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EXPERIENCING FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

ABSTRACT

In what follows I discuss the problem of constructing individual identity through experiencing freedom and responsibility. Self-determination and self-realization are important elements that complement human identity. On the way to self-realization, however, fear and anxiety occur due to permanent and global transformations of the cultural, social and political environment. It evokes a reluctance to make decisions, to take the risk of being oneself, the risk that comes in conjunction with meeting another person. Fear affects the perception of oneself and others. Thus, it is necessary to look at this phenomenon through the prism of experiencing one's own freedom and responsibility for oneself and others, and to try to inculcate in a young person the desire to overcome this feeling of fear and anxiety often experienced in the modern world. The aim of philosophical pedagogy is to awaken in a person the desire to be oneself despite these feelings. It is a very difficult but essential challenge. Therefore, based on Tischner's and Bollnow's philosophy of encountering the other, I examine the significance of the impact of openness towards oneself and others in the upbringing process.

Keywords: Freedom, responsibility, self-realization, meeting, anxiety, education

Słowa kluczowe: wolność, odpowiedzialność, samorealizacja, spotkanie, lęk, wychowanie

The human condition has been increasingly marked by anxiety and fear of the future. This is the result of the changing political, social and cultural realities and a lack of economic stability. The process of change also arises from the globalization process. The feeling of threat affects our development. Anxiety and fear influence our perception of ourselves and the other. They affect our self-fulfillment. Self-determination and self-fulfillment are important elements that complement human identity. Anxiety also influences the process of education, especially education systems.

In *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik* O.F. Bollnow draws attention to the link between philosophy and education. He concentrates on the issue of crisis in light of contemporary pedagogy. He addresses the question of the human being's emotional and intellectual formation through the conceptual lens of the impact of existential philosophy on pedagogy.¹ Philosophy anticipates the consequences of certain phenomena before they arise in the real world.

Contemporary philosophy, unlike in historical traditions, focuses on experience. It is not only about making good things happen, but about human existential survival in the first place. Phenomenology and hermeneutics are philosophical perspectives which focus on the subject, the *subiectum*, as well as on the world that appears to the individual, including the others it encounters.

Apart from explaining how the world appears to us empirically, it is our interpretation and making sense of it that plays a key role. The interpretation that always flows from our subjective feelings, our individual experience of the world and the values that we pursue together bring a different meaning to education. We already see the special role of the 'master' and the student in Plato's dialogues. Both seek the truth by asking questions.

Currently, philosophical investigation it is not only about the truth itself, but also about experiencing it. The master teaches the pupil, but also experiences and feels a relationship with the truth and with the pupil with whom it reveals the secrets of the world. Apart from the truth, the problem of freedom and responsibility appears in the contemporary world. The concept of freedom has been gaining in importance since the times of Descartes. This also applies to the notion of responsibility in the 20th century, which replaces the concept of justice. In Poland, these two concepts played an important role during the political transformation after 1989. However, it was 1980 and emergence of the Solidarity movement which became a special experience in this regard. The experience of social solidarity binds itself in a special way with responsibility, freedom and truth. These events had an impact not only on political and economic changes, but also on culture and education. From the perspective of German idealism, the problem of 'I (myself)' and the internalization of what can be described in terms of 'Not-I (not-myself)' emerged.

The Polish contribution to thought concerns the question of identity in that it is based on dialogue between subjects regarded as equals. Today we can see the experience

¹ O.F. Bollnow, *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 21.

of solidarity becoming more and more often deformed and distorted. However, it is precisely this experience that determines the meaning of education.

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the issue of one's own personal freedom, and also one's responsibility for oneself and for others, as the most important challenge for education.

Educational programs often refer to shaping attitudes and skills as well as acquiring knowledge, while forgetting about the willingness and spontaneity that enable us to solve problems. Current philosophy emphasizes the role of experience of the self and sensing values in our consciousness.

Assessment of effects and comparison of skills can destroy the real meaning of education, which – in addition to knowledge – should aim to develop in a person the ability to grasp the full complexity of a situation and to help in making autonomous decisions and being responsible for them, and for the relationship between one person and another, which requires one to go beyond the self, beyond the 'I'.

Education is based on empathy and openness to others, which should be grounded in a willingness to be open to the challenges that flow from the world. Meanwhile, the threat to openness is the feeling of fear in confronting the world. How do we motivate people and how are we willing to take on the challenges that the modern world brings? How do we learn to gain courage in an ever-changing world?

Let us then return to the question of identity posed by German idealism, one presented from the anthropological and ontological perspectives. However, it also touches upon what is the basic aspiration of modern man: to identify with the group, but while drawing boundaries drawing between oneself and others. Belonging to a subculture, being part of a community while emphasizing distinctiveness, is a good example of this. A similar element emerges here, one which philosophy sees in the concept of freedom and responsibility. It arises from the feeling of unity, of being in a community, while remaining distinct, as a separate individual which feels the need for proximity to others.

1. IDENTITY

Education is designed to not only teach, to develop skills, but it must first of all accompany a person in their psychophysical development, their adolescence, the intellectual process that is to lead to self-realization. One of the important elements of adolescence is the relationship to values, to goodness. Hitherto, philosophy has presented the good and the necessity of its implementation abstractly, from the perspective of ideals, while nowadays the good appears in approaching the person, their individual experience, which is an essential part of the experience of oneself, of another person, and of the surrounding world. By experiences of values we realize ourselves, we complement each other.

Values and their experience imply a question about ourselves, about who we are, as values open up to us. One is not the outside world and other people but becomes so through an opening to oneself. The problem of the modern individual lies in their

escapism of the world and the self. Escapism is the result of fear, a fear of oneself. The goal of education is to learn perseverance and not to seek reciprocation for any good done. The task of pedagogy is to awaken the willingness of people to think and act.²

The permanently changing world and fear of it influences our consciousness, which shows our attitude not only towards the exterior world, but also our search for our own identity. For the modern person, it is not enough to have an objective good; it is primarily about the experience of values that can be seen and touched. The individual is afraid of the world, but one also needs to experience values, which strengthens the power of survival and gives meaning to our existence.

Concern about the other and teaching them principles based on mutual trust that arises in the relationship is very much needed by the individual, but it is also a civic virtue of a democratic state, an open state. In modern societies, however, openness to another presents many problems, because we can observe an increasingly stronger tendency towards individualism, which makes dialogue impossible. It is characterized by focusing on oneself, closing off the self, and a tendency towards collectivism, which means loyalty to the group, which we identify as separate from ourselves (while simultaneously disregarding ourselves). Attitude towards a tribal bond may, although it does not have to, cause one to fail to realize values and draw benefits from them, both for themselves and for the group with whom they identify.

The solution to this problem is to awaken freedom in the individual, demonstrating the strength of interpersonal relationships, focusing on the experiences of goodness and empathy for others. My identity and self-realization, my self-identification arise from my experiences of otherness and openness to another human being. Only in this relationship can I find myself through the choices of others who ask me for help. There are many people, but only I have been chosen to respond to the cry for help that is being directed to me by others. Only under my responsibility can I find myself and my freedom.³

2. THE EXPERIENCE REFLECTED IN FREEDOM

In the process of education, philosophy and pedagogy are involved in the reestablishing a sense of identity in the human being, a sense of bond, of a community. This is not only an attempt to look for an external identity (understood as belonging to a group), but also an answer to the question about one's own identity, which characterizes internal life. One of the essential features that accompanies the search for one's own identity is **freedom**, which can be understood variously as **spontaneity, independence, autonomy, sovereignty, or transparency**.

² J. Tischner, *Myslenie według wartości*, Kraków 1993, p. 516.

³ Idem, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, Kraków 1998, p. 187.

2.1. Spontaneity

Heidegger noticed freedom as spontaneity in Kant's *Critique of pure reason*. Kant presents spontaneity the basis on the possibility of recognition. It is the possibility of perceiving what let us see in a phenomenon. Man perceives thanks to the form of intuition and giving them concept at the level of pure reason. The opportunity to recognition and comprehensive in the concepts as well as to create the same images and concepts is characterized by the spontaneous thinking. Spontaneity is shown from the perspective of the question of how cognition is possible, how it is possible to perceive what it allows us to see in a phenomenon. Man experiences phenomena by perceiving them and giving them concepts on the level of pure reason. The possibility of perceiving and putting phenomena into concepts and creating images and concepts based on them demonstrates the spontaneity of thinking.

Not only through the creation of concepts, but also referring to the principles and laws that people try to understand, freedom appears in the sense of spontaneity. Kant also presents freedom with regard to causality. "Causality according to laws of nature" and "causality through freedom", and he assumes that there are principles of nature and of freedom.⁴ The freedom from freedom begins a series. Kant states that both causalities are unopposed to each other, noting that causality does not exist outside of the self but is the result of the need to unite reason, which connects many representations. Causality means an attempt to determine the cause and effect that we perceive in events that have already occurred.

It needs to be emphasized, however, that spontaneity with regard to values and the educational process looks different. Reflecting on empathy and being for another requires spontaneity in making decisions that are not a consequence of someone else's actions or anything else. Spontaneity means to be free to decide about oneself, and it its will. Spontaneity implies that social interaction begins with me and my freedom. Spontaneity is the result of being open to what is new. It is also about assuming responsibility for one's actions. Spontaneity is at the antipodes of what in the language of culture is called the phenomenon of mimetic behavior, repetition. How to educate a person to make spontaneous and reasonable decisions?

Besides freedom in the sense of spontaneity, shown in so-called transcendental freedom, there is also a practical freedom, which is expressed by the word 'autonomy'.

2.2. Autonomy

The concept of freedom in the sense of autonomy means the necessity of determination of free will by moral imperative. By rejecting the motives which come from sensuality and by following the moral law, a person determines their will, and the fundamental problem becomes the action and will of one to realize moral law. Here, autonomy is interpreted as the opposite of heteronomy. Autonomy means self-determination, while heteronomy means dependence in making decisions.

⁴ I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hamburg 1998, pp. 548-549.

In Kant's philosophy, the autonomy of practical reason is understood as self-determination, decision-making without affecting the senses. Kant distinguishes the external world perceived through the senses from the moral world, on which the sensual has no influence. In terms of pure theoretical reason, the categories of time and space that lead to showing the world through the prism of causality become important. Kant and Heidegger reflect on combining these perspectives. Kant explains the tension between the causality of the world and freedom. True dissonance, however, is seen between the laws of nature and moral laws. Kant sees freedom through the act of free will, which means that we can talk about freedom through the prism of realizing the moral law that man adopts in the 'maxim', guided by free will. What binds the mind concentrated on the world of things, objects and the moral world is judgment.⁵ In it is realized human freedom, which was previously considered through the prism of the lack of dependence on the world perceived by the senses.

In this sense, spontaneity and autonomy show the necessary connection between the experience of freedom in the process of one gaining one's identity and the process of shaping personality and opening up to other people and the world. The shaping of one's personality or one's own existence is accompanied by the process of education and socialization. Apart from ethnicity, socialization within the realm of national community is essentially the source experience of culture and language. It is culture and language that frame the relationship between freedom and individual formation.

Tischner, on the other hand, refers to the Polish tradition of freedom as well as the early Christian tradition. He claims autonomy to be essential for the possibility of educating a person to self-determination. The distinctness of one's own decision requires one's upbringing to take on the burden of being oneself and to be able to oppose what one considers inappropriate, which comes from unreflectively imitating others. The phenomenon of imitation, of following other people's behaviour, of thinking that has already been mapped out in society, is referred to as mimetic, and is a kind of burden that every human being carries.

2.3. Sovereignty

Freedom as sovereignty refers to being a sovereign, that is, having the power of authority over others. Currently, there is talk about sovereign states that have the ability to make decisions regardless of the will of other states. Sovereignty once belonged to the monarch, and along with the formation of nation states, sovereignty concerned the independence of one state from the other. In democratic states, sovereignty is interpreted through the prism of the election of representatives by citizens to wield power for tenure. To be a sovereign state, it is also necessary to educate, develop a pro-state attitude in the citizen, and educate citizens who take care of the common good. Sovereignty, however, when considering spontaneity and autonomy within the concept of freedom, penetrates the depths of decision-making. It concerns the community-building we are engaged in.

⁵ I. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Hamburg 2001, p. 16.

Before one can speak of independence of sovereignty, there is spontaneity of action, unencumbered, free activity. This is perceived positively, as exercising power on behalf of the nation and society. Also, talking about freedom in the sense of community, one can use another concept, that of independence. Unlike sovereignty, independence expresses negation in its concept, a denial of influence over decisions.

2.4. Independence

Independence appears in the context of the individual, and also in the state, and it means not being subordinate to various influences. In a sense, it coincides with the meaning of sovereignty. In accordance of law – as Kant claims in the treatise “Perpetual Peace. A philosophical Sketch” – states that have a constitution are entitled to it.⁶ Independence ensures a lack of bias, a lack of internal pressure on making decisions. Freedom as independence in a certain sense is shown from the perspective of independence from the senses and it is based on moral law, in which it is about acting in such a way that the subjective maxim becomes a supreme law for all.

For Tischner, however, being independent means something else. The key motive for him is the ability to enter into dialogue with other people. A truly independent person is the one who not only starts acting but it keeps defending their beliefs against all odds.

Freedom, in the sense of spontaneity and autonomy, directly related to upbringing of a human being to make free decisions, in which a person experiences their own identity, and also is responsible for the common good which contributes to the development of society and the international community on the basis of an independent and sovereign culture that can still interact with other cultures, also has a different dimension. Transparency empowers the individual in the process of successful self-realization as well as in the implementation of community goals on the basis of equal access to science and knowledge and equal treatment of all entities.

2.5. Transparency

Compared to transparency, the previous expressions of freedom do not appeal to contemporary generations. Transparency means openness and equal treatment of all subjects. Any asymmetry shows the disruption of interpersonal dialogue and leads to a lack of transparency. To shape a person and to support their self-realization not only spontaneity, autonomy, sovereignty and independence are needed, but also transparency, which leads to the last experience of freedom, which is **openness**. Freedom, which characterizes the young generation, leans on independence, but also on the possibilities of self-realization. Young generations expect a new form of freedom, the result of which is wealth and financial independence. It is possible on the basis of transparency. Cultivating (upbringing) should stimulate internal development, but it should also be the space

⁶ Idem, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Stuttgart 1984, p. 10.

of freedom in which there is a desire to take up the challenge of, and the commitment to, the relationship between I and otherness. This is possible on the basis of original openness. It seems to me that starting from the problem of identity and upbringing through uncovering different types of concepts, but also the experience of freedom, we come to the crucial task of pedagogy, which is **stimulating, opening people to others** and to the surrounding world.

It is not that a person possesses freedom, but they are free. In situations of fear and danger, this openness is pushed to the background, although it depends on whether we are able to build a common ethical space based on principles and rules. Contemporary philosophy perceives the reduction of the experience of freedom, reducing it to independence from something, but the main meaning of education and upbringing is to prepare a person for creation, to open themselves up to challenges and situations of various kinds. Like Nietzsche, Tischner emphasizes that ethics is not only about building a world of values on negation, reaction to impulse, but about creating positive values on the ground of meeting other people. Philosophy sees in the relationship with another human being the possibility of self-realization and building a space of dialogue at the level of individuals, cultures, societies and states. Dialogue and meeting are in a way a method that enables people to open themselves to the values that the other person carries. It also enables an education process to be concentrated on the development and implementation of the individual need transcending the field of subjectivism. However, it only provides an opportunity to meet.

The abovementioned O.F. Bollnow in his book *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik* focuses on the concept of the **meeting** and draws attention to two periods in which the meeting has become a key category for philosophy.⁷ In the first period, the word 'meeting' appears in the philosophy of Buber, and also in the thought of Guardini, who refers to Buber, depicting it from the philosophy of a live perspective. The second period concerns just after the end of the Second World War. At this time, the meeting does not only have a dimension related to the philosophy of life, but it is presented from a religious and educational perspective. As Bollnow emphasizes, E. Rotten notes that education is a kind of meeting.⁸ Bollnow devotes the attention of the meeting from the perspective of relationships, such as between teacher and student, among others.

Bollnow sees the role of meeting with the other in finding one's own identity, but he also ponders the role of upbringing and education. It is important for him to show the connection between the meeting – understood as social interaction – and education.

Education [*Bildung*] is the formation of a human being, it leads to the formation of a subject that will be able to make decisions. Education is approached from the perspective of subjectivism. The meeting [*Begegnung*] extends this formula because education becomes preparation for a meeting that is difficult to plan, predict, or describe. Through the meeting, man sees the world more fully, because it completes the world of the self (I). This makes it necessary to think about the relationship between education

⁷ O.F. Bollnow, *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 87.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

and the meeting. It seems that to educate is to enable, to facilitate a means of possible dialogue with another person.

In the process of education and socialization there is a risk [*Wagnis*] that while shaping human consciousness, the source experience of the self will end in failure. Despite the rejection of dialogueness, the pupil is still aware of the self. This risk is the space of human drama in which one has salvation and defeat in their hands. Also in this sense, the risk of upbringing to openness is marked by the tragedy that bringing-up to openness will not cause the pupil to become more open to the world, but that they will reject the value of the meeting. Rising up to dialogueness carries a huge risk, the more so that it does not formulate what a person is supposed to do, but it arouses in one the desire to use their freedom to create a world of values that have no pragmatic dimension but are a sacrifice. In this sacrifice, however, we discover ourselves. By choosing a meeting, we choose ourselves.

In his reference to St. Augustine as well as the philosophy of dialogue, Tischner explains the meaning of the concept of freedom. A free person is one who can make independent, spontaneous decisions, and is able to take advantage of their freedom. Finally, a free person is the one who has the ability to be guided by the good, regardless of whether it brings benefits or not. Like Bollnow, Tischner sees the risk in human action. Risk is a manifestation of human existential drama. The human being is a drama, and this is because one can win or fail. Tischner places this drama on the horizon of good and evil. The human being is primarily a good being who can nevertheless fall down. Tischner mentions two elements of one drifting towards evil. The first is flattery, which makes one feel superior to others. The other element is the fear of betrayal. Another may betray me. These two elements cause a person to break off dialogue with another person, destroying both the dialogue the situation of the situation. Once the human being begins to cheat, it begins to lose the meaning of life. Only God can justify a human's existence and restore their ability to re-enter a dialogue with another, and to justify such choice. Tischner, unlike Levinas, assumes that the restoration of freedom allows only entering into dialogue and responsibility for oneself and others.

Considering the issue of a meeting based on freedom leads us to experience a special kind of relationship that manifests itself through the prism of responsibility. It is precisely in responsibility and its analysis that we see the self-fulfillment of a foster child, by responding to the call that the other person directs towards me, and also the risk of rejection of openness, rejection of a meeting in which a person goes beyond themselves as a certain monad, beyond their own subjectivism. Responsibility in the contemporary world replaced the notion of justice, through which our subjective experiences of values gain an objective character.

Upbringing to freedom refers, on the one hand, to freedom understood as spontaneity, i.e. the will, unconditioned by anything, willingness to undertake new challenges, to respond to emerging problems, the motivation for which comes from within our "I", from our consciousness, and on the other hand to freedom as autonomy of action, i.e. independent from external factors as to the motivation and means of action. One of the key elements of upbringing is precisely the independent assessment of a situation and

acting independently of external influences, which leads in consequence to the development of independent mechanisms within oneself.

Independence and impartiality in forming one's opinion and not being guided by one's own benefit demonstrate human freedom. How to teach a young person to be free? Perhaps this question should be replaced with another: How to arouse responsibility in the other? For freedom requires responsible action in which we find ourselves, our place, our identity. Responsibility has one more important feature: while freedom in the sense of upbringing emphasizes self-determination and independence from others, responsibility shows how freedom transforms into cooperation.

3. FREEDOM MEANS RESPONSIBILITY

Experiencing one's own freedom allows being responsible for oneself and one's actions. Responsibility can be interpreted in different ways: one of them is to understand responsibility through the prism of the term '*imputatio*', which means assigning to a concrete person the intention to act or to withdraw from action. Responsibility in this sense refers to past events. A suggestion or a judgment that someone is guilty of any action not only refers to the past, but in case of the continuity of the consciousness that is responsible for it, it bears a punishment that affects what will happen in the future. The second way to understand responsibility is as an apology, a defense. Responsibility so understood anticipates any kind of evaluation. To be accountable to someone one has to be a responsible person. Levinas notes that imputation means answering a question that is constituted in a concrete situation. With regard to the Latin term '*respondere*', the term '*imputatio*' is secondary. Only *respondere* allows and guarantees that we can bear responsibility in all its extent.

3.1. Responsibility as a *respondere*

A key determinant in the process of upbringing – in a social sense – is not so much the inevitability of punishment or bearing responsibility for an evil done, but by the fact that by exercising our freedom we can open ourselves to others and embrace them with our care, i.e. the possibility of transforming our own freedom into self-responsibility, our own independence, autonomy. Responsibility understood in this way can be understood as the ability to open up to others. As Tischner shows in his work, responsibility is the outcome of meeting another person who asks me a question. In order to be able to enter into a discourse with others, I need to follow freedom understood as the possibility of opening myself to others, to the stage that is the world and the passing of time. Responsibility therefore means being ready to accept another person, trying to penetrate the inside of another, to discover their thinking. Responsibility framed in this way means opening myself to dialogue, to words addressed to me by another person. Tischner refers here to the philosophy of Levinas, in which responsibility means answering an ethical question directed at me by another.

The experience of beholding another's face means that we cannot be indifferent to them. This lack of indifference is the result of a movement that arouses in us the naked face of another person. Levinas used the images of the faces of a foreigner, a widow and an orphan to question my first freedom, which is arbitrary and wants to dominate, to change myself to open up to the other, to be there for the other. The responsibility for the other means that freedom is marginalized. In the offering to another, the crucial experience is the closeness to the someone who is away, from whom I am separated. Proximity is what brings people closer to each other.⁹

Levinas ultimately does not reject freedom. He demonstrates that freedom appears in a different light at a time when the first freedom transforms into giving oneself to another.¹⁰ Initially, in the experience of the meeting, I am faced with the thought that I am offering assistance to someone else too late. I am always late towards the needs of the other.¹¹ The revelation of the other's face puts my identity into question. Meeting the other means that we do not come back to each other, but I am 'with' the other and 'for' the other. In this space of the emergence of responsibility for the other – substitution – I come back to myself as 'being for the other', and that constitutes my identity.

In my relationship with the other there appears an absolute separation between me and the other.¹² However, it is the substitution of being for the other¹³ that emerges as well. An invitation addressed to me by another turns my initial distrust into a desire to replace another with myself.

However, there is an absolute separation between individual human beings, and it is this separation which precludes me from becoming the other. However, through my language, I can open myself to another person. In the situation of the drama of a suffering person asking for help, the experience of absolute separation turns into a desire for substitution. Being for the other, which expresses substitution, leads to being for the other, which is sacrifice.¹⁴ It is only in responsibility that my freedom is revealed. However, it appears not as the original experience of lawlessness, but the possibility of being with and for another. As Levinas argues: 'As long as only one person is rejected in the world, no one has the right to be happy'. I am responsible for the misfortune of others. Tischner, on the other hand, approaches the relationship with the other differently. He focuses on the fact that in order to be responsible for another person, whom Tischner identifies as the other in the community of humankind, one needs to experience one's own freedom. In order to be responsible, I must first of all be free. This is a key category for Tischner. For him, upbringing means building a desire for freedom within a young person which will enable them to be ready to sacrifice for the other.

⁹ E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, Pittsburg 1996, pp. 82-86.

¹⁰ Idem, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Pittsburg 2009, p. 54.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 164.

¹² E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 147-151.

¹³ J. Tischner, *Zarys filozofii człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów*, Kraków 1991, pp. 114-115; E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being...*, pp. 18, 113-118, 142.

¹⁴ E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being...*, p. 164.

Tischner argues that the first experience will be agathological: the experience of dissonance between *Sein* and *Sollen*.¹⁵ Lack of consent to suffering makes us ready to act, which opens the axiological space.¹⁶ In this area of responsibility, we complete and realize our own freedom. Thanks to freedom, I can make a choice, and answer the call which the other person is giving me.

Experiencing one's freedom is accompanied by a feeling of desire and fear, fear for oneself.¹⁷ In elaborating on fear Tischner points to insights of Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Most specifically, however, Tischner refers to Antoni Kępiński, among the most influential scholars in the history of Polish psychiatry. It was Kępiński who demonstrated the destructive role of fear and its different manifestations for individual emotional integrity.¹⁸ He was also outspoken in demonstrating the meaning of the hope of meeting with the other to overcome fear psychosis.¹⁹ Freedom – but with it responsibility – leads to a situation in which a person feels fear, anxiety of the world and another person as part of self-realization. Dostoyevsky sees this when he presents the figure of the Grand Inquisitor, as one who wants to take freedom away from man to make him happy and carefree.²⁰ The price of happiness is to give up individual freedom. Hegel knows that freedom given to a human being, even when it is renounced, will become the object of its desires. The human being will always miss freedom. The Grand Inquisitor caused that a person, having rejected their own freedom, could not establish a relationship with another human being and could not rid themselves of fear.

Tischner notices that fear and anxiety play an important role in human thinking. Fear of the world makes a person unhappy, as does a hunger for the world. However, this is not yet the primary bond that philosophy speaks about. The original experience comes from the meeting. This is the basic category for Tischner. Meeting another makes me abandon myself: I refer to myself, but not as I, but myself for another, as my own identity in relation to another. In his *Philosophy of drama*, Tischner notices that the true misfortune of a man is not a tragedy resulting from the world of nature, but the breaking off of dialogue. Tischner understands evil in various ways, but at the basis of his philosophy is evil as the cessation of dialogue. This is the key to the survival of one's freedom: the ability to be responsible for oneself and for others. Evil is a rupture of dialogue, the symmetry of interpersonal relations. These are the most important challenges to teach a person openness to themselves and to others. At this point, self-fulfillment of oneself and community are also met. Man is a social being and therefore needs another. Max Scheler has already pointed out this problem, as did Karol Wojtyła.

Self-realization takes place in the feeling of community.²¹ One cannot realize oneself and one's values without being able to express them in a community. Scheler coined

¹⁵ J. Tischner, *Myslenie wedlug wartosci...*, pp. 516-517.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Augustyn, *Wyznania*, Warszawa 1983, p. 137 (X, 28).

¹⁸ J. Tischner, *Myslenie wedlug wartosci...*, p. 439.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 456.

²⁰ F. Dostojewski, *Bracia Karamazow*, Kraków 2009, p. 318.

²¹ K. Wojtyła, "The Acting Person", *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 10, Dodrecht 1979, p. 263.

the term 'the principle of solidarity',²² which Wojtyła mentions in the last chapter of the *The Acting Person*,²³ and in his presentation in 1975 at an international conference in Freiburg.²⁴ Wojtyła goes back to Scheler and his principle of solidarity, as Józef Tischner later tries to rethink the experience of the solidarity movement in *The Spirit of Solidarity*.²⁵ These reflections on the social movement are preceded by an analysis of the philosophy of Heidegger and Levinas. Tischner claims that social dialogue also takes place at the level of work.²⁶ Work itself is a dialogue. He attaches great importance to this connection. The principle of solidarity in Tischner is based on a symmetrical relationship with another human being. Tischner deepens the principle of solidarity with research on man and his encounter with the other. He is inspired by Buber, Rosenzweig and Levinas. He perceives self-fulfillment in the search for his own identity.

Tischner sees the possibility of self-realization on the grounds of maturing for his own freedom, which manifests itself in the possibilities of meeting other people. The truth about oneself comes through meeting another. In the meeting, the other makes the choice. The other, second person chooses me as a partner to talk to, to entrust each other. In-depth reflection makes me confident of another person, and I entrust myself to that person. The bond that arises between us is mutual entrustment. The evil that is stronger than the tragedy of unhappiness is the drama stemming from the breaking of dialogue, which is the betrayal of the other. This happens because in meeting with a third person I begin to doubt whether the other will not betray me, but also the conviction that I am worth more than the other. This sense and conviction are the result of the temptation that destroys in me the faith in dialogue, in the durability of interpersonal relations. The process of accepting evil as its own is a multi-stage process, with the first being to arouse uncertainty, fear, and a need for self-esteem. When it comes to betrayal, I begin to understand that I made a mistake. I judge myself in the sense that my life is not worth anything. This is not justified, because it can only make a bond with another. Instead of gaining the identity which was I promised during temptation and desire, I understand that I have lost it forever. The justification does not come from me, but from the other. Only their choice gives me the opportunity to regain my own identity, which enabled me to meet with others.

Tischner emphasizes the choice through which I experience myself. The person entangled in sin loses the sense of their own existence. When he understands that he is the author of evil, he wants to overcome it, but only God can do it. Tischner in his

²² M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Bern–München 1966, pp. 503, 523-526.

²³ K. Wojtyła, "The Acting Person"..., p. 284.

²⁴ Wojtyła, his article titled *Participation or Alienation*, was sent in translation into French to the 4th International Conference in Freiburg, Switzerland (January 24-28, 1975), and delivered him at the Department of Philosophy in 27 February 1975. The theme of this conference was 'Soi et autrui' (I and the Other). Wojtyła concentrates on the last two chapters of *The Acting Person*. In the first one he analyzes the neighbor as a member of the community, while in the second he will consider the commandment with love in relation to Marxist alienation (K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, New York 1993, p. 197).

²⁵ J. Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, San Francisco 1984, pp. 1-3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 16-17.

philosophy introduces the concept of condemnation [*potępienie*],²⁷ which he derived from Kierkegaard. Restoring the original state of man is possible only by re-choosing through God. He allows me to return to the community in which I am ready for a dialogue in which I find myself. The man chosen by God is ready to again be there for the other and find his own identity not through the prism of the ‘what’ question, but about the manner in which he realizes himself.

This is a very important guideline of Tischner. It emphasizes that during the upbringing process one should not be preoccupied with answering the ‘what’ but rather the ‘how’, regarding the symmetry of relationships with others. For the symmetry of a relationship, it is an openness that is needed. The symmetry of a relationship should, however, be balanced with transparency. Responsibility comes from the experience of the community and from faith in the good. It is difficult to convey faith in the good in a world for which prosperity and self-interest are more important than the common good. It is possible only through experience, thanks to meeting another person who is real, concrete.

It is precisely the basis of my relationship with another in which I find myself in self-realization in the horizon of good. The meeting reveals the primary meaning of responsibility as a response to ethical inquiry. Roman Ingarden attempted to show that responsibility as a punishment for committed evil and assumption of responsibility upon himself are possible only if we previously take responsibility as a possibility. Ingarden’s position will be defended by Władysław Stróżewski, referring to the allegations made by Jadacki after the publishing of Ingarden’s *Man and Value*.²⁸ In this sense, it can be said that responsibility as a ‘responder’ anticipates responsibility as the attribution of blame to somebody.

3.2. Responsibility as ‘*imputatio*’

Besides ‘*respondere*’, we can speak about responsibility from the perspective of the term ‘*Imputatio*’, which means attributing an action or a failure to act to a concrete person. By the term ‘*imputatio*’ we refer to something that happened in the past and for which

²⁷ Idem, *Filozofia dramatu*, Paris 1990, p. 173; idem, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, Kraków, 1998, p. 190.

²⁸ The book “Książeczka o człowieku” consists, among others Ingarden’s seminar paper entitled *Über die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente*, which was delivered in 1968 at the 14th International Philosophy Congress in Vienna. In the extended version in 1970, it appeared in German and two years later in Polish in a translation by Adam Węgrzecki. The Polish edition was criticized by Jacek Juliusz Jadacki in *Studia filozoficzne*. Jadacki claims that Ingarden’s responsibility is presented from the perspective of the condition why a person can take responsibility. In this manner, Ingarden omits responsibility for the guilt committed. Władysław Stróżewski in response to the allegations addressed to Ingarden published an article “Nad ‘Książeczką o człowieku’” in the *Studia Filozoficzne*, which emphasizes that Jadacki is limited in the analysis of responsibility only to the existence of an enforcer, recognition of negative responsibility, while what makes it possible to hold accountable is experience, experience himself as responsible for something. I am answering Ingarden’s not because I am in front of someone, but because taking responsibility is not a punishment or reward. Stróżewski states that Jadacki’s thesis about the need for an enforcer may lead to a false conclusion that without an executive, you cannot take responsibility (J. Jadacki, “Odpowiedzialność i istnienie świata”, *Studia Filozoficzne*, no. 5 (1973), pp. 245-257; W. Stróżewski, “Nad ‘Książeczką o człowieku’”, *Studia Filozoficzne*, no. 9 (1973), pp. 123-126; M. Rebes, *Między respondere i imputatio. Część pierwsza*, Kraków 2014, pp. 16-17.

the perpetrator now has to bear responsibility. However, in order to move from blaming into concluding a judgment, one first has to prove the guilt of the perpetrator. The perpetrator then bears responsibility for the act or intention that accompanied him before or after committing an offense. 'Imputatio' presupposes to predetermine rules and laws on the grounds that one can accuse another. Such a sense of guilt and accusation at the level of law has its source in ethics. At the level of ethics, it appears as the blame which is attributed to somebody. Unlike the level of the law, the prosecutor, that which accuses me of my guilt, is myself or God. In that sense, I am not held accountable, but I am accusing myself of having committed the act or hurting someone. Of course, one can accuse someone else of being guilty, but the accusation in ethical terms comes from me. I accuse myself because I respond to a call too late which was addressed to me by another, that I had betrayed another man. Here a major role is played by educating people to be responsible for their actions. From the perspective of contemporary philosophy and pedagogy, it is important to be able to experience values, to confess guilt and to take responsibility, to undergo 'metanoia', to change one's behavior.

The awakening in man of a willingness to be responsible means to stimulate the will to be a man of conscience, one who realizes goodness regardless of experience of fears and anxieties. It seems that the only way of educating people to be responsible for themselves and for others is not to suggest certain solutions or even to make decisions for them, but to let them discover themselves and what is most important to them in their encounters with others. Sometimes this requires the student to resist, to oppose what the world proposes. This permission does not mean leaving the student alone, but constantly accompanying them in their self-discovery, in creating relationships with other people and in forming their own world of values.

Then an individual finds their interior balance in relation to the other. Finding one's own identity is done in a meeting in which the question about oneself, about one's own identity, is deepened by a question about another, one's being for another.

A serious challenge for education is not so much the transfer of knowledge, but the ability to open oneself. This is especially difficult when a person does not see the need to be a person of conscience. Indifference, which results from nihilism, the fall of authorities, is a bigger problem for education than incorrect demeanor or bad behaviors, directed only at oneself, selfish and egoistic. It is also necessary to take this risk because pedagogy in the experience of freedom and responsibility can recognize an ally in forming the right attitudes in a young person, as well as in the experience of the encounter through which bringing up is not subjective, but objective.

In the process of education, human education is not about learning behaviors or acquiring knowledge; it is above all about the ability to take on challenges and engage in critical thinking, which is not so much based on imitation of behavior (mimesis), but on the creative, spontaneous perception of a situation and a attempt to realize positive values. In contrast to behaviors that are only a reflective representation of inculcated attitudes – although it is also a good method of upbringing – liberating the will to be self by realizing common values makes one discover in themselves a spontaneous and responsible action. The basic problem is therefore how to encourage kindness and openness

towards others, which should go hand in hand with the general aims of an educational process. Consequently, self-realization in general turns into self-realization in the form of a meeting with the other in particular. In this relationship, one experiences their own freedom and responsibility. These experiences should be the aim of education, as it opens up the horizon of openness to the pupil and educator. It is built on trust. The main question that pedagogy has to raise, is how to build empathy in people, to arouse concern for themselves, for others, for the environment. How to motivate people, how to foster a readiness and willingness to take on the challenges posed by the modern world. How can people, in spite of their fears and aspirations to meet their primary, natural needs, inspire trust in human for goodness and values? These questions can be answered by experiencing one's own freedom and one's responsibility towards others. The crucial is responsibility as '*respondere*', which flows from the call of the face of another who invites me to a meeting. This openness to meeting with others gives only empathy, openness to the other.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A fundamental problem for pedagogy is to stimulate in young people the desire to be themselves and to be a man of conscience in spite of everything, even though the modern world expects us to be effective and correspond to predetermined parameters. Also, the attitude towards pragmatism and technical achievements should not release one from the obligation of openness to experience of another. This is possible thanks to a meeting in which a person perceives himself through the prism of the feeling of community. Learning to assume responsibility for one's own freedom plays a key role here. This is noticed by Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyła. Levinas and Tischner see in this experience the need to focus on responsibility, but also, in Tischner, on freedom. For empathy to arise, it is necessary to experience one's own freedom based on the experience of meeting with other people. It is not about bringing up the unreflective realization of values, but about awakening in people empathy for suffering, the tragedy of others through the prism of experiencing the values that are concealed in the meeting. The awakening of openness towards others in a person does not exclude only their identity, but that person demands a kind of recourse that strengthens and deepens their identity.

One should not focus solely on respecting the norms adopted in society and culture in the process of upbringing. Instead one should prioritize such norms to be built organically, at the very foundation of society, in the spontaneous process of normative internalization based on the experience of one's own freedom and responsibility. Only being supportive of the pupil, and strengthening their awareness of individual freedom and responsibility leads to a successful education process. Based on the experience of oneself, it is possible to build social bonds and relationships with another person. The concepts of freedom and responsibility are key to the educational process.

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