FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE STATE

THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

ABSTRACT Since Zanzibar and Tanganyika became the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, African socialism called *ujamaa* spread widely in this country. The adoption of an African Socialist approach was accompanied by the nationalization of education and health facilities belonging to the religious institutions. However, since the collapse of *ujamaa* in the mid-1980s, Tanzania saw the increased activity of various faith-based organizations (FBOs) that were connected to the economic and political liberalization. The new system caused that FBOs have become part of a growing religious field which has repositioned itself toward the multiple opportunities and expectations of the established apex bodies to coordinate with each other and manage their relationships with the government. This article describes how religious actors in urban Tanzania have repositioned themselves in relation to the state as well as themselves during the liberalization era triggered by development.

Keywords: Religious Institutions, African Socialism, development, Tanzania
INTRODUCTION

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have been involved in various types of charitable, philanthropic, humanitarian, and development work as well as they have been funded by different donors for years. However, in development studies, policy and practice, religion is either neglected or taken as a given. When development discourse and practice consider religion, it tends to be regarded as either an obstacle to the achievement or development aims or as a missing ingredient which, if understood, will help to increase the effectiveness of development efforts. However, only over the past decade development donors have increasingly chosen to support the work of faith-based organizations. FBOs have attracted growing attention in recent international academic and policy studies concerning the role of the non-profit sector and the role of religions in national development. It is important to notice that this attention went up in all-West countries while in most countries of the South religion and religious institutions have shaped people worldview’s and social institutions throughout the post-colonial period, although its configurations and manifestations have changed.

This article focuses on the role of the FBOs in the development and their relations to the state as well. However, this paper does not attempt to explain the relationship between religion and development. Rather it focuses to understand the link between religion in development and the state. The spiritual development work of religious organizations is not covered in this article as well. This paper begins with an explanation of the term FBO in development discourse and examines the scale and the scope of development activities of FBOs in Tanzania, compared to the state. However, it focuses also on increased tensions along inter-religious and state-religious lines, especially along Muslim and Christian lines. Accordingly, there is a growing tendency that religious organizations publicly challenge government polices and the government’s relationships to sections of the society. The article concentrates on Christian and Muslim organizations, given the predominance of these religions in Tanzania.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

The current question is what exactly the term “faith-based” means. There are two main reasons that make for discussion about term of FBOs. The first concerns the nature of FBOs itself. The second touches upon the act of distinguishing between FBOs and secular organizations. According to Mark Chaves, we can conclude that the term “faith-based organizations” typically suggest religious congregations with primary missions

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of worship and religious education\(^2\). Other researchers have adopted narrower definitions. Julia Berger, for example, uses the term “religious NGO” (RNGO) rather than the term FBO, defining RNGO as “...formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operate on a nonprofit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level”\(^3\). However, since 2001 discussion of faith-based organizations has begun to expand beyond congregations and include a wide array of entities, which may or may not be linked to congregations\(^4\). Following this, there has been a group of scholars from the USA that have aimed to define what an FBO is and how faith is manifest in them. Thomas Jeavons quotes a description of seven key areas in which faith manifests itself within organizations: self-identity; religious convictions of participants; the extent to which religion helps or hinders the acquisition of resources; the extent to which religion shapes goals, products and services; the impact of religion on decision making; religious authority and power of leadership; and the extent to which religion determines inter-organizational relationships\(^5\). However, Jeavons argues that congregations should not be included within the definition of FBO because it can challenge the constitutive religion/state separation\(^6\). Berger agrees with him and distinguishes religious NGOs from congregations and argues that the latter are focused mainly on their members whereas RNGOs have a public mission. However, she acknowledges that there is some relationship between the two, since “RNGOs represent congregations, denominations, spiritual or political orientations, even the entire membership of a particular religion”\(^7\).

Another issue which concern scholars is the act of distinguishing between faith-based and secular organizations. It is because national surveys of NGOs and civil societies do not differentiate FBOs from NGOs or civil society generally\(^8\). Following this, it is necessary to understand what constitutes an FBO. Gerard Clarke and

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\(^7\) R. Berger, 'Religious Nongovernmental Organizations...'; p. 19.

\(^8\) In Tanzania, faith-based charitable, relief and development organizations are registered as NGOs or associations. See: R Leurs, P. Tumaini-Mungu, A. Mvungi, Mapping the Development Activities of Faith Based Organizations in Tanzania, Birmingham 2011, pp. 2-5 (Religions and Development Working Paper, 58).
Michael Jennings suggest that limit the definition of FBO to formally registered organizations that resemble NGOs would exclude many organizations such as congregations, apex bodies representing religious hierarchies, missionary organizations and religiously based socio-political groups. Following this, they suggest a definition in which FBO is considered “any organization that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teaching and principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within the faith”\(^9\). Emma Tomalin also argues that this differentiation ascribes a special status to the term FBO only because of the religious background which excludes them from many contexts where it may not be a term used to refer for example to humanitarian organizations motivated by religious values\(^10\). She adds that this approach is all-Western, where religion is separated from the state. Meanwhile in many non-Western countries, religion permeates all aspects of life\(^11\). According to this, Tomalin suggests the term FBO “as a label for organisations that arose or reshaped themselves in response to the new political climate, which sought to elevate the role that faith traditions can play in many aspects of public life, including international development”\(^12\). However, Tomalin remarks that it is necessary to identify different types of organizations because it helps with recognize its character and inform potential donors about potential opportunities for engagement with them\(^13\). Clarke suggests five types of FBOs relevant to international development: representative organizations or apex bodies; charitable or development organizations; socio-political organizations; missionary organizations; and radical or terrorist organizations. He argues that donors have engaged with second type FBOs, which are mainly Christians, suggesting that they express their faith identity in a passive way\(^14\). Still, there are many organizations that do not use the religious label because they afraid that would restrict their capacity to obtain international funding\(^15\).

Despite the fact that development is not the main object of analysis in this article, it constitutes a framework for analyzing the links between religion and state. Some key development concepts need to be considered, especially to in order analyze the scale and impact of FBOs in development in Tanzania. Carole Rakodi uses a very

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\(^10\) For instance: Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) which is a partner of UHNCR.


\(^12\) Ibid., p. 692.

\(^13\) Ibid., p. 695.


\(^15\) For example, in Tanzania where many FBOs have deliberately adopted secular names because it might be more difficult for an FBO to access international funding from secular donors who may fear that an FBO has a conversion agenda or might discriminate in terms of their intended or actual beneficiaries. See: R Leurs, P. Tumaini-Mungu, A. Mvungi, Mapping..., p. 7.
broad term of development as “a movement from a worse state to better.”16 However, development is not a monolithic idea with a single, universally accepted definition and different interests within each of society are likely to have different ways. It also depends on dominant ideas and sets of policies. Without doubt development has implications for conceptions of poverty. However, it acknowledges the importance of an adequate income, a good quality of life, supportive social relations, and a sense of a dignified self, based on cultural and political relationships17. As Rakodi noticed, the invisibility of religion in mainstream development theory and practice can be attributed to both the secularization of the state and society and to modernization theory, which was associated with the view that religion is associated with tradition and therefore should disappear from the public sphere18. However, when President Bush created the Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives in 2001, the approach has changed toward a positive view of FBOs. The donors have realized that in Asia, Africa and Latin America, FBOs have always been important in providing development services to the poor, particularly in health and education. Moreover, they recognize that many FBOs, even more than NGOs, highlighting that the first: provide efficient development services; reach the poorest; are valued by the poorest; provide an alternative to a secular theory of development; stimulate civil society advocacy; motivate action19. The notion that religious organizations are distinctive has been featured in academic discussion especially when it is assumed that FBOs are more trusted than secular organizations. There are critics of such assumptions, who argue that FBOs can be seen as problematic if they seek to recruit new adherents or if they are perceived to show a preference for helping members of their faith group above others20. Moreover, the distinction between FBOs and secular organizations is hardly recognized, for example in Tanzania, where some religious organisations operate much as secular organisations, despite their religious identity21.

There is a need to examine the requirements for legal registration of various types of non-governmental organizations in Tanzania to clarify the definition of FBO in the Tanzanian context. According to the NGO Act issued in 2002, a non-governmental organization is defined as: “... a voluntary grouping of individuals or organizations which is autonomous, non partisan, nonprofit sharing organized at a local, national or

17 Ibid., p. 638.
18 Ibid., p. 638.
21 For more information about this topic see: C. Rakodi, ‘A Framework...; R. Leurs, P. Tumaini-Mungu, A. Mvungi, Mapping...
international level, for purposes of enhancing or promoting economic, environmental, social or cultural development (…).” 22 The NGO Act includes also religious or faith organizations. Nevertheless, it highlights that these organizations: “do not include religious or faith propagating organization[s]” 23 . However, some Tanzanian and international organizations considered the new act merely as an attempt on the part of the state to control the NGOs 24 . This may explain why the previous document, the Societies Ordinance 1954, is still in force. The registration of civil society organizations (CSOs) in mainland Tanzania was governed by this document which defines a society as: “any club, company, partnership or association of ten or more persons whatever its nature or object” 25 . Following many different reports concerning CSOs in Tanzania it is easy to notice that this sector includes very different kinds of groups. A major part of Tanzanian civil society consists of informal groups and small community based organizations (CBO), professional associations and trade unions, as well as numerous faith-based organizations. According to the report of the Service Centre for Development Cooperation (KEPA), religious or faith-based organizations may be the most important ones in Tanzania with regard to their influence on people’s daily life 26 . Most of FBOs are Christian and Muslim organizations, since these are two main religions in the country. Although it is hard to estimate how many FBOs run in Tanzania at present, it is known that faith-based organizations in Tanzania are concerned with development, specifically education, health care and poverty.

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

The Tanzanian nation is marked by its multifaceted religious setting. There are more than 120 ethnic groups, religiously divided mainly between Islam, Christianity and African Traditional Religions (ATR). About 30 per cent of the population of the Tanzanian mainland adheres to Christianity, 35 per cent adheres to Islam (the majority of the people of Zanzibar are Muslim), while 35 per cent consists of the followers of indigenous beliefs. There are also active communities of other religious groups, primarily on the mainland, such as Buddhists, Hindus, and Bahais 27 .

23 Ibid.
26 T. Haapanen (ed.), Civil Society...
According to Pew Forum\textsuperscript{28}, 41% of Muslims leaving in Tanzania are Sunni, Shia represent 20%, Ahmadyyia 15% and non-identified Muslims 20%. Among Christians, 44% are Protestants and 51% are Catholics. There are also between five and ten thousand Pentecostal churches. A number of other churches are also active (e.g. the African Inland Church, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Mormons, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the New Apostolic Christians). While it is not known how many of these churches are directly engaged in development activities, it is known that the Catholic Church is identified by many sources as the biggest Christian provider of health and education services, followed by the Lutheran and Anglican churches. Pentecostal churches are perceived to focus more on evangelizing and to be less involved in development than Catholic, Anglican and Protestant churches\textsuperscript{29}. African Traditional Religions have permeated the life of the Tanzanians since the beginning. However, there are some differences between pre-colonial practices and the ones after colonization. When new religions emerged, new process of transforming traditional beliefs has begun. Belonging to one of the new monotheistic religions does not interfere with nurturing indigenous culture and religions. The new interpenetration of these religions and cultures meant that Tanzanians have done the internalization of new laws and customs to supplement their traditions with new experiences.

Analyzing the origins of Islam and Christianity in East Africa, one may perceive certain differences as well as similarities. First of all, Islam emerged in these areas much earlier than Christianity, for nearly eight centuries. Islamic civilization dominated so far on the east coast of Africa. Moreover, while Christianity spread primarily through a well-organized mission (which provided a range of services to the community, such as education and healthcare), the spread of Islam occurred mainly through traders or part-time preachers who did not act consistently in favor of converting people to Islam. The ultimate goal of the organization mission was to gain new believers through social activities or education and health assistance. Such organizations opened schools and health centers and then built a church. Muslims, in turn, did not have specialists in the proclamation of the faith, did not build schools or health centers. Instead, they build mosques, as the daily prayer was a priority for them. A madrasa, or a religious school, which educated Muslims only in terms of deepening their faith and observance of the rights of Islam, was often built at mosques. On the other hand, in both cases the local community undoubtedly tried to incorporate some African traditions into the established framework of foreign religions in the foreseeable future, which contributed to the emergence of religion referred to later as “African Islam” and “African Christianity”. The internalization of foreign monotheistic religions, however, did not contribute to the integration of a multicultural and religiously diverse society. These differences were already apparent on a symbolic level. For those who accepted Islam referred to


\textsuperscript{29} R. Leurs, P. Tumaini-Mungu, A. Mvungi, Mapping..., pp. 27-28.
themselves as *wastaarabu*, separating themselves from Christians who are defined as *washenzi* or uncivilized, or *makafiri* or non-believers. This division was undoubtedly exacerbated by colonial powers, which explicitly favored one religion\(^{30}\). During the colonization, both German and British colonial rule facilitated the growth of religious activities. The German colonial administration favored Muslims, nominating them as administrators. Under British colonial rule, Christians were favored by being enabled to work in social services and gain financial support from the British colonial administration. Christian mission schools provided activities compatible with the secular policy of the colonial bureaucracy. Following this, children attending Christian schools were trained in a more modern way than children attending Muslim madrasa schools. This reorientation from the East and Islam toward the West and Christianity caused increased tensions between Christians and Muslims, who competed for socio-economic and socio-political influence\(^{31}\). During the struggle for independence Tanzanians, under the mission statement of nationalism, created a movement called the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) aiming to get rid of the British colonialists. However, after independence, religious discourse has not changed and after some time it was presented as a hidden struggle for power.

**The Development Activities of FBOS During The Nyerere Government and *Ujamaa* System**

When the nationalist movement under Julius Nyerere started to embark on a national integration project by uniting people of various social identities for the anti-colonial struggle, it adopted various nation-building measures and discouraged discrimination of all kinds, including that on the basis of religion\(^{32}\). The fact was that political leaders perceived religion as a potentially divisive factor in a newly independent state what finally brought the secular state regime\(^{33}\). This standard point of view came from a belief that the colonial rulers were responsible for the present state of the relationship between religion and governance in Tanzania. However, despite being outspokenly secular, in accordance with the social principles of *ujamaa*, the state encouraged religious organizations to actively participate in the struggle for unity and development. In this way, religious institutions supposed to help Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) which was the only party to consolidate *ujamaa* and the national project within the society at large\(^{34}\). It seemed that two major religions, Christianity and Is-

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33 M. A. Bakari, ‘Religion, Secularism...’, p. 3.

34 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
lam, did not oppose at that time the *ujamaa* ideology and supported it by encouraging their followers to obey government orders. According to Abdulaziz Lodhi and David Westerlund, this drive toward the *ujamaa* could be due to the fact that socialism in Tanzania had many similarities with Islamic socialism\(^35\). Simultaneously, Nyerere had a Christian background which particularly had an impact on Nyerere’s notion of equality and his conceptualization of socialism\(^36\). However, as Lodhi and Westerlund noticed, the Christian reactions to the independence movement were mixed; many local and Western church leaders discouraged their followers from joining the movement\(^37\). Still, during this time religious institutions have had a big contribution in supporting the country’s socialist ideology but also in the provision of social services. The fact is that Christian churches had more developed organizational structures than Islam in Tanzania and thus they were asked to play their part and contribute to the development of the country through their strong social resources in the sectors of education and health care as well as educating Tanzania’s citizens\(^38\). The importance of the role of the churches consisted on playing an important role as conduit for foreign aid and channeling that aid to programs that reinforced the state’s development\(^39\). Tanzania’s two major Christian umbrella organizations, the Catholic Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), founded in 1956, and the Protestant Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), founded in 1934, soon followed this request. According to Jennings, the purpose of the decision was to move away from colonial models of service provision towards a broader and deeper connection with the state’s national development objectives\(^40\). Nevertheless, these close relationships did not protect the churches from the effects of all government policies. The Nyerere government wanted to nationalize provision and to establish a secular school system. Following this, all government-assisted secondary schools provided by voluntary agencies were nationalized through the Education Act of 1969\(^41\). The nationalizations were a way to create educational opportunities for Muslim stu-


\(^{38}\) H. Olsson, *The Politics…*, p. 29.


dents by changing the *status quo* that gave Christians the advantage because of the important role that churches played in providing education in the country. By nationalizing schools the government could ensure that a secular socialist education would be provided to Tanzanian students, eliminating the stigma of attending Christian schools for Muslims. According to Lodhi and Westerlund the Muslims mostly through the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), concentrated on building schools and mosques, providing scholarships and promoting literacy. Shiite Muslims, especially the Ismaili followers of Aga Khan, have concentrated on establishing schools, hospitals, libraries, building societies as well as engaging in industrial development. However, Muslim analysts have provided a critical point of view suggesting that the *ujamaa* regime attributed the creation of social divisions to colonial rule. According to some authors, the time after independence was characteristic by Tanzanian state’s anti-Muslim stance. Under Nyerere rules, unwanted Islamic elements, often adhering to orthodox or conservative Islamic way of thinking, were silenced and replaced by the Muslim organizations that have tended to be more pro-government. For instance, in 1968 the most prominent pre-independence Muslim organization, the EAMWS, which had included Muslims of all sects, was dissolved and replaced by the Supreme Islamic Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA).

THE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES OF FBOS AFTER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

In 1985 Nyerere retired from the presidency and was replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi. This marked the end of the *ujamaa* and the beginning of economic and political liberalization. The new president called for decentralization, including the creation of more space for civil society organizations such as religious institutions. Following this, he signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This shift from state-centered socialism to market-oriented liberalism guided Tanzania into political reform and existing NGOs were able to mobilize external funds to provide development projects. Finally, the number of registered NGOs in Tanzania witnessed a large increase. According to Lange et al., there were two main reasons for this increase:

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44 According to the Islamic view, both German and British rule (though to varying degrees) promoted Christianity at the expense of Islam. At the time of independence, the missions owned and ran two thirds of the schools and half of the hospitals in the country as well. See: M. A. Bakari, ‘Religion, Secularism…’, p. 10.
for the allowance of these organisations. Firstly, national integration had consolidated since independence; secondly, the government had come to realize their own incapability regarding service delivery\(^{47}\). Following this, the government called upon churches and other non-governmental organizations to play a key role in the provision of education and health care service. At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of the NGOs was a few hundred. However, it was estimated that by 1992-1993, in nine districts, 87 per cent of nursery schools were provided by a mixture of Christian religious organizations, private companies and individuals, while by 1994 Christian organizations were running 154 secondary schools\(^{48}\). As far as health care is concerned, the state remained the main provider of all services. However, NGO contributions led 43.5 per cent of hospitals that came mainly from religious organizations\(^{49}\). According to the Lange et al., just shortly after, in 1995 there were already 64 international and 749 local NGOs, while 155 of them where religious organizations\(^{50}\). In the years that followed sources mentioned about NGOs growing rapidly from 2.7 thousand non-government organizations for the mainland to 4 thousands in 2007\(^{51}\). However, it is not possible to tell from this database how many of the organizations can be defined as religious. Over one hundred of the organizations listed have religious names. It was also possible to obtain an (undated) list of 61 registered Christian and 35 Muslim organizations from the Vice President’s Office, although no basis for or definition used in the compilation of that list was provided\(^{52}\). However, according to the World Council of Churches website, there are more than 800 Catholic parishes, 1,800 smaller Anglican parishes and over 1,000 Lutheran congregations in Tanzania\(^{53}\). Among religious organizations there are a number of “apex bodies” that act as national umbrella bodies for Christian and Muslim religious communities and their institutions, but also which are also directly engaged in various forms of development work. The two most important Christian apex bodies are the Catholic Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) and the Protestant Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). In 1992, the TEC and the CCT formed the Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) as an ecumenical body to facilitate


\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 161.


the provision of social services by the churches. They manage roughly 40 per cent of the health care and education services in the country. According to Abel Ishumi’s statement between 1880 and 2001 TEC and CCT have run 119 newly constructed Church schools. The two most important Muslim apex bodies are the Bakwata and Baraza Kuu. As well as acting as an umbrella body for mosques throughout the country, Bakwata runs 20 secondary schools, two theological colleges and support numerous madrasa schools. Moreover, it has 110 dispensaries and is active in educational and empowerment programmes, for example HIV/AIDS prevention. However, Bakwata is less well-funded than the TEC or the CCT and therefore only able to work on a smaller scale and exercising less influence on policy. According to Leurs et al. the reason is that Bakwata has different organization (lack of leadership hierarchy) and is artificially imposed by government, whereas the TEC and CCT are part of the churches themselves. However, according to another statement of Ishumi, based on field data, Government Primary school enrolment in Dar es-Salaam between 1972 and 1999 averaged 42.9 per cent of Christians and 57.1 per cent of Muslims. At the same time Private Primary school enrolment averaged 43.6 per cent of Christians and 24.7 per cent of Muslims. This shows that regardless of the ownership of the school, access and to education was comparable for both Muslims and Christians.

**FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE**

Historically, the role of the FBOs in Tanzania has evolved through two phases. The first one has focused on service delivery which has taken place from the pre-independence era and which has focused on charities, self-help initiatives as well as providing schools and health care. The second phase has begun in the early 1990s and has focused on shifting from service delivery to influencing policies and advocating for opportunity. During this phase FBOs (as a part of NGOs and CSOs) criticize the shortcomings of government policies and their implementation. After the adoption of a multiparty political system in Tanzania in 1992, the FBOs started to watch the government closely. Taking under consideration the good governance indicators, FBOs started to impute bad governance to the state. According to FBOs, poor governance is characterized by: lawlessness, poor service delivery, corruption, discrimination on the basis of gender, poor service delivery, corruption, discrimination on the basis of gender, poor service delivery, corruption, discrimination on the basis of gender,
race, ethnic, tribal or religious differences, violation of human rights, secrecy, and, last but not least, lack of development. Since the country regained its independence in 1961, Tanzania has been preoccupied with several problems such as poverty, difficult access to both education and health services, and ignorance. In Tanzania 28 per cent of the population live below the poverty line, literacy among adults is estimated at 68 per cent and 75 per cent among young people. Additionally, there is only 35 per cent Health Professionals. The government, development partners and private funds constitute the dominant expenditures in the health sector. However, development partners contributing 44 per cent of Total Health Expenditure (THE) while the Government 28 per cent. FBOs make of course significant contributions, but more in terms of health service delivery and advocacy. Despite the situation, Tanzanian society is characterized by a culture of silence and constraint. The government critics remark that people show relatively little interest in politics largely because of lack of access to the benefits of any political change. Following this, the majority of the people still practice passive politics, in that they are unable to use existing political institutions to influence government policies. There is very weak and fragmented opposition while the civil society is still excluded from the political process of law. The policies of liberalization have created the conditions for greater social differentiation and hence the emergence of social classes as well as religious factions.

Regarding the neutrality or secularism of the state, Article 19(2) provides that “without prejudice to the relevant laws of the United Republic the profession of religion, worship and propagation of religion shall be free and a private affair of an individual; and the management of religious bodies shall not be part of the activities of the state authority.” The policy of NGOs in Tanzania is very categorical and according to NGO Act from 2002 (paragraph 5.0 (v): “NGOs are organizations that do not seek political and power or campaign for any political party.” However, when it comes to the elections it has

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62 UNDP, Human Development Report...
64 According to these critics, although there is multiparty system in Tanzania a multipartism is still in name and by law, but in practice it is still a one party-state with the dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Swahili ‘Party of the Revolution’). See: The Role of Faith Based Organizations in Good Governance..., pp. 11-12.
65 Ibid., p. 13.
67 The United Republic of Tanzania, Registration of NGOs in Tanzania...
been a practice for FBOs since 1995 to conduct civic education for their followers. The aim of this activity is to enable the citizens to participate meaningfully and effectively in social, economic, political and development-related decisions of their communities and the country at large from an informed position.\(^68\) Involving FBOs in state policy is a two-edged sword regarding the moments when political entities shall try to use the religious leaders of FBOs, very often through the support of them, to maintain the communication lines to the citizens during political campaigns\(^69\). The first multiparty elections in 1995 showed that the population needed civic education. In Tanzania civic education guidelines related to elections have also been produced and distributed before the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections. The government did not have enough resources to conduct such a programme. The task was assigned to a number of NGOs and religious organisations such as CCT and TEC that were obligated to teach the people about their rights and obligations which include, of course, voting\(^70\). However, despite the law banning campaigning for the parties or candidates in places of worship, some religious leaders were campaigning either directly or indirectly for certain candidates or parties\(^71\). This has raised suspicion and counter-suspicion, especially between Muslims and Christians. The Koranic Reading Development Council (Swahili: Baraza la Ukuzaji Kurani Tanzania – BALKUTA) for example, was the one that spearheaded the campaign in which they demanded that Islamic political parties be allowed\(^72\). Such a tendency may be a source of political instability and decline of democracy and good governance if left unchecked\(^73\). However, besides these individual cases the subsequent elections of 2000 and other were campaigned without any quite controversial cases involving religious organizations. But that does not mean that the elections excluded religious organizations entirely. One of the umbrella election-monitoring organizations – the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) – among around sixty involved organizations included some from two main religions such as BAKWATA, ELCT and CCT and so on. At the end of each election the organizations gave their evaluation of the election itself, using the criteria for “free and fair” elections\(^74\). Mallya concludes that even though religion can influence voter behavior in Tanzania, it is not a major factor. In the last two multiparty elections the president won votes in areas where his own religion dominated as well as areas where other religions dominated. The same applies to other members of

\(^{68}\) The Role of Faith Based Organizations in Good Governance..., p. 14.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 7.


\(^{73}\) The Role of Faith Based Organizations in Good Governance..., p. XIV.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 408.
parliament. In urban areas voters seem to be more influenced by party/candidate policies than religious, regional or ethnic identity. In rural areas regional identity is more influential than any other identity, including religious identity. Moreover, the results of the campaign are also dependent on other factors such as history, the level of corruption in the electoral process, personalities and so on\textsuperscript{75}. Nevertheless, when it comes to policy influence, these religious organizations have markedly some capacities and hence different impacts on policy engagement. One of such examples is the Muslim protest against allowing pregnant schoolgirls to continue their studies, which some human rights activist groups advocate\textsuperscript{76}. The Muslim position paper was hailed by all other religious denominations, including Christians, and the position was duly adopted as a consensus by all religious organizations that took part in the policy dialogue. With that common position of religious organizations, the government had to rescind its plan to introduce a new policy relating to schoolgirls’ pregnancies as demanded by human rights and gender equality activists. However, according to Muslim organizations as well as some authors, Christian organizations are much more engaged in policy and advocacy especially through preaching, pastoral letters, and lobbying. Moreover, Christians are generally well-organized and have a well-recognized representative body that acts as a spokesperson for the Christian community. On the Muslims’ side, there is no single organization or authority that could negotiate with the government on behalf of Muslims, while the Christian churches, through TEC and CCT, an umbrella organization consisting of Protestant denominations including Lutherans, Anglicans, and Moravians, collaborate effectively to engage with the government on various policy issues and decisions\textsuperscript{77}. One may infer that religion will play a critical part in shaping Tanzania’s development in the twenty-first century and the Muslim and Christian organizations tend to have different positions on a wide range of policy issues and government decisions. It is clearly visible in relations with the state, and attitudes toward the political system, as well as other political and social issues.

RELGIOUS CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA

The state has also been called to intervene in inter-religious conflicts particularly between Muslims and Christians. The huge increase in the number of development NGOs since the mid-1980 can be seen as a response both to the increasing gaps in

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 414.

\textsuperscript{76} From June 21 to June 22, 2007, the Ministry of Education held a seminar at Giraffe Ocean View Hotel in Dar es-Salaam. It invited leaders of religious organizations, both Muslim and Christian, to discuss the issue of schoolgirls’ pregnancies. Baraza Kuu’s position was that if the government were to disallow schoolgirls to get married but instead allow them to become pregnant and continue with their studies, which, in effect, would amount to destroying the institution of marriage and the licensing of adultery. See: M. A. Bakari, ‘Religion, Secularism…’, pp. 26-27.

service provision left by the former *ujamaa* system and as a response to new opportunities to access international funding. However, these political changes had important consequences for religious institutions. Olsson suggests that for institutions such as TEC, CCT and Bakwata, which had been closely affiliated to the *ujamaa* regime and its principles, liberalization made them face new challenges. This religious institutional pluralism within a reopened civil society increased tensions along inter- and intra-religious lines. One example of how Christian-Muslim tensions are manifested in contemporary Tanzania is the aggressive and polemical public preaching, also known as *mihadhara*, “open-air” meetings, where speakers from Muslim and Christian groups tried to win converts or strengthen their own faith at open debates. This *mihadhara* has seen as a method used by some religious institutions to oppose political power and government legislation in Tanzania. Some religious institutions worked hard to preserve their religion’s traditional worldview. Moreover, some of them complain about the structural marginalization of their own religious groups in favor of other groups. Muslims in Tanzania see themselves as victims of historic marginalization in terms of education, employment and socio-economic development. A significant minority of Muslims seemed to be suspicious of what they refer as “the Christians’ hidden agenda” to Christianize the country or at least to undermine Islamic culture through modernization and westernization. BALKUTA for example, admonished that it was blasphemous for Muslims to be ruled by Christians, and therefore Muslims should not vote for Christian candidates. The availability of external funding appears to have encouraged the formation of local organizations aimed to revitalize Islam. Organizations such as the Jamaat Ansar as-Sunna called upon Muslims to live their lives according to the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunna. According to this, some Muslims protested against the rearing of pigs and selling of pork in their neighborhoods. Others demanded that female students be permitted to wear the hijab. However, according to the Christian perspective, the predicament of Muslims in Tanzania is caused by internal problems among themselves, as well as the Muslim community’s neglect of education. For that matter, Christians viewed some inequality and discrimination among them from the future government. In 1993, for example, when the country had a Muslim president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, there were complaints among some Christians that President Mwinyi was favoring fellow Muslims in appointments to high positions in the government.

As Bakari and Ndumbaro noticed, the deepening of religious tensions in Tanzania since the late 1980s can be explained by several factors, where the major ones include

78 H. Olsson, *The Politics...*, p. 32.
the failure of the *ujamaa* ideology and its welfare policies, which continue to constitute an “ideological vacuum that could be not adequately filled by the market ideology”\(^83\).

The second factor, which contributed to the rise of religious tensions in Tanzania, was a resurgence of religious activism. Revivalism in Islam and Christianity in Tanzania became more pronounced as it provided alternative views or solutions to emerging socio-economic and political problems. The third factor, economic liberalization, created the necessity for redefining the nature of the state and its relations with society. Thereupon the new social forces emerged along diverse lines such as class, religion, ethnicity, and regionalism\(^84\). And finally, the change from single party to multiparty politics has opened up new vistas for socio-economic and political expressions under pluralistic politics. While citizens started to raise their issues, state institutions, mostly security ones, have continued to use the authoritarian techniques of the single party to violently deal with the citizens’ legally accepted democratic challenges such as demonstrations\(^85\).

What Bakari and Ndumbaro also argue is that state-religion relations in Tanzania cannot be adequately explained without reference to the role of external forces, the state itself, on which religious organizations significantly depend. For instance, external donors such as Iran, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have been accused of financing radical brands of Islam. At the same time, some Muslims have accused the United States of sponsoring Christian revivalism, which is intolerant to other religions\(^86\).

Bakari and Ndumbaro presented in their article different perceptions about the relationship between the state and religion in Tanzania\(^87\). While they were asked to assess the relationship between their own religion and state, 86.2 per cent of the ordinary respondents said the relationship was good and 2.4 per cent said the relationship was disharmonious. The main reason given by respondents for the cordial relationship was that FBOs did not involve themselves in politics (31.0 per cent) and both the institutions and the state share the goals of serving the community (27.8 per cent). What is interesting, for those who said the relationship was disharmonious, 96.0 per cent did not know why, and the other answers were that their religion is critical of government policies (2.0 per cent). When it comes to the relationships between Muslim and Christian organizations, 71.2 per cent respondents said that the relationship was good as opposed to 1.4 per cent who characterized it as disharmonious. It is interesting to note


\(^84\) Ibid., p. 343.

\(^85\) Ibid., p. 343.

\(^86\) For example, the bombing of the US embassy in Dar es-Salaam in August 1998 increased the state’s suspicion towards some Muslims in the country. Under the US pressure, the Tanzanian government hastily passed the Anti-Terrorist Act (2002) amid protests by Muslims and human rights activists in the country. See: A. Bakari, L. J. Ndumbaro, *Religion and governance in Tanzania...*, p. 346.

\(^87\) This survey involved 839 ordinary people and 200 religious leaders. While 46.6 per cent of the ordinary people and 42.5 per cent of religious leaders were Muslims and 48 per cent of the ordinary people and 55 per cent of religious leaders were Christians. For other religions, 3.5 per cent of non-believers, 1 per cent of African Traditional Religions and 0.8 per cent of other religions. Among religious leaders 2 per cent were leaders of other religions. See the following for the complete survey: A. Bakari, L. J. Ndumbaro, *Religion and governance in Tanzania...*, pp. 350-355.
that the relationship between Christians and Muslims is better than between religious organizations. About 77.9 per cent of the respondents said that the relationship was good while 3.8 per cent said it was disharmonious. However, as Bakari and Ndumbaro noticed, the fact that 16.3 per cent said that there was no relationship between Muslim and Christian organizations shows the serious problem of interaction between those organizations. Another question posed to the respondents was whether they thought some of the religious organizations were favored. About 78.1 per cent of respondents said “no” while 11.2 per cent said “yes”.

These surveys show that there is generally a good relationship between Muslims and Christians. However, their relations between Christian and Muslim organizations are not as good as that of their believers. The authors of these surveys argue that there is a need for establishing a national religious forum where religious leaders representing different religions and denominations could meet to discuss issues of national interest. Some measures already have been undertaken.

CONCLUSIONS

In the article presented above I have attempted to present how religion is related to the governance and all its basic components such as law, politics or social service. Despite the country's constitution that indicates that Tanzania is a secular state, the religion and politics in general have a special partnership which began in the past. During the Tanzanian socialism, religious institutions were instrumental in the provision of public services mainly in education and health, despite the relations between the state and the Muslims has not always been consistent. Today, FBOs make of course significant contributions, but more in terms of health service delivery, education and advocacy. The Tanzanian government has welcomed organizations that provide service delivery, but has been, and still seem to be, skeptical towards some of the advocacy of the FBOs. Nowadays, religion and governance are the topical issues in Tanzania. Even so, Tanzania is a secular state, according to some government critics, it is a myth to say that religion is, and must remain apolitical because politics exists everywhere. As they argue, religions face challenges such as poverty, ignorance, diseases, social injustice and inequality that are simply related to state policy. Moreover, in the current political


89 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and World Conference on Religion and Peace Tanzania (WCRPTZ) organized a three day Interfaith Based Organizations in Dar es-Salaam to engage them in a 'Constructive Interfaith Dialogue'. The dialogue held from 24 to 26 November 2009 was among others, and were equally expected to set a common agenda i. a. on how to influence political direction in non-discriminative and religious harmony. Dialogue Organizers also expected open and constructive discussions with a common agenda on how they could practically contribute to political education beyond narrow rhetoric, by building political competence among Tanzanians especially in crafting citizenship and state leadership. See the following for the complete report: The Role of Faith Based Organizations in Good Governance...

90 Ibid., p. XIV.
situation, state and donors should show extra sensitivity regarding religious polarization and be careful not to do anything that may destabilize local communities or the nation as whole. It is easy to notice that the ongoing problem is that Tanzania still has to cope with two different religious conflicts. The first is between religion and state. The second has to do with the conflict between and within religious organizations. There have been no serious confrontations between Muslims and Christians. Probably because the majority of the people still practice passive politics, in that they are unable to use existing political institutions to influence government policies. The great majority of Tanzanians still do not belong to formal organizations. This is because of a political culture inherited from the one-party rule that tended to emphasize obedience and obligations over competence and rights of citizens. It is also important to the government to engage serious problems emerging between Muslim and Christian organizations. In fact, the secular state ought to resolve inter-religious issues. This can happen only if faith-based organizations are independent of the state. The situation in Tanzania is different. While Christian organizations seem to be autonomous and enjoy strong support from the believers, the Muslim organizations have no strong organizational structure and no support from believers, like BAKWATA which was created by government. This, as long as religion-state relations are not equal toward two major religions in Tanzania, Muslim still feel humiliated and oppressed while Christians feel threatened. Tanzania as an non-homogeneous country with more or less equal proportions of Muslims and Christians has to be the platform of co-existence and toleration of different religious views. As a long-term perspective it is important to embrace these ideals in the perspective of ongoing development.

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