

Vera KATZ

University of Sarajevo

katz.vera@gmail.com

## A PLATFORM ON THE FUTURE YUGOSLAV COMMUNITY (IZETBEGOVIC-GLIGOROV PLAN)

### A VIEW FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

#### ABSTRACT

A platform on the future Yugoslav community or the Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan offered one of the options in searching of the possibilities for the organization of relating among the Yugoslav republics with the aim to avoid the war conflicts in a general disintegration of the party, political, economic and state system of the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The platform was based on the principle 2+2+2 and projected an asymmetric federation or confederation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were semi independent but sovereign republics, and Croatia and Slovenia were as sovereign and autonomous within the confederation as they considered to be necessary. However, the suggestion option could not reconcile the confronting political stances of Slovenia and Croatia on one and Serbia, Montenegro on the other side. The national interests which led to the creation of independent states were much stronger than the possibilities of reorganization of the Yugoslav federation into a modern European state.

**Key-words:** Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Alija Izetbegovic, Kiro Gligorov, Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan, Plan of Asymmetrical Federation

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is not easy to write about the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Internal political issues and foreign policy events of the late eighties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were extremely condense and complex, with controversial interpretations abounding. Furthermore, any investigation of the break-up of Yugoslavia is, at the same time, a debate over the history of the Yugoslav state since its foundation in 1918 until its end in the year 1992. This debate primarily addresses the topics of the Yugoslav idea, different conceptions of a state model, nationalism, various ways of inter-ethnic conflict resolution, identity, importance of proper perceptions and perceptions of other ethnic groups, but it is also includes many more issues. The first Yugoslavia was formed after World War I, and it disappeared at the beginning of World War II. Afterwards it was re-established on different ideological and political grounds during and in the aftermath of World War II, in order to again disappear from the international political scene during the wars that were waged for its heritage. Thus, wars were the main determinant of its emergence and disappearance, or, in other words, "The chances of being born and dying within the same state are rather slim here [...]" (a statement by Vlatko Stefanovski, a Macedonian musician). A topic of this paper is analysis of the proposed *Platform on the future Yugoslav community*, that is, analysis of only one out of numerous options proposed in seeking a way to regulate relations among the Yugoslav republics, in order to avoid wars during general disintegration of the party, political, economic and state system of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This Platform is usually cited in literature sources as the *Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan*. Events related to the break-up of Yugoslavia were interconnected so that neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Macedonia could be considered in isolation from other events that took place in other Yugoslav republics, or in isolation from the activity of the international community.

At the very beginning of this debate a fundamental question arises: what element brought these two Yugoslav republics closer in order for their presidents to offer such a plan? One of the responses could be that these two republics were the most sensitive according to the national divide. Bosnia and Herzegovina was directly situated on a glowing hot line of the resolution of the Serbian-Croatian relations<sup>1</sup>, while Macedonia, situated among several neighboring states, was primarily affected by the Greek politicians, who did not miss an opportunity to underline that the Greek government would refuse to recognize Macedonian independence, or independence of "the state, which would utilize such a historical Greek name", interpreting it as "falsifying the Greek historical and cultural heritage". Besides ethnically sensitive neighborhood, both republics had complex internal national structure. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was necessary to align the Serbian-Croatian-Bosniak interests, while in Macedonia it was necessary to align the Macedonian-Albanian interests. Additionally, at the level of Yugoslavia, both

---

<sup>1</sup> I. Lučić, 'Karadordevo: politički mit ili dogovor?', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2003).

republics found themselves on the periphery of current developments, since the main axis in resolution of the Yugoslav conflict appeared alongside the Ljubljana–Zagreb–Belgrade route. Therefore, this paper will briefly consider the *Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan* along the lines of good intentions of the two presidents, who offered a single compromise solution for remodeling of the Yugoslav state, as an attempt to avoid war. However, this attempt was not feasible under the conditions of the heated Yugoslav scene.

Circumstances in the Yugoslav state in the late 80s and the early 90s

The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist states significantly accelerated the dissolution of the Yugoslav republics, for which the grounds were largely set by the Constitution of 1974. In line with this Constitution, the population of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was organized in socio-political communities, socio-political organizations and, in case the citizens were employed, they were organized into basic organizations of associated labor, in six socialist republics – “states based on sovereignty of the people, on government, self-governance of the working class, and socialist self-government democratic communities of workers and citizens (Article 3 of the Constitution), and two autonomous provinces”, i.e. “autonomous, socialist, self-governing, democratic, socio-political communities” (Article 4 of the Constitution).<sup>2</sup> The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was also organized based on the republican principle. The League had been eleven years ago federalized as a federation of six republican Communist parties and two provincial Communist parties. Apart from a complex political and party structure, the Yugoslav Federation was especially burdened by significant differences in the level of development, efficiency and richness of particular republics and regions. There were disparities in the number of residents within particular republics, in the number of employees and their educational structure, as well as in general, cultural, historical and political traditions that the residents. The tensions were steadily increasing under the pressure of increasing mutual misunderstandings, which resulted in non-functioning of the federal authorities. In fact, the inter-republic disagreements have long existed in the Yugoslav society, while in the late eighties the culmination of these disagreements was publicly expressed. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republics were constituted based on the national principle. Hence, mutual conflicts had features of inter-ethnic misunderstandings. In fact, everyone was ever more loudly expressing dissatisfaction. Slovenia and Croatia were objecting that, as the most developed republics, they were earmarking the most financial means into the federal budget and into a Fund for the development of the underdeveloped areas. Additionally, Croatia was unhappy because their tourist currencies had been confiscated at unrealistic exchange rates and inflation rates. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the underdeveloped republic, depended on the Fund for development of the underdeveloped areas. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that the other republics were cheaply exploiting its raw materials and cheap labor force, thus thwarting its development. Serbia, among other things, resented because it believed that it had a huge market for expensive products of the Western republics that

<sup>2</sup> *Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Stručno objašnjenje*, Beograd 1975.

were becoming richer on the account of Serbia. Macedonians were unhappy with unrealistically low prices of their agricultural products. Albanians were expressing their discontent in a particular way. Namely, since the beginning of the eighties they had been demonstrating their frustration due to constant, conscious and systematic blocking of Kosovo's development, as Yugoslavia's least developed area. Their requirements for obtaining the status of the republic had already been very loudly manifested since 1981. Hence, economic disparities among the Yugoslav republics, coupled with mutually disordered financial affairs, have largely contributed to the worsening of the inter-republic, i.e. international relations, and, instead of reconstruction of the state and the economy, what followed was total disintegration of Yugoslavia. Settled mutual distrust and fear of the "other" resulted in clashes between the republican political party elites, what made reintegration and preservation of Yugoslavia impossible. Prolongation and unacceptance of the application of stronger monetary and fiscal discipline, coupled with obstruction of the liberal reforms of Ante Markovic, neutralized reconstruction of the Yugoslav federal state framework. Therefore, dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia was a result of many factors, rather than only one factor. According to various expert studies, historians, economists, sociologists and others find many arguments in favour of the weakness of the Yugoslav state. One of the political scientist notes of Yugoslavia that, "The main factor [...] is the breakdown of ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political elite, which came on through gradual and relatively long process that preceded the very collapse of the state institutions".<sup>3</sup>

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disappeared during the general movement of the "dismantling of the system"<sup>4</sup> in the European socialist countries and the Soviet Union in the late eighties and early nineties of the 20th century. Advance signs of the independence of the Yugoslav socialist republics were greeted by their population with mixed feelings – on the one hand, with expressions of satisfaction due to introduction of a multiparty system and creation of nation-states, and, on the other hand, in fear of possible armed conflict. The United States and the Western European countries were content with the events in the Eastern European countries because, with the collapse of communism, the Cold War politics had ended, and the process of introduction of liberal democracy in the former communist countries has been launched. Although the communist regime disappeared institutionally in many former socialist republics, the democratization process of the societies was not moving fast enough. The most obvious example of the unwillingness to initiate democratic changes in a society was found in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the 1990s (20-22 January), the last – 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was organized. On this occasion, all antagonisms present in the Yugoslav society escalated in public view. Slovenian delegates demanded radical economic and political reforms of the society and the state, while

<sup>3</sup> D. Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Četvrte Jugoslavije (1974-1990)*, Zagreb-Beograd 2003, p. 482 (*Edicija REČ / Samizdat B92*, 22).

<sup>4</sup> R. Vukadinović, 'Postsocijalističke evropske zemlje u međunarodnim odnosima', *Politička misao*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1992), pp. 67-79.

the Serbian communists supported firmly the unitary state idea. Impossibility to talk/agree resulted in the Slovenian delegation walking out of the *Sava Center* in Belgrade, where the Congress was held. The Slovenian delegation was followed by the majority of the communists belonging to the League of Communists of Croatia “[...], and only a few delegates of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina who did not fully accept the party discipline and guidelines produced at the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These Guidelines stipulated that the delegates from the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina should stand for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as the ‘force of Yugoslav unity’, and advocate for ‘democratic integration based on political pluralism’, alongside the ‘new role’ of the socialist alliance”.<sup>5</sup> This was a prelude to their departure from Yugoslavia. The “remnants” of the League of Communists in individual republics mostly transformed into social democratic parties, after unfeasibility of a one-party society to survive newly appearing events. Although the leadership of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to block the creation of a party pluralism, a few national parties of anti-communist political agenda were established until August 1990.

First multi-party elections that took place in all Yugoslav republics demonstrated the full reality of political and national orientations in the Yugoslav republics. During the 1990s, elections were held in all republics according to new electoral laws. Apart from Serbia and Montenegro, the reformed League of Communists and a Union of Reform Forces had not won the majority of the seats in the assemblies of the other republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In Macedonia, the Union of Reform Forces of Ante Markovic won 19 out of the total of 120 seats in the Sobranje; the reconstructed League of Communists won 30 seats, while the Macedonian organization VMRO – DPMNE (Interior Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) won 37 mandates. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, out of the total of 240 seats in the assembly, Markovic’s alliance won 13 seats, the reconstructed Communist League won 18 seats, the Party of Democratic Action won 80 seats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization won 13 seats, the Croatian Democratic Union won 44 seats out of possible 49 Croat seats, and the Serbian Democratic Party won 72 out of possible 85 Serb seats.<sup>6</sup> In such a way, the former socialist “brotherhood and unity” disappeared in front of “old/new” national ideas and programs, while national myths about the age, origin, bulwark, victims, suffering, size, values, and many other stereotypes and prejudices became priorities of each nation individually, i.e. the symbols of the past have become much stronger than the civil rights. A few national aspirations for proper territory and homogenous national community clashed in a small area, and, in such a cacophony, there was no room to hear and listen to the others. There was no compromise because compromise was considered a betrayal of national interests,

<sup>5</sup> I. Lučić, ‘Bosna i Hercegovina od prvih izbora do međunarodnog priznanja’, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2008), p. 108.

<sup>6</sup> M. Cupek Hamill, *Konferencija o miru u Jugoslaviji i raspad jugoslavenske federacije, 1991-1992*, Zagreb 2008, p. 47 (*Biblioteka Monografije iz Političkih Znanosti*).

which was associated with low political culture. In such an environment, the creation of the civil society of the Western European type proved irrelevant in comparison to the creation of a nation state and gathering around national leaders. Hence, three territorial national communities began illegitimately detaching themselves in Bosnia and Herzegovina – each one with its national leader and paramilitary units, while the legitimate authorities in Sarajevo were ever less able to control the overall political situation within the borders of the republic.

A few important processes were unfolding in parallel on the Yugoslav scene. On the one side, there was a process of adoption of republican constitutions, new electoral laws, organization of multiparty parliamentary elections and referendums that were legally laying the foundation for the road to independence. All of these processes were unfolding in the atmosphere of mutual distrust. On the other side, meetings of the six republican presidents were taking place, which included proposals of different plans for the recreation of the federation and preservation of Yugoslavia. In the newspapers, these meetings were often called “The traveling circus of the presidential summits” or “YU – summits”, and they were generally judged as events for buying time or delaying disintegration. At that time, various projects were emerging aiming at the recreation of Yugoslavia. In October 1990, Slovenian and Croatian legal experts released their proposal for the reconstruction of Yugoslavia titled *Draft Agreement on the Yugoslav Confederation – Alliance of the Yugoslav Republics*. The authors of this Draft claimed that they had created it in line with historical experience of the European Community. Based on the draft, Yugoslavia was projected as an alliance of sovereign states interrelated by a confederal agreement, as an act of international law. This act would exclude the possibility of binding the states through any other agreement or document that would limit their sovereignty. According to the plan, the confederation would, among others, be voluntary, and it would enable each member state to join the European community. Regarding common matters, the Draft envisaged common business of customs and monetary union, common market, infrastructure coordination, free movement of labour and goods, and joint military contingent in the event of imminent danger under the command of a Joint Command agreed by consensus.<sup>7</sup> Even though there was a public interest in the preservation of Yugoslavia, albeit in a more liberal form, this proposal could not have been universally accepted due to the fact that Serbia had much earlier manifested on the issue of confederal make-up (June 25, 1990), in an assembly session through a speech of Slobodan Milosevic: “Confederation is not a state but a union of states. For this reason, there can be no confederation in the frame of existing, administratively defined inter-republic boundaries, even if all the political entities of Yugoslavia wish so. In this case, the question of Serbian border is an open political question”.<sup>8</sup> By the end of 1990, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia have had their own constitutions, and they were increasingly blocking decisions of the federal government, avoiding decisions of the Federal Executive Council, “raiding” the IMF of Yugoslavia in an unauthorized

---

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 49.



way (an example of Serbia), and calling upon their own territorial integrity and national sovereignty. After a period of “constitutional nationalism”,<sup>9</sup> the Constitution of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was no more a binding umbrella constitutional system for federal Yugoslav units/republics.

## A PROJECT FOR THE REMODELING OF YUGOSLAVIA – IZETBEGOVIC-GLIGOROV PLAN

The Chairman of the Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, and the President of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov submitted their proposal on the remodeling of Yugoslavia to members of a high mission of the European “Twelve”, led by Jacques Santer, chairman of the Community, and Jacques Delors, president of the Executive Committee, on May 30, 1991. On this occasion they met with the republican leaders in Belgrade in order to help resolve the political crisis in Yugoslavia. Based on the principle 2+2+2, Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan projected an asymmetric federation: Serbia and Montenegro would be the centre of the federation (or confederation), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia would be both semi-independent and constituent republics, while Croatia and Slovenia would be as sovereign and autonomous within the Confederation as they deem necessary. Izetbegovic and Gligorov hoped that, in this way, both the Serbian desire for a unified Serbian state, and aspirations of the Slovenes and Croats for sovereignty would be met. “Serbia immediately took a hard-line stance against this plan. The *Politics* journal, on June 2 wrote that this plan ‘had been accidentally or deliberately targeted against the interests of Serbia’, and that it was first presented to foreigners; an attempt to reconcile all Yugoslav ‘conflicting facts’ was evaluated as ‘illogical’; it was a question of ‘political desperation’ of the two presidents due to the announced secession of Croatia and Slovenia. In their opinion, the most negative sides of the plan were twofold: recognized overruling only at the level of republics, and the standpoint that only people in the republics had the right to secession, and not the nation in the Yugoslav community as a whole: ‘It was clear to the creators of this platform that this proposal will to the greatest extent affect the interests of the Serbian people, as the most numerous and the most widespread in Yugoslavia’”.<sup>10</sup> Having presented the platform to the international community, Izetbegovic presented it at the last meeting of the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, held on June 4, emphasizing that he was

<sup>9</sup> Quoted by: *ibid.*, p. 49, note 79: “Hayden [...] defines constitutions of the newly established Yugoslav states as obvious examples of the so-called constitutional nationalism, under which term he implies a situation in which constitutional and legal structures lay down sovereignty upon a single nation, thus deviating from accepted democratic constitutional standards that perceive individual citizens as a fundamental subject of the constitution. In these constitutions, the state is understood as a manifestation of sovereignty of a single, ethnically defined nation. Others may be citizens, but they are not part of the body that has sovereignty. ‘Self-determination’ is not a matter of a citizen, but rather a matter of citizens who make up a majority ethnic group. Such a concept is a political key for disintegration”.

<sup>10</sup> K. Nikolić (ed.), *Bosna i Hercegovina u vreme raspada SFRJ 1990-1992. Tematska zbirka dokumenata*, Beograd 2011, p. 30, note 81 (*Biblioteka Jugoslovenska Kriza. Edicija Dokumenta*).

not an optimist. He still believed that the Platform provided “certain opportunities” for constructive talks because, in its most important questions, it met the requirements “of the Eastern and the Western parts of the country”. The Platform upheld the principle of a common state and continuity of Yugoslavia, which was what Serbia wanted, but it also stood by the principle of sovereignty of the republics, as requested by Slovenia and Croatia. According to conflicting political ambitions of Slovenia and Croatia on the one side, and Serbia and Montenegro on the other side, the Gligorov-Izetbegovic Plan was not able to reconcile these two completely different perspectives with maximalist demands. Hence, steering a middle course in order to exit the crisis was not accepted.

### RECOLLECTIONS OF KIRO GLIGOROV AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC ON THE PLAN OF ASYMMETRICAL FEDERATION

Kiro Gligorov, the president of the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-1999, noted in one of the interviews held in 2006 that, “Alija Izetbegovic and myself have substantively cooperated during the meetings of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. You need to know that our positions were similar. Neither we nor Bosnians were oriented towards the break up of Yugoslavia at all costs. However, we were prepared to support Milosevic’s solution – a solid, modern federation, as he called it. Actually, Zagreb and Ljubljana did not propose immediate break-up. Break-up will come later, after all other agreements proved a failure. The deal offered by Izetbegovic and myself was, actually, the outcome of one of my conversations with Alija, when we decided to do something because we were not conflicting parties. Izetbegovic told me to make a rough draft of our proposal, if I wish to do so. I took up this task very seriously. From day to day the situation was getting worse. I put something down on paper and send it to Alija. I think that I still have this paper among my personal files. I told him to freely introduce any objections, additions or modifications to the paper, and I will respect that. He had relatively few objections to it. Than we decided to distribute the proposal to everyone ahead of the next presidential session, that was supposed to be held in Sarajevo, and ask them to declare themselves. And so it was done. We thought that the proposal would ensure a more peaceful and balanced debate and discussion in order to reach a certain conclusion”.<sup>11</sup> In continuation of the interview, Gligorov said: “Actually, we proposed that an alliance of the Yugoslav republics be formed. That alliance would include all republics. Second, we proposed that each of these republics had the right to become a member of the United Nations. With this proposal, we approved the request of the northern republics. On the other side, we aspired to preserve Yugoslavia and certain functions in the Federation. These functions relate to the issue of defense and one segment of foreign affairs, since, if the republics become members of the United Nations, they need to have proper foreign affairs. Another thing is mutual agreement and the like [...] The proposal was explained by Alija Izetbegovic. He point-

<sup>11</sup> A. Jerković (ed.), *Sjećanja na Aliju Izetbegovića*, Sarajevo 2010, p. 35.



ed out two things. The first point was that each republic that wanted to be an independent country was able to do so through a referendum. The second point was that if the referendum outcome was positive, the country might request membership to the United Nations. [...] And then followed certain provisions on the prevention of abolishment of all economic, transport and other links, since hatred, which has already been blazing, could have caused communication breakdown, what would cause general damage. And then, I recall Alija Izetbegovic closing his address with the following statement: 'Listen, we do this due to our good intentions to avoid war. Our three nations, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, have lived together for so many years. If the war breaks up, the blood will run deep'.<sup>12</sup> Kiro Gligorov later commented on his meeting with a high-level EC delegation, held on May 30, 1991, in Belgrade, as follows: "At that time, the European Union, that is – the contemporary European Economic Community, paid somewhat greater attention to what was going on in Yugoslavia. So they sent three of their most prominent persons to Yugoslavia. The delegation was headed by then chairman of the European Economic Community (EEC), Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg Jacques Poos. He was joined by Jacques Delors, who was then heading the EEC Commission, which had already at that time been considered as the government of the EEC. The third member of the Commission was Hans van den Broek, who was supposed to be the next EEC chairman. We were waiting for them all day, and they arrived in the early evening. The meeting was attended by the members of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and presidents of the republics. Practically, the communication among us was very poor, since the situation had already been rather critical, and it had reached the degree where a single spark could start a fire. When the EEC delegation came in, we all set down to a big table. It was the same table at which the sessions of the federal government are held, in New Belgrade. Luxembourg's head of diplomacy Mr. Poos said, 'You know what, we are very concerned, and this is our last attempt. But I shall not speak further since Mr. Jacques Delors has a plan for you.' Delors was a systematic person, more of a scientist than a politician. His address was structured around ten points. The first point – if no war breaks up, we will immediately accept you by political decision into the European Community, without conditions and without procedure. Currently, all of us are struggling to accede into the European Union, and no one knows when the process will end. The second point – we are worried about repeated increase in prices, while the reform of Ante Markovic produced good results. The European Community would provide you with a donation amounting to five and a half billion dollars, with no need for repayment, to fix this problem. Then he was listing how much each institution would allocate out of the total sum. The World Bank would provide this much, the International Monetary Fund that much, the European Investment Bank, the Bank for Reconstruction and Development [...] Who would give you such a gift. And all in the same vein, elaborating on around ten points. And then, after Delors had finished his presentation, Poos asked us what we thought of the proposal. What followed was dead silence. Then Franjo Tudjman

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

asked to speak: 'My colleagues know this, but let me repeat it for the guests' sake. I am not interested in any billions. I feel that, after a thousand years, I am on a historic mission to renovate the Croatian state. And nothing else matters'.<sup>13</sup> According to Gligorov, after a short silence Milosevic asked to speak, and said, "I have repeated this on a few occasions now, but I will repeat it once more because of the guests, to familiarize them with my stand: Either Yugoslavia will be a solid, modern federation, with headquarters in Belgrade, or [...] He emphasized this point because, at that time, there were attempts to declare Sarajevo as a capital of the future Yugoslavia, due to then verbal attacks on Belgrade, that everything there was all evil. So, he wanted to say that it simply cannot be".<sup>14</sup> As a response to the editor's question on what the other meeting attendees spoke, Gligorov noted, "Well, what can small fish say to that, when two of the greatest nations say so. Well, now Alija Izetbegovic had his turn. He spoke as follows: 'Please, listen to me. I want to tell you that we are having a hard time without Belgrade and Zagreb alike. We are three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we have always been a separate entity. We would like to remain so, but we would also like to find a way in order to cooperate with Belgrade and Zagreb. This is an extremely serious matter. I think that it is not acceptable to provide such comments on the offered proposal. If something is not right with the proposal, we can talk about the particularities at a later stage, but why deny this opportunity. We have been living together for so many years'. And he reiterated his sentence: 'If this proposal does not pass, the blood will run deep'. He was not a man who advocated war, bombing, destruction, etc. [...] I regret that the proposal of myself and Alija Izetbegovic was not accepted, on Yugoslavia acceding the European community, while the Yugoslav republics would still be independent, and on Yugoslavia being secured funds for reforms launched by Ante Markovic. This way the thing that Alija Izetbegovic had exactly predicted happened – the blood was running deep".<sup>15</sup> In the words of Gligorov, upon individual talks of the representatives of the European community with the presidents of the Republics, the minister from Luxembourg said the following, "The result is the same, and there is no consent. So, we offered the plan, and we deeply regret that we will have to communicate to the European Community that no agreement was reached on the offered proposals. Unfortunately, only God can help you. And then they said: Well, we have no business here. We came with good intentions. One of you also mentioned potential victims, if no agreement is reached. However, if there is no good sense (he made a grimace with his hands), then we have nothing else to look for, let's go home".<sup>16</sup> According to further narration of Gligorov, the reader may conclude that the meeting ended by a well-known scenario of the "Balkan tavern", hosted by Borisav Jovic, chairman of the only formally ruling presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who invited the guests: "Oh, wait, you cannot leave in haste, Serbs are good hosts. Well, you visited us and you have had

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

nothing to eat. You must have a snack. [...] The waiters disappeared and, after around fifteen minutes, reappeared carrying large dishes with sliced cheese, salami, etc. [...] Then they also brought cognac. Hans van den Broek said: 'I cannot drink that,' and Delors added to that: 'It's late, we need to go back and I would rather not drink.' But, by God, the rest of the folks were drinking".<sup>17</sup> The question remains whether the hosts celebrated the end of Yugoslavia or the final preparations for war, or both?

In parallel to conducting talks on the preservation of Yugoslavia, individual republics were hurriedly managing affairs regarding their independence. Gligorov speaks on this issue as follows: "You could say that the United States and the European Union gave up on Yugoslavia when Slovenia seceded, and when discussions were launched in Croatia as well as in Macedonia on their separation. They simply accepted the fact that the Yugoslav people no longer wanted to live together. Afterwards they formed Badinter Arbitration Committee."<sup>18</sup> [...] It should be noted that the Slovenes and Macedonians had already passed their constitutions. The Badinter Commission concludes the following: First, all conditions were met for Slovenia and Macedonia to be recognized as independent states. And second – the constitution corresponds to the norms of European legislation, i.e. the constitutional right. Gligorov further noted that the Greeks had already started raising a question on the name of Macedonia, but the name could not represent a hindrance, nor is it a territorial claim to amend the borderline, and so on. Of course, this caused enthusiasm overflow with us and the Slovenes".<sup>19</sup> According to Kiro Gligorov, the newly arisen situation was commented by James Baker, U.S. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of his visit to Belgrade on June 21, 1991, as follows: "May God help you, because you will actually spill blood between yourselves, and afterwards you will need our help, you will ask us to make peace among yourselves".<sup>20</sup>

Similarly to the recollections of Kiro Grigorov, Alija Izetbegovic described the political situation regarding the proposal of the "asymmetric federation" made to the presidents of the former Yugoslav republics, as follows: "Prior to attending the first session of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in January 1991, I told the reporters the following: 'At the last session of the Presidency of the

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 41. It was the Arbitration Commission set up under the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. The Commission was set up by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community on 27 August 1991. The task of the Commission was to contribute to peaceful resolution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia by resolving disputed legal issues. Robert Badinter was appointed President of the five-member Commission consisting of presidents of Constitutional Courts of the EEC Member States. Members of the Commission were: Robert Badinter, president of the Constitutional Court of France, Roman Herzog, president of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Aldo Corasaniti, president of the Constitutional Court of Italy, Francisco Tomás y Valiente, president of the Constitutional Court of Spain, and Irene Petry, president of the Constitutional Court of Belgium. Between November 1991 and January 1993, the Arbitration Commission handed down fifteen legal opinions.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-40.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we established initial views on the future of Yugoslavia. We agreed that we want Yugoslavia, but we also want Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state within Yugoslavia – as sovereign as possible within the future integration process. Yugoslavia should be a democratic country where republics, nations and nationalities will be on equal terms. We also committed ourselves to the free market, with free flow of goods, people, capital and labour force. A dilemma between a federation or a confederation is a false one – the main point is democracy. This is the starting point for future negotiations.’ These ideas were, at first glance, ordinary, but for contemporary Yugoslavia these were ‘revolutionary’ ideas”.<sup>21</sup> It is evident from the recollections and records of Alija Izetbegovic that his attitudes were the most similar to those of Macedonia. Even his press statements were the most similar to the statements given by Kiro Gligorov. Both have advocated for the preservation of Yugoslavia, but significantly rearranged. “The session of all presidents of the republics, held in Sarajevo on February 22, 1991, was called by the media as a YU-summit. At this session, I presented a proposal of the asymmetric federation. Some have referred to this proposal as a ‘step-like federation’. My proposal envisaged Serbia and Montenegro in a classical federation, Slovenia and Croatia in confederation to the former two republics, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia as equally close and equally distant from all other republics. [...] March 1991 went by characterized by three more YU-summits, the first one was held in Split, the second one in Kranj, and the last one was held in Villa *Biljana* in Ohrid. These events offered nothing new and better compared to previous YU-summits. [...] In Stojčevac (June 6) in Sarajevo, Kiro Gligorov, a president of Macedonia, and myself, published a Platform on the structure of the future Yugoslavia. Instead of the federal government, we proposed transforming Yugoslavia into a union of states. Janez Drnovšek, a representative of Slovenia, was the first to publicly support our proposal, while Milosevic’s adviser reported to the *Reuters news* agency that it had been ‘a step forward’. In general, the proposal was evaluated as the last and only resort. The European Community welcomed a proposal at a meeting held two days later (Declaration on Yugoslavia on June 08, 1991). One of the conclusions of the meeting in Stojčevac was that a meeting will be held of the three presidents: Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic at an early date. This was explained by the fact that ‘poor international relations are at the root of the crisis, and that these poor relations also show up in individual relations between republics’. This meeting occurred on June 12 in Split. The talks lasted for hours. Milosevic and Tudjman obviously came well prepared. They were trying to direct the conversation to the tripartite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My response to offered proposals on the reconstruction of Yugoslavia was the Gligorov-Izetbegovic Platform. This conversation appeared as a long dialogue of the deaf, and it also resembled a chess game in which I was playing against the two, and with one chess piece less. I managed to pull out a draw”.<sup>22</sup> Sincere cooperation between Izetbegovic and Gligorov was also evident in relation to their realization of the meeting of Tudjman

<sup>21</sup> A. Izetbegović, *Izabrana djela*, Vol. 4: *Sjećanja. Autobiografski zapis*, Sarajevo 2005, p. 98.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

and Milosevic in Karadjordjevo. "No, I did not learn about this meeting while I was in Split. I learned about it from the Macedonian president Gligorov on the occasion of his arrival in order to attend the meeting of the six presidents in Sarajevo. Gligorov came to Sarajevo a day before in order to inform me that a few days before Tudjman and Milosevic had discussed in Karadjordjevo, and that he has reliable information that they had agreed on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is still a question mark whether they agreed on a division into two or three parts. It is well known that no document was released as a result of the meeting in Karadjordjevo. An official denial was issued of any agreement taking place at all. Yes, afterwards I was invited to come to Split for a conversation with Milosevic and Tudjman".<sup>23</sup>

### THE QUESTION OF AUTHORSHIP OF THE IZETBEGOVIC-GLIGOROV PLATFORM

Although the authorship of this Platform belongs to Izetbegovic and Gligorov, some politicians have appeared recently who attributed authorship to themselves. One of these politicians is Ante Markovic, the last prime minister of Yugoslavia (1989–1991). In his conversation with Adamir Jerkovic held on December 27, 2007, he said the following: "Alija and Kiro were the ones who, more than anyone else, asked me to remain at the Federal Executive Council, at least five to six months longer than I had planned. I kept in touch with them. Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina really fully supported me. They begged me to stay, since they had no one to rely on. Both of them told me as follows: When you leave, we have no one to address or to talk to, regardless of the fact that, at that time, I had little say in things. So, I was on good terms with both of them. [...] Yes, well, I will tell you what very few persons know. The so-called Proposal on the resolution of crisis in Yugoslavia, presented by Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov, nobody knows that I wrote it [...] And I offered it to Kiro and said – if I present the document, then 'this lot' will refuse it flatly. But if you propose it, that is, you and Alija Izetbegovic together, then there is a chance that the Proposal will pass muster, and it would be some way out of this situation. This compromise would ultimately ensure that it never came to the situation that later on arose. [...] Kiro was my adviser at the Federal Executive Council. A question arose of who will represent Macedonia in the presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and who will be the president of that country. After that I advised Kiro to go to Macedonia, and that Vasil Tupurkovski remains in the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I gave to Kiro Gligorov those papers, the material that I wrote with my colleagues as the only way out of the crisis. Kiro Gligorov has never mentioned a word

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Vol. 10: *Alija Izetbegović – dostojanstvo ljudskog izbora*, Sarajevo 2005, pp. 49-50. On the meeting with Milosevic and Tudjman in Karadjordjevo see more in: I. Lučić, *Uzroci rata – Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine*, Zagreb 2013, pp. 378-471 (*Biblioteka "Hrvatska Povijest"*). (Lučić denies an agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Karadjordjevo unlike other authors with whom he staged polemics in the book.)

about it, because it was our arrangement never to write about it.”<sup>24</sup> However, Adamir Jerkovic, advisor to Alija Izetbegovic in the period between mid-90s until the end of 2000, when Izetbegovic retreated from active state policy, added to this statement the following remark: “First, Alija Izetbegovic never told me that this paper was actually the proposal of Ante Markovic. Instead, all along he was mentioning this plan as Izetbegovic-Gligorov plan. He told me that it was worth giving a try.”<sup>25</sup> At some time past, Izetbegovic said to his advisor that, “I was working in good faith, even though I am not sure whether I believed in all that. Actually, this issue is in a sense philosophical. Hegel in his time said – all that collapsed did so for a reason. In other words, people can’t do anything about it. So it turns out that the joint state had to fall apart. Nowadays when I think about it I wonder whether Gligorov and myself acted as Don Quixotes. Yugoslavia was ill with a few serious illnesses, while two of these were incurable. These are Serbian hegemony and lack of freedom. Serbs could never tolerate equality, and the very mention of this word somehow offended them, while equality represents a key foundation of living together in a joint state. This dissatisfaction was gradually accumulating with other nations, the result of which was the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. The other key reason is a lack of freedom. All countries suffering from this syndrome collapsed. For this reason I believe that Yugoslavia had no chance, and that it had to change thoroughly. I am not sure whether it was possible to pull off with our cure, by which we tried to calm things down. You saw in the end how it all ended.”<sup>26</sup>

Besides Ante Markovic, Ejup Ganic, member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the first multi-party elections, was the one who took credit for the authorship of the Platform. In a documentary *Bosnia or death*, he spoke two to three sentences in which, in a rather unconvincing way, he pointed to his role in writing of the Platform: “Kiro Gligorov, Alija Izetbegovic, and myself, had these semi-secret meetings at which we were developing the concept of decentralized Yugoslavia. As a lot younger man, I was like their son. I was writing this material, drafting the Platform. That Platform was supposed to save Yugoslavia. [...]”<sup>27</sup>

Certainly, there is a possibility that particular contemporary politicians issued statements in the Macedonian public by which they took credit for the authorship of the document. However, the aim of incorporating into this paper the two statements on possible authors of the Platform was not to conduct an investigation. These statements were mentioned only as parenthetical annotations. Although this proposal to save Yugoslavia was often judged as naive and illusory, it is evident that certain individuals, who consider themselves to be more skillful than Izetbegovic and Gligorov, aspired to

<sup>24</sup> A. Jerković (ed.), *Sjećanja...*, p. 124.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 124-125.

<sup>27</sup> A. Huseinović, O.E. Hadrović, *Bosna ili smrt – dokumentarni film*, Haber Production, Sarajevo 2011, at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15uSRSvYeMo>> (I express my gratitude to Husnija Kamberović for providing me with this information).



public involvement in this project, even after many years have gone by. It is certain that a team of collaborators was supporting the two presidents in developing the proposal. However, the Platform is rightly attributed to Gligorov and Izetbegovic because, as reasonable and conscientious men, they presented the proposal at a time when presidents of other Yugoslav republics had little sympathy for the preservation of reconstructed Yugoslavia, and, hence, for the preservation of peace, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the presidents, in their public statements, used to express their fear of a war breaking out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they had a foreboding about the undoubtedness of the cruelty of such a war, they still demonstrated courage and readiness to offer a compromise solution.

### **POLITICIANS' OPINIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE IZETBEGOVIC-GLIGOROV PLAN**

Paddy Ashdown, High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 2002 and 2006, in one interview noted the following: "Alija Izetbegovic advocated for the continuance of Yugoslavia, and, together with the Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, he proposed the option of the 'asymmetric federation'. Unfortunately, the forces of reason and compromise were marginalized in the boiling Yugoslavia. Under these new circumstances, Izetbegovic was trying to get Bosnia and Herzegovina out of the turmoil of war, but this turned out to be mission impossible, given the agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic to divide Yugoslavia and the fact that Europe had not demonstrated any interest to prevent it".<sup>28</sup>

Longtime president of the Turkish government Bulent Ecevit rated this initiative in a similar way: "He [Izetbegovic] advocated for the subsistence of Yugoslavia, and, together with Macedonian Kiro Gligorov, he proposed the option of the so-called 'federation'. Unfortunately, the forces of reason and compromise in the heated Yugoslavia were on the fringe. Under these new circumstances, Izetbegovic tried to pull Bosnia and Herzegovina out of the maelstrom of war, but this turned out to be an impossible task given the bargain between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman to divide Yugoslavia, and the lack of interest on the side of Europe to prevent the collapse".<sup>29</sup>

Václav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia from 1989 to 1992, and president of the Czech republic from 1992 to 2003, was addressed the following question by an editor: "With regard to the situation that was occurring in Europe, the Czech Republic and Slovakia separated in a democratic way, while Yugoslavia went up in flames in a bloody war. Do you know that Alija Izetbegovic, together with the president Kiro Gligorov, called for asymmetric Yugoslav federation, but Milosevic wanted a unitary state"?

<sup>28</sup> A. Jerković (ed.), *Sjećanja...*, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Vaclav Havel replied as follows: "I am familiar with these circumstances. I have followed them up and worked on them for a long time. I do not know whether there was a fair chance to maintain the Yugoslav state in a time period marked by manifoldness of opinions on its future. I think that the prospects were grim, since very few persons were in the mood to negotiate. Serbs had their large minority groups in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina alike, and many of them felt in Yugoslavia as if it were enlarged Serbia. However, already at that time, the international community was paying little attention to all these developments and, unfortunately, it was not able to effectively influence the turn of events in Yugoslavia".<sup>30</sup>

Wolfgang Schüssel, a chancellor of the Republic of Austria in the period between 2000 and 2007, commented in similar way on the situation in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the idea of the "assymetric federation", "President Alija Izetbegovic was favorably disposed towards the idea of survival of democratic and radically transformed Yugoslavia, where each people will have its appropriate dignified place. Together with the Macedonian Kiro Gligorov, he pondered the idea of 'asymmetric federation'. He was probably the last serious and fair politician who really believed in the possibility of ethnic groups living together in peace and harmony. However, there was no possibility of this thinking prevailing over in boiling Yugoslavia. So afterwards he supported the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina similarly to the independence of other ex-Yugoslav republics".<sup>31</sup>

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

There is abundant literature of international and local authors relating to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the majority of it mentions the Izetbegovic-Gligorov Platform as an important document in an attempt to identify a solution for survival of Yugoslavia within the existing borders. In general, the comments on the Platform are the same or similar. Some call the Platform a naive attempt; others call it an illusion for the contemporary political situation in the country, while some call it a desperate attempt of the two presidents in the face of the war that was undeniable. Still, all authors underline the importance of this Platform in the light of conscientious, brave and honest approach to addressing such an extremely complex problem.

Carrington Draft Contract dating from October 17, 1991,<sup>32</sup> an attempt to reach a general agreement on the situation in Yugoslavia, points to the fact that the Platform had conceptual potential, but it lacked practical applicability. Carrington Draft Contract offered a model of "asymmetric federation", in laymen's terms, "Yugoslavia à la

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>32</sup> Quoted by: M. Cupek Hamill, *Konferencija o miru u Jugoslaviji...*, p. 86, footnote 160. "Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: Arrangement for General Settlement" – the so-called Carrington Draft Convention, the Hague, 18 October 1991; S. Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents. From its Creation to its Dissolution*, Dordrecht 1994.

Carte”, i.e. that respective section of Yugoslavia is either taken away from it or annexed to it, depending on the demands of the republics. “Even though Carrington probably ‘borrowed’ his model from Gligorov and Izetbegovic, he himself was insistent on a demand that no republic may be recognized independence before an agreement was reached on what republic wants to join the core of the future state, and to what degree. Otherwise, recognition of the independence would represent a *fait accompli* for others, contribute to escalation of the conflict, and thus have disastrous consequences for the peace plan and the peace conference”<sup>33</sup> Ultimately, this project could not have been implemented for the same or very similar reasons to those related to the project formerly proposed by Izetbegovic and Gligorov.

An idea from the Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan came to the fore once more. Izetbegovic spoke on this matter as follows: “Many years later, at a summit of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe held in Sarajevo in the summer of 1999, one journalist compared this plan [Izetbegovic-Gligorov] to the idea of the [Stability] Pact, considering that both plans have the same starting point – putting in order relations between the countries of the Southeast Europe. Then the journalist asked Izetbegovic the following question: ‘If the idea of a step-like federation had been proposed by someone from Europe, if NATO stood behind it, or someone as an increasingly important author Joschka Fischer, would it have succeeded?’”<sup>34</sup> On a number of occasions, Izetbegovic and Gligorov provided numerous comments and recollections on the proposal of the “step-like or asymmetric federation”, and they were always perceived as regretting that the project, even in its somewhat modified version, had not been accepted. At least it would have been a way to avoid the war and the bloodshed that happened, what was actually what Izetbegovic had been worrying about all along.

The peoples of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia met the end of the 1980s with a long list of mutual differences. After the years of war (1991–1995), their mutual differences were on the increase. Slovenia achieved successful transition, entered the European Union, entered NATO, and introduced the Euro currency. Furthermore, it chaired the European Union, became a member of the Security Council, and introduced a remarkable level of human rights. Croatia became an EU member state on July 01, 2013. After wars of conquest aimed at bringing all Serbs together into a single state, Serbia passed the state framework of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and, in 2005, it was formed as the Republic of Serbia that awaits accession treaties to the EU. Montenegro is on the same path as Serbia. A great number of countries recognized the independence of Kosovo since 2008. The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, divided the country into two Entities, set up an international high representative (commissioner), turned it into a dysfunctional state, and still far from joining the European Union. Macedonia was successful in avoiding all conflict until 2000, when an open conflict erupted with the ethnic Albanian

---

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> A. Izetbegović, *Izabrana djela*, Vol. 4, p. 104.

minority. After the signing of the Ohrid agreement, Macedonia started to move towards a more functional state.

Until the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia successfully balanced between the Eastern and the Western military-political bloc, and since 2004, on its territory there was established a dividing line between the EU and the Western Balkans – a newly-forged name for the newly established states of the nineties, which still have not met required European standards. Since July 01, 2013, Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained in front of the borders of the European Union, “again in anticipation of better and brighter future.”

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cupek Hamill M., *Konferencija o miru u Jugoslaviji i raspad jugoslavenske federacije, 1991-1992* [The Peace Conference in Yugoslavia and the collapse of the Yugoslav federation], Zagreb 2008 (*Biblioteka Monografije iz Političkih Znanosti*).
- Huseinović A., Hadrović O.E., *Bosna ili smrt – dokumentarni film* [Bosnia or Death – Documentary], Haber Production, Sarajevo 2011, at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15uSRSvYeMo>>.
- Izetbegović A., *Izabrana djela*, Vol. 4: *Sjećanja. Autobiografski zapis* [Selected Works. Memories – autobiography], Sarajevo 2005.
- Izetbegović A., *Izabrana djela*, Vol. 10: *Alija Izetbegović – dostojanstvo ljudskog izbora*, Sarajevo 2005.
- Jerković A. (ed.), *Sjećanja na Aliju Izetbegovića* [Memories of Alija Izetbegovic], Sarajevo 2010.
- Jović D., *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Četvrtje Jugoslavije (1974-1990)* [Yugoslavia – the State which withered away. The rise, the crisis and the fall of the Fourth Yugoslavia (1974-1990)], Zagreb–Beograd 2003 (*Edicija REČ / Samizdat B92*, 22).
- Lučić I., ‘Bosna i Hercegovina od prvih izbora do međunarodnog priznanja’ [Bosnia and Herzegovina since the first elections up to international recognition], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2008).
- Lučić I., ‘Karadžorđevo: politički mit ili dogovor?’ [Karadjordjevo: A political myth or a deal?], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2003).
- Lučić I., *Uzroci rata – Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine* [Causes of War – Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1980 to 1992], Zagreb 2013 (*Biblioteka “Hrvatska Povijest”*).
- Nikolić K. (ed.), *Bosna i Hercegovina u vreme raspada SFRJ 1990-1992. Tematska zbirka dokumenata* [Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990-1992 collapse of Yugoslavia. Thematic collection of the documents], Beograd 2011 (*Biblioteka Jugoslovenska Kriza. Edicija Dokumenta*).
- Trifunovska S., *Yugoslavia through Documents. From its Creation to its Dissolution*, Dordrecht 1994.
- Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Stručno objašnjenje* [The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: expert explanation], Beograd 1975.
- Vukadinović R., ‘Postsocijalističke evropske zemlje u međunarodnim odnosima’ [Post-socialist European countries in international relations], *Politička misao*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1992).

---

Vera KATZ, Scientific Associate of the Institute of History – University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her PhD from University of Sarajevo is in social, politic, cultural and economic history after the Second World War. Her research has been focused on Bosnian and Herzegovinian history during the twentieth century. Some of her new bibliography units include: ‘Tito and National Question in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in *Facing the Past, Searching for the Future: The History of Yugoslavia in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, The Hague–Novi Sad–Sremska Kamenica, 2010, pp. 391-400; ‘Several Examples of the Ideological Use of “People’s Enlightenment” in Herzegovina 1945-1952’ in I. Lučić (ed.), *Hum and Herzegovina through the History*, Zagreb 2011, pp. 509-529; *Društveni i ekonomski razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine 1945-1953*, Sarajevo 2011; ‘Recent Developments in the Historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina Relating to the Ottoman Empire and their Impact on History Textbooks’ in J. Nielsen, *Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space*, Leiden–Boston 2012, pp. 249-269; ‘The Introduction of Workers Councils as a Form of Democratization of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Society during the 1950-ies’ in *Ibrahim Karabegović’s Memorial – Book of Proceedings*, Sarajevo 2013, pp. 313-343.