

Politeja

No. 2(83), 2023, pp. 89-117

<https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.20.2023.83.05>

Licencing information: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Michał WAWRZONEK 

Jesuit University in Cracow

michal.wawrzonek@ignatianum.edu.pl

Tomasz SZYSZLAK 

University of Wrocław

tomasz.szyszlak@uwr.edu.pl

RELIGION IN THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING IN UKRAINE

CASE STUDY ON THE UGCC AND MILITARY CHAPLAINCY¹

ABSTRACT

Priests of various faiths have tried to accompany Ukrainian soldiers as military chaplains since the very beginning of the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Finally, the Ukrainian parliament regularized the status of the military chaplaincy adopting a relevant law. Analyzing the process of shaping the chaplaincy allows us to better understand the place of religious communities and religion itself in the social life of post-Soviet Ukraine. It also allows for an examination of the nation-building process from a different and very interesting perspective. The article consists of three parts. The first one briefly presents the process of institutionalizing the military service of priests in Ukraine. In the next part, the significance of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's (UGCC) special activity in the field of military chaplaincy is demonstrated. The third part attempts to explain the reasons why the UGCC, despite a number of objective limitations, plays the leading role in the sphere of chaplaincy in Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, military chaplaincy, Ukrainian army, Ukraine: nation-building process, Ukraine: collective memory

¹ This research was supported by National Science Centre Poland, grant number 2015/19/B/HS6/01257.

INTRODUCTION

The Revolution of Dignity and its consequences have been the main factors that have determined social and political life in Ukraine since 2014. In particular it concerns an armed conflict with the so-called pro-Russian separatists, i.e., de facto Russian-Ukrainian war.² The necessity to fight to defend one's own borders, the internal migration of civilians from areas threatened by hostilities and the sacrifices made became catalysts for the nation-building process in Ukraine,³ an ongoing process since 1991. In the conceptual dimension, it means the reconstruction of the understanding of the political community and the definition of its boundaries. On the other hand, in the institutional dimension, one of the key challenges of the nation-building process in Ukraine has become the necessity of creating its own armed forces almost from scratch, such that it will be realistically capable of defending the sovereignty of the country.

The active participation of religious communities in these processes are an important factor. Traditionally, these communities enjoy a high level of social trust and therefore act as an important factor in public life.⁴ Priests from various Churches were present at the Euromaidan. They provided spiritual support to its participants and worked towards the de-escalation of the conflict. Of course, due to the religious structure in Ukraine and the location of the most important events of the Revolution of Dignity (Kyiv), the two most important Orthodox Churches were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP). However, *the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC) and its intellectuals were among the first to join the Euromaidan protests.*⁵ An

² E.A. Clark, D. Vovk (eds), *Religion During the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict*, London–New York 2020; T. Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality*, London–New York 2022; A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska, R. Sakwa (eds), *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, Bristol 2015.

³ H. Hale, R. Orttung (eds), *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reforms in Ukraine*, Stanford 2016; G. Pop-Eleches, G. Robertson, "Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine – Before and After the Euromaidan," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2-3 (2018), pp. 107-118; O. Onuch, H. Hale, "Capturing Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2-3 (2018), pp. 84-106; T. Olszański, "The Great Decommunization: Ukraine's Wartime Historical Policy," *Point of View*, no. 65 (2017), at https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_65_great_decommunisation_net_0.pdf, 2 March 2023; V. Kulyk, "National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and War," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 68, no. 4 (2016), pp. 588-608; idem, "Identity in Transformation: Russian-Speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 71, no. 1 (2019), pp. 156-178; A. Oliinyk, T. Kuzio, "The Euromaidan Revolution, Reforms and Decommunisation in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 73, no. 5 (2021), pp. 1-30.

⁴ "Dovira do instytutiv suspil'stva ta polityky, elektoral'ni oriantatsii hromadian Ukraïny (lypen'–serpen' 2021p.)" [Trust in the Institutions of Society and Politicians, Electoral Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens (July-August 2021)], at <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dovira-do-instytutiv-suspilstva-ta-politykiv-elektoralni-oriantatsii-gromadian-ukrainy>, 2 March 2023.

⁵ H. Zоргdrager, *Patriotism, Peacebuilding and Patrons in Heaven: The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic*

appeal from the Ukrainian Catholic Church in protest against Yanukovych's decision not to sign the agreement with the European Union was the first public statement supporting protests issued by an entity connected with a religious organization.⁶ Also, incidentally, *Greek Catholic priests were the first to build a prayer tent on Maidan, which they soon started to share with their Orthodox colleagues and faithful*⁷.

The reform of the Ukrainian armed forces was, at the beginning, a natural process, forced by the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. In a sense, it was a consequence of the social mobilization during Euromaidan. The reform was comprehensive, not limited to a reorganization of the military structures or the creation of new units. *The war in the Donbas shaped the Ukrainian army. It gave awareness and motivation to the soldiers, and forced the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the government of the state to adapt the army's structure – for the first time since its creation – to real operational needs.*⁸ One of the challenges related to the reform of the Ukrainian army was the formation of the chaplaincy service.

Since the emergence and development of the chaplaincy will be considered here as an element of the nation-building process in Ukraine, it is worth recalling patterns for the study of nationality formulated by Steven Grosby. Those patterns are (1) *the nation as a structure for the transmission of life, that is, a form of kinship, albeit territorial kinship*; (2) *the nation as a structure for the order of life, as expressed through custom, tradition and law*; and (3) *the nation as a structure for the freedom of life, that is, self-government usually requiring a state*.⁹ According to Grosby, a national state is based on the co-existence of *the nation as a form of kinship [...] with the nation as a form to protect life*.¹⁰ However *one of the reasons that nationality is of interest are the many examples in which there is a tension between these two orientations, as when individuals sacrifice themselves for the nation*.¹¹ In the face of the armed and hybrid Russian aggression, social life in Ukraine remained largely determined by this kind of tension.

It causes a strong uncertainty, a condition resulting from *unknowability of the world*.¹² Grosby asserts, that *this uncertainty can be formulated, albeit with a different tonality, as the mystery of life, as we find it in the world of religion. Doing so opens up for our consideration what is distinctive about religion as a response to the problems of life*.¹³ Chaplains serving in the army is one of the manners of taming the mystery of life re-

Church in Times of War, p. 1, at https://www.academia.edu/12081188/Patriotism_Peacebuilding_and_Patrons_in_Heaven_The_Ukrainian_Greek_Catholic_Church_in_Times_of_War, 2 March 2023.

⁶ L. Fylypovych, O. Horkusha, *Majdan i Tserkva* [Maidan and Church], Kyiv 2014, p. 15.

⁷ H. Zorgdrager, *Patriotism, Peacebuilding...*, pp. 1-2.

⁸ A. Wilk, "The Best Army Ukraine Has Ever Had: Changes in Ukraine's Armed Forces Since the Russian Aggression," *OSW Studies*, no. 7 (2017), p. 31.

⁹ S. Grosby, "Nationality and Religion," *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2018), p. 260.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

lated to the need to sacrifice life and health for the good of one's own community and in defense of one's own state. In an ongoing armed conflict, as is the case with Ukraine, this challenge is of particular importance.

Priests of various faiths have tried to accompany Ukrainian soldiers since the very beginning of the fighting in eastern Ukraine.¹⁴ Their work has been hampered by a lack of appropriate legal regulations, following the established patterns of priest service, background and organizational culture of the armed forces, which was largely inherited after the Soviet period. Admittedly, the analysis carried out here focuses only on the activity of the UGCC. Nevertheless, analyzing the process of shaping the chaplaincy allows us to better understand the place of religious communities and religion itself in the social life of post-Soviet Ukraine. It also allows for an examination of the nation-building process from a new and very interesting perspective.

The article consists of three parts. The first one briefly presents the process of institutionalizing the military service of priests in Ukraine. In the next part, using the available empirical data, the significance of the UGCC's special activity in the field of military chaplaincy is demonstrated. The third part attempts to explain the reasons why the UGCC, despite a number of objective limitations, plays the leading role in the sphere of chaplaincy in Ukraine.

1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MILITARY CHAPLAINCY IN UKRAINE

Chaplains officially appeared in the military structures of independent Ukraine for the first time in 1999. According to the decision of the then Minister of the Interior, Yurii Kravchenko, the Orthodox clergy from the UOC (MP) were admitted as chaplains to the units which were subordinated to his office.¹⁵ At that time, the issue of military ministry aroused many controversies and concerns. First and foremost, this response was the result of the systemic atheization in the Soviet period. According to the data of the Ukrainian Ministry of National Defense, in 1992 only 4% of people serving in the army described themselves as believers. According to the same estimates, in 1996 this ratio increased to 29%.¹⁶ Still, the atmosphere for the development of the chaplaincy ministry was unfavorable. According to a survey conducted among active soldiers by the Institute of Sociology of the National Science Academy of Ukraine in 1999, only 8.3% of the respondents supported the idea that *religion should become part of the educational system in the military*. The common opinion was that the activity of religious affiliates in the ranks of the armed forces should be limited to the exercise of worship. In 1999, 48.6% of the surveyed soldiers were convinced that the introduction of the

¹⁴ *Kapelany. Na sluzhbbi Bohu i Ukraïni* [Chaplains. In the Service for God and Ukraine], Kyiv 2019.

¹⁵ V. Voroniuk, "U viis'kakh kapelaniv nemie, ale du-u-zhe khochet'sia" [There are no chaplains in the army, although they are really wanted], *Den'*, 14 September 1999.

¹⁶ *Natsional'na Bezpeka i Oborona* [National Security and Defense], no. 10 (2000), p. 55.

institution of a chaplain would have negative consequences for the army. Only 24% of the respondents were of the opposite opinion. Another study showed that opinions about the aim of introducing military pastoral care were divided among the general public as well.¹⁷

In the opinion of experts, it was also a highly controversial issue. Doubts were raised in particular about the role of the chaplaincy, which would not be strictly limited to celebrating occasional services and rituals, but would involve the participation of the clergy in broadly understood educational work. Until 2000, it was not possible to develop a coherent secular concept of patriotism and armed service to the Fatherland, which would go above and beyond denomination.¹⁸ In this situation, allowing educational efforts in the army to be taken by priests was considered dangerous.¹⁹

In spite of these fears, the churches operating in Ukraine systematically tried to build various informal and semi-official ties with individual segments of the Ukrainian power structures. At the end of the 1990s, both the UGCC and the two largest Orthodox Churches (UOC MP and UOC KP) began to create separate departments for cooperation with the power structures and a conceptual framework of this cooperation.²⁰ Constructing a network of contacts and influence among the power structures has evolved into a specific competition, primarily between the UOC MP and the UOC KP.²¹ However, despite initial doubts, in the following years the infrastructure of contacts between religious communities and Ukrainian power structures developed.²²

The results of the research conducted systematically over a period of several years indicate a steady increase in the acceptance of military chaplaincy institutions. In 2013, 52.4% of all survey participants (regardless of declared religious affiliation) expressed a positive opinion on this issue. In 2020, this answer was given by 63.7% of the

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Pro nas" [About us] <http://kapelan.org.ua/pro-nas/>, 2 March 2023; "Istoriia" [History], *Sokal's'ko-Žovkivs'koï Ėparhii UGCC*, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/istoriya>, 2 March 2023; *Natsional'na Bezpeka...*, p. 57; T. Szyszlak, *Lwowskie sacrum, kijowskie profanum. Grekokatolicyzm w ukraińskiej przestrzeni publicznej od pierestrojki do pomarańczowej rewolucji*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 290-291.

²¹ *Natsional'na Bezpeka...*, pp. 57-58.

²² *Dyrektyva vid 21 kvitnia 2006 roku № D-25 „Pro vporiadkuvannia pytan' zadovolennia relihiinykh potreb viš'kovosluzhbovtiv Zbroinykh Syl Ukraïny"* [Directive No. D-25 dated April 21, 2006 "On Regularizing Issues of Meeting the Religious Needs of Servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"], at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v-025322-06#Text>, 2 March 2023; *Memorandum pro spivrobitnytstvo u spravakh dushpastyrskoi opiky oniku viš'kovosluzhbovtiv Zbroinykh Syl Ukraïny* [Memorandum on Cooperation in Matters of Pastoral Care of Servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 10 November 2008, at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/goverments_doc/military/42756/, 2 March 2023; *Kontseptsiiia dushpastyrskoi opiky u Zbroinykh Sylakh Ukraïny (2011 roku)* [The Concept of Pastoral Care in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2011)], at <http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/zvyazki-z-gromadskisty/rada-u-spravah-dush-pastirskoi-opiki-pri-ministerstvi-oboroni-ukraini/normativni-dokumenti-ta-metodichni-rekomendaczii/2014/07/08/konczepczia-dushpastirskoi-opiki-u-zbrojnih-silah-ukraini/>, 2 March 2023.

respondents.²³ The level of acceptance for military ministry is most likely even higher among the soldiers themselves. According to the results of a study conducted in 2020 by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense among the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 76% of respondents expressed a positive opinion on the activities of chaplains (7% of the respondents had the opposite opinion, and 17% were unable to give a specific answer).²⁴ Presumably, this increase in the percentage of positive opinions about the presence of clergymen among soldiers results from the experiences of combatants in eastern Ukraine so far.

After the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbass, the Ukrainian government and the defense ministry issued further orders regarding the conditions of service of the clergy in various military formations and its status in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.²⁵ These were ad hoc measures and there was still no uniform or universal regulation of the institution of military chaplaincy. As a result, a peculiar ambiguity emerged. In 2016, Fr. Liubomyr Yavorskyi, deputy head of the Department of the Patriarchal Curia of the UGCC for Pastoral Care in the Power Structures, characterized this quite well. In one of the interviews he stated that although *the institution of the military chaplain does not officially exist*, ‘official cooperation’ was established with state structures in the field of military pastoral ministry.²⁶

According to available data, in 2016, 444 clergymen were registered as chaplains in the war zone.²⁷ Over time, separate posts for military chaplains were created within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As of the beginning of 2020, 116 posts had been formed, but only 85 had been filled.²⁸

²³ “Osoblyvosti relihiinoho i tserkovno- relihiinoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukraïny: tendentsii 2000-2020 rr.” [Peculiarities of Religious and Church-Religious Self-determination of Citizens of Ukraine: Trends 2000-2020], Kyiv 2020, at https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2020_religiya.pdf, p. 9, 2 March 2023.

²⁴ Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, *Bila knyha – 2019-2020. Zbroïni Syly Ukraïny* [White Paper – 2019-2020. Ukrainian Armed Forces], Kyiv 2021, p. 94, at https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/white-book/WB_2020_FINAL.pdf, 2 March 2023.

²⁵ *Kabinet Ministriv Ukraïny. Rozporiadzhennia vid 2 lypnia 2014 r. N 677-p „Pro sluzhbu viis’kovoho dukhovenstva (kapelansku sluzhbu) u Zbroïnykh Sylakh, Natsionalnii hvardii ta derzhavniï prykordonnii sluzhbi,”* [Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Decree of July 2, 2014 No. 677-r “On the Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain’s Service) in the Armed Forces, the National Guard and the State Border Service”], at <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/247489978>, 2 March 2023; *Nakaz Ministra oborony Ukraïny vid 27 sichnia 2015 r. N 40 „Pro zatverdzhennia Polozhennia pro sluzhbu viis’kovoho dukhovenstva (kapelansku sluzhbu) Zbroïnykh Sylakh Ukraïny”* [Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine dated January 27, 2015 No. 40 “On Approval of the Regulation on the Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain’s Service) in the Armed Forces of Ukraine”], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 8 May 2015, at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/goverments_doc/military/59934/, 2 March 2023.

²⁶ “Holovnyi viis’kovyi kapelan UHKTs u Poltavi” [Chief Military Chaplain in Poltava], Sokal’s’ko-Žovkivs’koï Ėparhii UGKC, at <https://sokaleparchy.org.ua/index.php/kapelanstvo/49-kapelan-v-jeparhii/2110-holovnyi-viiskovyi-kapelan-uhkts-u-poltavi>, 2 March 2023.

²⁷ T. Kalenychenko, R. Kokhanchuk, *Buty poruch. Osnovy viis’kovoho kapelanstva dlia viis’kovykh i volonteriv* [To be nearby: Basics of Military Chaplaincy for Military and Volunteers], Kyiv 2017, p. 42.

²⁸ “U Zbroïnykh Sylakh na kapelanskii sluzhbi – 85 sviashchennykiv” [There Are 85 Priests in Chaplain

Finally, on November 30, 2021, the Verkhovna Rada passed the Military Chaplaincy Service Act.²⁹ Thus, the stage of formally institutionalizing military pastoral ministry in Ukraine was completed. The aforementioned act includes, among other things, a provision according to which the minimum number of chaplains in Ukrainian uniformed formations is to constitute at least 0.15% of their total number. According to the current data, this means that the Armed Forces of Ukraine itself (246,445 people)³⁰ would need over 360 chaplains.

2. UGCC AND MILITARY CHAPLAINCY

In the process of developing the institution of chaplaincy, the situation of the UGCC deserves particular attention. According to the results of public opinion polls conducted by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies in 2018, 9.5% of respondents throughout Ukraine identified with the UGCC. By comparison, at the same time, the proportion of respondents declaring themselves as 'Orthodox' was 67.3%.³¹ Meanwhile, in 2016, among 444 registered chaplains operating in the UGCC conflict zone, as many as 97 of their clergy were represented, so 22% of priests among Ukrainian soldiers at that time were former Greek Catholic priests.³² Certainly, however, there were many more clergymen who, in a more or less formalized form, carried out pastoral activities, especially among the front line divisions. The UGCC declared in 2018 that it had 162 chaplains in its ranks.³³ In 2020, out of 85 filled chaplain positions, 17 (or 20%) were held by priests of the UGCC.³⁴

The above-mentioned data should be compared with the number of UGCC believers in the ranks of the Ukrainian army. Unfortunately, no hard data is available in this respect. An attempt will be made below to estimate the number of active soldiers of the Ukrainian armed forces who identify themselves as Greek Catholics.

Service in the Armed Forces], *ArmiaInform*, 11 January 2020, at <https://armyinform.com.ua/2020/01/u-zbrojnyh-sylah-na-kapelanskij-sluzhbi-85-svyashhennykiv/>, 2 March 2023.

²⁹ Verhovna Rada Ukraïni, *Zakon pro Sluzhbu viis'kovoho kapelanstva*, at http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=70878, 2 March 2023.

³⁰ A. Shynko, "Chysel'nist' ZSU i vytraty na utrymannia v 2021 rotsi" [The Number of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Maintenance Costs in 2021], *Ukrainian Military Pages*, 18 February 2021, at <https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2021/02/utrymannya.html>, 2 March 2023.

³¹ Razumkov Centre, *Derzhava i Tserkva v Ukraïni – 2019: pidsumky roku i perspektyvy rozvytku vidnosyn (informatsiïni materialy)* [State and Church in Ukraine – 2019: Round-up of the Lear and Prospects for the Development of relations (informational materials)], Kyiv 2019, p. 14, at https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2019_Religiya.pdf, 2 March 2023.

³² T. Kalenychenko, R. Kokhanchuk, *Buty poruch...*, p. 42.

³³ O. Hordiichuk, "Kapelany Ukraïns'koho viis'ka: sil'ky ikh, iakykh konfesii, iak sluzhat" [Chaplains of the Ukrainian army: How Many There Are, What Denominations, How They Serve], *Novinarnâ*, 27 April 2018, at <https://novynarnia.com/2018/04/27/kapelani-ukrayinskogo-viyska-skilki-yih-yakih-konfesi-yak-sluzhat/>, 2 March 2023.

³⁴ "U Zbroinykh Sylakh..."

First, it is known that the area in which the UGCC has strong and well-developed structures and where the great majority of Greek Catholics live, is quite confined geographically. These are the lands of the former Eastern Galicia. The modern regions of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil can be seen as a kind of stronghold of the UGCC. It can be estimated that no more than 45-50% of the population of the former Galicia are active members of the UGCC (although even 60% of the inhabitants of this area may declare formal affiliation to this Church)³⁵.

The above estimates of the proportion of UGCC believers in these key areas of importance for its structures can be verified with the help of another source of information: official data on the number of churches owned by Greek Catholic communities in the three mentioned regions. In this way, it will be possible to better assess the degree of actual institutionalization of UGCC structures. This, in turn, will help to better frame the way this Church functions in everyday social life in Ukraine.

According to the available data from 2015, Greek Catholic communities had 657 out of 1,249 churches in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, while in the Lviv and Ternopil regions 1497 out of 2177 and 698 out of 1535 respectively. In other words, in the three mentioned regions, they occupied 55% of religious buildings (52% in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, 68% in the Lviv region, and 45% in the Ternopil region).³⁶

In turn, according to the official lists published by the Ministry of Veterans of Ukraine, as of 1 July 2019, the status of 'Participant of Combat Operations' had been granted to a total of 46,037 inhabitants of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Zakarpattia regions, i.e., the concentrated area of UGCC believers. The mentioned number represents 15% of all people who obtained the veteran status as a result of service in the structures subordinate to the Ukrainian Ministry of National Defense and in the ranks of the National Guard.³⁷ At the same time, according to the estimates cited above, it should be assumed that about half of the people in this group can identify with the UGCC on a daily basis. So, presumably 7-8% of people who obtained the status of 'Participants in Combat Actions' by mid-2019 were Greek Catholics. These estimates confirm the results of the research carried out among the personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2020 by the Ministry of Defense. They show that 7% of all respondents participating in the survey identified with the UGCC.³⁸

³⁵ A. Yurash, "Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia and Their Influence on the Religious Situation in Ukraine," *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2005), p. 194.

³⁶ *Dani pro zabezpaczenist' tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii Ukraïny kultovymy budivliamy prystosovany my pid molytovni stanom na 1 sichnia 2016* [Data on the provision of churches and religious organizations of Ukraine with religious buildings and premises adapted for prayer rooms], *Ukrainska Pravda*, at <https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/11188/response/17906/attach/5/2015.xls>, 2 March 2023.

³⁷ "Rekordsmenka za kil'kisti UBD – Dnipropetrovshchyna, a sered vidomstv – Ministerstvo Oborony" [Dnipropetrovsk Oblast holds the record for the number of Participants of Fights, and the Ministry of Defense is among the departments], *ArmiâInform*, 25 July 2019, at <https://armyinform.com.ua/2019/07/rekordsmenka-za-kilkistyu-ubd-dnipropetrovshchyna-a-sered-vidomstv-ministerstvo-oborony/>, 2 March 2023.

³⁸ It should be noted that there may have been some inconsistency in the published results. On the one hand, they show that all respondents identify with a religious community, but at the same time not

On the basis of the presented data concerning the number of combatants in eastern Ukraine and the above-mentioned statistics on the affiliation of the confessional chaplains, it can be concluded that the UGCC is, in a sense, overrepresented among the military clergy. This means that it can be assumed that there are proportionally more Greek Catholic priests in the ranks of military chaplains than Greek Catholic believers in the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine. Where can this relatively large influence of the UGCC on the development of military ministry in Ukraine come from?

3. ASSETS OF UGCC RELATED TO THE PROCESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY CHAPLAINCY

3.1. Institutional Background and Network of Contacts

When analyzing the particularly active involvement of the UGCC in the field of military chaplaincy, this effort should not be viewed against the indicators relating to the number of chaplains. In raw numbers, the ranks of military priests in Ukraine are and will probably remain dominated by representatives of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This does not necessarily mean that this community, at least at present, has a decisive influence on the development of the institution of chaplaincy in the Ukrainian army. The UGCC has several advantages that allow it to actively influence this process.

The UCGK has been making efforts to gain access to the pastoral service in the power structures of the Ukrainian state since its inception. First of all, it advocated introducing the institution of a chaplain in the Ukrainian army and in other uniformed services. As early as 1995, the then head of the UCGK, Cardinal Liubomyr Lubachivskyi, speaking to the participants of the conference *Army and Spirituality: Freedom of Conscience and Religion*, argued that in order to provide full-fledged pastoral care in the army, separate structures should be established: the military ordinariate, which would coordinate the work of chaplains it oversaw.³⁹ For a long time, however, the development of military ministry was blocked by a lack of appropriate legal regulations.⁴⁰ Despite this, UCGK (along with other major religious communities in Ukraine) began the process of institutionalizing the chaplaincy within its own structures in advance.

all of them identified themselves as 'believers' (79%). 9% declared themselves 'non-believers' and 12% were unable to give a specific answer. It is theoretically possible for study participants who described themselves as 'unbelievers' or 'undecided' about their faith to identify with a particular religious community. In other previous studies on religiosity in Ukraine, such a category of respondents appears constantly ("Osoblyvosti relihiinoho...", p. 12). Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2020 by the Ministry of Defense. They show that 7% of all respondents participating in the survey identified with UGCC (*Bila Knyha...*, p. 94).

³⁹ L. Kovalenko (ed.), *Sotsial'no zorientovani dokumenty Ukraïns'koï breko-katolytskoï tserkvy (1989-2008)* [Social Oriented Documents of the UGCC (1989-2008)], Lviv 2008, p. 103.

⁴⁰ *Natsionalna Bezpieka...*, p. 100.

The Synod of Greek Catholic Bishops, held in September 1999, decided to create a special fund to support *the development of the military chaplaincy*.⁴¹ In the years to follow, the work continued on the Statute of the Branch of the Military Clergy (chaplaincy) of the UGCC.⁴² Finally, in 2006, the Department of Military Chaplaincy under the Patriarch's Curia was established within the UGCC structure.⁴³

The year 2014 and the beginning of the war in eastern Ukraine can certainly be considered a turning point in the process of developing military pastoral ministry. It was then that the spontaneous development of various forms of pastoral service in the Ukrainian army began. However, while other communities were starting this work basically from scratch, the UGCC already had 47 chaplains at the beginning of the so-called anti-terrorist operation.⁴⁴

UGCC representatives involved in the creation of the military chaplaincy had developed a relatively wide network of direct contacts with the officer corps long before 2014. It was possible thanks to the Hetman Petr Sahaidachnyi Institute (renamed later Academy) of the Land Forces. It was here as well that the UGCC began to gain its first experiences in the field of military ministry. It was not about the individual initiatives of individual clergymen, but about developing a system to serve as a model of cooperation between the UGCC and the Ukrainian army.⁴⁵

The implementation of this goal was facilitated by the reorganization of military education carried out by the Ukrainian authorities at the beginning of the 21st century. As a result, the Academy in Lviv became a training center for practically the entire cadre of land forces. According to Andrii Zelinskyi, the deputy head of the Military Chaplaincy Department of the UGCC, following these changes *eighty percent of future army officers were concentrated in Lviv*.⁴⁶ After graduation, they went to units all over Ukraine. However, as Fr. Zelinskyi pointed out to many of the students, it was possible *to forge very good friendly relations* at that time. As a result, many *combat officers and commanders of sub-units* who fought in the combat operations zone after 2014 were graduates of the Lviv University. They were the people who first encountered the subject of chaplaincy during their studies in Lviv, when they were in contact with priests of the UGCC.⁴⁷

Most of our students saw the priests from a different perspective initially, reports Fr. Zelinskyi. *Many of them had such Soviet conceptions about us, views which could be said to*

⁴¹ *Sotsial'no zorientovani...*, p. 169.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁴³ "Pro nas," Departament viis'kovoho kapelanstva, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pro-nas/>, 2 March 2023.

⁴⁴ A. Romanik, „Fenomen viis'kovoho kapelanstva v zoni boiovykh dii na skhodi Ukraïny (za materialamy fondovoï kolektsii NMIU)” [The Phenomenon of Military Chaplaincy in the Combat Zone in Eastern Ukraine (Based on the Materials of the NMIU Stock Collection)], *Naukovyi visnyk Natsional'noho muzeiu istorii Ukraïny*, no. 2 (2017), p. 118, at <http://visnyk.nmiu.org/index.php/nv/article/view/23/18>, 2 March 2023.

⁴⁵ *Kapelany. Na sluzhbbi...*, p. 227.

⁴⁶ *Kapelany. Na sluzhbbi...*, p. 229.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

*dominate in the south-eastern parts of our country, seeing us as 'dark' and 'unenlightened' popes. But because of our work, we managed to change this attitude. We educated officers from all Christian Churches: the students belonged to different denominations and after training they returned there. But we had our contribution: we shaped the man and his spiritual world; we shaped an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, emphasized one of the most famous chaplains of the UGCC.*⁴⁸

3.2. Material Resources

Another issue is the material resources at the disposal of the UGCC. Unfortunately, there is no precise data to quantify it. However, on the basis of public opinion polls, some conjectures can be formulated as to the specific possibilities that the UGCC may have in this regard, at least in comparison with other communities in Ukraine. This concerns in particular indicators such as the views of the faithful of a given Church on the importance of the institution of the chaplaincy, and declarations about the frequency with which they provide material support for their community. It can be assumed that the more members regularly contribute to the needs of their Church and the more faithful identify with the initiatives undertaken within it, the more funds a given community can obtain for the implementation of these initiatives.

At the same time, however, the available data show that among the faithful of the UGCC, the level of support for the idea of chaplaincy service is much higher than the 'national average'. In 2020, the Razumkov Center asked respondents identifying with various denominations the following question: 'Are chaplains needed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine?'. The highest number of positive responses was among the faithful of the UGCC (95.9%). By comparison, in the case of respondents who identify with the Orthodox Church, the greatest number of supporters of the institution of chaplaincy was among people identifying with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), namely 79.5%. In the case of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) it was 70.3%, while in the group of 'simply Orthodox', only 53.4% of the responses were positive.⁴⁹

Comparing the percentage of respondents who negatively answered the above-mentioned question or were unable to give a definite answer is also quite telling. Among the faithful of the UGCC it was 0.5% and 3.6%, respectively. On the other hand, in the group of the OCU faithful, these results amounted to 9.1% responding 'no' and 11.5% 'it is difficult to say'. In the case of the faithful of the UCP MP, these results were 13.2% and 16.5%, respectively. In turn, among 'simply Orthodox Christians' 27% responded negatively, and 19.6% were not able to express their definite opinion on this issue.⁵⁰

The faithful of the UGCC also stand out in terms of the systematic transfer of material resources to their community. In 2020, 43.5% of respondents who identified with

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "Osoblyvosti relihiinoho...", p. 34.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

the UGCC declared that they regularly support their Church materially. For those participants who identified themselves as faithful to the PCU, this proportion was 15.7%. In the case of the UPC MP, this indicator was 12.5%, and in the group of 'simply Orthodox' it amounted to 3.3%.⁵¹

Of course, the cited data do not in any way determine the amount of funds that individual Ukrainian Churches may have at their disposal for the implementation of the tasks related to military pastoral care. However, some idea of this can be derived from the circumstantial information available, which can be inferred from the statements of clergymen who have been involved in the chaplaincy in one way or another.

It is worth noting the words of Father Stepan Sus (UGCC Bishop as of 2019), who created the military ministry at the Military Academy of Land Forces in Lviv. During the Revolution of Dignity and at the time of the outbreak of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, he was a pastor in the church of St. Peter and Paul in Lviv, which serves as a garrison church. According to Fr. Sus, in the first weeks of fighting, his community was able to donate 3,000 bulletproof vests. As part of the collection carried out at that time at the above-mentioned church, he managed to gather 17 million hryvnias (more than 700,000 USD) for the needs of the so-called 'anti-terrorist operation' in Donbas and to help wounded soldiers and families of the fallen.⁵²

The fact that the UGCC has a relatively large financial base is evidenced by a statement by Father Serhi Dmitriev, who served in the army on behalf of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivian Patriarchate (now OCU). He said his community's social activity budget had increased to 300,000 USD in 2018. However, as he noted, this is *a small amount compared to Greek Catholics*, who were thought to have at their disposal *15 million euros* for social purposes in 2018.⁵³ It is not possible to verify these data. Perhaps the actual budgets for social activity at the disposal of both communities are slightly different. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the quoted statement quite well illustrates the gap between the financial means of the UGCC and other communities when it comes to the implementation of various projects in the social space, not only those directly related to the ongoing armed conflict.

The outlined difference may even be a bit surprising if we take into account the official statistical data on the number of parishes owned by the UGCC and the results of public opinion polls on religious identification in Ukraine. Fr. Dmitriev explained this situation by the UGCC being *financed by the Vatican*, which other communities, including the OCU, cannot count on. The belief in the significance of material support that the UGCC allegedly receives from the Holy See seems to reflect the vitality of certain stereotypes and myths that have lingered in social consciousness in Ukraine since Soviet times rather than anything rooted in reality. However, it refers to a justified assumption that, unlike other communities in Ukraine, the UGCC can count

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 27.

⁵² *Fenomen L'vova – fil'm pro L'viv'ân* [The Lviv's Phenomenon], YouTube, 11 November 2015, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9bBS1bX06A>, 2 March 2023.

⁵³ *Kapelany. Na sluzhbi...*, p. 96.

on material support 'from abroad.' However, presumably it does not come 'from the Vatican', but mainly from the Ukrainian diaspora in Western Europe and, above all, in North America, where the UGCC has quite well developed structures.

This does not mean, however, that its potential as an active participant in Ukrainian social life is based solely on the support received 'from abroad.' The resources at its disposal 'on site', i.e., in Ukraine, should not be underestimated either. This is evidenced by a statement made by Fr. Ivan Isaiovych. Although he belongs to the autonomous and formally independent Greek-Catholic eparchy of Mukachev, he was a chaplain on behalf of the UGCC. He extended his pastoral service to the area of direct military conflict, including in the most difficult period of 2014. His account shows that at that time, the Ukrainian armed forces were being basically created from scratch, everything was lacking, from bulletproof vests to clothing, to underwear, to 'moral and psychological' support.⁵⁴ The latter was provided by Fr. Isaiovych during his chaplaincy. On the other hand, when it came to supplementing the gaps in the equipment of soldiers, the aforementioned chaplain could count on the support of various parishes. *Many of my friends supported us with food; they shared what they had. [...] The churches of Transcarpathia, Ternopil, and Lviv helped a lot. We dressed the boys. They bought everything they could, starting with socks.*⁵⁵

3.3. Symbolic Capital

The UGCC has unique symbolic capital in Ukraine, which can be used by its clergy who perform the functions of military chaplains. First of all, historically, the Greek Catholic Church has the greatest experience as an institution providing moral and spiritual support to participants in the Ukrainian struggle for national liberation. In recent history, the tradition of the chaplaincy of Greek Catholic priests dates back to 1848, when the Uniate Church was involved in the creation of the National Guard in Galicia. At that time, Greek Catholic priests carried out pastoral service in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army and the Ukrainian Galician Army.⁵⁶

However, it seems that from today's point of view, the most important thing was the involvement of Greek Catholic clergy as chaplains in regular Ukrainian military units and in partisan units during World War II. As for these regular military formations, these were the Nachtigall and Roland battalions, and the 14th Waffen SS Galician Division. In fact, only in the latter of these units was the chaplaincy service actually institutionalized. This means that even at the stage of organizing the 'Galician' division, there was a plan to establish a military chaplaincy, to formalize the status of chaplains, their place in the structure of the entire unit, and the procedure for appointing clergy to serve in the ranks of the division's soldiers. The nominated priests received military training.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Kapelany. Na sluzhbi...*, p. 248.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁵⁶ "Istoriia..."

⁵⁷ D. Zabzaliuk, *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba ukrains'kykh viis'kovykh formatsii pershoi polovyny XX st.* [Pastoral service of Ukrainian military formations of the first half of the 20th century], Lviv 2012, pp. 128-135.

When it comes to World War II and the experience in the field of military chaplaincy from that period, the theme of the activities of the UPA is much more clearly utilized. After 2014, shaping a positive image of the UPA became one of the key goals of memory politics in Ukraine. In the narrative which was promoted by state institutions et al., the partisans formed by the OUN fought uncompromisingly against all enemies of Ukrainian statehood. They included both the Soviet Union and the Third Reich.⁵⁸

In this context, the memory of the Greek Catholic clergy who performed pastoral service among Ukrainian partisans takes on a special meaning. It confirms the uniqueness of the UGCC as a community with the greatest experience in the field of military chaplaincy in Ukraine. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Fr. Zelinskyi, the deputy head of the Department of Military Chaplaincy of the UGCC, stated his Church as *the only in Ukraine today* which can lay claim to *continuity of institutional memory of the chaplaincy of its clergymen even in those times when the Ukrainian nation did not have its own independent state*. This continuity was established by Fr. Zelinskyi from the Middle Ages, and one of the stages in the development of the tradition of military chaplaincy was precisely the presence of Greek Catholic clergy *in the ranks of the UPA*.⁵⁹

One of the elements of the new historical policy was the establishment of a new holiday in 2014 by President Petr Poroshenko: the Day of the Defender of Ukraine. It is celebrated on October 14, when, in keeping with the Eastern Christian tradition, holiday of Our Lady of Protection is celebrated. According to historical sources, since the Middle Ages Ukrainian soldiers have been expected to give special veneration to the cult of the Mother of God.⁶⁰ Following the Ukrainian narrative, October 14 is also the anniversary of the UPA. The coincidence of these dates as part of the Ukrainian remembrance policy was not incidental. As UINP argues, the founders of the UPA had intentionally started the operation of their organization on the day of commemoration of the Our Lady of Protection.⁶¹

Thus, in the case of actions taken to commemorate the UPA, one can speak of a sort of legitimacy through sacralization. The UGCC actively supports this narrative. In a message preceding the Defender of the Fatherland Day in 2021, the head of the Department of Military Chaplaincy of the UGCC, Bp. Mykhail Koltun, stated that the UPA was deliberately established on October 14 *to place itself under the care of Our Lady of Protection*,

⁵⁸ "Metodičnì materiàli Ukraïns'kogo ìnstitutu nacional'noï pam'âti šodo vidznačennâ 14 žovtnâ Dnâ zahisnika Ukraïni," Ukraïns'kij Ìnstitut Nacional'noï Pam'âti, at <https://old.uinp.gov.ua/news/metodichni-materiali-ukrainskogo-institutu-natsionalnoi-pam-yati-shchodo-vidznachennya-14-zhovt>, 2 March 2023.

⁵⁹ "Sviashchennyk-viis'kovosluzhbovets': potreba i obhruntuvannia" [Military Priest: Need and Rationale], *Patriârhat*, no. 1(483) (2021), at <http://www.patriyarkhat.org.ua/statti-zhurnalu/svyaschen-nyk-vijskovosluzhbovets-potreba-j-obhruntuvannya/?fbclid=IwAR3PQcWF9e20679LtwLJyZctgwkVZhFfynKWdjnyuD4ZUVjrEwYTFXuHs>, 2 March 2023.

⁶⁰ "Informatsiïni materiàly Ukraïnskoho ìnstytutu natsionalnoï pamiati do Dnia zakhysnyka Ukraïny," Ukraïns'kij Ìnstitut Nacional'noï Pam'âti, 6 October 2020, at <https://uinp.gov.ua/informaciyni-materialy/viyskovym/informaciyni-materialy-ukrayinskogo-institutu-nacionalnoyi-pamyati-do-dnya-zahysnyka-ukrayiny-2020>, 2 March 2023.

⁶¹ Ibid.

to emphasize the bond with the generations of warriors who fought fervently for the Ukrainian State and their nation.⁶² It should be noted that the head of the UGCC Military Chaplaincy Department quite consistently promotes the myth of the UPA partisans as the 20th century legacy of the pious knighthood tradition. In a similar message in 2015, he argued that UPA fighters *gave themselves over to the Mother of God, who covered them with her blue mantle in their service of peace, freedom, and building the independence of the Ukrainian nation*.⁶³ In the context of the current memory politics in Ukraine, the experience of the UGCC pertaining to chaplaincy in the ranks of the UPA takes on particular importance, especially since, as it has been shown, elements taken from the Eastern Christian tradition have been incorporated into the symbolic capital associated with the activities of the UPA. In this situation, the commemoration of the activities of Greek Catholic chaplains in the ranks of the partisans lends credence to the image of the UGCC as the current leader in the field of military pastoral ministry among religious communities in Ukraine.

There is one more element of symbolic capital that uniquely legitimizes the UGCC in this role. It concerns the memory of Fr. Omelian Kovch (1884-1944). He was clearly an effective priest as well as a local leader of Ukrainian social and national life in Pere-myshliany. During the Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict in Eastern Galicia in 1918-1919, he was the chaplain of the Ukrainian Galician Army. He actively supported various forms of Ukrainian national life in the interwar period, which resulted in repressions by the Polish authorities. During World War II, he was involved in the rescue of Jews. As a consequence, he was arrested and sent to the Majdanek concentration camp where he died in 1944.⁶⁴

In 1999, the Jewish Council of Ukraine awarded Kovch the title of Righteous in the Ukraine. The question of awarding the clergyman the title of Righteous Among the Nations by Yad Vashem Institute still remains open.⁶⁵ In 2001, Fr. Kovch was be-

⁶² "Privitannâ Preosvâshennogo vladiki Mihaila Koltuna z nagodi svâta Pokrovi Presvâtoi Bogorodici ta Dnâ zahisnikiv i zahisnic' Ukraïni," Sokal's'ko-Žovkivs'koï Êparhii UGCC, 13 October 2021, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pryvitannia-preosviashchennoho-vladyky-mykhaila-koltuna-z-nahody-sviata-pokrovy-presviatoi-bohorodytsi-ta-dnia-zakhysnykiv-i-zakhysnyts-ukrainy/>, 2 March 2023.

⁶³ "Privitannâ vijs'kovogo êpiskopa Mihaila (Koltuna) z nagodi Pokrovi Materi Božoi ta Dnâ Ukraïns'ko-gov vijs'ka," Sokal's'ko-Žovkivs'koï Êparhii UGCC, 14 October 2015, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pryvitannia-vijskovogo-yepyskopa-myhayila-koltuna-z-nagody-dnya-pokrovy-bozhoyi-materi/>, 2 March 2023.

⁶⁴ B. Hudziak, "Parokh Maïdaneku. Dopovid' mytropolyta Borysa Gudziaka na seminari sviashcheny-kiv Zakhidnoi Yevropy v Liurdi" [The Parish Priest of Majdanek: Metropolitan Borys Gudziak's Speech at the Seminar of Priests of Western Europe in Lourdes], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 22 October 2019, at https://risu.ua/paroh-maydaneku-dopovid-mitropolita-borisa-gudzyaka-na-seminari-svyashcheny-kiv-zahidnoyi-yevropi-v-lyurdi_n100670, 2 March 2023; More on this issue: O. Kruk, *Kovcheb ottsia Kovcha* [Ark of Father Kovch], Kyiv 2017 (Polish edition: *Błogosławiony Emilian Kowcz. Proboszcz Majdanka*, Lublin 2020); A.M. Kovch-Baran (ed.), *Za Bozhi pravdy i liud's'ki prava* [For God's truths and human rights], Saskatoon 1994.

⁶⁵ "Yad Vashem gathers information about Hieromartyr Omelian Kovch – Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine," Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 2 February 2020, at https://risu.ua/en/yad-vashem-gathers-information-about-hieromartyr-omelian-kovch-ambassador-of-israel-to-ukraine_n102469, 2 March 2023.

atified by John Paul II. In the following years, the UGCC popularized his legacy as an exemplary priest. In 2009, the head of the UGCC, Liubomyr Huzar, announced Bl. Omelian Kovch to be the patron of Greek Catholic priests. In 2010, the UGCC established a special Distinction of Blessed Omelian Kovch. According to the statute, it is granted to people who *made a significant contribution to the cause of ecumenical dialogue, dialogue of cultures and nations, interreligious and international agreement, social and charitable activities* or imparted an example of *sacrifice and humanism and heroic deeds* with their lives.⁶⁶

The winners of the first few editions were cultural activists, dissidents, politicians, and people involved in charity. After the Revolution of Dignity, the group of honored people was dominated by those involved in the various related events. The distinction began to be awarded to people or organizations that helped victims of bloody clashes during the Euromaidan, who had organized material and medical support for soldiers fighting against pro-Russian 'separatists' and for civilians from the conflict area, to people who had acted in support of Ukrainian independence after 2014 in the international arena, and to soldiers who had distinguished themselves with particular bravery on the battlefield.⁶⁷

As of 2019, 100 years had passed since Fr. Kovch *began his ministry as a chaplain*. Therefore, it was decided to award the distinction to four chaplains who distinguished themselves as pastors of soldiers fighting in eastern Ukraine. They represented three denominations: Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic (of two rites: Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic). At the ceremony co-organized by the Ministry of National Defense, the head of the UGCC, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, in the presence of the Minister of Culture of Ukraine, stated that Bl. Kovch had set an example for contemporary chaplains of all denominations who were looking for an example for themselves.⁶⁸

3.4. Constraints Stemming from the Symbolic Capital

The strength of the symbolic capital at the disposal of the UGCC results, among other things, from being complementary to the current memory politics in Ukraine. It also enables the construction of a clear narrative about the unique continuity of the chaplaincy tradition in the UGCC. At the same time, however, this capital may bring about some controversy and tension. This applies especially to issues related to the period of World War II.

In connection with the announcement of the decision to form the Waffen SS 'Galizien' division, its later chief chaplain, Father Vasyl Laba from the UGCC, delivered a sermon in which he declared that *a Ukrainian national army is being formed*, thanks

⁶⁶ "4 kapelaniv nahorodyly vidznakoiu im. Omeliana Kovcha" [4 Chaplains were awarded with a badge in honor of Omeljan Kovch], 28 March 2019, at <http://kovch.org.ua/ua/publications/opera>, 2 March 2023.

⁶⁷ "Vidnzaka" [Award], at <http://kovch.org.ua/ua/award/winners>, 2 March 2023.

⁶⁸ *Promova Blažennišogo Svätoslava pid čas vručennâ Vidznaki blažennogo svâšennomučenika Omelâna Kovča*, Žive Telebačennâ, YouTube, 27 March 2019, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8oB2fCqpeM>, 2 March 2023.

to which the tradition of Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Galician Army is being revived.⁶⁹ This reference to the Ukrainian struggle for independence at the end of World War I and after probably accurately reflected the intentions of those who initiated the creation of the SS 'Galizien' division and the motivations of the volunteers who applied for it. However, this does not change the fact that it was a form of collaboration with the Third Reich. Ultimately, both the SS Galizien and the previously formed Nachti-gall and Roland battalions, which operated in the Wehrmacht structures, were not included in the official catalog of organizations acting for Ukrainian independence announced in the law "On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the 20th Century."⁷⁰

Moreover, it is worth remembering that although the SS division 'Galizien' took part in the front lines in battles against the Red Army, at least some of the related sub-units were used at the rear of the front to fight partisans. And in this case, especially in the conditions of total war, the line that separates fighting against the enemy and the repression and murder of innocent civilians was sometimes quite blurry. A perfect example of this is the alleged participation of the 4th SS Police Regiment, a unit composed of volunteers for the SS division 'Galizien', in the massacre of Polish civilians in Huta Pieniacka.⁷¹ A separate chaplain was also assigned to this regiment.⁷²

In general, it can be said that the soldiers of the above-mentioned Ukrainian formations who collaborated with the Third Reich were involved not only in morally ambiguous activities, but also in war crimes. These issues still give rise to disputes and polemics, nevertheless one gets the impression that the legacy of the SS division 'Galizien' is becoming more and more embarrassing. To some extent, this also necessarily applies to the UGCC, which supported the idea of creating this unit.

On the official website of the Department of Military Chaplainship of the UGCC, in a short description of the development of the tradition of the Ukrainian military chaplaincy, it was noted that 12 chaplains were delegated to the SS Galizien division. Apart from that, however, this element of symbolic capital is not prominently displayed by the UGCC.

Commemorating the UPA chaplains may also raise some issues. The statements about the UPA quoted above in the commemorative messages of Bp. M. Koltun can be

⁶⁹ D. Zabzaliuk, *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba...*, p. 129.

⁷⁰ *Law of Ukraine. „On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the 20th Century,”* Ukraïns'kij Ìnstitut Nacional'noï Pam'atì, at <https://uinp.gov.ua/dokumenty/normatyvno-pravovi-akty-rozrobleri-v-instituti/zakony/law-of-ukraine-on-the-legal-status-and-honoring-the-memory-of-fighters-for-ukraines-independence-in-the-twentieth-century>, 2 March 2023.

⁷¹ "Śledztwo OKŚZpNP w Krakowie w sprawie zbrodni w Hucie Pieniackiej" [Investigation of the Regional Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Cracow related to the massacre in Huta Pieniacka], Zbrodnia Wołyńska, at <https://zbrodniawolynska.pl/zw1/sledztwa/157,Sledztwo-OKSZpNP-w-Krakowie-w-sprawie-zbrodni-w-Hucie-Pieniackiej.html>, 2 March 2023; G. Motyka, "Dywizja SS «Galizien» («Halyczyna»)," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002), p. 114.

⁷² D. Zabzaliuk, *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba...*, p. 138.

interpreted as an attempt to 'Christianize' various elements of memory about the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist underground for independence. This applies especially to the tendency to reconcile selected elements of this memory with the model of 'healthy nationalism', which, from the perspective of UGCC, imposes certain desirable and acceptable relations between morality and ethics, both in the individual dimension and for the good of the community.

The issue of the model of these relations became especially topical after the Revolution of Dignity, as it was then that the nation-building process in Ukraine gained new dynamics. Traditionally, the UGCC has tried to actively participate in it. Hence, the question of the relationship between religion in general and the UGCC in particular and the *national dimension of social life*⁷³ has been and continues to be the subject of discussions and disputes between the clergy and secular members of the Greek Catholic community. In fact, this debate has been going on since the 1930s, when the 'active nationalism' of the OUN became an essential element of social life in the area where the UGCC functioned. In the course of this debate, a general view of 'healthy nationalism' emerged in the doctrine of the UGCC, which rejects chauvinism and is based on a system of Christian values.⁷⁴ In fact, it coincides with what is referred to in the literature as civic (state) nationalism. It encompasses *the entire democratic ideological spectrum, support for Ukrainian independence and an inclusive, civic state*.⁷⁵

However, the UGCC's efforts to adapt the myths on OUN and UPA to its own symbolic capital faces a twofold challenge. It not only has to be aligned with the model of civic nationalism, but also with its doctrine and social teaching. In the case of the UGCC, if the memory of the Ukrainian nationalist movement is to be helpful in the choices that an individual makes in social life, it must not only be linked with a *process of state and nation-building and the development of a consolidated Ukrainian civic nation*⁷⁶ but also with imperatives arising from Christian ethics and morality. This is another problem.

In 1943, one of the founders and leaders of the UPA, Petro Oliinyk, stated that neither the Orthodox Church nor the Greek Catholic Church *can become a mobilizing factor for our nation today*. At the same time, he emphasized that all forms of their mass gatherings should be used for *our political work*.⁷⁷ Obviously, the aforementioned UPA commander had reservations about the clergy being a potential ally in the fight, and he treated religion itself in an instrumental way. It can be assumed that this was not an isolated case. Father Ivan Hryniokh, who was a member of the OUN, a close

⁷³ V. Moroz, "Stavlennia do natsionalizmu u suchasniï UHKTs: teoriia i praktyka utverdzhenia ekleziolohichnoi svidomosti" [Attitude towards Nationalism in the Modern UGCC: Theory and Practice of Establishing Ecclesiological Consciousness], *Filosof's'ka Dumka Sententiae* (2013), special issue no. 4, p. 248.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 249-250.

⁷⁵ T. Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002), p. 157.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 143.

⁷⁷ D. Zabzaliuk, *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba...*, p. 153.

associate of its leaders and at the same time a Greek Catholic clergyman, clearly stated that *there is no reference to God in the founding documents of the UPA and UHVR, there was no place for a field chaplain in the UPA's organizational structure*.⁷⁸ It happened that clergymen were admitted to the UPA divisions as chaplains, but it was unofficial.⁷⁹ Moreover, priests from the area where the given unit was currently located occasionally came to UPA divisions with their pastoral ministry. They celebrated holy masses, especially on the most important holidays.⁸⁰ Admittedly, the research conducted so far shows that the clergy of the UGCC *supported the national liberation struggle waged by the UPA and the OUN underground*. However, no documentary evidence of the presence of chaplains in the ranks of the UPA has yet been found in the archives related to the activities of the Ukrainian independence underground.⁸¹

The approach taken by the aforementioned partisan commander to the question of religion was a consequence of the ideological assumptions of the OUN. This is especially true of its radical wing, from which a large part of the UPA leadership came. It operated on the assumptions of 'active nationalism' formulated by Dmytro Doncow. In this view, religion was reduced to the role of a center of the political struggle. Even if the author of the idea of 'active nationalism' referred to Christianity, he did so selectively, taking individual elements out of their original context and relativizing their meaning. Thus, for example, he tried to affirm such attitudes in social life as *militancy, intolerance, violence and fanaticism* through references to Christian philosophy.⁸² They became an important element of the OUN radicals' action program and, as a consequence, were a determinant of the ethical and officially binding moral standards in the UPA. It is no wonder then that as early as 1934, one of the lecturers of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv, Father Mykola Konrad, stated that the ideology of Doncov is essentially anti-Christian.⁸³

Over time, the UGCC managed to develop conceptual tools that allowed for a critical review of the heritage related to the activities of the OUN and the UPA.⁸⁴ However, after 1991, the debate on this topic resumed under new circumstances, in which, one can observe examples of *misunderstanding the nature of the Church and nationalism*.

⁷⁸ I. Hryniokh, "Shche u spravi ukrains'koho viis'kovoho dukhivnytstva" [More on the Issue of the Ukrainian Military Clergy], *Patriárhat*, vol. 5, no. 257 (1992), at <http://www.patriyarkhat.org.ua/starti-zhurnalu/sche-u-spravi-ukrajinskoho-vijskovoho-duhivnytstva-4/>, 2 March 2023.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ D. Zabzaliuk, *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba...*, p. 153.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 24.

⁸² V. Moroz, "Stavlennia do natsionalizmu...", p. 245.

⁸³ M. Konrad, *Natsionalizm i katolytyzm* [Nationalism and Catholicism], Lviv 1934.

⁸⁴ M. Wawrzonek, "Andrey Sheptytsky's «Christian Patriotism in Light of Ukrainian Nationalism», in W. Glass (ed.) *Beyond Imagined Uniqueness: Nationalisms in Contemporary Perspectives*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2010, pp. 191-206; A. Zaitsev, O. Behen, V. Stefaniv, *Natsionalizm i religii: Hreko-Katolyts'ka Tserkva ta ukrains'kyi ruch u Halychyni (1920-1930-ti roky)*, [Nationalism and Religion: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement in Galicia (1920s-1930s)], Lviv 2011.

Still, the source of controversy is the lack of awareness regarding the *incompatibility of individual assumptions* included in the Ukrainian ideology of 'active nationalism' with 'Catholic teaching'.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, some participants of the aforementioned discussions make statements that introduce *confusion as to the essence of the views of activists and organizations from the past, which were supposed to be purely Ukrainian and Christian*.⁸⁶

Heleen Zorgdrager, among others, drew attention to this problem. She had the opportunity to closely observe the activities of the UGCC during the Euromaidan period and after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. According to her, *leadership of the Church and its intellectuals consistently promote a patriotism that leaves room for the other, that seeks to be inclusive to those of different ethnic, linguistic, confessional origins*. At the same time, however, she notes that *it is not a secret that there are priests who sympathize with the ultra-nationalist movement*. As an example, she named the spiritual provider of Pravyi Sektor, Fr. Mykola Medynskyi.⁸⁷ It is worth taking a closer look at his case, as it illustrates quite well the problems related to the above-mentioned attempts to 'Christianize' the elements of memory about the OUN and UPA.

In 2015, Fr. Medynskyi acted actually as *the head of the chaplaincy service of the Ukrainian Voluntary Corps Pravyi Sektor*.⁸⁸ Admittedly, in a fairly extensive interview from 2015, the clergyman said that he did not attach much importance to *propaganda and popularization of his work*.⁸⁹ However, it is not difficult to find materials on the internet that show his activities. They document both his activity as a chaplain for soldiers at the front and as a lecturer who at various meetings tries to tell the Ukrainians 'in the back' about what was happening on the front lines of the fighting. In the statements of Fr. Medynskyi, elements of the symbolism and ideology of the OUN are quite freely combined with excerpts taken out of context from the Bible, the history of the UGCC and its doctrine. Among other things, the chaplain compared the soldiers to Christ, because *they are ready to shed blood for their people* just like Christ did it. Father Medynskyi stated that he saw in them *new Banderas, Shukhevychs and Konovalets*.⁹⁰

During the meeting with the soldiers at the front, he linked the memory of All Saints on that day with the Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist, i.e., the key program document of the OUN. Characteristically, the speech of Fr. Medynskyi contained essentially a completely secular message and could rather be interpreted as an agitation

⁸⁵ V. Moroz, "Stavlennia do natsionalizmu...", p. 249.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 250.

⁸⁷ H. Zorgdrager, *Patriotism, Peacebuilding...*

⁸⁸ M. Medynskyi, "«Natsionalist, na vidminu vid shovinista spyraiet'sia na liubov do blyzhn'oho» – holovnyi kapelan «Pravoho sektora»" ["A Nationalist, Unlike a Chauvinist, is Based on Love for One's Neighbor" – The Chief Chaplain of the "Right Sector"], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 22 April 2015, at https://risu.ua/nacionalist-na-vidminu-vid-shovinista-spirayetsya-na-liubov-do-blyzhnogo-golovniy-kapelan-pravogo-sektora_n74057, 2 March 2023.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ *Pro vijs'ko Hristove Kapelan Mikola Medyn'skij (Zaliznâk) Pravij Sektor DUK*, Pravij Sektor DUK, YouTube, 30 January 2015, at <https://youtu.be/YT2YVFtBC24>, 2 March 2023.

speech than a classic 'sermon' with which the priest addresses the faithful.⁹¹ The 'sermon' published on 'the 5th Sunday of Lent' by Fr. Medynskyi has a similarly specific rhetorical overtone. Among other things, it says: *So let the blood seeds of today's heroes sprout in the minds and hearts of future generations, in connection with our Work for the fight for Ukrainian truth, prepare us a dignified place at the right hand of Christ in the Power and Glory of the Ukrainian State!!*⁹²

These quoted statements are just a few examples of 'pastoral' activity that arouses controversy, regardless of the intentions of the chaplain. It seems that the activity of Fr. Medynskyi attracted quite early on the attention of the Curia of the Kolomyia and Chernivtsi diocese, where he served on a daily basis. Already in September 2014, the clergyman was formally summoned in connection with a speech he gave during the funeral of one of the soldiers who died during the fighting in eastern Ukraine. The speech of Father Medynski was published on the web, and its content *caused a significant negative response in society*.⁹³ In a special statement, the Curia announced that a *disciplinary conversation was held* with the clergyman, in which he was reminded that *the main task of clergy is to preach the Word of God and seek reconciliation among people* and that he was given *canonical admonition*. The communiqué also stated that Fr. Mykola *became aware of his offense and expressed sincere regret for his speech, which is not befitting a clergyman*.⁹⁴ However, it appears that these sanctions were ineffective. All the previously quoted statements of Father Medynski kept reappearing after he received a reprimand from his mother Curia. Moreover, several months later, an ordinary of the Kolomyia-Chernivtsi diocese gave his blessing to the activity of the controversial chaplain.⁹⁵

Eventually, Father Medynskyi was banned from celebrating the liturgy for three months in 2020. He was also forced to cancel 'chaplaincy trips to the east of Ukraine.' The above sanctions were applied in connection with the fact that, contrary to the express prohibition of the Curia, the clergyman successfully ran for the Ivano-Frankivsk regional council. At the beginning of 2022, his name was no longer included in the official list of the clergy of the diocese.⁹⁶

⁹¹ *Propovid' kapelana Mikoli Medins'kogo*, ĭvanna Kalina Kostûk, YouTube, 11 June 2017, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfDUygcVzC0&t=206s>, 2 March 2023.

⁹² "Ievanheliie dnia – sertsebyttia Ukraïny" [The Gospel of the Day – The Heartbeat of Ukraine], Kapelan Medins'kij Mikola Facebook, at https://www.facebook.com/ua.kapelania/posts/574476459389012/?paipv=0&eav=AfZoBinvwk_VibUFJT079O6-cNJcNwAWIwcztbChLoQDBlqsu9Vw39qD_LLntc0MU6Q&_rdr, 2 March 2023.

⁹³ "V UGKC nakazali svâšenika, âkij pid čas pohoronu bijcâ ATO prigroziv 'moskovs'kij ordi' vtratiati sered bojovikiv," Religiâ v Ukraïni, 16 September 2014, at https://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/26860-v-ugkc-nakazali-svyashhenika-yakij-pid-chas-poxoronu-bijcya-ato-prigroziv-moskovskij-ordi-vtratiati-sered-bojovikiv.html, 2 March 2023.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ "Vladyka Vasyl Ivasiuk blahoslovyyv dukhovnu aktsiiu «Vervytsia peremohy»" [Bishop Vasyl Ivasiuk blessed the spiritual action "Rosary of Victory"], at <https://ukraine-victory.jimdoofree.com/благословення>, 2 March 2023.

⁹⁶ "Kolomyis'ka ieparkhiia" [The Eparchy of Kolomyia], at <https://kolugcc.org.ua/ieparkhiia/dekanaty/>, 2 March 2023.

CONCLUSIONS

Apparently, the leadership of the UGCC in the sphere of military ministry in Ukraine is not straightforward. In terms of the religious structure, the country is traditionally dominated by people who identify with the Orthodox Church. Hence, the vast majority of chaplains who used to and continue to work among soldiers of various Ukrainian armed formations come from the OCU. It can be assumed that this will also be the case in the future. However, the UGCC has resources that allow it to actively influence the development of military chaplaincy in Ukraine. They consist of a relatively high level of institutionalization of the entire Church and its structures intended for the organization and conduct of pastoral ministry in Ukrainian armed formations, an extensive horizontal network of cooperation among the Ukrainian armed forces at various levels, and stability – probably the best developed material base for chaplaincy activities.

Separate attention should be paid to the importance of the symbolic capital that the UGCC has at its disposal. It can be said that ties with the Ukrainian national movement, including the nationalist movement, are inscribed in the identity of this community. This is especially important after the Revolution of Dignity, when in view of the need to fight aggression from Russia and pro-Russian ‘separatists’, the key figures, symbolism and various themes from the ideology and activities of the OUN acquired a new significance. Reconstructed anew, often very selectively and thoughtfully, they become essential elements of contemporary Ukrainian patriotism and the official state politics of memory. It can be assumed that in these circumstances the UGCC has gained much credibility as an institution promoting military chaplaincy.

At the same time, however, the UGCC has faced the need to update the formula of Christian patriotism, in which the symbolic capital related to the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist underground could be reconciled with the basics of the UGCC’s pastoral theology in an appropriately palatable manner. It is quite a challenge for the Greek Catholic Church.

Religion refers to the ‘wholly other’ world. The tension between nationality and religion stems from the sense of this otherness. *Why are deities understood to dwell in the heavens? To believe that the deities are in the heavens is to recognize that they are beyond our grasp, both physically and conceptually. [...] There is something mysterious about their existence that eludes our understanding in a way that nationality is not.*⁹⁷ This mystery is touched upon in the message left by Bl. Father Kovch in his letter from the Majdanek concentration camp: *I thank God a thousand times a day for sending me here. I dare not ask Him for anything more. Do not worry about me – rejoice with me!*⁹⁸ It is in vain to look for this mystery in sermons of Fr. Medynsky.

At present, chaplains in Ukraine operate in a space marked by ‘religious attachments’ on the one hand and secular ‘social relations’ on the other. The UGCC has

⁹⁷ S. Grosby, “Nationality and Religion,” p. 264.

⁹⁸ B. Hudziak, “Parokh Maidaneku...”

a well-developed doctrine leaving no doubt that social relations are to be treated as a derivative of religious attachment. In other words, in the mission carried out by the UGCC, religious attachment is, in principle, superior to social relations.

Nevertheless, any attempt to incorporate elements of memory on the Ukrainian integral nationalism into the symbolic capital of the UGCC is risky, as it may turn religious affiliation into a derivative of social relations. Consequently, the role of chaplains may be reduced to the function of therapists or equivalents of former political officers, or to performing rituals that sanctify various secular and sometimes even anti-religious symbols and elements of heritage. In effect, the nation may become the object of religion, and nationalism will be transformed into *political religion*.⁹⁹ This seems to be illustrated quite well by Fr. Medynskyi's case. Yet, this is not a problem unique to the UGCC. To some extent, it also affects other Churches.

According to Volodymyr Moroz, the discrepancies between the official interpretation of the UGCC doctrine and the way in which it is interpreted *in the field* result from *insufficient activity of the Church hierarchy* in the promotion of the correct understanding of the UGCC teaching.¹⁰⁰ The case of Father Medynskyi described above allows us to state that the Church hierarchy tries to ensure coherence between doctrine and official teaching and practical pastoral activity. However, the measures taken in this area are sometimes of limited effectiveness and inconsistent.

From the point of view of the tension between religious attachment and social relation, the symbolic capital at the disposal of the UGCC is ambivalent. Some of its elements, such as the memory of Bl. Emilian Kovch, make it possible to effectively preserve religious attachment above social relation. The situation is slightly different in the case of the adaptation of the memory of the UPA and the OUN for the purposes of military pastoral care. Originally, OUN activists tried to trespass on religion and the UGCC for their political ends. Currently, representatives of the UGCC are looking for ways to use the UPA myth in their pastoral work. So, in a sense, the roles have reversed. However, this strategy risks the relativization of essential elements of the UGCC's social teaching.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents

Dyrektynva vid 21 kvitnia 2006 roku № D-25 „Pro vporiadkuvannia pytan' zadovolennia relihiinykh potreb viis'kovosluzhbovtsiv Zbroinykh Syl Ukraïny” [Directive No. D-25 dated April 21, 2006 “On Regularizing Issues of Meeting the Religious Needs of Servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”], at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v-025322-06#Text>.
Kabinet Ministriv Ukraïny. Rozporiadzhennia vid 2 lypnia 2014 r. N 677-p „Pro sluzhbu viis'kovoho dukhovenstva (kapelansku sluzhbu) u Zbroinykh Sylakh, Natsionalnii hvardii

⁹⁹ S. Grosby, “Nationality and Religion,” p. 263.

¹⁰⁰ V. Moroz, “Stavlennia do natsionalizmu...,” p. 250.

- ta derzhavniï prykordonniï sluzhbi*” [Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Decree of July 2, 2014 No. 677-r “On the Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain’s Service) in the Armed Forces, the National Guard and the State Border Service”], at <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/247489978>.
- Kontseptsiiia dushpastyrs’koï opiky u Zbroïnykh Sylakh Ukraïny (2011 roku)* [The Concept of Pastoral Care in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2011)], at <http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/zvyazki-z-gromadskistyru/rada-u-spravah-dushpastirskoi-opiki-pri-ministerstvi-oboroni-ukraini/normativni-dokumenty-ta-metodichni-rekomendaczii/2014/07/08/konczepczyia-dushpastirskoi-opiki-u-zbrojnih-silah-ukraini/>.
- Kovalenko L. (ed.), *Sotsial’no zorientovani dokumenty Ukraïns’koï breko-katolytskoï tserkvy (1989-2008)* [Social Oriented Documents of the UGCC (1989-2008)], Lviv 2008.
- Law of Ukraine. On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in the 20th Century*, Ukraïns’kij Īnstitut Naciõnal’noï Pam’ati, at <https://uinp.gov.ua/dokumenty/normatyvno-pravovi-akty-rozrobleni-v-instituty/zakony/law-of-ukraine-on-the-legal-status-and-honoring-the-memory-of-fighters-for-ukraines-independence-in-the-twentieth-century>.
- Memorandum pro spivrobotnytstvo u spravakh dushpastyrs’koï opiky oniku viïskovoslužhboutsiv Zbroïnykh Syl Ukraïny* [Memorandum on Cooperation in Matters of Pastoral Care of Servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 10 November 2008, at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/goverments_doc/military/42756/.
- Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, *Bila knyha – 2019-2020. Zbroïni Syly Ukraïny* [White Paper – 2019-2020. Ukrainian Armed Forces], Kyiv 2021, at https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WB_2020_FINAL.pdf.
- Nakaz Ministra oborony Ukraïny vid 27 sichnia 2015 r. N 40 „Pro zatverdzhennia Polozhennia pro sluzhbu viïskovoho dukhovenstva (kapelansku sluzhbu) Zbroïnykh Sylakh Ukraïny*” [Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine dated January 27, 2015 No. 40 “On Approval of the Regulation on the Service of Military Clergy (Chaplain’s Service) in the Armed Forces of Ukraine”], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 8 May 2015, at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/goverments_doc/military/59934/.
- Verhovna Rada Ukraïni, *Zakon pro Sluzhbu viïskovoho kapelanstva*, at http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=70878.

Scientific books

- Clark E.A., Vovk D. (eds), *Religion During the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict*, London–New York 2020, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429288463>.
- Fylypovych L., Horkusha O., *Majdan i Tserkva* [Maidan and Church], Kyiv 2014.
- Hale H., Orttung R. (eds), *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reforms in Ukraine*, Stanford 2016.
- Kruk O., *Kovcheh ottsia Kovcha* [Ark of Father Kovch], Kyiv 2017.
- Kuzio T., *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality*, London–New York 2022, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003191438>.

- Pikulicka-Wilczewska A., Sakwa R. (eds), *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, Bristol 2015.
- Szyszlak T., *Lwowskie sacrum, kijowskie profanum. Grekokatolicyzm w ukraińskiej przestrzeni publicznej od pierestrojki do pomarańczowej rewolucji*, Warszawa 2012, <https://doi.org/10.23734/26.17.031>.
- Zabzaliuk D., *Dushpastyrs'ka sluzhba ukraïns'kykh viis'kovykh formatsii pershoi polovyny XX st* [Pastoral service of Ukrainian military formations of the first half of the 20th century], Lviv 2012.
- Zaitsev A., Behen O., Stefaniv V., *Natsionalizm i religiia: Hreko-Katolyts'ka Tserkva ta ukraïns'kyi ruch u Halychyni (1920-1930-ti roky)* [Nationalism and Religion: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement in Galicia (1920s-1930s)], Lviv 2011.

Scientific articles and chapters of the books

- Grosby S., "Nationality and Religion", *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12365>.
- Kulyk V., "Identity in Transformation: Russian-Speakers in Post-Soviet Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 71, no. 1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1379054>.
- Kulyk V., "National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and War", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 68, no. 4 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1174980>.
- Kuzio T., "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310220137511>.
- Moroz V., "Stavlennia do natsionalizmu u suchasniï UHKTs: teoriia i praktyka utverdzhennia ekleziolohichnoi svidomosti" [Attitude towards Nationalism in the Modern UGCC: Theory and Practice of Establishing Ecclesiological Consciousness], *Filosof's'ka Dumka Sententiae* (2013), special issue no. 4.
- Motyka G., "Dywizja SS «Galizien» («Halyczyna»)", *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2002).
- Oliiynk A., Kuzio T., "The Euromaidan Revolution, Reforms and Decommunisation in Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 73, no. 5 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1862060>.
- Onuch O., Hale H., "Capturing Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2-3 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452247>.
- Pop-Eleches G., Robertson G., "Identity and Political Preferences in Ukraine – Before and After the Euromaidan", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2-3 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452181>.
- Romanik A., "Fenomen viis'kovoho kapelanstva v zoni boiovykh diï na skhodi Ukraïny (za materialamy fondovoï kolektsii NMIU)" [The Phenomenon of Military Chaplaincy in the Combat Zone in Eastern Ukraine (Based on the Materials of the NMIU Stock Collection)], *Naukovyi visnyk Natsional'nogo muzeiu istorii Ukraïny*, no. 2 (2017), at <http://visnyk.nmiu.org/index.php/nv/article/view/23/18>.

- Wawrzonek M., "Andrey Sheptytsky's «Christian Patriotism» in Light of Ukrainian Nationalism", in W. Glass (ed.), *Beyond Imagined Uniqueness: Nationalisms in Contemporary Perspectives*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2010.
- Yurash A., "Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia and Their Influence on the Religious Situation in Ukraine", *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2005), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637490500224964>.

Other sources

- "4 kapelaniv nahorodyly vidznakoiu im. Omeliana Kovcha" [4 Chaplains were awarded with a badge in honor of Omelyan Kovch], 28 March 2019, at <http://kovch.org.ua/ua/publications/opera>.
- Dani pro zabezpechenist' tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii Ukraïny kultovymy budivliamy prysotosovanyymy pid molytovni stanom na 1 sichnia 2016* [Data on the provision of churches and religious organizations of Ukraine with religious buildings and premises adapted for prayer rooms], *Ukrainska Pravda*, at <https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/11188/response/17906/attach/5/2015.xls>.
- "Dovira do instytutiv suspil'stva ta polityki, elektoral'ni oriiientatsii hromadian Ukraïny (lypen'–serpen' 2021p.)" [Trust in the Institutions of Society and Politicians, Electoral Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens (July-August 2021)], at <https://razumkov.org.ua/napiamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dovira-do-instytutiv-suspilstva-ta-politykiv-elektoralni-oriiientatsii-gromadian-ukrainy>.
- Fenomen L'vova – fil'm pro l'viv'ân* [The Lviv's Phenomenon], YouTube, 11 November 2015, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9bBS1bX06A>.
- "Holovnyi viis'kovyi kapelan UHKTs u Poltavi" [Chief Military Chaplain in Poltava], Sokal's'ko-Žovkiv's'koï Êparhii UGKC, at <https://sokaleparchy.org.ua/index.php/kapelanstvo/49-kapelan-v-jeparhii/2110-holovnyi-viiskovyi-kapelan-uhkts-u-poltavi>.
- Hordiichuk O., "Kapelany ukraïns'koho viis'ka: sil'ky ikh, iakykh konfesii, iak sluzhat" [Chaplains of the Ukrainian army: How Many There Are, What Denominations, How They Serve], *Novinarnâ*, 27 April 2018, at <https://novynarnia.com/2018/04/27/kapelani-ukrayinskogo-viyska-skilki-yih-yakih-konfesiya-yak-sluzhat/>.
- Hryniokh I., "Shche u spravi ukraïns'koho viis'kovoho dukhivnytstva" [More on the Issue of the Ukrainian Military Clergy], *Patriârhat*, vol. 5, no. 257 (1992), at <http://www.patriyarkhat.org.ua/statti-zhurnalu/sche-u-spravi-ukrajinskoho-vijskovoho-duhivnytstva-4/>.
- Hudziak B., "Parokh Maïdaneku. Dopovid' mytropolyta Borysa Gudziaka na seminari sviashchenykyv Zakhidnoï Yevropy v Liurdi" [The Parish Priest of Majdanek: Metropolitan Borys Gudziak's Speech at the Seminar of Priests of Western Europe in Lourdes], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 22 October 2019, at https://risu.ua/paroh-maydaneku-dopovid-mitropolita-borisa-gudzyaka-na-seminari-svyashchenykyv-zahidnoji-yevropi-v-lyurdi_n100670.
- "Ievanheliie dnia – sertsebyttia Ukraïny" [The Gospel of the Day – the Heartbeat of Ukraine], Kapelan Medins'kij Mikola Facebook, at <https://www.facebook.com/ua.kapelania/posts/>

574476459389012/?paipv=0&eav=AfZoBinvwk_VibUFJTo79O6-cNJcNwAWIwcztbChLoQDBlqsu9Vw39qD_LLntc0MU6Q&_rdr.

“Informatsiini materialy Ukraïnskoho instytutu natsionalnoi pam’ati do Dnia zakhysnyka Ukraïny”, Ukraïns’kij Ġstitut Nacional’noi Pam’ati, 6 October 2020, at <https://uinp.gov.ua/informaciyni-materialy/viyskovym/informaciyni-materialy-ukrayinskogo-instytutu-natsionalnoi-pamyati-do-dnya-zahysnyka-ukrayiny-2020>.

“Istoriia” [History], *Sokal’s’ko-Žovkivs’koi Ġparhii UGKC*, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/istoriya>.

Kalenychenko T., Kokhanchuk R., *Buty poruch. Osnovy viis’kovoho kapelanstva dlia viis’kovykh i volonteriv* [To be nearby: Basics of Military Chaplaincy for Military and Volunteers], Kyiv 2017.

Kapelany. Na sluzhbi Bohu i Ukraïni [Chaplains. In the Service for God and Ukraine], Kyiv 2019.

“Kolomyi’s’ka ieparkhiia” [The Eparchy of Kolomyia], at <https://kolugcc.org.ua/ieparkhiia/dekanaty/>.

Konrad M., *Natsionalizm i katolytyzym* [Nationalism and Catholicism], Lviv 1934.

Kovch-Baran A.M. (ed.), *Za Bozhi pravdy i liuds’ki prava* [For God’s truths and human rights], Saskatoon 1994.

Medynskyi M., “«Natsionalist, na vidminu vid shovinista spyraiet’sia na liubov do blyzhn’oho» – holovnyi kapelan « Pravoho sektora »” [“A Nationalist, Unlike a Chauvinist, Is Based on Love for One’s Neighbor” – the Chief Chaplain of the “Right Sector”], Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 22 April 2015, at https://risu.ua/nacionalist-na-vidminu-vid-shovinista-spirayetsya-na-lyubov-do-blyzhnogo-golovnyi-kapelan-pravogo-sektora_n74057.

“Metodichni materiali Ukraïns’kogo instytutu nacional’noi pam’ati šodo vidznačennâ 14 žovtnâ Dnâ zahisnika Ukraïni”, Ukraïns’kij Ġstitut Nacional’noi Pam’ati, at <https://old.uinp.gov.ua/news/metodichni-materiali-ukrayinskogo-instytutu-natsionalnoi-pam-yati-shchodo-vidznachennya-14-zhovt>.

Natsional’na Bezpeka i Oborona [National Security and Defense], no. 10 (2000).

Olśański T., “The Great Decommunization: Ukraine’s Wartime Historical Policy, *Point of View*, no. 65 (2017), at https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_65_great_decommunisation_net_0.pdf.

“Osoblyvosti relihiïnoho i tserkovno- relihiïnoho samovyznachennia hromadian Ukraïny: tendentsii 2000-2020 rr.” [Peculiarities of Religious and Church-Religious Self-determination of Citizens of Ukraine: Trends 2000-2020], Kyiv 2020, at https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2020_relihiya.pdf.

“Privitannâ Preosvâshennogo vladiki Mihaïla Koltuna z nagodi svâta Pokrovi Presvâtoi Bogorodici ta Dnâ zahisnikiv i zahisnic’ Ukraïni”, Sokal’s’ko-Žovkivs’koi Ġparhii UGKC, 13 October 2021, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pryvitannia-preosviashchennoho-vladyky-mykhaila-koltuna-z-nahody-sviata-pokrovy-presviatoi-bohorodytsi-ta-dnia-zakhysnykiv-i-zakhysnyts-ukrainy/>.

“Privitannâ vijs’kovogo ħpiskopa Mihaïla (Koltuna) z nagodi Pokrovi Materi Božoï ta Dnâ Ukraïns’kogo vijs’ka”, Sokal’s’ko-Žovkivs’koi Ġparhii UGKC, 14 October 2015, at <https://>

- www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pryvitannya-vijskovogo-yepyskopa-myhayila-koltuna-z-nagody-dnya-pokrovy-bozhoyi-materi/.
- “Pro nas” [About us], at <http://kapelan.org.ua/pro-nas/>.
- “Pro nas”, Departament viis’kovoho kapelanstva, at <https://www.kapelanstvo.ugcc.ua/pro-nas/>.
- Pro vijs’ko Hristove Kapelan Mikola Medins’kij (Zaliznák) Pravij Sektor DUK*, Pravij Sektor DUK, YouTube, 30 January 2015, at <https://youtu.be/YT2YVFtBC24>.
- Promova Blažennišogo Svâtoslava pid čas vručennâ Vidznaki blažennogo svâšennomučenika Omelâna Kovča*, Žive Telebačennâ, YouTube, 27 March 2019, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8oB2fCqpeM>.
- Propovid’ kapelana Mikoli Medins’kogo*, Ivanna Kalina Kostûk, YouTube, 11 June 2017, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfDUvgcVzC0&t=206s>.
- Razumkov Centre, *Derzhava i Tserkva v Ukraïni – 2019: pidsumky roku i perspektyvy rozvytku vidnosyn (informatsiïni materialy)* [State and Church in Ukraine – 2019: Round-up of the Lear and Prospects for the Development of relations (informational materials)], Kyiv 2019, at https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2019_Religiya.pdf.
- Razumkov Centre, “Dovira do ïnstitutiv suspil’sstva ta politikiv, elektoral’ni oriëntacii gromadân Ukraïni (lipen’–serpen’ 2021r.)” [Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens (July-August 2021)], at <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/dovira-do-ïnstytutiv-suspil’sstva-ta-politikiv-eklektoralni-oriëntatsii-gromadian-ukrainy>.
- “Rekordsmenka za kil’kistiu UBD – Dnipropetrovshchyna, a sered vidomstv – Ministerstvo Oborony” [Dnipropetrovsk Oblast holds the record for the number of Participants of Fights, and the Ministry of Defense is among the departments], *ArmiâInform*, 25 July 2019, at <https://armyinform.com.ua/2019/07/rekordsmenka-za-kilkistyu-ubd-dnipropetrovshchyna-a-sered-vidomstv-ministerstvo-oborony/>.
- Shynko A., “Chysel’nist’ ZSU i vytraty na utrymannia v 2021 rotsi” [The Number of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Maintenance Costs in 2021], *Ukrainian Military Pages*, 18 February 2021, at <https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2021/02/utrymannia.html>.
- „Sviashchennyk-viis’kovosluzhbovets’: potreba i obhruntuvannia” [Military Priest: Need and Rationale], *Patriârhat*, no. 1(483) (2021), at <http://www.patriarkhat.org.ua/statti-zhurnal-u-svyaschennyk-vijskovosluzhbovets-potreba-j-obhruntuvannia/?fbclid=IwAR3PQcWF9e20679LtwLJyZctgwkeVZhFfynKWdjynuyD4ZUVjrEwYTFxuHs>.
- “Śledztwo OKŚZpNP w Krakowie w sprawie zbrodni w Hucie Pieniackiej” [Investigation of the Regional Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Cracow related to the massacre in Huta Pieniacka], *Zbrodnia Wołyńska*, at <https://zbrodnia-wolynska.pl/zw1/sledztwa/157,Sledztwo-OKSZpNP-w-Krakowie-w-sprawie-zbrodni-w-Hucie-Pieniackiej.html>.
- “U Zbrojnykh Sylakh na kapelanskiï sluzhbi – 85 sviashchennykiv” [There Are 85 Priests in Chaplain Service in the Armed Forces], *ArmiâInform*, 11 January 2020, at <https://armyinform.com.ua/2020/01/u-zbrojnykh-sylakh-na-kapelanskij-sluzhbi-85-svyashchennykiv/>.
- “V UGKC nakazali svâšenika, âkij pid čas pohoronu bijcâ ATO prigroziv ‘moskovs’kij ordi’ vtratami sered bojovikiv”, *Religiâ v Ukraïni*, 16 September 2014, at https://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/26860-v-ugkc-nakazali-svyashhenika-yakij-pid-chas-pohoronu-bijcya-ato-prigroziv-moskovskij-ordi-vtratami-sered-bojovikiv.html.

“Vidnzaka” [Award], at <http://kovch.org.ua/ua/award/winners>.

“Vladyka Vasyl Ivasiuk blahoslovyyv dukhovnu aktsiiu «Vervytsia peremohy»” [Bishop Vasyl Ivasiuk Blessed the Spiritual Action “Rosary of Victory”], at <https://ukraine-victory.jimdo-free.com/благословення>.

Voronuk V., “U viis’kakh kapelaniv nemaie, ale du-u-zhe khochet’sia” [There Is No Chaplains in the Army, Although They Are Really Wanted], *Den’*, 14 September 1999.

Wilk A., “The Best Army Ukraine Has Ever Had: Changes in Ukraine’s Armed Forces Since the Russian Aggression”, *OSW Studies*, no. 7 (2017).

“Yad Vashem gathers information about Hieromartyr Omelyan Kovch – Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine”, Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 2 February 2020, at https://risu.ua/en/yad-vashem-gathers-information-about-hieromartyr-omelyan-kovch-ambassador-of-israel-to-ukraine_n102469.

Zorgdrager H., *Patriotism, Peacebuilding and Patrons in Heaven: The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Times of War*, at https://www.academia.edu/12081188/Patriotism_Peacebuilding_and_Patrons_in_Heaven_The_Ukrainian_Greek_Catholic_Church_in_Times_of_War.

Michał WAWRZONEK – professor in Jesuit University in Cracow, graduated in the Ukrainian philology (1997) and political science (2000) from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. PhD from the same university in 2003 on the basis of dissertation on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky ecumenical activity in Ukraine and Russia (published in Rome in 2006 in Ukrainian). Habilitation conferred in 2016 for the thesis *Religion and Politics in Ukraine: The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System* (published in 2014 by Cambridge Scholars Publishing). Co-author of the book *Orthodoxy Versus Post-Communism? Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir* (with Nelly Bekus and Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska) published in 2016. Author of several articles in *East European Politics, Societies and Cultures*, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, *Схід/Захід*, *Український Історичний Журнал*, *Baltic Worlds*, *Politeja*.

Tomasz SZYSZLAK – PhD in political science (2009). He works at the Department of Eastern Studies at the Institute International of Studies (University of Wrocław). He studied ethnology and international relations at University of Wrocław. Author of several dozen scientific works, including the monograph *Lwowskie sacrum, kijowskie profanum. Grekokatolicyzm w ukraińskiej przestrzeni publicznej od pierestrojki do pomarańczowej rewolucji* (Warsaw 2012). Editor-in-Chief of journal *Wschodnioznawstwo* (ISSN 2082-7695), as well as a member of the editorial board of the magazine *Культурологічний вісник* published in Zaporizhia (ISSN 2413-2284). Guest lecturer at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, at universities in the Czech Republic, on Lithuania, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, as well as at the Faculty of Theology of the University in Opole as part of postgraduate studies “Peaceful Conflict Resolution. Ecumenical paths of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.”