ABSTRACT
This short text contains a few layers: first, it reports on the author’s evolving interest in and work on what she calls Median Europe; second, it tries to define Median Europe; third, it presents the role the thinkers of that part of Europe play in its quest for self-understanding and definition; fourth, it puts forth the thesis that these thinkers have much to offer to those who search for a new narrative on Europe now; fifth, it explains why these Median European voices are not better heard, especially in France; and sixth, drawing practical conclusions from the above points, the author presents a large research and editorial project she is involved in that is meant to change this situation.

Key words: Median Europe, European dream, Fernand Braudel, European narratives

Słowa kluczowe: Median Europe, Europa Środkowa, europejskie marzenie, Fernand Braudel, europejskie narracje
The field in French academic research which is best suited for the subject of this article and my academic interests can be called cultural transfer, particularly between Central and Eastern Europe and the western part of Europe after 1945. This field is developing slowly in France but is still very often too dependent, in my opinion, on an outdated vision of sovietology which privileges automatic links between Eastern and Central Europe and the Slavic world. Fortunately, interdisciplinary research has recently become better organized, ever since a group of academics interested in these complex problems founded a network called GDR CIM (Connaissance de l’Europe Médiane).¹ Thanks to that, various paths have been opened for many researchers to have an intellectual engagement with Central and Eastern Europe, which a lot of us now call Median Europe. I will explain this label, which is not just a linguistic choice but the result of deeper reflection of research going on in France with partners from many countries of Central and Eastern Europe. My personal struggle is to persuade French colleagues to perceive this part of Europe as an autonomous part of the world, not just as a label given by others to indicate a part of something bigger. You will see that a ‘simple’ change of designation is in fact a real change of vision, which of course not everybody will agree with.

Coming back to the subject at hand, which is European narratives, I would like to present the research in which I am currently involved with a group of colleagues in France. For me this all started when we asked ourselves about what the European dream could be today In 2013, together with several colleagues from France and Central and Eastern Europe, we organized a conference at our university entitled “What is the European dream today?”² Our question was about whether Europe was still a dream or a permanent myth, a fiction, a common imaginary or a utopia. Our questions concerned what kind of common basis we could find for this dream (or imaginary, or myth, or ideal, or utopia). We addressed this question to many members of our academic community in order to think about it together from different perspectives. We drew the conclusion – a working conclusion – that it could perhaps be human rights, perhaps democracy, perhaps ecology and as a new humanism, perhaps cultural diversity. This was the basis of our reflection. We thought that Europeanity as a proposition could rather be a mix of national narratives. We tried together to compare the European dream as it is seen today in different countries.

One of the participants in the conference, Jean Francois Mattéi, the author of many important books including one of particular importance to this topic, entitled Trial of Europe. Greatness and Misery of European Culture,³ is one of the rare French philosophers able to reaffirm the existence of the European dream and the European’s right to be, to exist as a European without feeling guilty and without being obliged to say that there is only a negative, imperialistic, colonial, past. He suggested a conflict, a double

---

¹ See GDR CIM, at <http://cem.hypotheses.org>, 1 August 2015.
imagination for Europe: one being religious and cultural and the other one, a rejection of this conceptualization. Religious and cultural aspects come of course from Greek rationality and Christian revelation, whilst the second one is the rejection of this heritage or image. His point was that the European narrative is a constant conflict of those two narrations, which explains why we do not have a European narration today. In fact, the lack of narration is the constant ideological conflict on narration. While we do not want to overtly state the reason for this, the underlying factor is undoubtedly the feeling of guilt for European imperialism and colonialism. It is here where we see the first crucial difference between Central and Eastern Europe, and the western part of Europe: in Central and Eastern Europe we do not speak about colonialism, our colonialism. Even if Western historians try to convince us that we should speak about colonialism too, for example when we speak about Ukraine, Belarus, and what we call Kresy (the Eastern borderlands), as this schematic manner, this paradigm of analysis or relationship between the center and periphery should be ours too. I often encounter colleagues who say: You are not used to thinking like that but you should! In fact you should feel guilty towards Ukrainian peasants because you were as imperialistic towards them as we were in Africa.

According to Mattéi’s theory, the confusion between these two imaginary formations is the reason for the European crisis. I have also come to understand why it was so important in France to create a new narrative for Europe and especially about Central-Eastern Europe. I clearly understood that after the collapse of the cold war system, there had been no specific narration for this part of Europe. In fact, many academics working on the border of the two parts of Europe or, like me, in Western institutions but coming from this part of Europe, have the choice between adopting the Western view or reporting on what is done in research in Central Europe – and neither of those two solutions were satisfactory. I would like to try to explain the reason for this state of affairs – the reason for this dissatisfaction that I experienced at the end of the conference which I organized about the European dream.

As a provisory solution, I suggested considering the concept of a new humanism produced and developed in Central-Eastern Europe in the writings of many thinkers living here, working here, coming from what I suggested calling ‘the other Europe’ (taken from the French title of the famous essay by Czesław Miłosz), and I argued why those texts were important for European thought and not only for Central and Eastern Europe.

I understood very quickly that those texts were not easily understood in France. Of course people listened to me politely, but I understood that it was very important to offer something more than just an analysis of this new humanism and to show what the specificity of this thought is, compared for example to French ideas in the same period. I was sure of my feeling that something very specific was happening here, but I knew that this work should be done more precisely in a comparative way. I tried to understand why the most prominent thinkers from what I started to call Median Europe (and not Central and Eastern Europe) continued to be insufficiently known to the French public.
Let me first explain why I speak about *Median Europe* instead of Central and Eastern Europe, and why I am not in favour of ‘Eurasian Europe’ (of course being against the concept of Eurasia). Median Europe is a concept introduced in France by the historian Fernand Braudel. It appears in French literature in the text of the introduction to the book of Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs – called *Three Europes.*

The idea of this book, published in 1983 in French, was that we do not have two Europes – Western and Eastern – as was usually said during the Cold War, but three Europes: Western, Central-Eastern, and Eastern. Szűcs argued that these three Europes had the same European dream, but this dream was realized to differing degrees in the span of history because of difficult neighbors or because of internal constraints. And according to Szűcs, if you ask who is European, and if you compare the stage of Europeanity, you’ll be amazed that the most important points of European integration are inside of what Europeanity means to him, and what those three criteria of Europeanity are. It is a very quick resume, but it is really important to understand why Braudel was so interested in this book. Those three important points of what he calls ‘criteria of Europeanity’, of course excluding Russia from so-construed Europe, are political and not cultural. If we consider music and literature, he fully agreed that great Russian literature and great Russian music cannot be excluded from European culture. But as a political culture, Russia of course cannot be considered as a European country. The argument is the separation of Church and state, the existence of civil society capable of contesting political power, and the existence of the culture of contract between individuals that excludes slavery. He emphasized these points, stating that this is what we call the *acquis communautaire*, the minimum level of *acquis communautaire* today. Braudel wrote an introduction to this seminal book, which was also influenced by a certain ambiance of the Cold War. What we can understand about the relations, the tensions between the three parts of Europe and the specificity of the Median part is that the more you go to the east, the less your European dream can be fulfilled. Westerners were the happiest; they fulfilled the European dream almost completely because they were often free to do so. People from Central and Eastern Europe, let’s say historical Bohemia, Hungary, and the historical commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania fulfilled this dream only partially. Whereas Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania, North and South-Eastern Europe, couldn’t really make this dream come true, and are hardly able to do it now. Braudel suggested speaking about *Median Europe*, wherein it is not a question of borders but a kind of intermediate Europe for a lot of nations having the same destiny.

This concept of intermediate *Median Europe*, rather than central or *Mitteleuropa* seems interesting to many of us today because of the lack of ancient geopolitical connotations. For example, German geopolitics prefers the term Central Europe, the idea of Central-Eastern Europe is used by Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, whereas the idea of Asian or Central-Asian Europe is used by those who like the proximity of Europe and Russia. All those ideas are influenced by some kind of geopolitics, while *Median*

---

5 See ibid.
Europe – *Europe médiane* in French – has the privilege of being politically neutral. This word has many meanings at the same time: it means ‘intermediate’, ‘being in the middle’ as well as ‘can be a mediator’, which is exactly what the inhabitants of this region were historically and try to be today in Europe. This concept was promoted and some researchers in the 1980s accepted it even if many people forgot this term, and journalists and diplomats still prefer to use the terms Eastern and Central Europe to describe Post-soviet Europe. I myself like this concept of Braudel’s because it is new, it is neutral, it is also elegant from an aesthetic point of view in the French language and I decided to try to promote the idea by using this word in conferences and publications. I realize that it is slowly catching on; a lot of colleagues are interested by this idea so we will see whether it will stick in the future.

This concept is further interesting because it covers a territory larger than Central-Eastern Europe – by *Median Europe* you can understand North, South, East and Central parts of the continent – many more nations than just the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs. Historically we can include many more countries in the intermediate sphere of Europe: the South Eastern part of Europe but also North Eastern Europe, like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and of course Ukraine.

When the sphere of *Median Europe* was established, I tried to see which thinkers who use this term are well-known in France – I tried to test it on my students, PhD researchers and M.A. students in France to determine whose work is translated, and also who in France is working on those thinkers. I discovered a lot of books had been translated here but remarkably few papers of very famous authors that I know of. I realized that in France especially those who cannot read in different languages of the region are extremely separated from this thought and cultural tradition primarily because of linguistic reasons, and of lack of interest in translating and editing the works of all those authors.

We can say without exaggeration that the most prominent thinkers from *Median Europe* continue to be insufficiently known to the French public. A number of major works were subsidized and published in French during the period 1998-2000 and shed some light on central European political thought. These works included: Aleksandra Laignel-Lavastine *Esprits d’Europe*, collective works to which I contributed: *Histoire des idées politiques de l’Europe centrale, Mythes et symboles politique de l’Europe centrale, Les Dissidences, L’esprit de la dissidence* about Patočka, Jacques Dewitte’s *Le clivage de l’humanité* about Kolakowski, many publications by Maria Delaperrière about writers, those by Antoine Marès (e.g. *Mémoire et pouvoir en Europe Médiane*) and Les

---

intellectuels de l’Est exilés en France\textsuperscript{11}), L’Autre Francophonie,\textsuperscript{12} Culture et identité en Europe centrale. Canons littéraires et les visions de l’histoire\textsuperscript{13} and La religion et l’identité.\textsuperscript{14} Various texts by some thinkers are available in French: L’Europe après l’Europe, Essais hérétiques and L’Europe vue de Bohème (Patočka), Les essais politiques (Havel), Les trois Europes (Szuć), Misère des petits États de l’Europe de l’Est (Bibó), L’antipolitique (Konrad), Epistolaire de l’Autre Europe (Matvejevitch) and L’Eglise, la gauche, le dialogue polonais (Michnik).

As for Kołakowski, two of the three volumes of his Histoire du marxisme are available along with a scattering of texts in specialized journals, but there remain many of his essays published in Polish that would be important to bring to the attention of French readers. Another major thinker, the philosopher Barbara Skarga, who has a large body of work in her own language, is only known in French through Les limites de l’historicité and Penser après le Goulag (translated and published under my supervision). Her compatriot Józef Tischner is only visible for his La Philosophie du drame and L’ethique de Solidarité, although he authored several major essays. In the Czech sphere, Tomáš Halík, who studied under Patocka and served as advisor to President Václav Havel, exerts some influence today and has a large body of work translated into other languages, but is virtually unknown to readers in France. Only one of his books is available in French: Donner du temps à l’éternité which was published recently by Les éditions du Cerf.\textsuperscript{15} Of course, Kundera’s older writings (e.g. the essay Un Occident kidnappé\textsuperscript{16} and Havel’s Essais politiques are widely known in France. However, this is not true of their works written after the dissident period, which are of great interest to reflections on the European question in Median Europe. One example is Havel’s Zmieniać świat\textsuperscript{17} (2012) with an introduction by Halík. Mention must also be made of texts by Ukrainian thinkers, very important today in light of their country’s situation; these texts are nearly impossible to find in French but have been competently translated into the languages of the region (e.g. Sny o Europie\textsuperscript{18} – a collection of essays by many Ukrainian intellectuals on the European question). L’Institut Littéraire Kultura in Maisons-Laffitte, outside Paris, has just opened its website.\textsuperscript{19} Also its archives, which figure on UNESCO’s Memory of the World registered heritage list, are now available to researchers

\textsuperscript{14} See M. Masłowski (ed.), Religion et identité en Europe centrale, Paris 2012.
\textsuperscript{17} V. Havel, Zmieniać świat. Eseje polityczne, transl. by P. Godlewski et al., Warszawa 2012.
\textsuperscript{18} O. Hnatiuk (ed. and transl.), Sny o Europie, Kraków 2005.
\textsuperscript{19} See www.kulturaparyska.com.
and curious readers. Fortunately, thanks to a private fund-raising, a translation of the most important information into French, English and Russian has been made.

I asked myself how people in France, one of the most important countries in the creation of the European Union, could imagine a narration for Europe without knowing another part of Europe and without being able to figure out what happened here during the Cold War. The research about that time period, the narration offered is often made only by academics, particularly Western academics coming from a Department of Sovietology. They have a certain vision of what happened here, which affects the nature of their narration. My project consists in linking colleagues who work in that field in different countries of Median Europe into a network of European researchers interested in the ‘European life of spirit’ of the region after 1945.

Little by little, the gap of knowledge is slowly being filled. Now it is important to spread the ideas of thinkers focusing on Median Europe in France, a country interested in the life of ideas. That is what we will do now. To me, the most important specificity is that those people we call ‘thinkers’, that is philosophers, writers, poets, sociologists, were very often resistant to the Nazi regime as well as the communist regime, and were the builders of democracy here. Nobody in Western Europe had those three characteristics. Few people had those three characteristics at the same time. There were not so many, but some had the unique experience of resistance in two camps (Nazi and Gulag) and two totalitarian systems. They were able to make a real comparison between two totalitarian systems, they were able to speak about the long-term captive mind, something that nobody in Western society knows from experience. Those thinkers were able to show the difference between the concept of auto-limited revolution, dissidence, democratic opposition, protestation – concepts which nobody in a Western country can analyse with the same level of subtlety, which are of crucial importance today. A lot of those researchers have tried to compare what has happened in Arabic countries with what happened in the case of the so-called Eastern-European social movements.
Those thinkers know the difference between civil society, civic society, social movements, or anti-politics – all those concepts have been very well described by them and they are different from classical political analysis conducted in the western part of Europe. I could see myself how difficult the analysis done by a French sociologist working on the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s was, because everything was new and the analytical tools which worked in other places, like for instance Latin America, could not really work here.

The historical experience of Median Europe after 1945 is unique. What is extremely precious in the case of thinkers speaking about this period is not only their resistance but also that a few of them (for example Havel, Mazowiecki, and Geremek) had a very high national and international level of responsibility after the collapse of Communism. I took those three examples and we have texts about how they compare dream to reality. Havel wrote important texts about it, Mazowiecki also, and Geremek spoke a lot in the international sphere. We don't have so many examples of people struggling for freedom and having responsibility and comparing both.

Doing this work of international comparison of political thought is very risky. One of the difficulties I am conscious of but I find particularly interesting is how to use conventional Western categories of left or right wing to understand who they were. Philosophers like Kolakowski, Tischner, Skarga, Geremek, and Havel all had leftist sensibilities, but on the other hand they were also conservative. It seems to me that if we try to understand who they were, they could be called liberal conservatives, although I am uncertain what it means in western political science. Therefore we have to imagine a new category to describe their political thought. I don't know how but we have to think together, because Western categories don't apply to them.

Another proposal I have is that they all attacked Communism, were all anti-communists, because they all thought that Communism was an anti-European movement. Clearly, they were all very in favour of Europeanity. If you read their works, they were all in favour of European culture. We have their texts, for example Geremek's Foundation today is completely in favour of Europe. Skarga represents the same attitude. But at the same time they are not in favour of the philosophy of deconstruction – they were openly attacking deconstruction. I think this was because, and it would be very interesting to have a common reflection on this, they probably thought that Communism had a lot of common points with post-modernism. I will astonish you by saying this, but I'm convinced this is true and you'll understand better, perhaps, my many reactions here against this post-modern facility of thinking. I will give you some examples of what Communism tried to deconstruct, and post-modernism too. For example: the deconstruction of the idea of the country, transcendence, the canon of traditional culture, the canon of traditional family. These are just a few examples of what internationalism, the idea of Communism was to be, as opposed to cosmopolitanism. This is exactly the confrontation of today's debate on the post-modern idea of internationalism. None of those thinkers was in favour of internationalism, they hated the idea of internationalism but they were all in favour of cosmopolitan education. We have to be clear – the term cosmopolitan education today is not understood in the same way by my
colleagues in Western and Median Europe. In the latter, historically, this kind of education does not mean the opposite of attachment to one’s country, language or national tradition.

The collectivization of many aspects of social life is another example, resulting from the negation of singularity. Post-modern thinkers don’t like singularity, they like individuality. Economic and social determinism in the interpretation of historical phenomena, positivism, materialism, detestation of speculative philosophy, egalitarianism, conventional language – these are other examples of similarities between Communism and post-modernism. It is very interesting to compare the similarities of what we can see in the post-modern analysis of reality and what all those thinkers rejected in their reality, which was often the philosophical struggle against Communism.

The question I ask myself now is why all those thinkers cannot be easily accepted in Western sociology today. In the 1980s it was trendy to know them and to quote them, everybody cited some examples from their books. It was very easy, especially in a French university, to have some friends in Hungary, in the former Yugoslavia, to invite Matvejevitch, to quote Patocka, and to have Michnik as a friend. This was a means of solving some problems with the Marxist implication of most of the leftist in Western intellectual life. The joint debate with them was a way of creating a new leftist thought in Western universities.

Today, to take a concrete example, in Revue Litteraire I read a debate between people in favour of Enlightenment and those against it, saying: What did those people from Central and Eastern Europe give us? Nothing. Therefore today the trendy idea is that we do not have a common debate in Europe (even right-wing thinkers, I think, are close to saying that). Why? Because I think that what is said in Central and Eastern Europe is disturbing. (it is important to say that this conference was pronounced before the controversies about PiS and Orbán politics) Some topics are exactly the opposite to what is going on in France, and the key word is ‘tragic’. ‘Tragic’ is not trendy. ‘Tragic experience’ is exactly what people don’t want to hear. And because most of those texts speak about tragic experience, it is exactly what we said; the easiest manner of escaping common debate is to say: You’re just a witness. A witness knows exactly what happened by experience. If you don’t want to debate with such people, you say: You are not an expert. You are just a witness. And to be a witness means to have a personal point of view, it is necessarily too affective, it is too emotional, it’s not scientific. And this manner is what I call condescension. I understood little by little, and it’s a manner of forcing you to be silent and not engaging in dialogue when your testimony is uncomfortable.

I will give you an example: Michnik wrote a very interesting text about the place of the Catholic Church in the protests in Poland. This text was astonishing for leftist thinkers in France, who couldn’t understand the place of a priest in the Gdańsk protests and why workers wanted to pray during strikes. This text changed the mind of many about the nature of protests in this country. So this is an example of the necessity to adopt the paradigmatic vision that protestation can be different from country to country, and the place of institutions can be different. Another example is Havel’s and Patočka’s text concerning bureaucracy, pointing out that the totalitarian system in the
1970s wasn’t a Stalinist system, it was rather one of the excessive power of bureaucracy under an anonymous mass of people, and people became disengaged. And his whole theory of engagement came from the criticism of bureaucracy. This manner of analysing the situation of Czechoslovakian society in the 1970s is extremely interesting today for Europe. To speak about the strength of bureaucracy inside of the idea of totalitarian domination seems very much true and very contemporary. About the excessive strength of bureaucracy, Havel was very right for all Europeans.

Another important point is the problem of manipulation of thought by language, which has been widely analysed by many intellectuals from the other Europe, starting with the famous book by Czesław Milosz *The Captive Mind*, analysed also by Aleksander Wat in *Mon siècle*. In a special issue of the Hermes review we showed the difference of treatment in France of what is called in French langue de bois and what was called under the communist regime ‘wooden language’. We could speak also about the theory developed by philosopher Jan Patočka about soin de l’âme (‘care of the soul’) which has fallen out of favour today but is extremely important in the debate about the culture and place of the humanities. Another point this philosopher develops called vie dans la vérité (‘life in the truth’) shows the conflict with some relativistic theories of post-modern philosophers who pretend to ignore the existence of the truth. The last book of Jean François Mattéi entitled *L’homme dévasté* shows the consequences of such an attitude for what we used to call humanism.

These authors are more or less inaudible today. While their voices – those of a European tragedy, one that was overcome – could reveal hidden fractures in today’s Western world, our contemporary societies are not very fond of tragedy. These thinkers were victims, witnesses and actors in the major upheavals that Europe went through in the 20th century. They lived, described, took action and conversed with the West as to where these upheavals were leading. This research project proposes to record their experiences giving them an audible voice not only as witnesses but also as creators of ‘life of spirit’ to imagine a new common European narrative.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


---