

Robert KŁOSOWICZ 

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

robert.klosowicz@uj.edu.pl

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND – BALANCE OF ACTIVITIES DURING THE PRESIDENCIES OF GEORGE H. BUSH, BARACK OBAMA AND DONALD TRUMP

ABSTRACT The article aims at analyzing the development of the U.S. Africa Command during the three presidential administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. According to the author, the attitude of individual American presidents and their administration to the U.S. AFRICOM is an accurate reflection of the approach to both the problems of African states and the place of Africa in the foreign and security policy of the United States. Since the foundation of the U.S. AFRICOM by the administration of G.W. Bush to D. Trump's desire to liquidate the command. Trump's attitude to Africa is also illustrated by the fact that he was the first American president since Ronald Reagan who did not visit any of the 54 African states. His two predecessors paid nine such official visits to African countries in total. It seems that despite many myths and fears that accompanied the birth of AFRICOM and during its first years of existence, the worst scenarios have not come to fruition. AFRICOM has not militarized Africa, it has not caused the drastic exacerbation of the rivalry with China in the region, and it has not become the military arm of US expansionism on the continent. What is more, even many skeptics among African state leaders have noted that it has thus far played and continues to play a positive role in counteracting terrorism, therefore, it has supported the stability of African countries.

Keywords: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Armed Forces, International Security, Foreign Policy, African States

In February 2021, 14 years will have passed since the date of the official announcement made by the Defense Secretary Robert Gates to the Senate Armed Services Committee that President George W. Bush had given the authority to create the new African Command on October 1st, 2007, which later became an active and fully autonomous command as of October 1st, 2008. It was to cover the entire African continent with the exception of Egypt, which was to remain within the framework of the U.S. Central Command.¹ The period includes the terms in office of three presidents, the last year of George Walker Bush's presidency (2001-2009), during which AFRICOM was convened,² eight years of Barack Obama's two terms in office (2009-2017), and four years of Donald Trump's presidency (2017-2021). Has AFRICOM, for which the U.S. decision makers had such high hopes, fulfilled its role? Has its creation instead turned out to be a relatively meaningless political and military gesture made by Washington, meant only to show that Africa's role and its perception in the USA had gained significance? Was it an effective tool for promoting rule of law and the stability of African states and was it successful in combatting terrorism, or rather – as was feared would happen – did it become purely an instrument for the implementation of Washington's political aims on the continent?

From the beginnings of its existence, the political decision makers in the USA argued that U.S. Africa Command would be a hybrid command, merging the economic, social, political and security purposes. One of its most important tasks was to have been inhibiting the process of the disintegration of states and reinforcing stability on the continent: *US security interests are linked to the elimination of terrorist networks and safe havens, prevention of the development and use of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms proliferation [...]. Weak or unstable states create threats to US interests because they offer attractive venues for terrorists, weapons proliferation, and crime.*³

The United States are currently an unquestionable political, economic and military world power; therefore, the global character of their armed forces should correspond to their global political actions. These are supposed to not only validate US hegemony in the world, but also ensure the protection of its security and interests through the ability of reacting in military terms in any area of the globe. All this is reflected in the geostrategic organization of the system of commanding US military forces. The Pentagon divided the world into six regional command units, ready to manage military operations in specific regions of the world. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), covering the entire area

¹ *Strategic Survey 2007: The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2007, p. 251

² Plans for the formation of African Command first appeared during George Walker Bush's first presidency and he himself was an ardent advocate of its creation. During his entire second term in office, intense preparations for creating AFRICOM were in motion; cf. L. Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the Military in Africa", *Congressional Research Service*, 3 April 2010, p. 4.

³ E. Feleke, L.A. Picard, T.F. Buss, "African Security Challenges and AFRICOM", in: T.F. Buss, J. Adjay, D. Goldstein, L.A. Picard (eds.), *African Security and the African Command: Viewpoints on the US role in Africa*, Sterling 2011, p. 34.

of Africa except for Egypt, is the youngest regional command unit, officially launching operations on October 1st, 2008.⁴ During the Cold War and more or less a decade after it had ended, the United States did not have a separate command for Africa. American military activities on the African continent were divided between three separate regional commands: U.S. European Command – responsible for the larger part of the African continent, U.S. Central Command – encompassing Egypt, Sudan and what is referred to as the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya), and U.S. Pacific Command – which included Madagascar, along with other islands on the African coast in the Indian Ocean. All three commands were focused mainly on other regions, while African matters were treated peripherally, which can be attested by each of the Commands designating only a few middle-rank officers from among the military personal to deal with Africa. This was obviously a consequence of the fact that the United States did not attach much importance to Africa as the continent had held peripheral strategic significance during the period marked by Cold War rivalry.⁵

Immediately following the end of the Cold War, George Herbert Bush's Administration (1989–1993) faced a few serious challenges on the African continent. These included the need to support actions aimed at ending apartheid in South Africa, opposing the growing Chinese expansionism in Africa, and the issue of the destabilization of the internal situation in many African states, which in a few cases actually led to their disintegration, as happened in Somalia.

Meanwhile, China – the USA's main rival in Africa – had not only increased their export of basic commodities to African countries year by year, but also – to an ever greater extent – of arms, and even of advanced nuclear technologies, an example of which would be Algeria. China first began providing support to Algeria in building a nuclear reactor in 1988. The United States learnt of the project only two years later, when the construction of the reactor was greatly advanced. China also sold parts for chemical weapons to Libya, though deliveries were immediately ceased following fierce protests voiced by the US government.⁶ In addition, the Chinese supplied armaments to dictators on a large scale, undermining the efforts of the international community exerting pressure aimed at introducing democratic reforms and ceasing human rights violations. As discussed by Robert Kagan, the Chinese had no intention of introducing conditional limitations on the aid provided to African countries in order to demand political and systemic reforms

⁴ *United States Africa Command*, at <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp>, 19 December 2010; J. Garamone, *DoD Establishing U.S. Africa Command...*

⁵ D. Volman, *AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa*, African Security Research Project, June 2008, <http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=12>, 19 December 2010. This also resulted from the fact that the African region was perceived in Washington as the sphere of influence of European colonial powers. This is noticeable in the structure of the Department of State. In this case, US diplomatic relations were monitored by four geographical divisions, see: "Division of Near Eastern & African Affairs", in: A. Mania, *Department of State 1789-1939. Pierwsze 150 lat udziału w polityce zagranicznej USA*, Kraków 2011, p. 235; *Strategic Survey 2008: The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2008, pp. 265-266.

⁶ M. Trzcionka, "Polityka sankcji Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Chin w latach 1950-2007", in: K. Budzowski (ed.), *Wybrane aspekty handlu międzynarodowego*, Kraków, 2008, p. 178.

they were not planning to introduce in their own country.⁷ All this was happening in a situation in which, following the Cold War, former Socialist countries were also opening their arsenals and ridding themselves of their surplus of outdated arms, exported to underdeveloped countries, including some in Africa. While the end of the Cold War was beneficial in other areas, it brought about the global influx of superfluous weapons, leading to an increasing risk of the armed resolution of local conflicts.⁸ Payment for arms came primarily in the form of mineral resources, including diamonds, which led to a series of internal conflicts, of which the most bloody took place in Liberia and Sierra Leone. What is more, it turned out that a large part of the trade in diamonds served to finance terrorism, with the participation of such groups as Al-Qaeda. The USA first declared war on the trade in uncertified diamonds. In November 2002, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was created, regulating the monitoring procedures for the production and trade in diamonds.⁹

The decision to create a separate African Command was also influenced by geostrategic concepts that claimed the increasing strategic significance of peripheral areas. One such concept was the one proposed by Thomas P. Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*.¹⁰ It distinguishes areas that Barnett refers to as Non-Integrated Gaps, which as unstable and economically non-autonomous regions were not subject to global integration processes and constituted potential areas of future conflicts and further destabilization. This would include the whole of Africa, South-East Asia and Central America. According to Barnett, it was precisely such areas that would in the future focus main US and NATO efforts involving peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹¹

The concept fits the situation that emerged following the fiasco of the UN-led humanitarian operation *Restore Hope* in Somalia, a country which had faced the danger of state failure since the 1990s. Even though the US forces formed the core of the UN armies, Washington quickly faced the issue of disputes within the organization, both concerning the competences and the military operations strategy. The last straw was the death of 18 American soldiers during an operation meant to capture one of the Somalian warlords – Mohamed Farrah Aidid in Mogadishu. When it ended in failure and the NBC showed the bodies of a massacred American ranger being desecrated by a crowd of people and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the outraged US public opinion forced the Clinton Administration to withdraw the American military

⁷ R. Kagan, *The Return of History and The End of Dreams*, Poznań 2009, p. 78.

⁸ J. Boutwell, M.T. Klare, „A Scourge of Small Arms”, *Scientific American*, vol. 282, no. 6 (2000); M. Zachara, „Międzynarodowy handel bronią jako czynnik destabilizujący sytuację państw dysfunkcyjnych”, in: R. Kłosowicz (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i ich destabilizujący wpływ na stosunki międzynarodowe*, Kraków 2013, p. 209.

⁹ M. Trzcionka, *Sankcje gospodarcze w polityce zagranicznej USA po II wojnie światowej*, Kraków 2015, pp. 53-54.

¹⁰ T.P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, Washington 2004.

¹¹ Z. Lach, J. Skrzyp, *Geopolityka i geostrategia*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 53-55.

contingent from Somalia. The Somali lesson brought the US army strategists to the realization that even such a mighty country in military terms as the United States could have a lot of issues with bringing peace and stability in such terrain, especially in an asymmetric military clash, when sending forces to conduct operations in conditions of state dysfunctionality and in an area controlled by non-state actors (various militant and guerrilla forces, frequently with the participation of child soldiers).¹² In this situation, Washington decided that in the future it would not become involved militarily in solving conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. A few months later, the nightmare of African internal wars returned to the screens of American televisions and newspaper headlines as a result of the genocide in Rwanda. The helplessness of the world in the face of the Tutsi massacre brought the politicians in Washington to the realization that a global power does not have the luxury of avoiding the problems of the African continent and that it was in the interests of the United States to prepare a coherent strategy toward Africa; all the more so as the conflicts on the continent were impacting and destabilizing increasing numbers of countries.¹³

The conflicts in Africa and destabilization of the region led to tragic consequences for the civilian population (massacres, hunger, rape, refugee crises) broadcast by the media effectively enough that the world leaders could no longer ignore the problem. In June 1994, the Clinton Administration organized a two-day debate *White House Conference on Africa*, which was to symbolize a breakthrough in the US political approach towards Africa. The aim of the conference was to prepare a new strategy towards the continent, which would enable the integration of Africa into the world economy, minimizing the effects of the crises and curbing the plague of corruption.¹⁴

The second event signaling Clinton's new approach to African issues was his 12-day journey to various African countries at the turn of March and April 1998. He visited six states: Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, Botswana, South Africa, and Senegal. In Uganda, he participated in a regional conference of the leaders of East African countries dedicated to resolving regional crises, fighting terrorism and organized crime.¹⁵ Four months after Clinton's visit, Al-Qaeda conducted terrorist attacks at the American diplomatic posts in Kenya and Tanzania.¹⁶ This event reinforced the conviction already present within the Clinton Administration of the urgent need for preparing a strategy for Africa. Two years later, President Clinton returned to Africa, where during a four-day-long stay he

¹² R. Kłosowicz, *U.S. Marines jako narzędzie polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, Kraków 2008, pp. 254-256; J. Mormul, "Problem łamania praw człowieka w państwach dysfunkcyjnych. Przypadek dzieci żołnierzy", in: R. Kłosowicz (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne...*, pp. 255-265.

¹³ R. Dowden, *Africa, Alerted States, Ordinary Miracles*, London 2009, pp. 110-111, 114-115; D. Rothchild, E. Keller, *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters*, London 2006, p. 5.

¹⁴ J.F. Clark, "The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracies", *Journal of Opinion*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1998), at <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1166821>, 20 November 2010.

¹⁵ "U.S. President Bill Clinton in Africa", 27 March – 2 April 1998, *AllAfrica*, at http://allafrica.com/specials/clinton2000/clinton_res.html, 20 November 2010.

¹⁶ E. Landau, *Osama ben Laden: Wojna z Zachodem*, przeł. K. Gradoń, Warszawa 2011, pp. 158-162.

visited Nigeria, Egypt and Tanzania – the site of one of the above-mentioned terrorist attacks on US embassies in 1998.¹⁷

If Clinton spoke about the need for evening the odds, ending conflicts and the promotion of human rights in Africa, from the very beginning of his term in office his successor to the White House, George Walker Bush indicated the practical dimension of American interests in Africa, declaring that cooperation with African countries would – on the one hand – help in the war against terrorism, while – on the other – facilitate access to its oil reserves, which lay in the strategic interests of the USA.¹⁸

Richard Haass, one of the main theoreticians and architects of US foreign policy, who performed the function of principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell during George W. Bush's term in office,¹⁹ foresaw in 2005 that by the end of the decade Sub-Saharan Africa could become an important source for the import of energy resources.²⁰ In 2006, Africa covered 18% of US demand for oil. A year later, US oil import from Africa was higher than its import from the Near East.²¹ Everything indicated that in the coming years the US import of African oil would increase. Meanwhile, a major competitor emerged in the race for this strategic resource in the form of the People's Republic of China, which for that same period was importing 25% of its demand for this raw material from Africa.²² It was forecasted that by 2025 China would double its demand for African oil.²³ The Chinese extracted oil also in countries with a high conflict threat indicator, where American companies did not venture. As a result, the conviction began to grow in Washington that the USA was losing the competition for new oil fields in Africa.²⁴

From the very beginning of its term in office, the Bush Administration maintained that African oil was of strategic significance for US interests and thus required

¹⁷ "Clinton praises 'new Nigeria'", *BBC News*, 26 August 2000, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/897423.stm>; "President Bill Clinton's Africa Trip", August 2000, Africa South of the Sahara, at <http://www.sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/clinton2000.html>, 20 December 2010.

¹⁸ D. Volman, "The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 98 (2003), pp. 573-584.

¹⁹ Richard Haass worked in prominent Federal-level American scientific research institutes. During George Herbert Bush's presidency, he was the director of the National Security Council.

²⁰ The American Department of Commerce showed that the import of oil from Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes 87% of American-African trade exchange.

²¹ "Middle East Oil Less Important than African Oil for USA", *Mongabay*, 22 February 2007, at <http://news.mongabay.com/2007/02/middle-east-oil-less-important-than-african-oil-for-us/>, 15 February 2016.

²² "China's Trade and Investment Relationship in Africa", April 2013, *Brookings*, [https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/2013-04_China-Africa\(GamacheHammerJones\).pdf](https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/2013-04_China-Africa(GamacheHammerJones).pdf), 15 February 2016.

²³ M. Klare, D. Volman, "The African Oil Rush and US National Security", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 609-610; P.J. Deutsch, "Energy Independence", *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2005, p. 20.

²⁴ "China's African Oil Hunt Revisited", *International Relations and Security Network*, *Security Watch*, at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=52652&lng=en>, 15 February 2009.

Washington's more emphasized military presence in the region. In April 2002, the former U.S. ambassador to Chad, Donald R. Norland, noted that for the first time the two concepts – "Africa" and "U.S. national security" – had been used in the same sentence in the documents of the Pentagon.²⁵

During his visit to Nigeria in July 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner declared that African oil was of strategic significance for his country and that this demand would grow in the future.²⁶ In these regards, the Bush Administration had the broad support of the Republican Party, expressed by a prominent politician of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa Chairman Ed Royce, who stated that African oil should be treated as a priority for U.S. national security post 9–11. The document *African Oil Policy Initiative Group: African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development* is maintained in the same spirit, clearly indicating that both the U.S. Congress and the state administration should see the Gulf of Guinea as an area of vital importance for American interests.²⁷

Thus, from the beginnings of the Bush Administration, Africa took on an importance it had never had before. The 2001 9-11 terrorist attacks on the *World Trade Center* in New York and the Pentagon in Washington led to Africa gaining even greater significance in American national security policies as U.S. intelligence agencies uncovered a network of connections between the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations on the African continent.²⁸

On 16th September 2001, in the NBC program *Meet the Press*, Dick Cheney clearly stated the following: *We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful.*²⁹

A day later, President Bush signed a secret directive which gave the right to kidnap and imprison people suspected of terrorism from any place in the world. This in effect led to the formation of a system of secret detention and interrogation of people suspected of terrorism, which officials referred to using the name "black hole". These actions were carried out by the CIA. As it turned out, one person that had long demanded that such actions be taken was the CIA agent Cofer Black, who had spent

²⁵ "DoD News Briefing-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael A. Westphal", *US Department of Defense News Transcript*, 2 April 2002, at <http://www.defenselink.mil>, 20 December 2010.

²⁶ D. Volman, "The Bush Administration & African Oil...", p. 573.

²⁷ "African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African", *African Oil Policy Initiative Group*, at <http://www.iasps.org/strategic/africawhitepaper.pdf>, 19 December 2010.

²⁸ R.G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, November 2007, pp. 3-6.

²⁹ "The Vice President Appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert", Camp David, 16 September 2016, *The White House: President George W. Bush*, at <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vice-president/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html>, 3 January 2017.

many long years in agency facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa (Zaire, Zambia, Sudan, Somalia and South Africa). Black had informed his superiors about the terrorist ideological offensive on the African continent and had to no avail requested appropriate steps be taken. After 11th September 2001, the situation changed and his voice was finally heard.³⁰

After 9-11, the Bush administration successively increased the value of arms deliveries and expenditure for military training programs for Africa – from 100 million dollars in 2001 to 800 million in 2008. It seems obvious that in connection with long-term plans to increase expenditure on military aid for select African countries, Washington – in creating AFRICOM – wanted to have more control over them. Obviously, this was also about directing the aid in accordance with American interests on the continent, such as continuing operations in Somalia, antiterrorist actions in the Sahel region or anti-piracy sea operations near the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea.³¹

The genesis of the creation of AFRICOM goes back to 2002, when President George Walker Bush announced a new National Security Strategy, which anticipated preventative and pre-emptive interventions if there were any premises suggesting possible threats to U.S. state security.³² The White House, in wanting to direct more attention toward Africa, faced a problem with ensuring a certain and stable source of financing these policies. The foundation of AFRICOM was thus also linked to financial issues, as the formal creation of a command ensured the means for its support, granted annually by Congress; money that was guaranteed in the budget, in contrast to the funds for military aid adopted every year within the framework of individual programs targeted at Africa. The creation of AFRICOM as a separate regional command under the leadership of a high-ranked officer with direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff strengthened the position of the new command within military structures, also within the Pentagon.³³

In 2005, the U.S. Congress approved 500 million dollars for a five-year period (100 million annually) for the *Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative*, aimed at providing support for countries involved in the fight against terrorism sponsored by Al-Qaeda, which had organized its terrorist network in such countries as Algeria, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger and Senegal. The program also assumed counteracting arms and drug trade, as well as the provision of training to local special forces. To a large extent, it was based on the former *Pan Sahel Initiative*, which ended in December 2004.³⁴ The Pentagon began the formation of *Cooperative Security Locations* and

³⁰ J. Scahill, *Brudne wojny*, transl. by J. Małecki, Kraków 2014, p. 34.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-48.

³² "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", Washington, D.C., *The White House: President George W. Bush*, 20 September 2002, at <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>, 10 March 2010.

³³ D. Volman, *AFRICOM...*, 15 December 2010.

³⁴ *Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)*, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>, 19 December 2010.

Forward Operating Sites in Africa.³⁵ These facilities along with the army camp in Camp Lemonier w Djibouti became the primary locations of AFRICOM on the continent.³⁶ In 2006 the Pentagon expanded military base by almost five times its original size, from 88 to 500 acres³⁷.

In mid-2006, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formed a group for planning the future regional command for the African continent. At the beginning of December, he presented the advisory group's work results together with the proposal to create AFRICOM.³⁸ Pentagon's military analysts clearly concluded that if in 2003 EU-COM had to a very low extent dealt with African matters, in 2006 the issues from this continent took up 70% of the command's activities. This was caused by the fact that EU-COM was forced to shoulder the majority of African issues due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan occupying most of CENTCOM's attention.³⁹

AFRICOM was supposed to function as a subcommand of EU-COM until it was prepared to work as an autonomous command, which – as already mentioned – occurred on 1st October 2008.⁴⁰ The budget of the African command over subsequent years amounted to: in 2007 – 50 million, in 2008 – 75.5 million, and in 2009 – 310 million.⁴¹ On 6th February 2007, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates informed the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that the President had authorized Admiral Robert Moeller to create a new regional command – the U.S. Africa Command – and gave him the task of forming the logistics structures of the future command. Towards the end of September 2007, the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination of General William E. Ward, the former Deputy Commander of EU-COM, as the first official commander of AFRICOM. This officer had experience connected both to stabilization missions in Africa and heading the structures of regional commands.⁴²

In the course of AFRICOM's formation, G. W. Bush's Administration was conducting negotiations with the governments of some African countries about providing access to bases for the U.S. army. On the basis of bilateral agreements, the USA gained access to local military bases and their equipment so that the American forces could use them both for transport and supply purposes and combat operations. As these bases are

³⁵ "U.S. European Command Statement Following President Bush's Remarks Addressing Global Posture", *United States European Command*, 16 August 2004, at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=282>, 20 October 2010.

³⁶ Dakar in Senegal, Entebbe in Uganda, Libreville in Gabon.

³⁷ K. Mengisteab, *The Horn of Africa*, Cambridge 2014, p. 128.

³⁸ "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa", *National Public Radio: News and Analysis*, 7 February 2007, at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7234997>, 20 October 2010.

³⁹ F. Kempe, "Africa Emerges as a Strategic Battlefield", *Wall Street Journal*, 25 April 2006.

⁴⁰ "U.S. Africa Command Stands Up", *United States Africa Command*, 9 October 2008, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2177>, 19 December 2010.

⁴¹ "FACT SHEET: United States Africa Command", *U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office*, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644#>, 19 December 2010.

⁴² "General William E. 'Kip' Ward Commander United States Africa Command", *U.S. Africa Command*, at <http://www.africom.mil/ward.asp>, 19 November 2010.

only lent out to the Americans and remain under the management of individual African countries, officially the USA does not have any bases on the African continent except for in Djibouti. This country with pro-Western foreign policies, located ca. 50 km south-west of the Arabian Peninsula, is of enormous strategic significance for the USA, as they monitor the activities of terrorist groups in the Near East and in the Horn of Africa from the US bases located there.⁴³

A lot of speculation and controversy was evoked by the decision about where to locate the main headquarters of the command. Of all the African countries, only Liberia and Botswana officially announced their willingness to take in AFRICOM on their territory. Various voices expressing skepticism or even aversion towards the idea of potentially hosting the Americans were much more frequently heard.⁴⁴ The President of Nigeria Umaru Yar'Adua went the furthest when he announced in November 2007 that not only would he not agree to American bases on the territory of his country but he would also oppose their placement in other West African countries. A similar position was adopted by South African President Thabo Mbeki and his Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, who stated that *it would constitute an unacceptable violation of Africa's sovereignty*.⁴⁵ This went against the plans of the government in Washington, which had initially planned on creating the AFRICOM headquarters in one of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, which was of strategic importance for the USA due to the large oil deposits in the region and in order to stem Beijing's economic expansion.⁴⁶

In February 2008, the AFRICOM spokesperson cut speculations short by issuing a statement that the command was not looking for a location for its main headquarters on the African continent and that in the nearest future it would be based in Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart.⁴⁷

In reference to any potential changes to the location of the AFRICOM headquarters from the base in Germany to some African country, speculations on the topic have clearly died down in recent years. During a conversation between the author of this article and the Deputy Director of Public Affairs U.S. Africa Command Vincent Crawley, conducted in the main headquarters of the command in Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, he denied any plans for changing the headquarters in the nearest future. Crawley refuted press speculations that the command was introducing efforts to establish a location in an African country, substantiating the claim by stating that Stuttgart was the optimal place for the main headquarters due to its logistical, transport, social, financial and political advantages. The logistical issues are extremely important, primarily

⁴³ D. Volman, *AFRICOM...*

⁴⁴ "Terrorism in Africa is No Longer Somebody Else's War", *New African*, no. 560 (21 April 2016), p. 37.

⁴⁵ P. Fabricus, "AFRICOM May Be Looking for a New Home", *Institute for Security Studies*, 18 September 2020, at <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africom-may-be-looking-for-a-new-home>, 3 October 2020.

⁴⁶ S.B. Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, Lanham 2014, p. 417.

⁴⁷ "US AFRICOM headquarters to remain in Germany for 'foreseeable future'", *Herald Tribune*, 19 February 2008, at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/19/africa/AF-GEN-US-Africa-Command.php>, 20 December 2010.

the close vicinity of the airport in Frankfurt-am-Main, which boasts flight connections with many countries in Africa. Connections with the remaining African countries are provided by the closeness of the airports in Paris, London or Amsterdam, to which there are a few flights daily. Therefore, it is much easier to travel from Europe to various African countries than between these states from airports in Africa, without even taking into account the technical quality of the aircrafts. Internet and phone communication with American bases in Africa, in the USA or with American fleets operating on the coast of Africa is also much more reliable from the headquarters in Stuttgart. The living conditions of the military personnel and their families are also very important – the quality of life, the schools for their children, safety issues. In addition, financial considerations also speak for the current location of the command. Finally, the perception of the headquarters in the world and in Africa does not evoke such strong emotions and bias as in the case if it was located on the African continent.⁴⁸

AFRICOM is not similar to the traditional forms of regional commands. It does not assume the maintenance of large military units on the African continent. This is in accordance with the politics of reducing American army contingents beyond US borders. The military structure of AFRICOM also differs from that of the remaining regional commands. The commands of its individual components are not all located in one place but are scattered in various bases across Germany and Italy. The AFRICOM Navy was allotted from among the U.S. Sixth Fleet to form the U.S. Naval Forces Africa, while its main headquarters was set in Napoli. In addition, the U.S. Navy has bases in Africa in Liberia and Djibouti.⁴⁹

Another feature that makes the African regional command different is that it has a potential to go beyond military purposes, since AFRICOM consists simultaneously of military and civilian personnel, including staff members of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The commander of AFRICOM has two deputies – a military one and a civilian one.⁵⁰ A significant part of the personnel is made up of civilian employees, who are experts in such fields as intelligence, diplomacy, health and other specializations. The innovative structure of AFRICOM is reflected by the fact that aside from traditional military targets, it will have no less important tasks in civilian matters, taking active participation in the realization of programs supported and financed from the budget of the Department of State. The Bush Administration, indicating AFRICOM's innovative hybrid structure, emphasized that the objectives behind the creation of a new regional command included not only

⁴⁸ Interview with Vincent Crawley, Deputy Director of Public Affairs U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, 1 December 2010.

⁴⁹ "MARFORAF Stands Up as Corps' Newest Command", *U.S. Africa Command*, 14 November 2008, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2251&lang=0>, 19 December 2010); *U.S. Army in Africa*, at <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/mission.html>, 19 December 2010; "History Southern European Task Force", *U.S. Army Africa*, at <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/history.html>, 19 December 2010; *17th Air Force*, at <http://www.17af.usafe.af.mil/>, 19 December 2010.

⁵⁰ "Diplomat, Admiral Become Co-Deputies of U.S Africa Command", *U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs*, 29 October 2007, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.art=1576/>, 19 December 2010.

military considerations. Therefore, AFRICOM is to aid Africans in creating greater possibilities for using their own natural resources and ensuring security and stability. AFRICOM is tasked with providing countries with support through various training programs, as well as military and technical counseling, while also supporting the development of the African Standby Force.⁵¹

According to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whelan, U.S. Africa Command's mission was to provide African countries with diplomatic, economic and humanitarian aid, as its main objective was preventing conflicts from occurring and not military interventions. These words were echoed by the declaration made by the White House that AFRICOM would strengthen the cooperation between the USA and Africa both in the field of security and by creating new possibilities for raising the potential of U.S. partners in Africa. These efforts are aimed at introducing peace and a sense of security among African inhabitants, as well as at the realization of such goals as: development, provision of health services, democracy and economic growth in Africa. Thus, officially, AFRICOM's main task is coordinating the operations of the American forces in Africa, for which up until that moment as many as three regional commands (EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM) were responsible, i.e., preventing conflicts in the region, ensuring support for peace and humanitarian missions and aid to deeply dysfunctional countries in their return to stability.⁵² This is confirmed by AFRICOM's official statement adopted in May 2008 concerning their mission: *U.S. Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces and responds to crises in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity.*⁵³

Even though the high officials of the Department of State on numerous occasions denied that the economic and political expansion of the People's Republic of China was against U.S. interests, can it really be considered a coincidence that during the visit of the Chinese leader in Africa (31st January – 11th February 2007), the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on behalf of President G. W. Bush announced the launch of AFRICOM (on 6th February 2007)? Even if it was a coincidence, it continues to have a symbolic dimension.⁵⁴

From the beginning of the creation of the African command, Washington attempted to convince the leaders of the region that there were no hegemonist intentions or a secret strategy. The main task set before the new structure was supposed to be supporting the African Union, African regional organizations and ensuring stability on the

⁵¹ *African Standby Force*, at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/asf.htm>, 19 December 2010.

⁵² J. Frazer, *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, DC, 1 August 2007, at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/africom.pdf, 19 December 2010.

⁵³ "What We Do", *United States Africa Command*, at <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do>, 19 December 2010.

⁵⁴ "DoD Establishing U.S. Africa Command", *Department of Defense*, at <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2940>, 15 December 2010.

continent (e.g., by supporting regional peacekeeping or humanitarian missions). However, there was a widespread conviction across the continent that the aim of the presidential administration was an attempt at offsetting the growing influences and significance of China and to assume control over key natural resources. The Americans themselves contributed to the negative reception of the idea of a regional command by politicizing the initial discussion about its mission and including it into the broad strategy for combatting terrorism.⁵⁵

When Barack Obama assumed the presidential office, it was received by the Africans with great hope for even more interest and aid from the United States for African countries. In Ghana, to which the President made his first foreign visit in Africa, on the day of the presidential elections in the USA, all-day-long prayers were organized to pray for Barack Obama's victory. The wave of euphoria that spread through African societies after the election of the first American president of African descent was psychologically justified. It was not a white man who had become the leader of the mightiest superpower of the modern world, but someone who looked like them, which obviously increased the hopes and expectations of African societies of support for their interests.⁵⁶

The first moves made by the White House seemed to confirm these hopes. The Obama Administration announced a considerable increase in funds for aid programs related to security matters for African countries most threatened by terrorism, which was to prove that the new Administration was continuing the course of action established towards Africa by President G. W. Bush. At the beginning of May 2009, the Obama administration presented the Congress with budgetary proposals for the 2010 financial year, in which there were propositions to significantly increase not only the expenditure on security aid programs, but also to cover AFRICOM expenses. The administration proposed 278 million dollars for expenses directly linked with maintaining AFRICOM, including increasing the command's personnel and securing air transport for its activities. Funds were also foreseen from the budget of the Department of Defense in the amount of 300 million dollars to cover AFRICOM's expenses within the framework of supporting the operations of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. In addition, capital was also dedicated to the expansion of AFRICOM's most important base in Africa – Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, as well as for the annual payment for leasing the terrain (an area of 500 acres) for a sum of 30 million (the cost itself of maintaining the base was said to amount to 170 million dollars).⁵⁷ Ultimately, AFRICOM's expenses in 2010 were higher and reached 295.2 million dollars. A similar amount was planned for the following year 2011 amounting to 296.2 USD.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ K. Wiatr, „Trudne początki Africomu”, *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych*, 5 October 2008, at <http://www.psz.pl/tekst-13863/Trudne-poczatki-AFRICOMu>, 15 December 2010.

⁵⁶ J. Kościółek, *USA wobec ludobójstwa w Afryce: Rola amerykańskiej kultury politycznej w ewolucji polityki antyludobójczej*, Warszawa 2019, pp. 258-259.

⁵⁷ D. Volman, „Africom to Continue Under Obama”, *Global Research*, at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14131>, 15 December 2010.

⁵⁸ L. Ploch, „Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa”, *Congressional Research Service*, 3 April 2010, pp. 12-13.

Along with the increase in financial involvement, Obama attempted to primarily emphasize AFRICOM's humanitarian and aid provision dimension, highlighting such aspects as its engagement in peacekeeping missions and providing humanitarian aid. This was one of the purposes of Barack Obama's two-day visit to Africa. During his speech in the Ghanaian parliament on 11th July 2009, President Obama presented his political approach towards the African continent, declaring that he would like to direct most of the efforts of the White House towards supporting projects combatting corruption and counteracting human rights violations. Obama's message had a special significance as in the speech he referred to his father's African (Kenyan) roots. There was also a sentence that referred directly to AFRICOM: *And let me be clear: Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world.*⁵⁹ In August of that year, the American diplomatic offensive in Africa was continued by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who visited 7 countries during an 11-day visit.⁶⁰ During his time in office, President Barack Obama conducted four official visits to Sub-Saharan African countries. The aforementioned first one involved a trip to Ghana in July 2009. The second, at the turn of June and July 2013, included Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. The third was connected with the Nelson Mandela's funerary ceremonies in the Republic of South Africa in December 2013. During his fourth visit in July 2015, the President visited Kenya and Ethiopia.⁶¹ During all these trips, one key topic referred to issues of security and the involvement of the states he visited in the war against terrorism.

During the civil war in Libya, following the U.N. Security Council's resolution no. 1973 issued on 17th March 2011 that implemented a no-fly zone above Libya, for the first two weeks AFRICOM coordinated the coalition's military operations until full responsibility for the military intervention was taken over by NATO. At the beginning of April, Obama withdrew American forces from direct military operations and from that moment onwards they performed a supportive role, supplying ammunition and fuel. AFRICOM covered 80% of NATO air-to-air refueling.⁶²

During the civil war in Mali, which was a consequence of the civil war in Libya and the fall of Muammar Kaddafi, AFRICOM provided support for the French military activities within the scope of Opération Serval targeting jihadist groups, which in

⁵⁹ "Obama's Speech in Ghana," [Remarks by the president to the Ghanaian Parliament], 11 July 2009, at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament>, 23 June 2020; "Obama Visit Stirs Pride Among Ghanaians," *The Washington Post*, 11 July 2009.

⁶⁰ "Hillary on Safari," *The Economist*, 15 August 2009, p. 30; "Clinton's Africa Trip Ends with a Promise," *The Washington Post*, 15 August 2009, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/08/14/ST2009081403320.html?sid=ST2009081403320>, 12 December 2010.

⁶¹ "Presidential and Secretaries Travels Abroad," President Barack Obama, *Department of State. Office of the Historian*, at <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/obama-barack>, 13 November 2016.

⁶² The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2012, p. 12.

spring 2012 proclaimed to have set up an independent territory called Azawad in the northern 60% of Mali. AFRICOM provided transport and telecommunications support, aircraft refueling and provided intelligence.⁶³

In October 2015, the USA and Niger signed a military agreement requiring both countries to cooperate on counteracting terrorism. Two years earlier, the Niger government had agreed to the U.S. construction of a drone base in the country and an American garrison housing 150 people. In addition, Special Forces instructors, popularly referred to as the green berets, were sent to the African country with the task of conducting training programs. In September 2016, the Americans also built a second combat drone base in Agadez in Niger, which was supposed to have been used for the tracking and elimination of terrorists operating in the Sahel region. The aim was also providing support for the Niger government and French forces in antiterrorist operations against militant groups in Niger, Libya and Mali within the scope of Operation Juniper Shield.⁶⁴ Toward the end of 2017, 800 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Niger, with the number remaining unchanged in spring 2020, though plans have appeared to reduce the U.S. military staff in West Africa, including in Niger. It should be emphasized that in October 2017 four US Special Forces members died in an ambush in Niger during a patrol. Officially, the military presence of AFRICOM in Niger is described as providing: *training and security assistance to the Nigerien Armed Forces, including support for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to facilitate their efforts to target violent extremist organizations in the region. This training includes advising and assisting the Nigeriens to increase their organic ability to bring stability and security to their country.*⁶⁵

The Obama administration also increased antiterrorist military operations using combat drones to a scale larger than ever before, mainly in Somalia, Libya and Niger.⁶⁶ Critics have noted that the price Washington pays for its antiterrorist alliances in Africa is turning a blind eye to human rights violations and the breaking of democratic rules by the regimes of allied states. During his last visit to Ethiopia in July 2015, Obama emphasized twice that the government of the African country had been chosen democratically, even though the elections had not taken place in accordance with democratic rules. When during the same journey to Africa he visited Kenya, ruled by a corrupt and semi-authoritarian regime, he expressed hope that the country would continue on its path to the development of a strong, responsible and transparent democracy.⁶⁷ As has been revealed by the press, both Ghana and Senegal agreed to receive prisoners from

⁶³ F. Heisbourg, "A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 55, no. 2 (2013), pp. 7-14.

⁶⁴ J.H. Keenan, "War Games in the Sahel", *New African*, no. 568 (January 2017), p. 37.

⁶⁵ "Why the U.S. Military is in Niger", *United States Africa Command*, 20 October 2017, at <https://www.africom.mil/article/30023/why-the-u-s-military-is-in-niger>, 2 July 2020.

⁶⁶ T. McCrisken, "Obama's Drone War", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 55, no. 2 (April-May 2013), pp. 98-117.

⁶⁷ L. Diamond, "Democracy in Decline: How Washington Can Reverse the Tide", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016), pp. 154-155.

Guantanamo and hold them in prisons located within their borders. The leaders of these countries could in exchange count on Washington's support.⁶⁸

U.S. Africa Command also undertook activities aimed at ensuring African maritime safety and developing security capabilities through its Africa Partnership Station⁶⁹.

In 2014, while West African countries were facing the Ebola epidemic, it is worth emphasizing that the USA sent 3,000 American soldiers to the affected countries in order to help fight the virus by constructing 17 treatment centers. U.S. Africa Command set up a Joint Force Command Headquarters in Liberia to support U.S. military activities and help coordinate expanded U.S. and international relief efforts to fight the West Africa Ebola outbreak.⁷⁰

In recent years, the situation linked to the rivalry between the USA and China for natural resources in Africa has changed considerably, which is most easily observable in the context of oil. The drastic fall in oil prices strongly impacted import from Africa. According to data from December 2014 to May 2015, the import of oil to the USA from Africa was at its lowest since the 1970s.⁷¹ Therefore, from the perspective of the passage of a few years, the rivalry with China for this strategic resource seems currently to not be very important, even though it was raised in the critical literature on the topic as one of the main reasons for the creation of AFRICOM.⁷²

Meanwhile, Washington began attaching increasing importance to cooperation with African countries not only in the scope of security issues, but also economic development and the process of supporting what is referred to as good governance. The USA was forced to change its approach to foreign policies in Africa, so that it would not only be defined by issues related to the war against terrorism but rather the promotion of democratic solutions, human rights, freedom of the press or respecting the rights of minorities. The political approach of supporting governments taking into account only their involvement in the war against terrorism had turned out to be short-sighted, but brought long-term negative effects for the region. Such examples might be the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopian and their consequences for the Horn of Africa. After the 1998-2000 war between these two countries, the U.N. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission conceded the disputed city of Badme to Eritrea.⁷³ Ethiopia, backed by the USA, which was a consequence of Addis Ababa's involvement in Somalia, did not

⁶⁸ B.B. Diop, "The Danger of 'Yes Sir' Politics", *New African*, no. 562 (June 2016), pp. 21-23.

⁶⁹ *Strategic Survey 2020. The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2010, p. 294.

⁷⁰ Ch. Pellerin, "Obama to Announce AFRICOM Joint Force Command HQ in Liberia", *DoD News*, 16 September 2014, at <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/603259/obama-to-announce-africom-joint-force-command-hq-in-liberia/>, 20 June 2020.

⁷¹ "Where Does America's Oil Come From?", *World Economic Forum*, at <http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/where-america-oil-come-from>, 14 February 2016.

⁷² It is certainly connected with the political instability in the Niger Delta as well.

⁷³ *Reports of International Arbitral Awards: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia*, 13 April 2002, vol. 25, pp. 83-95, United Nations 2006, at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/83-195.pdf, 20 August 2016.

comply with the Commission's 2002 judgment.⁷⁴ This led to Eritrea supporting terrorist organizations in Somalia and the fueling of internal separatisms in Ethiopia.⁷⁵

The Africans evaluate the eight years of President Obama's politics toward Africa with some disappointment, especially considering their high hopes and expectations. The majority of the promises made were never fully introduced, with the exception of the increased militarization of the continent.⁷⁶

The results of the presidential elections in the United States in November 2016, with the winner being the candidate of the Republican Party, Donald Trump, put in doubt various issues linked to the foreign policies of the new Administration, inevitably also including Africa. This corresponded with the social mood in the USA. According to public opinion polls, for the first time in 50 years, the majority of Americans did not want US involvement in solving global problems to the scale as the previous military involvement. American society expected those in office to focus rather on solving the country's own internal problem and taking care of their own interests. Increasingly frequently, the strategy of offshore balancing was mentioned, i.e., withdrawing their military forces from various parts of the world and exerting pressure primarily by using political and economic instruments and encouraging the strongest countries in the region and allies to become more engaged also in military terms in the issues in their region. The USA was to conduct military interventions only when it was absolutely necessary.⁷⁷

Trump as a candidate in the presidential elections practically did not mention Africa; however, many political analysts were of the opinion that his Administration would depart from the principles of Washington's political relations with African countries in terms of issues linked to democracy and respecting human rights to an even greater extent. In short, the realization of US economic and security interests was supposed to be oriented toward effectiveness and achieving the highest benefits possible. There were even fears that Trump would have no qualms against doing business with the worst African dictators.⁷⁸ Over the course of his first three months in office in the White House, Trump approved the expansion of antiterrorist military operations in Somalia, Libya and Nigeria, and he championed the approach that American commanders in Africa should have more possibilities of conducting more important military actions in complete secrecy, without consultation with local governments. American ground forces were granted extended rights in large areas of Somalia considered officially war zones, including the possibility of being provided support in the form of air strikes.

⁷⁴ R. Kłosowicz, J. Mormul, *Erytrea i jej wpływ na sytuację polityczną w Rogu Afryki*, Kraków 2018, p. 164.

⁷⁵ C. Abraham, "Eritrea – Ethiopia Tensions", *New African*, no. 563 (July 2016), pp. 50-52; R. Kłosowicz, "The Role of Ethiopia in the Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa", *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2015), p. 88.

⁷⁶ O. Wambu, "Obama: The Final Verdict", *New African*, no. 565 (October 2016), p. 106.

⁷⁷ J.J. Mearsheimer, M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016, pp. 70-74.

⁷⁸ J. Zimmerman, "Trump, as Africans See Him", *New African*, no. 564 (October 2016), p. 15.

Simultaneously, the President announced cuts to budget expenses, which had serious consequences for the continent, especially for Sub-Saharan African countries.⁷⁹

Soon, Trump's Administration faced a serious challenge in the form of Russia's growing political and economic engagement in Africa and attempts at reconstructing Moscow's former spheres of influence in the continent. During the period of the bipolar division of the world, the USSR was a major actor in Africa, counterbalancing the West. In recent years, more or less since 2014, Kremlin has undertaken intense activities to regain influence in various regions of the world in order to rebuild Russia's former power and significance. This also includes Africa, where – after an absence of almost two decades – Russia is making a strong comeback.⁸⁰ Even though over the last decade Russia has doubled its trade turnover with African countries, reaching as much as 20 billion dollars annually, this is still ten times less than China and five times less than the USA. In March 2008, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov went on a five-day visit to five African countries: Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, during which he negotiated the creation of special economic zones for Russian companies in the African states and establishing military and technical cooperation.⁸¹

One of the elements of the reconstruction of Russia's influences in Africa involved Moscow organizing a huge political event for the first time in history in the form of a Russian-African summit, oriented towards Kremlin regaining influences in Africa. The summit took place under the name "A shared vision 2030" on 24th-25th October 2019 in Sochi in Crimea, with the event bringing together the representatives of all 54 African countries, of which 43 delegations were represented by top-level officials. During the summit, the Russian President Vladimir Putin organized a bilateral meeting with the leaders of 16 states and representatives of African regional institutions. The summit was accompanied by a Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, within the frameworks of which meetings are to be held every three years at the highest level, while there are to be annual meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs. During the summit, about 50 agreements and economic treaties were signed worth a joint sum of 800 million rubles, i.e., 12 billion dollars. The content of the summit's final declaration was symptomatic, with the participants expressing the will to further develop their cooperation, to defend themselves against attempts at limiting their suzerainty through the activities of Western countries, and to oppose economic sanctions introduced without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council, while also emphasizing the need to counteract manifestations of the hegemony of the Western world. There can be no doubt that the declaration was addressed mainly toward the USA.

Russia's offer must have been attractive for African countries not only in economic terms, but also political and military ones. Previously, Russia had already sent primarily army equipment and military advisors to Sub-Saharan African countries. Russian

⁷⁹ "Can Africa out-trump Trump?", *New African*, no. 571 (April 2017), p. 24.

⁸⁰ J. Burger, "The Return of Russia to Africa", *New African*, no. 588 (November 2018), pp. 15-21.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

armaments were cheaper than Western arms and better than Chinese ones.⁸² Along with the export of arms, Russia provides their African partners with a wide range of military training programs. In 2014-2018, over 2,500 military personnel from African countries participated in such programs in Russia. In addition, Russia also offers the military services of security and contract companies, such as the notorious Wagner group, whose personnel hired by the Libyan National Army during the civil war in Libya amounted to 2,000 people according to AFRICOM reports from September 2020.⁸³

In November 2018, the American weekly "Bloomberg" stated that Russian companies linked to Russian businessmen closely tied to Kremlin government circles were already active in ten African countries – Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Angola, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Kongo. The companies provide services in such areas as security, technology, political support in exchange for the rights to extract resources. The Russians were also involved in political activities, e.g., organizing the election campaign of the current president of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as well as the presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Kongo and Madagascar. In August 2018, Russia signed an agreement to build a logistics base in Eritrea. The construction of the base will give the Russian naval forces access to the Red Sea.⁸⁴ The newest Russian initiative involves plans for reaching an agreement with Sudan to open a base for their fleet by the Red Sea, which would allow Moscow to monitor the situation of one of the most important ship routes in the world, running from the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden. The agreement is to be reached for a period of 25 years with the possibility of its extension. Within the framework of this agreement, Russia will also be able to use Sudanese air space to ensure the base's security and its effective functioning.⁸⁵

Moscow's growing interest in the African continent has had a stimulating effect on Beijing, which has heightened its efforts to increase its military presence in Africa. In 2017, China completed work on the construction of a military base in Djibouti, which in the future will be able to accommodate military personnel consisting of 10,000 soldiers.⁸⁶ Beijing is also a huge supplier of weapons to African states. Over the past decade, China as a major producer of Soviet-caliber weaponry has come to dominate the legal African arms market offering cheap or offset deals.⁸⁷

⁸² Among other things, Russia sold the combat aircraft Su-27 and Su-30 to Angola, Algeria and Uganda, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2017, p. 480.

⁸³ "Russia, Wagner Group Complicating Libyan Ceasefire Efforts", July 15 2020, *AFRICOM*, at <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33008/russia-wagner-group-complicating-libyan-cease>, 20 August 2020.

⁸⁴ R. Raji, "More Caviar, Fewer Guns on Sochi Menu?", *New African*, no. 598 (October 2019), p. 71.

⁸⁵ H. Foy, "Russia to Build Naval Base in Sudan", *Financial Times*, 16 November 2020.

⁸⁶ F. Dubé, "China's Experiment in Djibouti", *The Diplomat*, at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/chinas-experiment-in-djibouti/>, 26 June 2020.

⁸⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2013, p. 488.

In July 2019, General Stephen J. Townsend became the fifth commander of AFRICOM. Questioned by the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services in April 2019, Townsend stated that while currently counteracting extremism remains the most important American objective in Africa, Russia and China's growing involvement will shape the mission of AFRICOM in the continent in the longer perspective.⁸⁸ In his opinion, these countries will expand their presence in such African countries as Djibouti or the Central African Republic and strive to achieve economic benefits and then political ones, which will undermine U.S. interests. For this reason, AFRICOM must heed their competitors' activities in order to defend U.S. interests in Africa.⁸⁹

The command's tasks for the next years have also been determined. U.S. Africa Command is to provide the command, and component commands, strategic direction to advance strategic goals on the continent. It is to be done in a burden-sharing and balanced approach, accounting for the increased presence of external actors, namely China and Russia. To achieve the U.S. Africa Command Campaign Plan objectives, the command emphasizes six main tasks: 1) to strengthen partner networks; 2) to enhance partner capability; 3) to develop security in Somalia; 4) to contain the instability in Libya; 5) to support partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions; and 6) to set the theater to facilitate U.S. Africa Command day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.⁹⁰

Over the course of the last 30 years, every American president has launched a major program for Africa, beginning with George Herbert Bush's *National Security Review 30: American Policy Towards Africa* in the 1990s, meant to promote peaceful changes and the resolution of conflicts; to support the development of democracy, human rights, political pluralism; to combat transnational threats, i.e., AIDS, terrorism, the drug trade, the refugee crisis and polluting of the natural environment.⁹¹ President Bill Clinton continued with the assumptions of the African strategy introduced by his predecessor, intensifying contacts between the USA and Africa, expressed through the trade-focused program created by Congress in 2000 – *The African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA), which presumed, e.g., the creation of free-trade areas in Africa, expanding access to American markets by providing Africa with a 10-year exemption from customs duties for the import of goods, the formation of a USA-Africa economic forum and the assignment of 650 million USD to cover the costs of private investments

⁸⁸ B.W. Everstine, "AFRICOM Nominee: Russia, China Growing Concern in Africa", *Air Force Magazine*, 2 April 2019, at <https://www.airforcemag.com/africom-nominee-russia-china-growing-concern-in-africa/>, 30 November 2020.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander United States Africa Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 7 February 2019, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_02-07-19.pdf, 6 July 2020.

⁹¹ "National Security Review 30: American Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s-Key Findings", *AllAfrica*, at <https://allafrica.com/stories/200101080520.html>, 26 June 2020; M. Kumelska, "Problemy pomocy dla Afryki w okresie prezydentury George'a W. Busha Juniora", *Forum Polilogiczne*, vol. 12 (2011), p. 305.

in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁹² George Walker Bush assigned the sum of 200 million dollars to establish a new Global Fund, the prioritized aim of which was preventing the spread of such diseases as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. In 2002, the USA launched the program *International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative* with the objective of preventing children becoming infected by HIV by their mothers during pregnancy – 500 million USD, which allowed for the treatment of a million women annually and lowered the rate of HIV infection among babies by 40%. These two initiatives gave beginning to the breakthrough *President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief* (PEPFAR) aimed at counteracting such diseases as AIDS, HIV, malaria and tuberculosis with a dedicated sum of 15 billion USD over a 5-year period. This was the largest such initiative within the frames of which a single country designated such large financial means to fight an individual disease.⁹³ In 2013, President Obama launched *Power Africa*, a partnership among the U.S. Government, African governments, bilateral and multilateral development partners, and the private sector to improve access to electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The Electrify Africa Act of 2015* aimed at doubling access in the continent by 2030, as two out of three people in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to live without access to electricity.⁹⁴ Towards the end of 2018, John Bolton presented the initiative *Prosper Africa Initiative*, which aimed to stimulate American investments in Africa, opening up possibilities both for American and African companies and employees, as well as to expand the middle class in Africa. In addition, it can be observed that the *Prosper Africa Initiative* and the new strategy aimed at Africa are a direct response to the growing Chinese and Russian influences on the continent.⁹⁵ However, Donald Trump's Administration emphasized that the initiative is not a new program within the framework of U.S. Foreign Assistance, but only a method of stimulating and harmonizing existing programs, as well as the resources and possibilities available to particular agencies and departments. The official inauguration of the *Prosper Africa* program took place in mid-2019 during the USA-Africa business summit in Mozambique. For the budgetary year 2020, the amount of 50 million USD was allocated for its implementation.⁹⁶ US AFRICOM played an important supportive role in all these initiatives.

In accordance with election declarations, when Donald Trump assumed the presidency in the USA, it was linked with a change in Washington's priorities in foreign policy and signified the lower involvement of the USA in individual parts of the world,

⁹² R.W. Copson, *The United States in Africa: Bush Policy and Beyond*, London–New York 2007, pp. 34-37.

⁹³ M. Kumelska, „Problemy pomocy dla Afryki...”, pp. 308-309.

⁹⁴ “Electrify Africa Act of 2015 – Report to Congress”, *USAID*, at <https://www.usaid.gov/open/electrify-africa/2016>, 25 June 2020.

⁹⁵ *Prosper Africa: U.S. Government Trade and Investment Initiative*, at <https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa>, 5 September 2020.

⁹⁶ *Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*, Department of State, Fiscal Year 2020.

including Africa. In December 2017, the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* was published, which indicated changes in the US political approach, summarized by one sentence which best reflects what is contained in the strategy itself: *This National Security Strategy puts America first.*⁹⁷ In the 53-page document, there is only one page that discusses Africa toward the end of the text. In turn, only 3 sentences were dedicated to security issues: *We will continue to work with partners to improve the ability of their security services to counter terrorism, human trafficking, and the illegal trade in arms and natural resources. We will work with partners to defeat terrorist organizations and others who threaten U.S. citizens and the homeland.*⁹⁸

In accordance with his declarations, Donald Trump introduced a radical program of saving on budget expenditures, which has also had an impact on government aid programs for Africa. As a result, the Pentagon prepared a plan for the coming years to withdraw hundreds of soldiers running antiterrorist operations in Africa, while simultaneously introducing efforts aimed at establishing the priorities for long-term rivalry with China and Russia. Currently about 7,200 members of American military personnel are located in various parts of the continent (Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Niger, and Libya). In November 2018, the US Secretary of Defense General James Mattis announced the plan to reduce the military personnel in Africa by 10%. The Pentagon also posits the limitation of missions involving the provision of advisory services, training programs and intelligence support to African countries. These reductions are to impact about 700 members of the US military forces, primarily in the West African region. Simultaneously, the American military missions in Djibouti, Somalia and Libya will not be included in the planned staff reductions. These actions are meant to optimize the operations of special forces, which in the future are to play an important role in the rivalry with China and Russia on the African continent.

The approach of the Trump Administration toward Africa is very well illustrated by what was stated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Strategy, Ambassador John R. Bolton, in December 2018 in Washington D.C. for the conservative think tank *Heritage Foundation*. Bolton emphasized that President Trump's African strategy emerges from an intensive interagency process, and reflects the core elements of President Trump's foreign policy doctrine. In the document, emphasis is placed on the most effective political approach toward Africa, as the efforts made until then, costing the American taxpayer billions of dollars, had practically not achieved the expected results either in the scope of security issues or in raising the living standards of Africans. In addition, despite the USA's huge financial involvement in helping Africa, other countries have been more successful on the continent in terms of gaining economic benefits. *Under the Administration's new approach, every decision we make, every policy we pursue, and every dollar of aid we spend will further U.S. priorities in the region [...] The United States will no longer*

⁹⁷ *A New National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, 20 April 2020.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

*provide indiscriminate assistance across the entire continent, without focus or prioritization. And, we will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions.*⁹⁹

As can be observed, Bolton clearly and explicitly links American aid for African countries with the USA's political and economic interests. *Under our new Africa strategy, we will target U.S. funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives. All U.S. aid on the continent will advance U.S. interests, and help African nations move toward self-reliance. Our first priority, enhancing U.S. economic ties with the region, is not only essential to improving opportunities for American workers and businesses; it is also vital to safeguarding the economic independence of African states and protecting U.S. national security interests. Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States.*¹⁰⁰

In March 2019, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, Head of U.S. Africa Command, stated that about 300 troops would be cut by June 2020, in phase one of a 10-percent reduction.

As Katherine Zimmerman from the American Enterprise Institute notes, thinking about these issues only from the perspective of financial calculations is a mistake, since the U.S. military spends almost 2 billion USD to sustain its African operations, which is only 0.3 percent of its \$700 billion budget. This is used to fund US Africa Command, intelligence support, operations on the continent, and provide security assistance programs for US partners. As Zimmerman puts it herself, *It is a mistake. In terms of bang for the buck, America's small military footprint in Africa buys more than just security from terrorism threats, it buys American influence on the fastest-growing continent, and does so cheaply.*¹⁰¹ According to the Institute for Security Studies, AFRICOM now has 15 'enduring' bases and 12 less permanent 'non-enduring' or 'contingency' bases in Africa.¹⁰²

What is more, further reductions of the workforce will undermine USA's credibility, not only among Washington's African partners, such as Ethiopia or Kenya, but also France, which makes extensive use of the logistics and intelligence support provided by the USA, while shouldering the burden of conducting military operations in the countries of the Sahel region in the fight against terrorist organizations in Niger, Mali

⁹⁹ "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy", Washington, 13 December 2018, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>, 24 May 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 26 June 2020.

¹⁰¹ K. Zimmerman, "Why the US Should Spend 0.3 Percent of Its Defense Budget to Prevent an African Debacle", *Military Times*, 12 March 2020, at <https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/12/why-the-us-should-spend-03-percent-of-its-defense-budget-to-prevent-an-african-debacle/>, 5 July 2020.

¹⁰² P. Fabricus, "AFRICOM may be looking for a new home...", 3 October 2020.

and Burkina Faso. Without Washington's support, France will probably not be able to continue these activities, while the statistics show that the amount of terrorist attacks in the Sahel Belt has been increasing year after year. In Mali, 160 terrorist attacks took place in 2018 with 310 casualties, while in 2019 the number grew to 268 attacks leading to 869 deaths.¹⁰³

After the decisions about the reductions had been made, a spectacular terrorist attack took place in January 2020 at the American and Kenyan army base in Lamu in Kenya. Three U.S. citizens died as a result of the al-Shabaab attack. It evoked a debate about American involvement in the war against terrorism not only in Africa but across the globe regarding the planned reductions of the U.S. army contingents, caused by the changing political priorities in Washington as implemented by the Trump Administration. The opinion voiced by Colin P. Clarke, senior research fellow at the New York-based Soufan Center, may serve as an example: *In the national defence strategy and security strategy there is a shift away from the global war on terror towards the concept of Great Power competition against Russia, China and currently Iran*. Such an approach is opposed by the Commander of AFRICOM General Stephen Townsend, who is a staunch supporter of U.S. continued military involvement in the war against terrorism in Africa. This is attested by the intensification of American military activities in Somalia, which carried out 63 drone strikes in 2019, up from the 47 done the year before.¹⁰⁴

Toward the end of November 2020, the U.S. Army announced the consolidation of U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Africa into a new command, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF). This new command will be the army service component command for both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. The recently promoted General Christopher G. Cavoli will be the commander of USAREUR-AF. *This consolidation enhances global and regional readiness in support of the National Defense Strategy*, stated Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary of the Army, and went on to say that *the new structure will increase command and control effectiveness, flexibility and the capability to conduct large-scale, joint and multi-domain operations*.¹⁰⁵

In the face of the Trump Administration's plans to reduce the military personnel around the world and – as a result – also in Africa, and the rumors about the possibility of AFRICOM being closed down, numerous voices can be heard opposing such actions not only from military circles but also Washington political circles. According to "World Politics Review", the best decision in the scope of foreign affairs and military issues made over the last 20 years by Congress was the creation of AFRICOM. In their eyes, the liquidation of the African command would at the present moment be

¹⁰³ A.J. Venter, "Keeping the Terrorists at Bay: ISIS, AQ Moved to Africa", *New African*, no. 601 (April/May 2020), p. 17.

¹⁰⁴ T. Collins, "Is al-Shabaab Becoming Bolder?", *New African*, no. 601 (April/May 2020), p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ "U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commands Consolidate", *U.S. Army Public Affairs*, 20 November 2020, at https://www.army.mil/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.army.mil%2Farticle%2F241094%2Ffu_s_army_europe_and_africa_commands_consolidate, 28 November 2020.

a terrible decision and it is good that the plans met with decisive and strong opposition in Congress.¹⁰⁶

Donald Trump, who refers to his own political approach using the slogan *America First*, has already made American immigration policies more restrictive, reduced the funding for peacekeeping missions and the U.N. Population Fund, as well as withdrawing the country from the U.N. Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the Paris climate change agreement. His policy of protective customs tariffs on steel and aluminum has hit the economies of Egypt and the Republic of South Africa hard. It is also worth noting that it took his administration about 18 months to appoint an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at the Department of State. All these steps were taken very badly within African societies, as a result of which the USA is squandering the capital of affinity and influences the previous U.S. government administrations had built up over decades.

Trump's approach toward Africa is also illustrated by the fact that he is the first American president since Ronald Reagan who did not plan a visit to any of the 54 African states in the second largest continent in the world. His four predecessors paid official visits to African countries seventeen times in the years 1990-2015, including the five times of his direct predecessor to the presidential office, Barack Obama.¹⁰⁷

It seems that despite the many myths and fears that accompanied the birth of AFRICOM and during its first years of its existence, the worst scenarios have not come to fruition. AFRICOM has not militarized Africa, it has not caused the drastic exacerbation of the rivalry with China in the region, and it has not become the military arm of US expansionism on the continent. What is more, even many skeptics among African state leaders have noted that it has thus far played and continues to play a positive role in counteracting terrorism, through the training programs supporting government enforcement forces, which can thus more easily deal with terrorist militants and extremist movements; therefore, it has supported the stability of African countries. The command is also involved in programs connected to global health, the promotion of democracy, and supporting European allies. AFRICOM attempts to merge all these disparate aspects into a coherent whole. Of course, such things can always be done better, but evaluating the command's track record for the last 10 years of its activities shows that it can be considered to have been a success. There can be no doubt that the command will be facing changes and its formula will have to undergo certain transformations. The reductions of military staff members and decrease in financial funds, while – on the other hand – the pressure to be more effective will be a serious challenge for AFRICOM. It is possible that its future, or perhaps even its very existence, will be dependent on the successful implementation of these objectives.

¹⁰⁶ C. Rondeaux, "Cutting U.S. Funding for AFRICOM Is a Losing Proposition", *World Politics Review*, 21 February 2020, at <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28550/cutting-u-s-funding-for-africom-is-a-losing-proposition>, 2 December 2020.

¹⁰⁷ Egypt – June 2009, Ghana – July 2009, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania – June-July 2013, South Africa – September 2013, Kenya, Ethiopia – July 2015, "Presidential and Secretaries Travels Abroad", 11 July 2020.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abraham C., “Eritrea – Ethiopia Tensions”, *New African*, no. 563 (July 2016).
- “African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African”, *African Oil Policy Initiative Group*, at <http://www.iasps.org/strategic/africawhitepaper.pdf>.
- African Standby Force*, at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/asf.htm>.
- Barnett T.P.M., *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, Washington 2004.
- Berschinski R.G., *AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, November 2007, pp. 3-6.
- Boutwell J., Klare M.T., “Waging a New Kind of War: A Scourge of Small Arms”, *Scientific American*, vol. 282, no. 6 (2000), <https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0600-48>.
- Burger J., “The Return of Russia to Africa”, *New African*, no. 588 (November 2018).
- “Can Africa out-trump Trump?”, *New African*, no. 571 (April 2017).
- Clark J.F., “The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracies”, *Journal of Opinion*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1998), at <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1166821>, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1166821>.
- “Clinton Praises ‘New Nigeria’”, *BBC News*, 26 August 2000, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/897423.stm>.
- “China’s African Oil Hunt Revisited”, *International Relations and Security Network, Security Watch*, at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=52652&lng=en>.
- “China’s Trade and Investment Relationship in Africa”, April 2013, *Brookings*, at [https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/2013-04_China-Africa\(GamacheHammerJones\).pdf](https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/2013-04_China-Africa(GamacheHammerJones).pdf).
- “Clinton’s Africa Trip Ends with a Promise”, *The Washington Post*, 15 August 2009, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/08/14/ST2009081403320.html?sid=ST2009081403320>.
- Cohen S.B., *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, Lanham 2014.
- Collins T., “Is al-Shabaab Becoming Bolder?”, *New African*, no. 601 (April/May 2020).
- Congressional Budget Justification Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*, Department of State, Fiscal Year 2020.
- Copson R.W., *The United States in Africa: Bush Policy and Beyond*, London–New York 2007, <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350223608>.
- “Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Decision of 13 April 2002”, *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, vol. 25, pp. 83-95, United Nations, December 2008, at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/83-195.pdf, <https://doi.org/10.18356/65fe2835-en-fr>.
- Deutsch P.J., “Energy Independence”, *Foreign Policy*, November–December 2005.
- Diamond L., “Democracy in Decline: How Washington Can Reverse the Tide”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016).

- Diop B.B., "The Danger of 'Yes Sir' Politics", *New African*, no. 562 (June 2016).
- "Diplomat, Admiral Become Co-Deputies of U.S. Africa Command", *U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs*, 29 October 2007, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.art=1576/>.
- "DoD Establishing U.S. Africa Command", *Department of Defense*, at <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2940>.
- "DoD News Briefing-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael A. Westphal", *US Department of Defense News Transcript*, 2 April 2002, at <http://www.defenselink.mil>.
- Dowden R., *Africa, Alerted States, Ordinary Miracles*, London 2009.
- Dubé F., "China's Experiment in Djibouti", *The Diplomat*, at <https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/chinas-experiment-in-djibouti/>.
- "Electrify Africa Act of 2015 – Report to Congress", *USAID*, at <https://www.usaid.gov/open/electrify-africa/2016>.
- Everstine B.W., "AFRICOM Nominee: Russia, China Growing Concern in Africa", *Air Force Magazine*, 2 April 2019, at <https://www.airforcemag.com/africom-nominee-russia-china-growing-concern-in-africa/>.
- Fabricus P., "AFRICOM May Be Looking for a New Home", 18 September 2020, *Institute for Security Studies*, at <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africom-may-be-looking-for-a-new-home>.
- Feleke E., L.A. Picard, T.F. Buss, "African Security Challenges and AFRICOM", in: T.F. Buss, J. Adjaye, D. Goldstein, L.A. Picard (eds.), *African Security and the African Command: Viewpoints on the US role in Africa*, Sterling 2011.
- Foy H., "Russia to Build Naval Base in Sudan", *Financial Times*, 16 November 2020.
- Frazer J., *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, DC, 1 August 2007, at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/africom.pdf.
- "General William E. 'Kip' Ward Commander United States Africa Command", *U.S. Africa Command*, at <http://www.africom.mil/ward.asp>.
- Heisbourg F., "A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali", *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 55, no. 2 (April–May 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458>.
- "Hillary on Safari", *The Economist*, 15 August 2009.
- "History Southern European Task Force", *U.S. Army in Africa*, at <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/history.html>.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2012. The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2012.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2013. The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2013.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), *The Military Balance 2017. The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, London 2017.
- Interview with Vincent Crawley, Deputy Director of Public Affairs U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, 1 December 2010.
- Kagan R., *The Return of History and The End of Dreams*, New York 2009.
- Keenan J.H., "War Games in the Sahel", *New African*, no. 568 (January 2017).
- Kempe F., "Africa Emerges as a Strategic Battlefield", *Wall Street Journal*, 25 April 2006.

- Klare M., Volman D., "The African 'Oil Rush' and US National Security", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590600720835>.
- Kłosowicz R., "The Role of Ethiopia in the Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa", *Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences and Language Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2015).
- Kłosowicz R., *U.S. Marines jako narzędzie polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, Kraków 2008.
- Kłosowicz R., Mormul J., *Erytrea i jej wpływ na sytuację polityczną w Rogu Afryki*, Kraków 2018.
- Kościółek J., *USA wobec ludobójstwa w Afryce: Rola amerykańskiej kultury politycznej w ewolucji polityki antyludobójczej*, Warszawa 2019.
- Kumelska M., „Problemy pomocy dla Afryki w okresie prezydentury George’a W. Busha Juniora”, *Forum Politolologiczne*, vol. 12 (2011).
- Lach Z., Skrzyp J., *Geopolityka i geostrategia*, Warszawa 2007.
- Landau E., *Osama ben Laden: Wojna z Zachodem*, przeł. K. Gradoń, Warszawa 2011.
- Mania A., *Department of State 1789-1939: Pierwsze 150 lat udziału w polityce zagranicznej USA*, Kraków 2011.
- „MARFORAF Stands Up as Corps’ Newest Command”, *U.S. Africa Command*, 14 November 2008, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2251&lang=0>.
- Mengisteab K., *The Horn of Africa*, Cambridge 2014.
- McCrisken T., "Obama's Drone War", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 55, no. 2 (April–May 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784469>.
- Mearsheimer J.J., Walt M., "The Case for Offshore Balancing", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016.
- "MiddleEastOilLessImportantthanAfricanOilforUSA", *Mongabay*, 22 February 2007, at <http://news.mongabay.com/2007/02/middle-east-oil-less-important-than-african-oil-for-us/>.
- Mormul J., "Problem łamania praw człowieka w państwach dysfunkcyjnych: Przypadek dzieci żołnierzy", in: R. Kłosowicz (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i międzynarodowe wysiłki zmierzające do ich naprawy*, Kraków 2014.
- "National Security Review 30: American Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s-Key Findings", *AllAfrica*, at <https://allafrica.com/stories/200101080520.html>.
- "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", Washington, D.C., *The White House: President George W. Bush*, 20 September 2002, at <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.
- A New National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- "Obama's Speech in Ghana", [Remarks by the president to the Ghanaian Parliament], 11 July 2009, at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament>.
- "Obama Visit Stirs Pride Among Ghanaians", *The Washington Post*, 11 July 2009.
- Pellerin Ch., "Obama to Announce AFRICOM Joint Force Command HQ in Liberia", *DoD News*, 16 September 2014, at <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/603259/obama-to-announce-africom-joint-force-command-hq-in-liberia/>.
- "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa", *National Public Radio: News and Analysis*, 7 February 2007, at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7234997>.

- Ploch L., "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa", *Congressional Research Service*, 3 April 2010
- "President Bill Clinton's Africa Trip", August 2000, Africa South of the Sahara, at <http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/clinton2000.html>.
- "Presidential and Secretaries Travels Abroad", President Barack Obama, *Department of State. Office of the Historian*, at <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/obama-barack>.
- Prosper Africa: U.S. Trade and Investment Initiative*, at <https://www.trade.gov/prosper-africa>.
- "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy", Washington, 13 December 2018, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>.
- Rondeaux C., "Cutting U.S. Funding for AFRICOM Is a Losing Proposition", *World Politics Review*, 21 February 2020, at <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28550/cutting-u-s-funding-for-africom-is-a-losing-proposition>.
- Rothchild D., Keller E., *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters*, London 2006.
- Raji R., "More Caviar, Fewer Guns on Sochi Menu?", *New African*, no. 598 (October 2019).
- "Russia, Wagner Group Complicating Libyan Ceasefire Efforts", 15 July 2020, *AFRICOM*, at <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33008/russia-wagner-group-complicating-libyan-cease>.
- Scahill J., *Brudne wojny*, transl. by J. Małecki, Kraków 2014.
- 17th Air Force*, at <http://www.17af.usafe.af.mil/>.
- Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander United States Africa Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 7 February 2019, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_02-07-19.pdf.
- Strategic Survey 2007: The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2007.
- Strategic Survey 2008: The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2008.
- Strategic Survey 2020: The Annual Review of World Affairs*, London 2010.
- "Terrorism in Africa is No Longer Somebody Else's War", *New African*, no. 560 (April 2016).
- Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCIT)*, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>.
- Trzcionka M., "Polityka sankcji Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Chin w latach 1950-2007", in: K. Budzowski (ed.), *Wybrane aspekty handlu międzynarodowego*, Kraków 2008.
- Trzcionka M., *Sankcje gospodarcze w polityce zagranicznej USA po II wojnie światowej*, Kraków 2015.
- "U.S. Africa Command Stands Up", *United States Africa Command*, 9 October 2008, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2177>.
- "US AFRICOM headquarters to remain in Germany for 'foreseeable future'", 19 February 2008, *Herald Tribune*, at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/19/africa/AF-GEN-US-Africa-Command.php>.
- "U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commands Consolidate", *U.S. Army Public Affairs*, 20 November 2020, at https://www.army.mil/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.army.mil%2Farticle%2F241094%2Fu_s_army_europe_and_africa_commands_consolidate.
- U.S. Army in Africa*, at <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/mission.html>.

- “U.S. European Command Statement Following President Bush’s Remarks Addressing Global Posture”, *United States European Command*, 16 August 2004, at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=282>.
- “U.S. President Bill Clinton in Africa”, 27 March – 2 April 1998, *AllAfrica*, at http://allafrica.com/specials/clinton2000/clinton_res.html.
- “United States Africa Command”, *U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office*, at <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644#>.
- „The Vice President Appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert”, Camp David, 16 September 2016, *The White House: President George W. Bush*, at <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html>.
- Volman D., *AFRICOM: The New U.S. Military Command for Africa*, African Security Research Project, June 2008, at <http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?p=12>.
- Volman D., “Africom to Continue Under Obama”, *Global Research*, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&caid=14131>.
- Volman D., “The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy”, *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 98 (December 2003), <https://doi.org/10.1080/04>.
- Venter A.J., “Keeping the Terrorists at Bay: ISIS, AQ Moved to Africa”, *New African*, no. 601 (April/May 2020).
- Wambu O., “Obama: The Final Verdict”, *New African*, no. 565 (October 2016).
- “Where Does America’s Oil Come From?”, *World Economic Forum*, at <http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/where-america-oil-come-from>.
- “Why the U.S. Military is in Niger”, *United States Africa Command*, 20 October 2017, at <https://www.africom.mil/article/30023/why-the-u-s-military-is-in-niger>.
- Wiatr K., „Trudne początki Africomu”, 5 October 2008, *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych*, at <http://www.psz.pl/tekst-13863/Trudne-poczatki-AFRICOMu>.
- Zachara M., “Międzynarodowy handel bronią jako czynnik destabilizujący sytuację państw dysfunkcyjnych”, in: R. Kłosowicz (ed.), *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i ich destabilizujący wpływ na stosunki międzynarodowe*, Kraków 2013.
- Zimmerman J., “Trump, as Africans See Him”, *New African*, no. 564 (October 2016).
- Zimmerman K., “Why the US Should Spend 0.3 Percent of Its Defense Budget to Prevent an African Debacle”, *Military Times*, 12 March 2020, at <https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/12/why-the-us-should-spend-03-percent-of-its-defense-budget-to-prevent-an-african-debacle/>.

Prof. Robert KŁOSOWICZ, Ph.D. – historian of international relations, Africanist, professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Director of the Jagiellonian Research Center for African Studies, His research interests include relations between diplomacy and the armed forces, the issues of international security and military conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, dysfunctional and *de facto* states. He has conducted fieldwork in over twenty African countries.