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THE POLICY OF THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH'S ADMINISTRATION TOWARD MACEDONIA

ABSTRACT At the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its geopolitical significance for the United States. The President George H.W. Bush Administration tried to support these political forces in the SFRY, which tended to maintain the multiethnic country, for example the new Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Ante Marković, and the leader of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov. The Americans opposed the independence aspiration of Croats and Slovenians, because they were afraid that it would lead to the ultimate falling apart of the country, which could influence the USSR. When the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia, the Bush Administration refrained from following European countries until April 1992, considering the consequences for Bosnia and Macedonia. The peaceful and democratic nature of Macedonia's independence placed the republic in a good position to be recognized by the United States. But Greece led a vigorous campaign against the recognition of Macedonia and the Administration of George H.W. Bush was worried that a conflict between Greece and Macedonia could spark a regional conflict in which Greece and Turkey, two members of the NATO, could clash against each other. One influence on the decision of the Bush Administration was the Greek lobby in the United States, which actively engaged in the Macedonian case and the 1992 presidential campaign. Concurrently, without establishing official diplomatic relations with Macedonia, the Americans engaged in the works of the CSCE mission and supported the preventive deployment of "blue helmets" to appease the domestic situation and contain neighbours from aggressive steps. "The Macedonian Problem," as the bloody war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remained unravelled by George H.W. Bush and became a problem for his successor in the White House.

Key-words: Yugoslavia, Macedonia, United States of America, Bush Administration, disintegration of Yugoslavia

During the Cold War, the Balkans were a place of strategic rivalry between the United States and the USSR. After 1945, there was an observable rise in Washington's interest in this region, as Americans attempted to weaken Moscow's influence through supporting Greece, Turkey and, after the Stalin-Tito conflict, Yugoslavia as well.¹ The Yugoslav federation played a particularly important role in these matters. After 1948, this country remained outside of the block of countries under Moscow's control and became the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, skillfully balancing between the competing blocks. The consecutive American Administrations attempted to exploit a geopolitical and strategic meaning of Yugoslavia in southern Europe, to influence Josip Broz-Tito to stay far from the USSR, to support the integrity of the multicultural country, and to present the Yugoslavian example as a model of "another way" for the countries dependent on the Kremlin.² As the American diplomat Warren Zimmermann observed, the policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia throughout the Cold War could be summarized in four words: "independence, unity, territorial integrity."³ The situation changed at the turn of the 80s and 90s of the twentieth century, when the rivalry between the two powers ended.⁴ According to researcher Renéo Lukic, "The end of the Cold War [...] signified a profound alteration of the balance of power in East-West relations, to the West's advantage. The dissolution of the bipolar international system in Europe was the most important event in international politics, opening the way for the creation of new states in East-Central Europe. This new wave touched the Balkans first."⁵

¹ For more, see: F.S. Larrabee, 'Washington, Moscow, and the Balkans: Strategic Retreat or Reengagement?' in idem (ed.), *The Volatile Powder Keg. Balkan Security after the Cold War*, Washington-Lanham 1994, pp. 201-208; S. Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1: *Origins*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 198-220.

² For more on Yugoslav-American relations during the Cold War, see: D.L. Larson, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963*, Washington 1979; J.R. Lampe, R.O. Prickett, L.S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II*, Durham 1990; L.M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat. The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, University Park 1997; T. Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici, 1948-1963*, Zagreb 2002 (*Povijesna Knjižnica*, 3); idem, *Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države, 1945.-1955.*, Zagreb 2003; D. Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961-1971*, Beograd 2012 (*Studije i monografije – Institut za savremenu istoriju (Belgrade, Serbia)*).

³ W. Zimmermann, 'Yugoslavia: 1989-1996' in J.R. Azrael, E.A. Payin (eds.), *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, Santa Monica 1996, p. 178.

⁴ A part of Yugoslavian communists had a positive attitude to the détente between East and West, and gladly saw the resignation from the Brezhnev Doctrine. It meant the minimalisation of danger for the security of Yugoslavia from the Soviets. See: D. Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away*, West Lafayette 2009, p. 27 (*Central European Studies*); A. Wachtel, Ch. Bennett, 'The Dissolution of Yugoslavia' in Ch. Ingrao, T.A. Emmert (eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies. A Scholars' Initiative*, West Lafayette 2009, p. 28 (*Central European Studies*).

⁵ R. Lukic, 'The Emergence of the Nation-State in East-Central Europe and the Balkans in Historical Perspective' in S.P. Ramet (ed.), *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 54-55.

Initially, Washington was surprised by the speed and scale of the events in Eastern Europe.⁶ In December 1989, the American president George H.W. Bush⁷ admitted that the United States was “shaken by the rapidity of the unfolding changes” in this region of Europe. Simultaneously, he changed his attitude toward the relations with Moscow, claiming that he would not undertake the actions aimed at weakening the position of the Russians.⁸ The United States pursued the careful “balance policy” toward Yugoslavia as well, in order to avoid destabilizing the situation in Europe.⁹ At that time, the United States became *de facto* the only superpower, but Bush started to consider the “new world order,” where “nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice” and “the strong respect for the rights of the weak.”¹⁰ According to Polish researcher Jadwiga Kiwerska, “America would assume the role of the world gendarme. It was expected by the allies and partners of Washington.”¹¹

At the end of the Cold War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) lost its geopolitical significance for the United States. At that time, the Americans did not need the SFRY as a buffer zone separating the West from the Warsaw Pact countries.¹² From Washington's perspective, more important concerns than the deepening crisis in the Yugoslav federation were, for example, the unification of Germany, the situation in the Soviet Union, in the Middle East, and even the situation in Poland and Hungary – countries certainly more open to changes and domestic reforms than the SFRY. At the same time, the representatives of the West feared that in the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, decentralists' movements could influence the development of the situation in the USSR. It could lead to a situation in which the “Yugoslavian example” would encourage the decentralists tendencies in the USSR and, as a consequence, end with its disintegration and perhaps even that of Czechoslovakia.¹³

⁶ G. Bush, B. Scowcroft, *Świat przekształcony*, trans.by J.J. Górski, Warszawa 2000, p. 58 *et seq.*; K. Michalek, *Mocarstwo. Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki 1945-1992*, Warszawa 1995, p. 479; G. Nycz, ‘Amerykańska polityka wspierania demokracji w Europie Wschodniej w latach 1989-1991’, *Przegląd Zachodni*, No. 1 (2010), p. 210.

⁷ Bush became the 41st President of the USA in January, 1989.

⁸ J.L. Gaddis, *Zimna wojna. Historia podzielonego świata*, trans. by B. Pietrzyk, Kraków 2007, p. 289.

⁹ G. Khudo, *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans. A US Foreign Policy Perspective*, Basingstoke 1996, p. 84.

¹⁰ See: ‘Toward a New World Order. President Bush. Address before a Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, September 11, 1990’, *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990), pp. 91-92; G. Bush, B. Scowcroft, *Świat przekształcony*, pp. 380-381. The main concepts of “new world order” were included in Bush's speeches in September 1990 and in January 1991. See: J. Zając, ‘Koncepcje polityki zagranicznej USA po zimnej wojnie’ in eadem (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie*, Toruń 2005, pp. 20-21.

¹¹ J. Kiwerska, ‘Czas wielkich zawirowań’, *Przegląd Zachodni*, No. 1 (2009), p. 7.

¹² See: W. Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers – America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why*, New York 1996, pp. 7-8.

¹³ See: P. Chmielewski, ‘Konflikty bałkańskie pierwszej połowy lat 90. XX w. w polityce Kremla’ in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton. Przeszłość – teraźniejszość – perspektywy. Studia i szkice*, Łódź 2011, p. 215 (*Balkany XX/XXI*); M.J. Zacharias, *Komunizm*,

The President Bush Administration tried to support these political forces in the SFRY, which tended to maintain the multiethnic country. This group of politicians consisted of the new Prime Minister of Yugoslavia (since March 1989), Croat Ante Marković¹⁴, and later also the leaders of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1990, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – one of the pillars of power in the SFRY – fell apart. In addition, between April and December 1991, the election took place and the winner parties mainly tended to increase the independence of the particular republics. Some of them even proposed secession from the federation.¹⁵

In Macedonia, in one of the poorest parts of the SFRY¹⁶, elections took place in November and December 1990.¹⁷ In January 1991, the newly elected Parliament (*Sobranie*) selected Gligorov as the president. He was a representative of the post-communist camp and a former close partner of Tito.¹⁸

The Americans observed the election in 1990 in the SFRY with anxiety. Zimmermann¹⁹, the US ambassador to Belgrade was aware that it could “bring democracy to birth, they helped strangle it in its cradle.”²⁰ The changes on the republican political scene were dangerous for the primary aim of the United States – maintaining

federacja, nacjonalizmy. System władzy w Jugosławii 1943-1991. Powstanie, przekształcenia, rozkład, Warszawa 2004, p. 546; R. Lukic, A. Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, Solna–New York 1996, p. 253.

¹⁴ J. Wojnicki, *Przeobrażenia ustrojowe państw postjugosłowiańskich (1990-2003)*, Pułtusk 2003, pp. 24-25; L. Benson, *Jugosławia. Historia w zarysie*, trans. by B. Gutowska-Nowak, Kraków 2011, p. 220 (*Historiai*). Marković tried to save the SFRY, which economic situation was tragic. More about the economic problems of the federation after the death of Tito, see: W. Walkiewicz, *Jugosławia. Państwa sukcesyjne*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 245-251 (*Historia Państw Świata w XX Wieku*); H. Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Oxford 1989, *passim*.

¹⁵ For more about the elections, see: K. Krysiel, ‘Jugosławia na rozdrożu. Wybory do władz republikańskich w 1990 roku’, *Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis*, No. 7 (2011), pp. 162-180; J. Wojnicki, *Proces instytucjonalizacji przemian ustrojowych w państwach postjugosłowiańskich*, Pułtusk 2007, pp. 269-284.

¹⁶ The decision regarding the creation of the Republic of Macedonia in the framework of the Yugoslav Federation was undertaken in 1943. Firstly, it functioned under the official name “the People’s Republic of Macedonia,” then “the Socialist Republic of Macedonia.” I. Stawowy-Kawka, ‘Republika Macedonii dzisiaj i jej miejsce na politycznej mapie Bałkanów’ in M. Pułaski et al. (eds.), *Z dziejów Europy Środkowej w XX wieku. Studia ofiarowane Henrykowi Batowskiemu w 90. rocznicę urodzin*, Kraków 1997, pp. 201-202 (*Varia UJ*, 374).

¹⁷ K. Krysiel, J. Wojnicki, *Partie i systemy partyjne państw byłej Jugosławii (Bośnia i Hercegowina, Chorwacja, Czarnogóra, Macedonia, Serbia, Słowenia)*, Pułtusk 2009, pp. 128-129.

¹⁸ M.J. Zacharias, *Komunizm, federacja, nacjonalizmy...*, p. 497; B. Szajkowski, ‘Macedonia: An Unlikely Road to Democracy’ in G. Pridham, T. Gallagher (eds.), *Experimenting with Democracy. Regime Change in the Balkans*, London–New York 2000, pp. 255-256 (*Routledge Studies of Societies in Transition*, 13). This experienced politician was called the “Fox of the Balkans”. See: J. Phillips, *Macedonia. Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*, London 2004, p. 53.

¹⁹ Zimmermann came to Belgrade in the spring of 1989. It was his second stay in Yugoslavia. Previously, he worked there as a diplomat from 1965-1968.

²⁰ W. Zimmermann, *Origins...*, p. 65.

the integrity of Yugoslavia. It is worth stressing that in the Bush Administration, there were many experienced diplomats who very well knew the Yugoslavian issues, including Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor to the president, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who was called "Lawrence of Macedonia."²¹ Indeed it was Eagleburger who had a decisive influence on the Bush Administration policy toward the SFRY.

In the spring of 1991, Yugoslavian politicians undertook several attempts to contain the disintegration of the country – ineffectively, unfortunately. It is interesting that the clashes between Belgrade and Zagreb did not inhibit the leaders of Serbia (Slobodan Milošević) and Croatia (Franjo Tuđman) from holding talks (in March and April 1991) about a possible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²² It was one of the factors that influenced the policy of the United States and its aversion to Croats and Serbs.

The last attempt to stop the dissolution of the SFRY was undertaken by the leaders of Bosnia and Macedonia. At the beginning of June 1991, Izetbegović and Gligorov proposed a transformation of the country into a "federation of countries."²³ This idea was eventually rejected. It became clear that in the nearest future the country would break down. Dark clouds gathered over the Yugoslavian federation.

In the first half of 1991, the representatives of the international community tried to address different initiatives in order to stop the process of disintegration of the SFRY. Those efforts, however, were ineffective.²⁴ The Americans played a minor role in these activities because the Bush Administration counted on the active role of European politicians.²⁵ Washington continued to maintain a verbal support for the government

²¹ In 1963, an earthquake led to the death of many citizens of Skopje and to the damaging and destruction of numerous buildings. At that time, Americans helped in the capital city of Macedonia and among the people who supported the victims was the young worker of the American embassy in Belgrade – Eagleburger. This diplomat returned to Yugoslavia as an ambassador in 1977-1981. For more, see: D. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace. Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*, New York 2002, p. 25; D. Doder, L. Branson, *Milosevic. Portrait of a Tyrant*, New York 1999, p. 69.

²² See: P. Żurek, 'Bośnia i Hercegowina w wizji politycznej Franjo Tuđmana (1991-1995)' in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton...*, pp. 16-17; I. Lučić, 'Karadordevo: politički mit ili dogovor?', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2003), pp. 7-36.

²³ For more, see: M.J. Zacharias, *Komunizm, federacja, nacjonalizmy...*, p. 534; M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, *Serbia pod rządami Slobodana Miloševića. Serbska polityka wobec rozpadu Jugosławii w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku*, Kraków 2008, p. 101; A. Izetbegović, *Inescapable Questions. Autobiographical Notes*, trans. by S. Rissaluddin, J. Izetbegović, Leicester 2003, pp. 93-94.

²⁴ For more, see: S. Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. The Critical Years, 1990-95*, New York 2002, p. 32 et seq. (*Advances in Political Science*); S.L. Szczesio, 'Międzynarodowe reakcje na rozpad federacji jugosłowiańskiej w 1991 r.' in K. Taczynska, A. Twardowska (eds.), *Poznać Bałkany. Historia, polityka, kultura, języki*, Vol. 4, Toruń 2012, pp. 109-116.

²⁵ Washington preferred to leave the "Yugoslavian problem" to the EC. The White House was more interested in the Middle East. Before the SFRY started to crumble, Secretary of State James Baker visited this region – eight times during the period from March to October 1991. See: R. Fiedler, 'USA wobec konfliktu izraelskopalestyńskiego 1991-2008. Instrumenty, możliwości, błędy i ograniczenia amerykańskiego mediatora', *Przegląd Zachodni*, No. 1 (2009), p. 201, note 5.

of Marković and stressed that the policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia comprised five elements: democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms and unity.²⁶

Almost, on the eve of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the chief of the United States diplomacy decided to visit the capital city of the SFRY. James Baker came to Belgrade on June 21, 1991. He met with the representatives of federal authorities, all republics, and Albanians from Kosovo. Baker himself confirmed that his travel was influenced by the danger of dissolution of the country, which could have “very serious consequences,” not only for Yugoslavia, but also for the whole of Europe.²⁷ As he wrote in his memoirs, Baker confessed that, with the exception of Gligorov and Izetbegović, he had been unable to persuade the majority of Yugoslavian politicians.²⁸ The leaders of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia confirmed a lack of support for the Gligorov and Izetbegović proposition. During the talks with Baker, the Macedonian president predicted a “bloodbath” if Croatia and Slovenia were to secede.²⁹ Despite the gravity of the situation, the Americans had little to offer to the representatives of the nations of Yugoslavia and were limited merely to verbal support for the unity of the country, for Prime Minister Marković, and for the proposition of the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.³⁰

Ultimately, on June 25, 1991 – despite Baker’s warnings – Croats and Slovenians declared independence. Soon the short war in Slovenia broke out, and then in Croatia. The secessionists’ actions of Zagreb and Ljubljana were quickly criticized by most countries. The diplomats of Western countries wanted the bloodshed to end in this part of Europe. The main power that took responsibility for the action was the European Community (EC).

The Americans did not want to engage directly into solving the dispute between the Yugoslavian nations. Baker claimed, “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”³¹ This attitude resulted from the lack of eagerness in Washington, but also was caused by the ambition of EC countries, which perceived the United States’ engagement with reluctance. They believed that the crisis should be resolved by Europeans.³² Luxemburg’s

²⁶ ‘U.S. Policy toward Yugoslavia. Statement Released by Department Spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, May 24, 1991’, *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 2, No. 22 (1991), p. 395.

²⁷ ‘Secretary of State Baker, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, June 21, 1991 (Excerpts)’, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1991), p. 73.

²⁸ J.A. Baker III (with T.M. De Frank), *The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*, New York 1995, p. 480. See also: R.L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s Account of U.S. Diplomacy in Europe, 1989-1992*, Washington–Baltimore 1997, p. 310.

²⁹ W. Zimmermann, *Origins...*, p. 136.

³⁰ One of the American diplomats David C. Gompert concluded: “Washington hoped that such a loose structure might satisfy the aspirations of most Slovenes (and thus Croats) and that the Serbs would see that it was the only way to hold Yugoslavia together”. D.C. Gompert, ‘The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars’ in R.H. Ullman (ed.), *The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars*, New York 1996, p. 126 (*Council on Foreign Relations Books*).

³¹ L. Silber, A. Little, *Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation*, New York 1997, p. 201.

³² One of the representatives of the Bush administration, cited by the *Financial Times* at the end of June 1991 said: “It’s not our problem, it’s an European problem”. J.B. Steinberg, ‘The Response of

foreign minister, Jacques Poos, noted, "This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans."³³

While the conflict in Slovenia was successfully ended after a short period of time, the war in Croatia lasted for several months and became a challenge for European countries. Meanwhile, in the shadow of these dramatic events, Macedonia also wanted to separate from the SFRY. On September 8, 1991, a referendum was carried out in which two-thirds of eligible voters participated,³⁴ and 95% supported the independence. Soon thereafter, the creation of the sovereign Republic of Macedonia was announced.³⁵ In November 1991, the *Sobranie* adopted a constitution, which later, together with the results of referendum, became a basic argument for Skopje to claim that this country fulfilled the necessary conditions to recognize its independence.³⁶

However, Greece stood against the independence aspirations of Macedonia. From the Greek point of view, the most controversial issue was the name of this Yugoslavian republic.³⁷ The Greeks also protested against the flag, emblem and records of the Macedonian constitution, which stated that Macedonia represents the interests of all Macedonians, both within the country and abroad.³⁸ The government in Athens feared possible territorial claims from the emerging country to Greek Macedonia, which belongs to Greece. "The Macedonian issue" was one of the key elements of Greek foreign policy in the last decade of the twentieth century.

International Institutions to the Yugoslavia Conflict: Implications and Lessons' in F.S. Larrabee (ed.), *The Volatile Powder Keg...*, p. 241. Furthermore, as stated D. C. Gompert: "unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the breakup of Yugoslavia was a problem with no good, feasible solutions". D.C. Gompert, 'The United States...' p. 140.

³³ Quoted in D.N. Gibbs, *First Do No Harm. Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Nashville 2009, p. 91.

³⁴ Macedonia was the third republic of the SFRY after Slovenia (December 1990) and Croatia (May 1991), where the referendum about the independence was held. It was boycotted by the Albanian and Serbians minorities which live in this republic.

³⁵ I. Stawowy-Kawka, *Historia Macedonii*, Wrocław 2000, p. 293; A. Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians. A History*, Stanford 2008, p. 266 (*Studies of Nationalities*). The first step to the independence of republic was adopted by parliament on January 25, 1991 Declaration of Sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. A. Koseski, 'Główne problemy transformacji w republice Macedonii (1991-2000)' in T. Godlewski, A. Koseski, K.A. Wojtaszczyk (eds.), *Transformacja systemowa w krajach Europy Środkowej, Wschodniej i Południowej 1989-2002. Wybrane problemy*, Bydgoszcz-Pułtusk, p. 152; D. Bechev, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia*, Lanham 2009, p. XXXVII (*Historical Dictionaries of Europe*, 68).

³⁶ J. Jackiewicz, 'Wstęp' in *Konstytucja Republiki Macedonii*, trans. by T. Wójcik, Warszawa 1999, pp. 6-7; Z.T. Irwin, 'Macedonia since 1989' in S.P. Ramet (ed.), *Central and Southeast European...*, p. 335.

³⁷ For more, see: I. Stawowy-Kawka, 'The Greco-Macedonian Dispute over the Name of the Republic of Macedonia', *Politeja*, No. 2 (2009), pp. 223-238; G.C. Papavizas, 'FYROM: Searching for a Name, and Problems with the Expropriation of History', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2010), pp. 86-103.

³⁸ I. Stawowy-Kawka, 'Republika Macedonii i Macedończycy w greckiej polityce po 1991 roku' in I. Stawowy-Kawka, M. Kawka (eds.), *Macedoński dyskurs niepodległościowy. Historia, kultura, literatura, język, media*, Kraków 2011, pp. 205-206; A.M. Brzeziński, *Grecja*, Warszawa 2002, p. 233 (*Historia Państw Świata w XX Wieku*).

The Greeks counted on cooperation with their neighbours, including Belgrade, which were displeased with the West, including with the United States. At the beginning of 1990s, Greek leaders, including Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis and the chief of diplomacy Antonis Samaras held several meetings with Serbian politicians to discuss the problem of Macedonian republic.³⁹ Although Belgrade officially dissociated itself from ideas such as the division of Macedonia and incorporating it into part of "Great Serbia," they mentioned it frequently to representatives of Serbian political parties such as Vojislav Šešelj and Vuk Drašković.⁴⁰ These plans, together with the fact that Macedonia was not recognized by the Serbs (and since April 1992 by the so-called new Yugoslavia⁴¹), could give rise to unrest within the government in Skopje. For this reason it was crucial for the leaders of the Republic of Macedonia to gain the international support for its international aspirations, and particularly from the United States.

The representative of the government in Skopje, including President Gligorov and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denko Maleski, went many times to the United States to influence the Bush Administration and American politicians to support the independence aspiration of Skopje. Nevertheless, Washington continued to support the idea of integrity of the Yugoslav Federation, as well as the necessity to engage in the dialogue between the nations of Yugoslavia. Even the results of the referendum from September 1991 did not influence the change of the American policy.⁴² Despite this fact, Macedonian politicians continued their efforts⁴³ and, at the beginning of 1992, the unofficial representation of Macedonia in Washington was created, with Ljubica Ačevska as its leader.⁴⁴ Moreover, the representatives of

³⁹ For more, see: J. Phillips, *Macedonia. Warlords...*, p. 54; T. Michas, *Unholy Alliance. Greece and Milošević's Serbia*, College Station 2002, pp. 47-56 (*Eastern European Studies*, 15).

⁴⁰ See: M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, 'Stanowisko serbskie wobec procesu tworzenia państwa macedońskiego w 1991 roku' in I. Stawowy-Kawka, M. Kawka (eds.), *Macedoński dyskurs...*, p. 226; D.M. Perry, 'Macedończycy, Bułgarzy czy sławofońscy Grecy? Problem świadomości narodowej', *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, No. 7-12 (1992), pp. 123-124; S. Biserko, *Yugoslavia's Implosion. The Fatal Attraction of Serbian Nationalism*, Oslo 2012, pp. 218-219 (*Fritt Ord*).

⁴¹ Macedonia and Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations at the beginning of 1996. D. Gibas-Krzak, A. Krzak, *Południowosłowiańska mozaika. Charakterystyka geograficzno-polityczna państw postjugosłowiańskich*, Szczecin 2010, p. 148 (*Świat, Konflikty, Pokój*).

⁴² See: 'U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #132, Tuesday, 9/10/91', at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1991/9109/132.html>, 3 January 2014.

⁴³ The head of Greece diplomacy accused the government in Skopje in February 1992 of hiring the American PR firm "Hill and Knowlton" to lobby "Macedonian issues" in the United States. 'Appendix IV. Address of Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras (Lisbon 17 Feb. 1992)' in A. Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question*, Aldershot 2000, p. 223.

⁴⁴ M.S. Lund, 'Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1999: From Containment to Nation Building' in B.W. Jentleson (ed.), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized. Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, Lanham 2000, p. 187 (*Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*); L. Luxner, 'Service to Country and Humanity: Macedonia's Ljubica Z. Acevska', Luxner News Inc., July 1997, at <http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=196>, 12 January 2014. Ačevska will later officially first ambassador of Macedonia in the US.

Macedonian emigrants⁴⁵ would engage themselves in the actions supporting the "Macedonian Issues". However, certainly they lacked the influence to the same extent as the Greeks.

In the meantime, at the turn of 1991 and 1992, also the Muslims and Croats living in Bosnia started to withdraw from the federation. Their aspirations met protest from the representatives of the different nation of "Yugoslavia in miniature" – Serbs.⁴⁶ These events remained in the shadow of fights in Croatia.

Different representatives of the international community were engaged in attempts to end the bloodshed, including Lord Peter Carrington (EC) and the envoy of the United Nations, former American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. In August 1991, the Council of Ministers of the EC created an arbitration commission, commonly known as the Badinter Commission.⁴⁷ It was intended to issue a legal opinion considering the situation in Yugoslavia. In their Opinion No. 1 in November 1991, the commission acknowledged that "the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution."⁴⁸

Meanwhile, in the beginning of November 1991, the Americans announced that they would not recognize as the legal power "rump" presidium of the SFRY,⁴⁹ which *de facto* was comprised of only the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina. At the same time, Ambassador Zimmermann claimed that the US should persuade Macedonia and Bosnia to participate in this vestigial presidium.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ An important role was played by the Macedonia Patriotic Organization, which existed in America since 1922. Its leader Ivan A. Lebamov confessed that he carried out for a long time activities in US in order to get recognition for Macedonia: "there were many trips to Washington, thousands of letters, hundreds of faxes and tons of paper", work with politicians, congressmen, generals, etc. For more on this subject see: J. Shea, *Macedonia and Greece. The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation*, Jefferson 2008, pp. 182-185.

⁴⁶ More about situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina see: K. Krysiel, *W cieniu Dayton. Bośnia i Hercegowina między etnokracją a demokracją konsocjonalną*, Warszawa 2012, p. 162 *et seq.*; D. Wybranowski, *Między niepodległością a dezintegracją. Bośnia i Hercegowina w XX i XXI wieku*, Szczecin 2011, p. 179 *et seq.*; S.L. Szczesio, 'Droga ku wojnie – sytuacja w Bośni i Hercegowinie w latach 1990-1992' in H. Stys, Sz. Sochacki (eds.), *Balkany w XX i XXI wieku. Historia, polityka, kultura. Materiały z konferencji "Poznać Balkany". Toruń, 29 maja 2009 roku*, Toruń 2009, p. 33 *et seq.*

⁴⁷ Her president was French lawyer Robert Badinter.

⁴⁸ 'Conference on Yugoslavia. Arbitration Committee. Opinion No. 1', *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 31 (1992), p. 1497.

⁴⁹ This institution was created during Tito's lifetime. After his death, the presidential office was removed and the entitlements were taken over by the presidium of the SFRY, consisting of eight persons. See: A. Zdeb, 'Ustrojowe przesłanki rozpadu Jugosławii. Wzorzec dla Bośni i Hercegowiny?' in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Balkany Zachodnie między przeszłością a przyszłością*, Łódź 2013, pp. 84-85 (*Balkany XX/XXI*, 3).

⁵⁰ B. Zieliński, 'Kalendarium procesów integracyjnych i dezintegracyjnych na ziemiach dawnej Jugosławii', *Sprawy Narodowościowe*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1993), p. 198; S.P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*, Washington 2006, p. 408; J. Glaurdić, *The Hour of Europe. Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, New Haven-London 2011, p. 264.

Autumn 1991 was the time of active German engagement and diplomacy, which intended to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia,⁵¹ in opposition to the opinions of many European partners and representatives of the United States and the United Nations. They feared the consequences of the agreement on the sovereignty of two former republics, on the territory of these parts of Yugoslavia, which were not embraced by war.⁵² The United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar expressed his anxiety saying, "I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region."⁵³ The Bush Administration sent a warning to the EC, claiming that recognition would "almost inevitably lead to greater bloodshed."⁵⁴ Washington tried to put pressure in this case also on Berlin. American officials warned that the too hasty recognition of Slovenia and Croatia could encourage other Yugoslavian republics to declare independence and might also be held as an example for secessionists in other parts of Europe.⁵⁵ In the same time, in order to put pressure on all sides of the Yugoslavian conflict and force them to concessions, on December 6, 1991, the Americans announced the imposition of sanctions for the whole of Yugoslavia, in order to bring about, as stated in a communiqué of the Department of State, "support of efforts to end the fighting and to obtain a political settlement."⁵⁶

The authorities in Washington were convinced that, with the help of France and Great Britain, it would be possible to subdue Berlin's position with respect to Zagreb and Ljubljana. Americans also counted on the support from another partner from NATO, namely Greece. After the rule of the left-wing party PASOK, which was inimical to America⁵⁷, Greece was under the leadership of Mitsotakis, who supported the Bush policy, e.g. in the Middle East. Therefore, Washington (like Berlin) favoured the Greek Prime Minister, fearing at the same time that the Macedonian problem might cause his down-

⁵¹ About the policy of Germany toward the Yugoslavia in that time, see: B. Koszel, *Mitteuropa rediviva? Europa Środkowo – i Południowo-Wschodnia w polityce zjednoczonych Niemiec*, Poznań 1999, pp. 249-266 (*Studia Europejskie*, 8); M. Waldenberg, *Rozbicie Jugosławii. Jugosłowiańskie lustro międzynarodowej polityki*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 88-96; P. Sokołowska, *Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa RFN wobec państw obszaru byłej Jugosławii w latach 1990-2005*, Toruń 2010, pp. 59-89.

⁵² More about the dangers linked with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia see: A. Orzelska, *Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990-1995*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 62-64.

⁵³ J. Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace. A Secretary General's Memoir*, New York 1997, p. 493.

⁵⁴ Quoted in M. Brenner, *The United States Policy in Yugoslavia*, Pittsburgh 1995, p. 7 (*Ridgway Papers*, 6).

⁵⁵ S. Kinzer, 'Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics', *The New York Times*, 9 December 1991, p. 18.

⁵⁶ D. Binder, 'U.S. Suspends Trade Benefits to All 6 Yugoslav Republics', *The New York Times*, 7 December 1991, p. 7; 'U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #182, Thursday, 12/6/91', at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1991/9112/182.html>, 2 January 2014. Few days before EC limited sanctions to two republics – Serbia and Montenegro.

⁵⁷ See: J. Bonarek et al., *Historia Grecji*, Kraków 2005, pp. 635-636; J.V. Kofas, *Under the Eagle's Claw. Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.-Greek Relations*, Westport 2003, p. 191 et seq.

fall. If that were to happen, the anti-American socialists might come to power again.⁵⁸ This was an important factor in the Bush policy toward Greece and Macedonia.

The United States considered at the beginning of December 1991 that the Greeks shared Washington's point of view and would stop the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC.⁵⁹ During the Mitsotakis' visit to the United States, after his talks with Bush in Washington on December 12, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Thomas Niles announced that, according to the situation in Yugoslavia, "the United States and Greece have very similar views. [...] We both agree that recognition of any of the republics of Yugoslavia's independent countries at this time would not be conducive or would not contribute to a successful resolution of the crisis."⁶⁰

Ultimately, Germany convinced the partners from the EC to its own plans, including Greece (in that case, the Germans agreed not to recognize the independence of Macedonia). On December 16, 1991, a meeting of the Minister Council of the EC took place, at which guidelines were adopted for considering the recognition of new countries in Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as a declaration on Yugoslavia, which, together with the opinions of the Badinter Commission, formed the basis of independence of certain Yugoslavian republics by the EC.⁶¹

Finally, on January 11, 1992, the Badinter Commission issued six opinions which, *inter alia*, opted for the recognition of Macedonia and Slovenia and reported some reservation to Croatia and Bosnia. These opinions were to be a supportive voice for the leaders of the EC. On January 15, 1992, the heads of diplomacy decided to recognize the independence of two of four countries: Slovenia and Croatia. The issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina was postponed at the suggestion of the commission to organize a referendum. The recognition of Macedonia – which, according to Opinion No. 6⁶², complied with all requirements – was blocked by Greece.⁶³ Commenting on the fact, the

⁵⁸ B. Koszel, *Mittleuropa rediviva?...*, p. 272; S.P. Ramet, 'The Macedonian Enigma' in S.P. Ramet, L.S. Adamovich (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia. Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*, Boulder 1995, p. 218 (*Eastern Europe after Communism*); L.H. Gelb, "Macedonia" for Greece', *The New York Times*, 12 June 1992, p. 25.

⁵⁹ *Interview with Thomas M.T. Niles*, 5 June 1998, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, at <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:9:/temp/~ammem_leol::>, 2 February 2013; A. Lubowski, 'Świat znów płaci za Bałkany', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 December 2011, p. 27.

⁶⁰ 'Press Briefing. Excerpt from a Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Ambassador Thomas Niles, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991', *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 2, No. 50 (1991), p. 897.

⁶¹ R. Caplan, *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia*, Cambridge 2005, p. 16; R. Lukic, 'The Emergence...', pp. 57-58.

⁶² For the full text, see: 'Conference on Yugoslavia. Arbitration Commission. Opinion No. 6. On the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States', *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 31 (1992), pp. 1507-1512.

⁶³ See: A. Orzelska, *Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii...*, pp. 68-69; I. Stawowy-Kawka, *Republika Macedonii i Macedończycy...*, p. 206. The first country to recognize the independence of Macedonia (as

press around the world stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia “have become victims of gameplay between the countries of Europe.”⁶⁴

As Niles put it, the Americans believed that without Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia would not want to remain in one with Serbia because they needed Zagreb and Ljubljana to maintain balance in the federation. For this reason, it was also a preferred solution for Washington to maintain a weak SFRY, rather than to see its disintegration.⁶⁵ At the end of 1991, the Americans also counted on the realization of plans establishing a confederation in Yugoslavia. In an interview from 1995, Niles recalled his talk with Gligorov in December 1991, when the representatives of the United States again tried to convince the president of Macedonia of their ideas. However, the experienced politician contented at the time that the realization of the idea without Slovenia and Croatia had no chance for success, and that he could not imagine a joint confederacy with Milošević, considering the disproportions of people of the Serbian and Macedonian republics. Niles claimed that, “We really didn’t have an alternative. EU recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia killed our policy, which was based on this confederation idea. We turned our attention to Bosnia.”⁶⁶

At the beginning of 1992, representatives of the authorities of Croatia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) signed the next truce, and in February 1992 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution No. 743 to send the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Croatia.⁶⁷ The “blue helmets” had to separate the warring parties in Croatia, yet the scenario of an outbreak of a new armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina became more and more real.

At the beginning of 1992, the Americans refrained from recognizing the independence of the SFRY and were observing diplomatic efforts carried out by international negotiators and restraining the Serbs’ and Croats’ inclinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶⁸ The “Macedonian problem” was also raised during the talks between the representa-

well as Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia), was Bulgaria, 15 January 1992. See more: R. Woźnica, ‘Miejsce Macedonii w polityce zagranicznej Bułgarii po 1991 roku’ in I. Stawowy-Kawka, M. Kawka (eds.), *Macedoński dyskurs...*, p. 234.

⁶⁴ S. Tekieli, ‘Allah łaskawy’, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 January 1992, p. 6.

⁶⁵ *Interview with Thomas...* About the necessity of recognizing new countries in a “package,” the former SFRY republics and the reluctance to stay in the “rump” Yugoslavia as Gligorov and Izetbegović said in talks with the UN envoy Vance in October 1991. See: J. Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace...*, pp. 482-483. It is worth remembering that the federation *de facto* scattered, while the subsequent republics announced independence. On December 20, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Marković handed in his resignation. S. Kovačević, P. Dajić, *Chronology of the Yugoslav Crisis (1942-1993)*, Belgrade 1994, p. 48.

⁶⁶ *Interview with Thomas...* Robert L. Hutchings, who at that time was working in National Security Council, also writes about the lack of alternatives for the German aspirations to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. R.L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy...*, pp. 314-315.

⁶⁷ W. Walkiewicz, *Jugosławia...*, pp. 259-260; *The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, New York 1996, p. 488.

⁶⁸ For more, see: S.L. Szczesio, ‘Problem uznania niepodległości Bośni i Hercegowiny w polityce Stanów Zjednoczonych’, in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Balkany Zachodnie...*, pp. 195-200.

tives of the Bush Administration and European policymakers, including the envoys of the Yugoslavian republics. At the end of January 1992, the Serbian politician and partner of Milošević, Borisav Jović, assured during the meeting with Eagleburger that Serbia did not oppose the withdrawal of Macedonia from Yugoslavia. Contemporaneously, he claimed that the information about the Serbian-Croatian plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina was a lie.⁶⁹ At the same time, Gligorov was in America trying to gain the support of Bush Administration representatives and members of Congress for the independence aspiration of Skopje. This politician stressed that sovereignty for his country and Yugoslavia would be “a chance for peace and stability in this region.” Gligorov also pointed out the negative consequences of American-imposed sanctions on Macedonia, and concurrently praised the work of American ambassador in Belgrade stressing that, “He’s one of the very good, maybe the best, knowledgeable men, and I think he will not be angry if I call him my friend.”⁷⁰

Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1992, Macedonia recalled its representative from the SFRY authorities, as well as Macedonian diplomats, who were representing the collapsing country from abroad.⁷¹ The government in Skopje successfully signed an accord with JNA, whose troops withdrew from the territory of the republic in March 1992.⁷² Macedonia’s withdrawal of the SFRY came about in a peaceful way, without the bloodshed, in contrast to Slovenia and Croatia.

At the end of February 1992, the Bush Administration decided to change the course of its policy toward the independence of the SFRY republics. Two factors determined the change: the danger of the outbreak of war in Bosnia and, on a minor scale, the threat for Macedonia. On February 17, 1992, Baker received a study prepared by Niles, which contained several variants of recognizing sovereignty of these countries.⁷³ In the meantime several countries recognized Slovenia and Croatia, when

⁶⁹ ‘Chronology, 1992 – January through March’, *Croatian International Relations Review*, Vol. 3, No. 8-9 (1997), p. 122. These kinds of talks about Bosnia and Herzegovina were carried out. See: R. Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition*, London 1997, p. 48; S.L. Burg, P.S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, Armonk 2000, p. 104.

⁷⁰ *National Press Club Morning Newsmaker – President Kiro Gligorov Of Macedonia*, 30 January 1992, database Lexis-Nexis Academic, at <<http://www.lexisnexis.com>>, 29 December 2013. Gligorov said also: “We have created a state entity which is called Macedonia [...] And I believe that [...] Mr. Zimmermann, will not be angry with me if I quote, “Then we also, the United States, have taken over the name of Americans. Because the United States of America is only a part of the American continent””. Ibid.

⁷¹ J. Jackiewicz, ‘Macedonia’, *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia*, Vol. 2 (1992), p. 119; D. Mirčev, *The Macedonian Foreign Policy, 1991-2006*, Skopje 2006, p. 163 (Edicija Eoni, 7).

⁷² A. Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians...*, p. 267; S. Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia. Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia*, Boulder 2011, p. 32. The withdrawing Yugoslavian units took most of the equipment. The Macedonian forces since that time took control over the whole country territory and started a buildup of a new army. At the beginning of 1993, it consisted of only 10 thousand poorly-equipped and trained soldiers. I. Stawowy-Kawka, *Historia Macedonii*, pp. 309-310; J. Gow, J. Pettifer, ‘Macedonia – Handle with Care’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 9 (1993), p. 387.

⁷³ J.A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy...*, p. 639.

Macedonia was recognized by just a few.⁷⁴ This document mentioned: "There is a real possibility that intercommunal violence could erupt at any time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recognition is seen as a way to reinforce stability." Moreover failing to recognize Bosnia and Macedonia "leaves them vulnerable to political pressures and activities of radicals". Contemporaneously, it was stressed that Gligorov and Izetbegović – "the two most reasonable actors in the Yugoslav crisis – have warned us they would be destabilized if the U.S. recognizes other republics but not theirs."⁷⁵ Niles concluded that America should recognize Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and see an agreement with the EC in the case of Macedonia. In his comment to this study, Eagleburger wrote: "How could we recognize Croatia and Slovenia, which had pursued independence unilaterally and in violation of Helsinki principles, and not recognize Skopje and Sarajevo, which had done so in a peaceful and democratic manner."⁷⁶ Not recognizing Bosnia and Macedonia, he noted, "could create real instability, which less than mature players in Serbia and Greece might decide to exploit."⁷⁷

Also staying in Belgrade, Zimmermann came to the conclusion that there was a need to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to stop the outbreak of an armed conflict. The ambassador's plans coincided with the remarks of National Security Council and Department of State.⁷⁸ For this reason in Washington, at the beginning of March 1992, an important decision was made that Americans would actively engage in actions aimed at recognizing the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. On March 5, 1992, Baker sent a letter to the leaders of European countries and to negotiators Carrington and Vance, proposing a meeting between the representatives of the EC and the United States concerning the Yugoslav republics.⁷⁹ He indicated the possibility of recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. A letter in this case was also sent to

⁷⁴ In mid-1992, Macedonian independence was recognized by Bulgaria, Turkey, Slovenia, Croatia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. D.M. Perry, 'Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 25 (1992), p. 35. The problems of Skopje at that time were signaled by the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Lubomir Frčkoski, who was cited by the media: "Serbia recognized the existence of the nation, but did not accept the Macedonian state, Bulgaria recognized Macedonia as a country, but did not recognize the existence of the nation, while Greece accepted neither the country nor the nation." Quoted in M. Kawka, P. Płaneta, *Dyskursy o Macedonii*, Kraków 2013, p. 131.

⁷⁵ J.A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy...*, pp. 639-640.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 640.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* For the whole time, the Americans in the case of Macedonia considered the opposition from Greece. President Bush spoke about it during his meeting at the White House with the Prime Minister of Bulgaria Philip Dimitrov on March 3, 1992. The American leader stressed then that Washington was analyzing the Athens attitude and did not want to act rashly. 'Meeting with Prime Minister Dimitrov of Bulgaria, March 3, 1992, Oval Office', George Bush Library and Museum – Texas A&M University, at <<http://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1992-03-03-Dimitrov.pdf>>, 12 November 2013.

⁷⁸ W. Zimmermann, *Origins...*, p. 192.

⁷⁹ J.A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy...*, p. 641.

Samaras, the chief of diplomacy of Greece. Baker pointed out, "We are, as friends and allies, very sensitive to your concerns about Macedonia." Americans stressed that the issue of Greece-Macedonia border was undisputed. Simultaneously, the Secretary of State underscored that the US would continue its efforts, jointly with partners from the EC, to achieve an agreement on the Macedonian issue. "Failure to recognize what is now known as Macedonia in a reasonably timely fashion will contribute to instability and encourage other Yugoslav elements to adventurism which could rapidly escalate to open conflict," noted Baker. It would not be in the interests of the neighbours of Yugoslavia, the EC nor the US.⁸⁰

The Europeans hesitated before making a decision about the issue of independence of the four republics. Chiefly, the Greeks protested against the Macedonian issue. The attitude of Greece influenced the outcome of the meeting of US-EC representatives where the politicians decided that the EC would recognize the independence of Bosnia (April 6), but Americans would recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia.

Due to the attitude of the representatives of Athens *vis-a-vis* the Macedonian problem, Baker said, "I backed off and devoted my energies to Bosnia."⁸¹ Finally, on March 10, the official statement on post-Yugoslavian republics was announced. Representatives of America and the EC had to jointly lead the actions toward the republics, which were pursuing independence. The Americans expressed agreement on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and on the coordination with the EC policy toward Serbia and Montenegro.⁸² The declaration of March 10 mentioned that "positive consideration should be given to the requests for recognition of the other two republics, contingent on the resolution of the remaining European Community questions relating to those two republics" (referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia). This record was introduced under Greek influence, passing over the name the Republic of Macedonia, which was controversial for the Greeks.⁸³ At the same time, President Bush informed Gligorov about the common arrangements of the EC and the US, stressing that America had good relations with Greece, a "friend and ally" of the United States.⁸⁴

The representatives of Greek authorities coaxed Washington into restraining from recognition of Macedonia. Prime Minister Mitsotakis convinced Eagleburger that he needed three months to prepare a public opinion in his country for a change in policy toward Skopje.⁸⁵ This time frame was to be one of diplomacy, but the representatives of the American administration were assured that after the recognition of Slovenia,

⁸⁰ 'Appendix V' in A. Tziampiris, *Greece...*, p. 235.

⁸¹ J.A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy...*, pp. 641-642.

⁸² 'US-EC Declaration on the recognition of Yugoslav Republics, 10 March 1992' in S. Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia through Documents. From its Creation to its Dissolution*, Dordrecht 1994, p. 520.

⁸³ A. Orzelska, *Wpływ konfliktu...*, p. 84.

⁸⁴ D. Mircev, 'Engineering the Foreign Policy of a New Independent States: The Case of Macedonia, 1990-6' in J. Pettifer (ed.), *The New Macedonian Question*, Basingstoke 1999, p. 211.

⁸⁵ M.S. Lund, 'Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia...', p. 188.

Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina “after the short break,” the United States would also recognize Macedonia.⁸⁶

The Athens reluctance and the rising Macedonian-Greece conflict had a significant impact on dampening the inclinations of American politicians and diplomats in the Macedonia issue alongside in one package with the other three SFRY republics. Washington feared that such decisive actions could intensify the dispute, which could easily be transformed into a regional conflict involving Greece and Turkey – two American allies from NATO. Representatives of the State Department were concerned about the possibility of Turkish intervention in Macedonia in the wake of war with Greece.⁸⁷ Taking this into account, and the necessity to keep good relations with its allies and to maintain stability in region, the Bush Administration decided to refrain from recognizing Skopje.⁸⁸ Paradoxically, “on paper” this country was an adequate candidate for a peaceful way out from the Yugoslav Federation and acceptance of its sovereignty by the United States. However, this step *de facto* threatened the interests of NATO and the EC in the region. As one of the members of the Bush Administration said, “The winner of the Badinter beauty contest didn’t even get a prize.”⁸⁹

An additional factor which shaped the US attitude was the activity of a significant and influential lobby of Americans with the Greek roots. Among them, special roles were played by Andrew Manatos (the former Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the Jimmy Carter Administration) and Representatives of Congress Micheal Bilirais and Paul Sarbanes (the long-standing member of US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).⁹⁰ It is necessary to stress that 1992 was an election year and Bush advisors needed to consider the votes of hundreds of thousands of citizens with ties to Greece. As acknowledged in an interview with Robert Rackmales, who was a deputy of Zimmermann, and who, after his departure, led the diplomatic post in Belgrade, “The Greeks were able to block any sensible policy not only on the part of the European community, but on the part of the United States which is hampered by the clout of the Greek lobby and the Greek members of Congress.”⁹¹

⁸⁶ D. Binder, ‘Concern for Greece Delays U.S. Move on Yugoslav Republics’, *The New York Times*, 28 March 1992, p. 4. The point of view was shared by the representatives of EC in January 1992 after Slovenia and Croatia independence recognition. In that time the head of Italian diplomacy Gianni De Michelis announced, that the issue of Macedonia was frozen for “short period of time” and it should not last longer than several weeks... D. Marolov, ‘The EU Policy towards the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. Special Emphasis on the EU Policy towards the Republic of Macedonia’, *Analytical Journal*, Vol. 4 (2012), p. 106.

⁸⁷ CIA also delivered information about such a danger. J. Phillips, *Macedonia. Warlords...*, p. 60.

⁸⁸ J. Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power. U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts*, Montreal 2010, pp. 80-81.

⁸⁹ M.S. Lund, ‘Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia...’, p. 188.

⁹⁰ J.W. Swigert, *Greek Roots to U.S. Democracy. Influence of the Greek-American Lobby over U.S. Policy toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Washington 1994, pp. 2-3; H. Rosin, ‘Greek Pique’, *The New Republic*, 13 June 1994, p. 11.

⁹¹ *Interview with Robert Rackmales*, 11 May 1995, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, at <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:7:./temp/~ammem_0Voj::>, 2 November 2013.

In the end, on April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized the independence of Bosnia. One day later, so did the United States. Americans in one package recognized Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as "sovereign and independent countries."⁹² The Bush Administration omitted the Republic of Macedonia⁹³, which according to Western researcher Jonathan Paquin, "was left in the diplomatic waiting room."⁹⁴ In addition, the United States lifted economic sanctions from the former three republics of the SFRY and from Macedonia as well.⁹⁵ The Americans also reaffirmed their support for the actions undertaken by the UN and the EC to achieve the aims of the peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia.⁹⁶ Washington counted on solving the Macedonian-Greek problem on European soil. Nevertheless, Athens still blocked Macedonia's recognition on the EC forum, and from April 1992, for the US, the most critical issue in its policy became war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Americans, like other Western nations, were surprised by the scale of the fighting that had broken out in Bosnia. Very quickly they contented Serbia as the main perpetrator and supporter of Bosnian Serbians. The US believed that without Belgrade aid for the army of general Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian conflict would quickly end.⁹⁷ In the meantime, "on the rubble" of the two SFRY republics (Serbia and Montenegro), on April 27, 1992, a new nation was formed: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which was called "new" or "third" Yugoslavia.⁹⁸ In mid-May, 1992, the Americans recalled ambassador Zimmermann from Belgrade as a sign of protest against the Serbian aggression in Bosnia,⁹⁹ while on May 30, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro – the "new" Yugoslavia (Resolution No. 757).¹⁰⁰ Many times Washington expressed deep concern about the development of the situation in the Bosnian country. In August 1992, president Bush said, "Like all Americans, I am

⁹² 'President Bush's Statement (on the Recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia), Washington, 7 April 1992' in S. Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia through Documents...*, p. 521.

⁹³ "We will continue to work intensively with the European Community and its member states to resolve expeditiously the outstanding issues between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, thus enabling the United States to recognize formally the independence of that republic as well." Ibid.

⁹⁴ J. Paquin, 'Managing Controversy: U.S. Stability Seeking and the Birth of the Macedonian State', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2008), p. 445.

⁹⁵ The sanctions were still maintained against Serbia and Montenegro.

⁹⁶ 'President Bush's Statement...', p. 522.

⁹⁷ W. Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower. United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95*, Basingstoke 1997, p. 159. For more about the armed forces of Bosnian Serbs see: D. Wybranowski, 'Armia Republiki Serbskiej w Bośni (1992–1995) – geneza, struktura i pierwsze lata istnienia' in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Balkany Zachodnie...*, pp. 153-178.

⁹⁸ E. Bujwid-Kurek, *Państwa jugosłowiańskie. Szkice politologiczne*, Kraków 2008, p. 151; W. Szczepański, 'Główne problemy polityczne jugosłowiańskiej Republiki Czarnogóry w okresie od kwietnia 1992 r. do marca 1999 r.' in H. Stys, Sz. Sochacki (eds.), *Balkany w XX i XXI wieku...*, p. 44. It is interesting that the first foreign politician who came to Belgrade after the creation of the new country was Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis. M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, *Serbia pod rządami...*, p. 141.

⁹⁹ W. Zimmermann, *Origins...*, p. 208.

¹⁰⁰ R. Lukic, A. Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals...*, p. 291; W. Walkiewicz, *Jugosławia...*, p. 261.

outraged and horrified at the terrible violence shattering the lives of innocent men, women, and children in Bosnia. [...] This is, without a doubt, a true humanitarian nightmare.”¹⁰¹

Macedonia remained in the background of these dramatic events. Representatives of the Bush Administration stressed the necessity to continue the policy of refraining from recognition of this country, despite the prolonged time in which Skopje and Athens had to reach a deal on contested issues. Americans did not want to put too much pressure on Prime Minister Mitsotakis. Concurrently, the Greeks intensively campaigned abroad against Macedonia, using the media and the press (including in the US, Canada and Australia) and distributing material in English, and printed in Greece, which presented their own point of view.¹⁰² What is more, Greek emigrants organized a manifestation consisting of several thousand people in Washington at the end of May. In April and May 1992, they bought a full-page advertisement in *The New York Times*, warning about the radicals from Macedonia and their territorial demands against Greece.¹⁰³

At that time the Republic of Macedonia found itself in a difficult situation. Its leaders were afraid of spreading the armed conflict on the territory of Macedonia or of the division of the country as a consequence of the actions of its neighbors,¹⁰⁴ particularly Athens and Belgrade. The economy of this poorest republic of the SFRY had difficulties. The embargo imposed on Serbia, its main trade partner, as well as the economic blockade from Greece were the significant blows on Skopje.¹⁰⁵ Refugees escaping from war-torn areas in the crumbling Yugoslav Federation constituted an additional burden.

¹⁰¹ ‘Containing the Crisis in Bosnia and the Former Yugoslavia’, *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 3, No. 32 (1992), p. 617.

¹⁰² J. Shea, *Macedonia and Greece...*, pp. 2-4.

¹⁰³ D.M. Perry, ‘Macedonia...’, p. 40; J. Paszkiewicz, ‘Problem macedoński w przetargach politycznych na Bałkanach w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu XX wieku’, *Balkanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia*, Vol. 15 (2009), p. 183; S. Evans, ‘Greek Americans Protest New Republic’s Use of “Macedonia”’, *The Washington Post*, 1 June 1992, p. 20. In these articles warnings were included about a “dangerous ticking time bomb” and threat of war in the Balkans in which the United States could become involved. It was stressed that Greece, “the mother of democracy,” has always stood by America’s side. It called on President Bush to stop “remnants of Communist expansionism” to create a source of conflict for decades to come and “not to discount the concerns of the Greek people and the three million Greek-Americans who stand united on this issue.” See: J. Shea, *Macedonia and Greece...*, pp. 4-5, 186.

¹⁰⁴ Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia/Yugoslavia were called “four wolves”. S. Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia...*, p. 33; A. Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail. Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*, Syracuse 2000, p. 71 (*Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution*). Gligorov admitted in interview in 2001 that, “We were always afraid of Milošević’s Serbia. We never considered Greece a real threat because we knew that she was constrained in her actions by her membership in the European Union and above all in NATO”. T. Michas, *Unholy Alliance...*, p. 56.

¹⁰⁵ For more, see: I. Stawowy-Kawka, *Historia Macedonii*, pp. 304-305; E. Bujwid-Kurek, ‘Implikacje konfliktu postjugosłowiańskiego dla regionu bałkańskiego’ in B. Klich (ed.), *Ogniska konfliktów – Bałkany, Kaukaz*, Kraków 2000, pp. 41-42 (*Zeszyty Fundacji “Międzynarodowe Centrum Rozwoju Demokracji”*, 44); R.A. Panagiotou, ‘Greece and FYROM: the Dynamics of Economic Relations’, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2008), pp. 230-231, 234-238.

In addition, the problem existed with the attitude of minorities living in this country, notably Albanians and Serbs.¹⁰⁶ Of course, there was also the unlikely scenario that Macedonia would start a war with Greece.¹⁰⁷ However, taking into consideration different variants of the neighbours' engagement in the military actions on a broader scale, the Bush Administration until the end of its term decided not to escort this country "out of diplomatic waiting room." The United States had to count on the opinion of its partners from the NATO and avoid risking the spread of an armed conflict from Bosnia throughout the entirety of the Balkans,¹⁰⁸ and expected, as one of the representatives of the Department of State wrote in a letter in Autumn 1992, "close and friendly relations between Greece and Macedonia as the important factor of stabilization and development on the Balkans."¹⁰⁹ This did not signify the lack of American activity on the Macedonian issue. This topic frequently discussed in talks between the highest authorities of the United States and European politicians.

Washington also actively participated in the creation of the preventive mission of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),¹¹⁰ which was responsible for monitoring the situation in Macedonia. It was created in September 1992.¹¹¹ In order to avoid a controversial name of the country, it functioned as "Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje." Its first chief was an experienced American diplomat, Robert Frowick.¹¹² Unofficially, this mission played the role of "multinational embassy" and helped in the activities of nongovernmental organizations.¹¹³ It was important for Skopje because it symbolized an international engagement in this country, which was recognized only by few countries.

¹⁰⁶ For more, see: I. Stawowy-Kawka, 'Republika Macedonii dzisiaj...', pp. 202-206.

¹⁰⁷ Despite some actions from Serbian politicians there also existed a small probability of armed conflict with Belgrade, which was occupied by wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and did not need a new, southern front. D. Marolov, *Republic of Macedonia Foreign Policy. Diplomacy in the Middle of the Balkans*, Newcastle 2013, p. 33, 43-44.

¹⁰⁸ Some politicians feared that war in Macedonia might turn into a third Balkan war. See: A. Tziampiris, *Greece...*, p. 51.

¹⁰⁹ J. Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power...*, p. 82.

¹¹⁰ In autumn 1992 the CSCE also sent missions to Kosovo, Sandžak and Vojvodina. See: R. Zięba, 'Funkcjonowanie paneuropejskiego mechanizmu bezpieczeństwa KBWE/OBWE', *Studia Europejskie*, No. 3 (1998), pp. 96-97; B. Zieliński, 'Kalendarium...', p. 215.

¹¹¹ I. Stawowy-Kawka, 'Albańczycy w Republice Macedonii w latach 1991-2000 – podstawowe problemy' in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Balkany Zachodnie...*, p. 440; R. Zięba, 'Funkcjonowanie...', p. 97. For more, see: P. Grudziński, *KBWE/OBWE wobec problemów pokoju i bezpieczeństwa regionalnego*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 244-247.

¹¹² A. Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail...*, p. 135. He was accompanied in this mission by among others, the representative of a Department of State Marshall Freeman Harris. J. Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power...*, p. 98; *Interview with Marshall Freeman Harris*, August 1993, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, at <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfidp:1:/temp/~ammem_0Voj::>, 12 March 2013.

¹¹³ See: A. Mitić, 'The Impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Macedonia 1991-1993', *Crossroads. The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2011), p. 23.

Throughout the entire period of the Bush Administration activity, Americans did not have an official diplomatic representation in Macedonia. The United States embassy in Belgrade was responsible for contacts with this country. As Rackmales recalled, he travelled to Macedonia every few weeks and had personal meetings with president Gilgorov. Also staying in a hotel in Skopje was an unofficial American representative who mainly focused on observing and reporting on the situation in the country. Rackmales describes him and his work in the following words: "He would either fax or come up from time to time and write reports. He was an outstanding officer, and that was very useful"¹¹⁴

Finally, the "Macedonian problem" was not used during the election campaign by competing rivals, in contrast, for example, to the war in Bosnia.¹¹⁵ The Democrats and their presidential candidate Bill Clinton assumed a similar position to the incumbent administration. However, they stressed that the Greeks' reservations about the name of Macedonia should be taken into account.¹¹⁶

In the second half of 1992, representatives of the American administration, jointly with European partners, carried out talks about the necessity to contain the spreading of the war on the Balkans (including Macedonia and Kosovo). It was the topic of talks between the US president and Prime Minister of Great Britain John Major in December 1992.¹¹⁷ Americans feared that at the end of 1992, Belgrade could exploit the favourable situation, when the US would be plunged into elections, to carry out actions against Kosovo or Vojvodina. For this reason, the Bush Administration, at the end of its term, attempted to be more assertive than earlier in its term.¹¹⁸ In December 1992, Eagleburger, who replaced James Baker as Secretary of State, published a list of politicians and the military, mainly Serbian, responsible for crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and warned that in case of a conflict in Kosovo, Washington would be determined to stop Belgrade.¹¹⁹

One of the last elements of the Bush Administration's engagement in the "Macedonian problem" was its support for the concept of the preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces¹²⁰ – the first time in history of the United Nations. In December

¹¹⁴ Interview with Robert Rackmales...

¹¹⁵ See: S.L. Szczesio, 'Droga do Dayton – zaangażowanie dyplomacji amerykańskiej w końcowej fazie wojny w Bośni i Hercegowinie' in P. Chmielewski, S.L. Szczesio (eds.), *Bośnia i Hercegowina 15 lat po Dayton...*, p. 178; M. Wintz, *Transatlantic Diplomacy and the Use of Military Force in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York 2010, p. 57.

¹¹⁶ See: D. Oberdorfer, 'Macedonia Appeals for Recognition, Aid', *The Washington Post*, 10 November 1992, p. 24.

¹¹⁷ 'Remarks with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom and an Exchange with Reporters', 20 December 1992 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. 1992-93, George Bush*, Book 2: *August 1, 1992 to January 20, 1993*, Washington 1993, p. 2205.

¹¹⁸ See: D. Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, New York 1995, p. 91.

¹¹⁹ J. Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, London 1997, p. 211; R. Lukic, A. Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals...*, p. 319; D.C. Gompert, 'The United States...', p. 136.

¹²⁰ W. Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower...*, p. 158.

1992, the Security Council of the UN decided to send to Macedonia a UNPROFOR unit, which came to the country at the beginning of 1993.¹²¹ The American forces participated in this pioneer mission. The decision about sending American soldiers would be undertaken by Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, who on January 20 became the forty-second President of the United States of America. The Clinton Administration was forced to deepen the engagement in the Balkans, but one of the elements of its policy would be an official recognition of Macedonia independence in 1994.¹²²

* * *

One of the biggest challenges for the international community at the beginning of 1990s, in the moment of the end of the "Cold War", became an issue of dissolution of Yugoslav Federation. The administration of George H.W. Bush pursued the project of building a "new world order" and initially left the problem for the Europeans. For a long time, Washington had hoped for the maintenance of a single, united Yugoslavia and, in order to achieve its aim, lent support to Gligorov and Izetbegović to make only modest modifications to the functioning of the SFRY. Americans opposed the independence aspiration of Croats and Slovenians, because they were afraid that it would lead to the ultimate falling apart of the country, which could influence the USSR. When the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia, the Bush Administration refrained from following European countries until April 1992, considering the consequences for Bosnia and Macedonia. Although, "on paper" it appeared that the Republic of Macedonia was a perfect candidate to have its sovereignty accepted, as a result of Greek actions, Washington and countries of the European Community placed Skopje in a "diplomatic waiting room." The eyes of the international community were focused on the drama in multiethnic Bosnia. Americans were concerned that the recognition of Macedonia could lead to the weakening or even overthrow of the rules of the pro-American Prime Minister Mitsotakis and transforming the "conflict about a name" into a serious regional conflict, which might engage partners from NATO: Greece and Turkey. One influence on the decision of the Bush Administration was the Greek lobby in the United States, which was actively engaged in the Macedonian case and the 1992 presidential campaign. Concurrently, without establishing official diplomatic relations with Macedonia, the Americans engaged themselves in the works of the CSCE mission and supported the preventive deployment of "blue helmets" to appease the domestic situation and contain neighbours from aggressive steps. "The Macedonian Problem," as the bloody war in Bosnia, remained unsolved by Bush and became a problem for his successor in the White House.

¹²¹ For more, see: H.J. Sokalski, *Odrobina prewencji: dorobek dyplomacji prewencyjnej ONZ w Macedonii*, trans. by A. Kozłowski, Warszawa 2007, p. 141 *et seq.*; *The Blue Helmets...*, p. 538 *et seq.*

¹²² However, under the name accepted by the UN, *i.e.*, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). America recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its name only during the term of George Bush Junior, in 2004. See: J. Paquin, *A Stability-Seeking Power...*, pp. 91-96; G.C. Papavizas, 'FYROM...', pp. 101-102.

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