radical right's political outlook.

[1]   S. Dennison, P. Zerka, "The 2019 European Elections: How Anti-Europeans Plan to Wreck Europe and What Can Be Done to Stop It", *European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)*, 2019, at <https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/EUROPEAN_PARLIAMENT_FLASH_SCORECARD_online. pdf>, 27 July 2019.

[2]   See C.E. De Vries, E.E. Edwards, "Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism", *Party Politics* vol. 1 (2009), pp. 5-28.

[3]   See e.g. J. Ambrose, "European Markets Rise on EU Election Relief", *The Telegraph* 27 V 2019, at <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/05/27/european-markets-rise-eu-election-relief/>, 26 July 2019; "Can Europe Breathe a Sigh of Relief?", *Eurotopics* 28 V 2019, at <https://www.euro-topics.net/en/220611/can-europe-breathe-a-sigh-of-relief#>, 26 July 2019.

[4]   See M. Pielużek, "Unia Europejska jako antywartość. Narracje europejskie w komunikacji polskiej skrajnej prawicy", *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze*, vol. 2 , no. 230 (2017), pp. 303-328.

[5]   See R. Stöss, *Rechtsextremismus im Wandel*, Berlin 2010, at <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/08223.pdf>, 27 July 2019.

[6]   The correlation between the two phenomena – globalization and existence of the European Union – has also been recognized and studied by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The study from 2016 shows that

In my recent research project[7] I conducted an in-depth qualitative analysis of political and ideological programmes of five German political groupings, which are usually categorized as extreme or radical right.[8] The selected organisations were the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), Pro Bewegung, Die Rechte, the German branch of the identitarian movement (Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland e.V., IBD) and Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD)[9]. For the purposes of this article I have decided to extract from the research material only the European and global aspects. This paper will hence focus on the stance of these five German radical organisations on European matters as well as on global processes in general. It will be guided by the following research questions: What are the political goals of the far right organisations in European politics? Do they want to abolish the EU, re-design it, or just amend the way it currently operates? What is the radical right's stance on globalization? Is this process perceived as completely unacceptable or is the radical right willing to accept any elements of this process? Finally, what role do the anti-European and anti-globalist perspectives play in the extreme right ideology in general?

This research project applies Michael Freeden's morphological analysis of ideology,[10] which has also been partially implemented in Cas Mudde's research on the ideology of the extreme right.[11] This choice was tightly connected to the general assumption that an ideological layer of extremism exists and that it is manifested in political re-

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those people who perceive globalization as a threat are also more reluctant towards the European Union and therefore less supportive or even anti-EU. See C. de Vries, I. Hoffmann, "Globalisierungsangst oder Wertekonflikt? Wer in Europa populistische Parteien wählt und warum", *Bertelsmann Stiftung*, Berlin 2016, p. 4, at <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_eupinions_Fear_Studie_2016_DT.pdf>, 27 July 2019.

[7] The PhD research project "Contemporary ideas of the German extreme right", financially supported by the Polish National Science Center (project number 2018/28/T/HS5/00335).

[8] Given the lack of clarity in the terminology used within the field of studies on the extreme right it is worth highlighting that in the article I use the terms radical, extreme or far right interchangeably only for stylistic reasons. These terms should be differentiated from what is nowadays called populist radical right or populist nationalism. For the purposes of this article I consider extreme right as an entirety of attitudes, behaviors and actions, organized or not, that come from the general conviction of racially or ethnically driven social inequality of people, demand the ethical homogeneity of nations and reject the imperative of equality of people as stated in various declarations of human rights. They highlight the importance of a collective above an individual, therefore being anti-individualistic. Additionally, they reject pluralism, including pluralism of democratic values. See H.-G. Jaschke, *Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit: Begriffe, Positionen, Praxisfelder*, Wiesbaden 2001, p. 30.

[9] The key for selection of the cases was three-fold: organisations needed to operate in Germany, they needed to be active during the so-called migration crisis and they had a written political or ideological programme, available at least in a form of an online publication. The choice was narrowed to these organisations who are commonly believed to be far right – both in the public discourse and in the scientific literature.

[10] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford 1996; M. Freeden, "The Morphological Analysis of Ideology", in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, M. Stears (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford 2013, pp. 115-137.

[11] C. Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*, Manchester 2000.

ality through extreme right organisations, beliefs, rhetoric and activities. Freeden believes that theorizing about political thought should be based on the analysis of typical, day-to-day manifestations and expressions of it. Also, Mudde assumes that *ideologies function as the normative bases of the pursued policies of political parties.*[12] Both authors suggest that familiarization with the visible, "tangible" layer of political organisations, e.g. political programmes, can lead to discovery and recognition of their ideologies.

The morphological approach assumes that ideologies are structured configurations of political concepts. The morphological analysis is dedicated to the search for internal structures of these concepts within an ideology, internal relationships between them, and the significance of individual concepts for the whole ideology. The purpose of research on ideologies is therefore not to steer political events or to suggest any particular political solutions but rather to explain, interpret, de-code and categorize ideologies and their structures – *to illuminate [them] with optimal interpretative light.*[13] These ideological building blocks – the concepts – are phrased with the aid of language. As a result, this theoretical framework indicates qualitative methods and research work on texts. Therefore, political and ideological programmes of the selected organisations – treated as manifestations of an ideology – have been read, categorized and qualitatively analysed with the aim of finding the core, adjacent and peripheral concepts of the extreme right ideology, as indicated by Freeden.

It is worth highlighting that the presented research includes both partisan and non-partisan radical organisations. This deliberate decision is also an indirect result of acknowledging Freeden's view on ideologies as political devices[14] and his conviction that *every major political thought or speech act will include ideological components, and that very many such acts undertaken by each and every individual display the attributes of ideologies.*[15] Therefore loose, non-partisan groups cannot be assumed not to be "producers" of ideologies just because of their less formal internal organization.

2. GERMAN FAR RIGHT STANCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEAN ISSUES

The section below presents the results of the qualitative content analysis of political programmes of the selected organisations, with a special focus on European and global matters. Interestingly, not each selected programme has a separate section dedicated to these issues, as was usually the case in non-partisan organisations such as Pro Bewegung or IBD. Nevertheless, European and global matters have been touched upon in various parts of their manifestos. Furthermore, in the most elaborative programmes, like those of NPD or AfD, European and global matters have not only been captured in

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[12]   Ibid., p. 5.

[13]   M. Freeden, "Ideologies and Political Theory…", p. 6.

[14]   M. Freeden, *Ideology. A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2003, p. 4

[15]   Idem, "Ideologies and Political Theory…", p. 45.

respective chapters fully dedicated to these political problems, but they have also been indirectly presented in other parts of programmes, especially those dedicated to economics or multicultural issues.

Selected organisations will be presented in chronological order, by the date of their establishment.

2.1. NPD

Anti-globalism has been an important element of the political programme of the NPD since the 1990s. Some authors claim, however, that this ideological element of the party is even older than that. Lösche indicates that the previous anti-communism and anti-bolshevism of this political group simply developed over time into other forms of anti-globalist attitudes, which became more popular after the fall of communism.[16]

Negation of globalization is justified in the political programme of the NPD by alleging that this process is *a declaration of war against the national order and as a result also against the freedom of nations.*[17] Globalization puts the preferred world order in danger because it equates nations in terms of their culture; it makes them politically incapacitated, economically exploited and ethnically destroyed. The party puts emphasis on the capitalist nature of global processes and on them being controlled by "big capital" and international companies. This type of executing power is the least preferred one for three reasons: because it is power located outside of the nation, because it is impossible to control it, and – as Thomas Grumke und Andreas Klärner point out – in the eyes of right-wing extremists it is also faceless and ahistorical.[18]

Until the financial crisis of 2007-2008 the anti-globalist attitude of the NPD usually went hand in hand with its strong anti-Americanism. In the perception of this party, the USA embodied globalization and moreover – it did so on purpose. Globalization was perceived to be a well-thought out imperialistic strategy of this country[19]. Simultaneously, the target of the NPD's criticism in Europe is the EU. In "Deutsche Stimme" – a press organ of the party – it is stated, for example, that this organization is *an enforcement body of globalization in Europe.*[20] An interesting light on NPD's stance on European matters is shed by the definition offered by "NPD's political lexicon", in

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[16]   P. Lösche, *Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Parteien,* Stuttgart 1993.

[17]   NPD, *Das Parteiprogramm. Arbeit. Familie, Vaterland*, Berlin 2013, at <https://npd.de/Parteiprogramm_NPD.pdf>, 28 February 2019. Please note that all the translations from German are the author's unless otherwise indicated.

[18]   T. Grumke, A. Klärner, *Rechtsextremismus, die soziale Frage und Globalisierungskritik – Eine vergleichende Studie zu Deutschland und Großbritannien seit 1990*, Berlin 2006, p. 135, at <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/04233.pdf>, 27 July 2019.

[19]   *Warum lehnt die NPD so entschieden die Globalisierung ab?*, at <https://npd.de/warum-lehnt-die-npd-so-entschieden-die-globalisierung-ab/>, 28 February 2019.

[20]   J. Gansel, "Das nahende Ende der völkerfeindlichen Globalisierung", D*eutsche Stimme*, at <https://deutsche-stimme.de/2016/03/23/das-nahende-ende-der-voelkerfeindlichen-globalisierung/>, 28 February 2019.

which we can read that *today Europe is a blurring and euphemistic label for a fief state of "Western community of shared values" and international capitalism.*[21] The party adds that the state in which Europe is currently – *the Europe of "bosses and bigwigs"*[22] – is in direct opposition to what they and other nationalists would like to achieve.

A logical consequence of the anti-globalist stance of the party is its unwillingness to support Germany's involvement in any kind of international cooperation. The NPD claims that each international organisation is actually a manifestation of globalization, with all its negative consequences. When it comes to current agreements, the party wishes to withdraw from the NATO alliance but also highlights the need to *terminate the membership in the Brussels' system of foreign control.*[23] The programme does not specify how the procedure should look, nor does it mention any deadlines of proceedings.

2.2. Pro Bewegung

Compared to other organisations analysed in this paper, Pro Bewegung is the most locally oriented group. Global and structural arguments therefore play a less important role in electoral competition on the municipal or regional levels than do parties aspiring to parliamentary or EU competition.

Nevertheless, anti-globalist sentiments can still be observed in the political programmes of various regional branches of the movement. First of all, the special focus on the protection of local communities from foreign influences gives the movement a great opportunity to criticize the current ideological dependencies of Germany. The skepticism focuses especially on multiculturalism, which is perceived as an embodiment of global tendencies. According to the movement, by pushing various national and ethnic groups into close cooperation, multiculturalism puts their identity at risk and threatens the loss of individual characteristics.

Pro Bewegung is also against the unification of customs, senses of style and beliefs, for which the organization blames blind and harmful acquisition of Western values. In light of the migration crisis, criticism is not only directed at the US but also towards oriental styles of life and belief systems, which are perceived as being equally dangerous. The movement believes that protection of local customs and traditions as well as increased focus on their own history and values should compensate for the current negative state. Their suggested political solutions focus especially on the protection of local languages, including dialects.

When it comes to the economic aspects of globalization, Pro Bewegung suggests even more radical solutions, which they feel should help combat globalism. For example, economic freedom should not only be limited but selected branches of the economy should become nationalized and protected by the state, including water and power

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[21]   *Europe*, in NPD, *Politisches Lexikon*, at <http://www.npd-niedersachsen.de/index.php/menue/58/thema/213/Politisches_Lexikon.html#lexianker_6>, 28 February 2019.

[22]   Ibid.

[23]   NPD, *Das Parteiprogramm…*, p. 22.

supplies and public services such as hospitals.[24] The political and economic programme designed according to these guidelines leaves little or no space for international competition in many business areas.

The Pro Bewegung is not precise or elaborative about European matters. It seems however to prefer European patriotism and the concept of a "Europe of nations". At the same time, it strongly criticizes the concept of "Europe of technocrats", without suggesting any particular solutions for European politics.

2.3. Die Rechte

The political programme of the Die Rechte party puts relatively little emphasis on global issues. The word "globalization" does not appear in the party programme at all. However, as in the case of other analysed organisations, the need to protect the nation from foreign influences is also evident in its manifesto. One such political demand is that German media should limit broadcasting of any kind of content that excessively promotes foreign cultural values.[25]

On the other hand, Die Rechte presents rather clear and elaborative opinions about the EU. One reason for this might be the fact that Die Rechte used to participate in elections for the European Parliament. The party programme, while being strongly critical towards the EU, does not suggest that Germany should leave the organisation, neither does it claim that the EU should no longer exist. First and foremost, Germany should instead re-confirm the legal possibilities of leaving the Eurozone. The party wishes to return to national currencies and resign from any joint financial cooperation.

The political programme focuses on limiting the transfer of rights from sovereign states to the level of international organisations, including the EU. The ideal European cooperation is a strong union, which guarantees members their rights to *live according to their natural order*.[26] This suggests that the "natural" political order is the national order, while the EU pushes individual states into the unnatural structures of international cooperation. Furthermore, the party claims that the EU as an organisation is also not governed "naturally", as it is the case on the national state level, but it is instead steered by *lobbyists and oligarchs*.[27] The ideal form of European cooperation depicted in the political programme would be a loose form of collaboration, allowing national states to execute their sovereign rights. The party also highlights that such a union should be based on common values, which are called the values of Occident (*Abendland*). This expression suggests on the one hand that the EU in its current state does not live up to common European values. On the other hand, it also places the ideal union in clear

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[24] Pro Deutschland, *Programm der Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland*, 2010, at <https://prosachsen. wordpress.com/programm/>, 28 July 2019.

[25] Die Rechte, *Programm der Partei Die Rechte*, 2018, p. 6, at <https://die-rechte.net/programm/>, 28 July 2019.

[26] Ibid., p. 11.

[27] Ibid., p. 12.

contrast to those values which are not occidental. Implicitly, this passage from the party programme puts Europe in opposition to any other communities based on their own values – in light of the migration crisis these are mainly Middle Eastern or Islamic.

2.4. The IBD

When analysing the political and ideological programme of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, we need to keep in mind that this organisation operates as a regional branch of a wider, European movement. As such it plays a double role, promoting the identitarian concept in Germany and adjusting it to the national context, all while operating in line with guidelines and values of the wider movement, promoting the unified European concept of identitarianism. This can be best observed on the example of the IBD's understanding of patriotism. The movement claims to be both German as well as European patriots.

The programme of the IBD is visibly less concrete in comparison to the other analysed manifestos. The movement attempts to propose a new world outlook rather than practical, political solutions. It does not criticize specific individuals, parties or institutions, but does give vent to its general dissatisfaction with the system and the current state of the country and the continent. Identitarians perceive Europe as a community of legacy and destiny, which requires attention and care from its members. This community should be especially protected from globalization and multiculturalism. Both processes have negative influence on Europe because they lead to heterogenization: they welcome difference and diversity. The IBD sees a link between mixing ethnic and national groups and their dismantling, and as a result: extermination.[28] The more fragmented European society is, the worse for its identity, tradition and values. Instead identitarians favor ethnopluralism as a response to globalization, although it is strongly criticized by the vast majority of scholars and the wider public, who perceive this concept as a new form of racism.[29]

Also, identitarians ascribe low fertility rates and negative demographic tendencies in Europe to globalization. The vicious circle of compensating demographic issues by immigration from non-European countries is the main point of the IBD's attack. It is interesting that the movement does not only challenge pro-immigration and pro-globalization politicians, but also European communities themselves. Instead of working at "bringing new Europeans to the world", they just observe current trends and act as a powerless group, easily steered by political powers from within and outside of Europe.

Although the IBD has not come up with any concrete demands about the EU, it calls for a general *change in political thinking.*[30] Political powers ought to focus more on

[28]   *Was versteht ihr unter Multikulti und warum seid ihr dagegen?*, at <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/category/faq/>, 28 February 2019.

[29]   See e.g. H.-G. Betz, "The Growing Threat of the Radical Right", in P. H. Merkl, L. Weinberg (eds.), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century*, London 2003, p. 84.

[30]   *Wer oder was ist die Identitäre Bewegung?*, at <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/category/faq/>, 28 July 2019.

developing native culture and protecting Germans and Europeans from foreign threats, *because apart from the bureaucratic apparatus there is also another Europe, which is more than just the construct of the Union.*[31] On the other hand, identitarians stress that Germans and Europeans themselves should attend more to their traditions, customs, language and values, rather than following trends from the outside.

2.5. The AfD

Out of all the analysed political organisations, the AfD's stance on European matters is the most concrete and well thought out. It is a natural consequence of the party origins. The AfD started its political career by challenging the way in which the EU reacted to the financial crisis. Over time the political focus of the party has changed, but the state of European politics is still a matter of its concern.

The political programme of the AfD seems to be slightly less critical towards the process of globalization. It is clearly visible in its economic aspects. While other analysed political organisations aim at a national economy and – in the most extreme cases – even economic autarky, this party promotes the free market on both the national and international levels. The party acknowledges the fact that the German economy benefits from international trade, therefore limiting contact with the foreign third parties would lead to visible economic losses. Another aspect of the AfD manifesto that may position this party outside of the group of critics of globalization is its stance on Germany's affiliation with international organisations. The party does not suggest rapid changes, neither does it tend towards any kind of negation of these organisations. Nonetheless a study conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung shows that 78% of AfD supporters are afraid of globalization[32]. The anti-globalist stance of the party comes to the fore not in economic matters but in cultural ones. Its rejection of multiculturalism and its sharp opinions on immigration and integration issues best exemplify this tendency.

In European politics the party is clearly against any political changes aimed at centralization of power. It rejects both the concept of the United States of Europe and the EU as a federal state. The EU is believed to destroy national countries and antagonize them. Moreover, European institutions tend to deprive national states of their sovereignty and limit their political and economic freedoms. The programme of the AfD does not foresee Germany leaving the EU structures but only the Eurozone, which is the most heavily blamed element of the European order. The manifesto suggests however, that if the EU cannot be transformed into a loose cooperation, a *democratic dismantling* of the organisation should be considered[33]. An ideal form of loose European

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[31] *Werkstatt Europa – Veranstaltungshinweis*, at <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/blog/werkstatt-europa-veranstaltungshinweis/>, 26 July 2019.

[32] C. de Vries, I. Hoffmann, "Globalisierungsangst...", p. 29.

[33] Alternative für Deutschland, *Programm für Deutschland,* Berlin 2016, at <https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2018/01/Programm_AfD_Druck_Online_190118.pdf>, 28 July 2019.

cooperation seems to be the concept of Europe of nations, in which national states are granted sovereign rights in the most important areas, such as social systems, foreign policy and security policy.

3. FINDINGS

The analysed political programmes of the five radical right groupings in Germany are inconsistent when it comes to the issue of globalization. The political stances vary from strong anti-globalism to an ambiguous tolerance of globalization. Moreover, several groups tend to make contradictory statements about the matters of our interest, which makes it difficult to clearly categorize their views. The most critical positions completely reject global processes as steered by political and economic powers that destroy the traditional national order while blindly following profits.

What is noticeable however is that any kind of criticism towards global trends, regardless of their radicalism, is focused on the potential threat of global processes to the national order. Global relations and dependencies are either evilly bad or acceptable, but only to the point where they start to enter the territory of national sovereignty. The difference among the analysed organisations lies in the perception of the extent of this territory and hence, how much influence from the outside is allowed. The stricter the attitude of the political organisation towards the nation and nationalistic ideas, the less willing it is to cooperate with the outside world.

In European matters the five groupings seem to be closer to reaching a consensus. The vast majority of these parties and movements are definitely against the centralized model of the EU, especially the "EU of technocrats". They are rather united in their political outlook, claiming that the best form of European cooperation would be a less structured and less binding form of collaboration, ideally following the concept of a "Europe of nations". Any kind of "European dictatorship" should be strictly avoided as it would deprive the national states of their natural rights, especially the right to sovereignty. Interestingly, none of the analysed groups was willing to propose any concrete steps towards the dismantling of the EU, even if they have suggested that this should take place at some point in the future. It is worth stressing that the German radical right organisations do not reject the concept of Europe as such. Europe still has significant value, but only when understood as a community of shared values, as a *world of real Europeanness*,[34] that has nothing to do with bureaucracy and procedures.

It is usually claimed that the extreme right groups believe that the national state should be the primary unit of political organisation.[35] Based on the analysed material I would even go one step further and claim that if there were no global or international organisations and institutions, which the radical right ought to address, a world consisting of national states would probably be the only kind of political order that would satisfy the

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[34]   B. Smolik, *Naród we współczesnej polskiej myśli nacjonalistycznej*, Kraków 2017, p. 224.

[35]   C. Mudde, *The Ideology of…*, p. 187.

radical right. The analysed groups are usually not willing to discuss international coop-eration but are expected to do so in order to be perceived as fully fledged political actors.

While speaking about the EU or global matters the common point of departure is their stance on the nation and the national state. This perspective puts the radical right in sharp contrast to other critics of globalization, especially radical left, which tends to focus more on such aspects of the issue as commercialization, privatization of the public sphere, unification of tastes, fair trade and the environmental consequences of global processes.

CONCLUSIONS

The conducted analysis leads to an interesting observation that the topics of globaliza-tion, multiculturalism, the EU or any other form of globally interconnected processes are for the radical right just an excuse to present their views on the nation and the na-tional order. They touch upon these global processes, concepts and actors only because they have an impact on how the national order functions and not because they find these topics attractive or interesting on their own. With high degree of probability can we state that the far-right groups would not raise these issues if they were not of such interest for the nations that they feel they are representing.

The "classical" topics of radical right, like immigration, are strengthened by global processes, which raises the need to address them as well. Additionally, globalization re-inforces the spread of individualism and liberal values, which on their own are problem-atic from the radical right's point of view. As Catharina Froio points out, *globalisation processes […] bring increasing levels of economic, cultural and political interconnectedness between different individuals and states. In this sense, globalisation challenges the pillars of the populist radical right's identity: nativism, nationalism and cultural homogeneity. Therefore, radical right populists oppose globalisation, portraying it as a triple "threat to the native people" in cultural, economic, and political terms.*[36] A result of this opposition on the rhetorical level is the combination of social and cultural matters as well as their ethnicization[37] or re-nationalization[38] in the right-wing discourse.

Although this analysis focuses mainly on the programmatic and ideological layer of right-wing extremism, we cannot forget that anti-globalist stance of the radical right also plays an important strategic role. When rhetorically presenting societies as being oppressed and abused by global powers, anti-globalist political organisations demonize them, while presenting themselves as thus willing – and more importantly capable – of taking care of those who are oppressed and abused. Additionally, a common enemy

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[36] C. Froio, *Are far-right parties a threat to the European union? Interview with Nonna Mayer and Cater-ina Froio*, at <https://www.sciencespo.fr/centre-etudes-europeennes/en/content/are-far-right-par-ties-threat-european-union>, 27 July 2019.

[37] T. Grumke, A. Klärner, *Rechtsextremismus…*, p. 133.

[38] T. Greven, *Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik: Anti-globaler Gegenetwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Glo-bal Governance*, in: *Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globali-sierung*, T. Greven, T. Grumke (eds.), Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 15-29.

embodied by internationally connected powers, such as the EU, forms a convenient platform of transnational cooperation of right-wing organisations.[39] Being nationalistic while simultaneously willing to cooperate transnationally seems to be one of the biggest paradoxes of the radical right.

As indicated by Freeden, the morphology of a political ideology consists of well-connected concepts which play a more or less important role in this ideology. The least constituent ideological concept (peripheral concepts) are also highly dependent on time and space – on the actual political discourse in which the political actor producing the ideology is placed. The analysis of the political and ideological programmes of the German radical right has clearly indicated that the anti-European stance, being exactly one of the context-dependent peripheral concepts, is a result of the ideological concept of anti-globalism. On the other hand, anti-globalism, being slightly closer to the core of the ideology, is a direct result of the radical right's focus on nationalism, national order, and the self-sufficiency and homogeneity of the nation. The causal relation between being primarily nationalistic, and secondarily anti-globalist and therefore also anti-EU, helps to place all three of these concepts into the morphological structure of the right-wing ideology. Therefore, in the ideological morphology of the radical right we can categorize nationalism as a core concept, anti-globalism as an adjacent concept, and anti-European attitudes as a peripheral concept, one highly dependent on current discussions.

In other words, the ideology of the extreme right would not be the same without its nationalism, whereas the anti-European stance is not a constituent element of this ideology. It is highly useful and eagerly discussed, and it potentially contributes to the electoral success of far-right political parties, but it is nevertheless not inevitable for a radical right political ideology. Consequently, anti-globalist or anti-European attitudes are not the lowest common denominator of the radical right scene. The selected organisations – and many other organisations in and outside of Germany – are counted into the category of the far or extreme right not because of their anti-globalist stance, but rather due other ideological characteristics which are shared by all political groups in this category. And conversely – not all critics of the EU and globalization are by definition radical right.

As Claus Leggewie rightly points out, the opposition towards globalism is neither left nor right.[40] Anti-globalist rhetoric should then not be perceived as "belonging" to any particular political worldview, even though the common intuition would rather connect it with the left or the radical left. Anti-globalism as a political concept can therefore play a more or less significant role in various ideologies. As it has been shown, in the case of the radical right worldview it plays a secondary role. The far right's rejection of globalization is not anti-democratic nor anti-liberal per se, but these are rather other elements of this radical worldview that puts this political worldview at odds with liberal democracy[41].

[39]   T. Grumke, A. Klärner, *Rechtsextremismus...*, p. 167.

[40]   C. Leggewie, "Rechts gegen Globalisierung", *Internationale Politik*, vol. 4 (2003), p. 36.

[41]   A. Pfahl-Traughber, "Globalisierung als Agitationsthema des organisierten Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. Eine Analyse zu inhaltlicher Bedeutung und ideologi- schen Hintergrfinden", in *Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus?...*, p. 39.

Criticism of globalization should therefore not be understood as an indicator of right-wing political thought, but rather as a phenomenon giving the extreme right an opportunity to spread their views on matters on which globalization has an influence and which are central to this radical worldview, such as nation, collectivism and ethnicity.

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Agata KAŁABUNOWSKA – PhD, a graduate of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Her research interests include studies on political ideologies, radical movements, foreign policy and contemporary politics of Germany.