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POLAND'S RAISON D'ÉTAT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

ENLARGEMENT POLICY AS A CASE STUDY

ABSTRACT

The different views on EU–Polish relations articulated by different political actors in Poland illustrate two opposite approaches toward the shape of the integration process. The ongoing political debate on Poland's *raison d'état* (reason of state) in the European Union calls for the necessity to define this notion in the current geopolitical context. In light of recent challenges and declared plans of the European Commission to transform the EU's foreign policy it seems particularly reasonable to analyze Poland's *raison d'état* in reference to the EU's enlargement policy. Therefore, the major purpose of the article is to define and explain the essence and evolution of Poland's position on the issue of EU enlargement. To be precise, the case study is concentrated on the developments caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a trigger for the reconsideration of the EU's foreign policy. By doing so, the author makes an attempt to answer the research question on the essence of Poland's *raison d'état* as regards further EU enlargement and Polish structural potential to promote its interests and shape the EU's foreign policy overall.

Keywords: European Union, member state, *raison d'état*, enlargement policy

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the collapse of communism in Poland, there was a long-lasting consensus among Polish political actors regarding membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) as the national *raison d'état*. Such foreign policy priorities were clearly outlined by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski and supported by his successors. Meanwhile, Poland's accession to the EU led to different visions on the nature of relations between EU institutions and member states as well as the scale and form of integration process overall. For the time being, more than one Polish vision of the EU exist. Instead, there are two clearly outlined alternative views on the future of European integration. Interestingly enough, representatives of both groups declare that their aim is to build a strong position of Poland in the EU. In order to realize this declaration, supporters of deeper integration argue in favor of close economic and political cooperation with the EU institutions considering them as political partners in promoting and defending European values both in the EU and among its neighbors. On the other hand, a concept of Europe of nations proposed by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s is eagerly employed in the political discourse of the conservative political camp in Poland, who advocate the idea of limiting competences of EU supranational institutions and political integration inside the EU.

Such political debates on Polish national scene reflect the state of discussion in the wider European arena. In fact, the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) devoted to the future role of the EU institutions in building relations with the governments of member and non-member states has illustrated the complexity of the subject¹ and argued for the solutions relevant to the existing geopolitical realities caused by such crises as the COVID-19 pandemic or Russia's unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. It is particularly the latter that has triggered the discussion on the need of reconsideration of the EU foreign policy and brought the issue of enlargement back into the political agenda of the EU institutions and member states' governments.

Taking into account the above mentioned developments, the major purpose of the article is to define and explain the essence and evolution of Poland's *raison d'état* in the EU on the example of the EU enlargement policy as a case study. To achieve this purpose, an attempt is made to answer the research question on the Polish structural potential to promote its interests on the European forum in the context of the EU foreign policy and, particularly, further EU enlargement. The author puts forward the hypothesis that Poland's leverage on incorporating its foreign policy vision in the official agenda of the EU is directly dependent on such factors as political leadership of Polish government and model of cooperation with the EU supranational institutions.

The article is structured as follows: the next section presents the methodology, conceptualization of key notions and research framework of the article. Then, the focus is

¹ P. Markowicz, P. Tosiek, "Deliberative Democracy or Deliberative Supranationalism? Preliminary Insights from the Conference on the Future of Europe," *Online Journal Modelling the New Europe*, no. 42 (2023), p. 162.

put on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and the role of key EU institutions in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the analysis covers Poland's official position on the enlargement as an instrument of CFSP and its impact on the transformation of the EU enlargement agenda. By doing so, an attempt is made to answer the research question on the essence of Poland's *raison d'état* as regards further EU enlargement and Polish structural potential to promote its interests and shape the EU's foreign policy overall.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY NOTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

As far as the notion of *raison d'état* (reason of state) is concerned, a generally adopted definition states that it should be analyzed from the perspective of the supreme interest of a state and the common values of the majority of its citizens and civil society organizations. To give an example, K. Łastawski defines it as the supremacy of the general interest of a state as a whole over the interests of specific groups treated as parts within this whole.² A more detailed definition is put forward by K.A. Wojtaszczyk, who points to different constructive elements of *raison d'état*. While such constituents as independence, internal order, security or territorial integrity belong to sustainable elements of the definition, it has also a number of variables of changing nature, that is, evolution of external interests due to geopolitical changes or changes in the system of civil values.³ As a matter of fact, article 5 of the Constitution of Poland underlines a number of sustainable elements mentioned above such as independence and integral sovereignty or security of Polish citizens as crucial issues that Poland protects.⁴

While *raison d'état* of a particular state focuses on the promotion of that state's position⁵ in the decision-making process in the international arena, the process of European integration aims at finding a common position of EU member states in different dimensions of the EU as a collective international actor. In fact, the process of European integration calls for confronting the *raison d'état* priorities of the states in order to come up with a consensus for effective functioning of the EU political system.⁶ Taking this into account, the article puts focus on the case study of the enlargement policy of the EU that, as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine,⁷ has returned into the political

² K. Łastawski, *Polska racja stanu po wstąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2009, *Debaty Europejskie*.

³ K. A. Wojtaszczyk, "Integracja europejska z perspektywy polskiej racji stanu," in S. Domaradzki, V. Zheltovskyy (eds.), *Racja stanu Polski w Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2020, p. 23.

⁴ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa 1997, at <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/pol/ski/kon1.htm>, 15 November 2023.

⁵ I. Radić Milosavljević, S. Domaradzki, "The EU's Raison d'état in the Western Balkans: Can the New Enlargement Methodology Help?" *Medjunarodni problemi*, vol. 74, no. 3 (2023), p. 393.

⁶ K.A. Wojtaszczyk, "Integracja europejska...", p. 24.

⁷ A. Corpadean, *A Model of Transference of the EU Integration Experience*, London 2023, p. 5.

agenda of the EU Institutions.⁸ By doing so, the author makes an attempt to illustrate the leverage of Polish position in the decision-making process on reconsideration of the EU foreign policy.

Concerning the research methodology, the empirical part of the article uses qualitative rhetorical analysis and is based on the political discourse analysis and content analysis as two leading methods. The methodology of content analysis is employed in order to conduct a qualitative analysis of selected documents on the EU enlargement policy proposed by the European Commission. On the other hand, the discourse analysis was based on a qualitative study of selected cases of political rhetoric delivered by prime minister of Poland, prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and presidents of the European Council, European Commission or European Parliament on the issue of the EU's foreign policy transformation. In terms of the subject limitations of this article, the major focus is put on the Eastern dimension of the enlargement policy and concentrates mainly on political addresses delivered after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Such choice of chronological and subject limitations has been undertaken due to the fact that Russia's open aggression against Ukraine served as a trigger for the reconsideration of the EU–Russia relations and EU's position as a structural power among its Eastern neighbors.

Additionally, by employing the method of process tracing, the undertaken study divides the analytical framework of the research into the following chronological stages related to crucial political decisions on Ukraine made by its Western allies that have direct reference to the enlargement policy of the EU:

1. 24 February 2022 to 23 June 2022 – from a full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine to the decision of the European Council to grant candidate status to Ukraine;⁹
2. 24 June 2022 to 23 November 2022 – from the decision of the European Council to grant candidate status to Ukraine to the resolution of the European Parliament designating Russia as a 'state sponsor' of terrorism due to its actions in Ukraine;
3. 24 November 2022 to 8 November 2023 – from the resolution of the European Parliament designating Russia as a 'state sponsor' of terrorism due to its actions in Ukraine to the adoption of the 2023 Enlargement Package by the European Commission.¹⁰

⁸ European Commission, *Commission adopts 2023 Enlargement package, recommends to open negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, to grant candidate status to Georgia and to open accession negotiations with BiH, once the necessary degree of compliance is achieved*, Brussels, 8 November 2023, at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_5633, 15 November 2023.

⁹ European Council, *European Council conclusions*, 24 February 2022, at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/24/european-council-conclusions-24-february-2022/>, 15 November 2023.

¹⁰ On 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted the 2023 Enlargement Package, providing a detailed assessment of the state of play and the progress made by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye, and for the first time also Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia on their respective paths towards accession to the European Union.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: POST-LISBON INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

To analyze the member state potential in promoting its *raison d'état* in the UE's foreign policy-making, it is necessary to critically evaluate the role of particular EU institutions in this process.

It is the Treaty of Lisbon that defines the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at present. Keeping in mind the failure of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe, the legislators of the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a combination of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the decision-making process in CFSP. The provisions are aimed at improving democratic legitimacy of the EU as a collective actor and introducing coherence and consistency into its external policies. In order to increase the international role of the EU, two new positions were established. First, it is the position of the President of the European Council with maximum of two two-and-a-half-year terms in office. Second, it is the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).

Interestingly, the new position of the HR combines the positions of the HR before the Treaty of Lisbon and the Commissioner for External Relations introducing the idea of two-hat concept for a holder of given office.¹¹ As mentioned above, such a combination of intergovernmental and supranational features is another example of attempts undertaken by legislators in order to increase the effectiveness and coherence of the EU external policies. The introduction of the supranational dimension to the HR functioning may be seen as a response to critical voices regarding the lack of political impact of the discussed position before the Treaty of Lisbon. As a reminder, the first HR, Xavier Solana was called 'powerless'¹² due to the lack of political instruments provided for his post in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

What is more, Javier Solana as the first HR was called 'a general without an army' due to the lack of institutional support for the functioning of the HR. The Treaty of Lisbon addressed this criticism by the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This *sui generis* institution was seen as a clear sign of the increase of the EU's international representation. In fact, EEAS, like the position of the HR, combines supranational and intergovernmental elements as it consists of staff from both intergovernmental and supranational institutions such as the General Secretariat of the Council and Diplomatic Services of EU member states or the European Commission.

Meanwhile, one could argue that there is still a lack of clear message regarding the representation of the EU in the international arena. The Treaty of Lisbon gives a field for interpretation as regards the level of engagement of the President of European

¹¹ S. Özoğuz-Bolgi, "Is the EU Becoming a Global Power After the Treaty of Lisbon?" in A. Boening, J.F. Kremer, A. van Loon (eds.), *Global Power Europe*, vol. 1, Berlin–Heidelberg 2013, p. 9.

¹² J. Habermas, J. Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe," *Constellations*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 291-297.

Council and the HR stating that: *The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.*¹³ Such formulation may raise questions on the potential of the EU to speak with one voice in the international arena in the case the President of the European Council and the HR represent different views on particular matter.¹⁴

It is, in fact, the nature of position of the HR that might create a range of other difficulties in the interpretations. Being a Vice-President of the European Commission on the one hand, and a Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council on the other, the HR represents both institutions. As a representative of the European Commission, the HR is responsible for the ensuring consistency and coherence of the EU's external action in relations with the third parties. Meanwhile, as a representative of the Council, the HR is engaged with CFSP and responsible for the ensuring the implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. As for the Foreign Affairs Council, its role is to *elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent.*¹⁵

At the same time, the decision-making process in the field of CFSP is clearly dominated by the intergovernmental dimension presented in article 31 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Even though there is a provision on constructive abstaining in a vote, unanimity is the main form of the decision-making. Furthermore, the Treaty excludes the possibility of adoption of legislative acts in the field of CFSP. Finally, the provision stating that: *If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken*¹⁶ puts member states in a driver seat when it comes to the promotion of their *raison d'état* priorities.

The existing state of play in the field of CFSP illustrates the complexity of voting on foreign policy transformation and poses a question as to the ability of the EU as a collective actor to develop a joint position that would encompass the *raison d'état* priorities of all 27 member states. It is worth noting that the vast majority of EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe did not perceive Russia as a significant threat before 2022.¹⁷ Therefore, the following part of the article makes an attempt to explain how the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine transformed the aims of the EU's foreign policy and how the EU enlargement as *raison d'état* of Poland was promoted by Polish prime minister in international arena.

¹³ *The Treaty of Lisbon*, article 15, 2009, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties/treaties-force.html>, 22 March 2024.

¹⁴ V. Zheltovskyy, "The European Parliament as Transformational Actor toward the Reconsideration of the EU Eastern Policy," *Politics of Central Europe*, vol. 18, no. 4 (2021), p. 667.

¹⁵ *The Treaty of Lisbon*, article 16.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ P. Tosiek, "The Polish Vision of EU Future: Imitation of the Hungarian Model?" *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, no. 13 (2019), p. 289.

POLAND'S RAISON D'ÉTAT IN CONTEXT OF THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY TRANSFORMATION

The analysis of the EU's foreign policy towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states (EaP) before 24 February 2022 proves that the EU's structural foreign policy in the EaP region was based on a transactional approach focused on short-term needs and maintaining the status quo with Russia. What is more, the transactional approach dominated the leadership style in the EU's relations with the Association Trio¹⁸ (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), whose appeals to the EU to provide them with a candidacy perspective fell on deaf ears of the EU officials. The situation, however, changed significantly after the unprovoked Russian military aggression against Ukraine that served as a turning point for the EU foreign policy transformation.

Having analyzed the rhetorical strategies undertaken by the leaders of the main EU institutions representing the EU in the international arena, it is possible to define four major narratives of transformational leadership in the political discourse of the leaders of the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament:

- 1) the EU as an independent actor in geopolitical relations;
- 2) the EU as a transformational power in the international arena;
- 3) the EU as a promotor of European values among member and non-member states;
- 4) 'special responsibility' of the EU toward Ukraine in light of Russia's military aggression.¹⁹

The EU's institutional consensus on the need to build its own 'strategic vision' and elaborate a new formula of cooperation with Russia resulted in the 2023 Enlargement package submitted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023. In terms of the Eastern dimension, the Commission has recommended that the Council opens accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.²⁰ Such a historic decision illustrated the political will of the European Commission's leadership to play as a proactive actor on the issue of foreign policy transformation. Similar assumption refers to the Commission's position on Georgia, which received a positive recommendation on granting the status of a candidate country. By doing so and demonstrating political will and initiative, the EU proves its structural capacity in the Eastern neighborhood countries.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the EU's foreign policy shift will result in the long-lasting political compromise on strengthening the policy of sanctions against Russia and no return to the transactional approach of 'business as usual.' In other words, the central question is whether member states will be able to sustain the 'commonality of purpose' in the context of EU–Russia relations.²¹ That is why the essence of both

¹⁸ The format of cooperation among Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia established in joint Memorandum signed in May 2021 in Kyiv that aims to unite efforts toward the EU membership.

¹⁹ V. Zheltovskyy, "The European Parliament...", p. 674.

²⁰ European Commission, *Commission adopts 2023...*

²¹ H. Maurer, R. Whitman, N. Wright, "The EU and the Invasion of Ukraine: A Collective Responsibility to Act?" *International Affairs*, vol. 99, no. 1 (2023), p. 231.

transformational leadership²² and structural potential²³ lies not only in the establishing of new structures by significant political and legal changes in the functioning of the particular state system of (potential) candidate of the EU but in the sustainability effect of newly adopted mechanisms as well.

As far as Poland's position on the enlargement issue is concerned, the following part of the article presents the narration elements in Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki's speeches devoted to the reconsideration of the EU's foreign policy. The analysis covers the speeches delivered after February 2022. On the basis of the conducted study, it is possible to define three major categories of narration on the matter of Polish *raison d'état* in the context of the EU's policy towards Russia:

1. The vision of transforming the EU's policy towards Russia.
2. The purpose of the proposed actions.
3. The moral constituent of the transformation.

The vision of transforming the EU's policy towards Russia. As regards the presented vision on the need to transform the EU–Russia relationship, a message has been repeated that Russia's invasion of Ukraine must be considered as a turning point in European history. As a result, the political discourse of Polish prime minister included calls for increased cooperation between EU member states in order to achieve coherence of action in the international arena in the face of unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine and for the need to abandon the model of transactional cooperation with Russia. It was, in fact, the transactional character of EU–Russia relations that led to close economic and political ties between a number of EU member states and Russia before 2022.²⁴ Therefore, another example of Polish *raison d'état* were the statements on changing the model of cooperation between EU member states and Russia by becoming independent from Russian hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, Poland has become a strong proponent of tighter sanctions against Russia. Among others, it was due to the lack of effectiveness of the policy of sanctions implemented after 2014 that another act of Russian aggression against Ukraine became possible in 2022. This argument was repeatedly used by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his rhetorical campaign on strengthening international sanctions against Russia.²⁵

Concerning the Polish vision on achieving the proposed change of the EU's foreign policy, the official discourse of Polish prime minister has underlined the following points:

- good relations between EU member states as the basis for effective EU foreign policy;

²² M. Leonard, "Europe's Transformative Power," *CER Bulletin*, no. 40 (2005), at <http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2005/europes-transformative-power>, 30 October 2023.

²³ S. Keukeleire, T. Delreux, "Competing Structural Powers and Challenges for the EU's Structural Foreign Policy," *Global Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2015), p. 43.

²⁴ P.J. Cardwell, E. Moret, "The EU, Sanctions and Regional Leadership," *European Security*, vol. 32, no. 1 (2023), p. 17.

²⁵ A. Khudoliy, V. Zheltovskyy, "Rhetorical Argumentation as a Public Action: the Case of Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Presidential Rhetoric," *Online Journal Modelling the New Europe*, no. 42 (2023), p. 19.

- the importance of Polish-German cooperation for the development of the region;
- cooperation with partners from the Visegrád Group to promote a common foreign policy vision in the European forum.

It is important to note that the Visegrád Group has proved to be not unanimous on a wide range of issues since its establishment.²⁶ Interestingly enough, the analysis of the political discourse of Petr Fiala,²⁷ prime minister of the Czech Republic and Eduard Heger,²⁸ prime minister of Slovakia, vividly illustrates similar features with the main line of Mateusz Morawiecki's narration on the future shape of the EU's foreign policy. At the same time, while three leaders agreed on the need to strengthen sanction policy against Russia and build strong position of the EU as a global power, one could notice different accents regarding the model of cooperation between member states and the EU institutions. If Petr Fiala and Eduard Heger argued for closer cooperation with the EU institutions and European solidarity in order to build an efficient strategy to counter the consequences of Russian aggression, Mateusz Morawiecki stressed the need to reduce the leverage of supranational institutions such as the European Commission on EU policy-making and underlined the support for the concept of Europe of Nations. In terms of Hungary, as a member of Visegrád Group, Victor Orbán continued advocating close relations with Russia and repeatedly criticized the EU's policy of sanctions and plans to resign from the status quo with Russia.²⁹

The purpose of the proposed actions. Mateusz Morawiecki asserted that the proposed actions would lead to building a strong Europe of nation states as an independent actor in the international relations. Among other aims in line with Polish *raison d'état* was strengthening the partnership of the Visegrád Group with the Western EU member states through increased economic cooperation. Undertaking the proposed steps would result in an irreversible change in the status quo in relations with Russia. Most importantly, the main purpose of the proposed actions is the preparation of the EU enlargement that would not only include Ukraine and Moldova but the Western Balkans as well.

Such rhetorical strategy implemented by Mateusz Morawiecki proved to be an important tool of promoting the official governmental position on Poland's *raison d'état* in the EU and illustrated two major elements: 1) support for the strong position of the EU as a powerful actor in the international arena and for further enlargement as a condition for growing leverage of the EU on geopolitical processes; 2) criticism for plans to increase competences of EU supranational institutions and their impact on the EU's foreign policy.

²⁶ H. Bauerová, "The V4 and European Integration," *Politics in Central Europe*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2018), p. 134.

²⁷ The author's summary of Petr Fiala's speeches on EU foreign policy, at <https://www.vlada.cz/en/cle-nove-vlady/premier/speeches/>, 12 November 2023.

²⁸ The author's summary of Eduard Heger's speeches on EU foreign policy, at <https://www.politico.eu/person/eduard-heger/>, 13 November 2023.

²⁹ The author's summary of Victor Orbán's speeches on EU foreign policy, at <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks>, 14 November 2023.

The moral constituent of the transformation. The moral constituent appears to be of significant importance from the current perspective for a number of reasons. First, observers admit that Russia, to some extent, adjusted its functioning to the implemented sanctions and thus avoided serious economic consequences.³⁰ Second, the existing views on integration and model of cooperation between EU member states and institutions stress the need of new elites and political leadership in the EU as well as for the joint effort for the sake of integration process.³¹

As a matter of fact, the reference to morality became a common feature of the political discourse in the EU. The emphasis on the role of Ukraine's fight for the defense of European values has been a common message sent by both collective (institutional) actors of the EU and individual political actors such as Mateusz Morawiecki. Moreover, the moral constituent has been used by Polish prime minister in his international addresses to promote Poland's *raison d'état* in the context of further enlargement among other member states. For this purpose one could have regularly heard the call for assistance to Ukraine as an obligation of EU member states. As for the appeals to the governments of the Western European countries (especially the government of Germany), they were centered on the calls for increased support for Ukraine and on the calls to abandon the transactional model in bilateral relations with Russia. What is more, political rhetoric of Morawiecki included criticism of the Western European countries for developing bilateral interests with Russia at the expense of other countries.

Having analyzed the way Poland's *raison d'état* was promoted in the political discourse of Polish prime minister in the aftermath of Russia's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, it is worth emphasizing that by introducing a new strategic vision based on elements of transformational leadership, the head of Polish government supported the discussion among the EU's institutional actors about the need to change the policy towards Russia. Additionally, the rhetoric of the heads of such states from the Visegrád Group as the Czech Republic and Slovakia bore strong resemblance to the rhetoric of their Polish counterpart. Another novelty was the fact that the discourse of the mentioned politicians clearly advocated taking into account the moral issue in the long-term planning of the EU foreign policy and EU–Russia relations in particular. This moral constituent was used as an argument in the discussion on such issues as abandoning the transactional model in bilateral relations with Russia as an immoral action or supporting Ukraine and a greater involvement of the EU in the developing of the enlargement strategy as a moral responsibility of the EU.

³⁰ I. Stasiukevych, M. Malovec, *EU Sanctions against Russia: Alignment of the EU Enlargement Countries*, Brussels 2022, p. 6, at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/639327/EXPO_IDA\(2022\)639327_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/639327/EXPO_IDA(2022)639327_EN.pdf), 14 November 2023.

³¹ J. Fiszer, "Koncepcje reform Unii Europejskiej i jej stanowisko wobec integracji Europy," *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, no. 13 (2019), p. 52.

CONCLUSIONS

The conducted case study of Poland's *raison d'état* in the context of the EU enlargement policy makes it possible to define the role of political discourse as a persuasion tool in promoting the Polish vision in the international arena. Meanwhile, as far as the article's assumption regarding Poland's leverage on incorporating its foreign policy vision in the official agenda of the EU is concerned, the above analysis of rhetorical strategies employed by Prime Minister Morawiecki leads to the following observations:

- the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine became a trigger for the transformation of the EU's foreign policy agenda and brought the enlargement issue, which had been politicized for a long time, back to the table of political discussion among member states;
- the issue of further EU enlargement has been repeatedly presented as Poland's *raison d'état* in the EU. For that purpose, the political discourse of Polish prime minister employed the argument stating that enlargement will lead to strengthening the structural potential of the EU and developing its position as an international actor;
- the attempt of Polish prime minister to build a joint narration within the Visegrád group resulted in a joint message of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia addressed to the Western European countries in order to convince hesitant political decision-makers to transform the formula of cooperation with Russia and develop a new vision of foreign policy. This vision primarily assumes support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. An equally important element of the political discourse of the three prime ministers was the issue of Ukraine's accession to the EU, as well as the issue of the EU enlargement and support for democratization processes in candidate and potential candidate countries;
- the moral constituent has become a central element in the political narration of the EU institutional leaders and heads of the analyzed governments on the issue of political support for Ukraine's membership perspectives. Meanwhile, despite a joint vision of Poland and European Commission on the enlargement policy as a vital step in the transformation of the EU's foreign policy, the discourse of Prime Minister Morawiecki demonstrated a lack of political will to abandon the unanimity rule as a basis of CFSP.

These observations make it possible to assert that, despite critical remarks on supranationalism expressed by Prime Minister Morawiecki in his political discourse, Poland's *raison d'état* in the context of the enlargement policy was reflected in the EU enlargement agenda. However, it remains to be seen whether such a joint vision on the enlargement as a vital element of the EU's foreign policy transformation will have a sustainability effect on those member states who do not see it as their *raison d'état* at present.

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