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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE THREE INPUTS OF GOVERNANCE: EXPERTISE, SELF-INTEREST, AND EMOTIONS

ABSTRACT The idea of evidence-based policy-making is in crisis. On the one hand, it is being disrupted by agonistic partisan polarization and post-truth politics. On the other hand, despite some nostalgia for technocracy, converging trends in political science and theory downplay the authoritative role of expertise, while emotions and self-interest receive positive reappraisals. This is most clearly visible in the evolution of deliberative democratic theory. In order to synthesize these developments, we present an integrated framework of the three inputs of governance: expertise, self-interest and emotions. We discuss and systematize non-deliberative and deliberative ways of considering these three inputs. The latter include: meaningful and contextualized representation of expertise; deliberative negotiation on parties' self-interests; as well as emotional testimonies, storytelling, bridging rhetoric etc. The framework highlights the composite nature of political discourse (as an interplay between the three inputs), serving as a comprehensive tool for policy analysis and a guide for institutional design.

Keywords: deliberation, expertise, self-interest, emotions, deliberative democracy, deliberative system

1. INTRODUCTION

The role and feasibility of *pure* expertise in democracy – i.e. expertise understood in isolation from other relevant inputs – is increasingly subject to doubt, as discussed in political science and political philosophy, among others. Policy decisions – even in the health sector, which is clearly dependent on science – are almost always burdened with prejudices, subjective preferences, and other non-expert inputs.[1] This is due to decision-makers' difficulty in understanding professional jargon,[2] stakeholder pressure,[3] or difficulties in building coalitions around policies supported by evidence.[4]

This explains a growing skepticism about the viability of evidence-based policy-making (EBPM). Marmot[5] contrasts it with the actual practice of 'policy-based evidence', where expertise is cherry-picked to legitimize predefined policies. These observations converged with the 1990s and 2000s backlash against the technocratic (*no-alternative*) neoliberal consensus and the diagnosis of *The Return of the Political*.[6] As partisan polarization became more prominent – with the proliferation of the post-truth politics – such agonistic view of democracy revealed its darker side.[7] This, in turn caused a backlash against mass democratic politics, of which *Against Democracy*[8] is illustrative, with epistocratic calls for a more elite- and expert-driven polity. At the same time Boswell proposed to consider EBPM not as an attainable practice but rather as a useful myth with a political, pragmatic, and procedural utility.[9] Unfortunately, a core element of this myth – i.e., dispassionateness, detachment from self-interest, and a sole focus on 'facts' – often serves to conceal our preexisting biases.

Menkel-Meadow has observed that naïve political theories about democratic deliberation perceive 'reason' as antithetical to *instrumental bargaining* and *effective or*

1 M.J. Dobrow, V. Goel, L. Lemieux-Charles, N.A. Black, "The Impact of Context on Evidence Utilization: A Framework for Expert Groups Developing Health Policy Recommendations," *Social Science & Medicine*, vol. 63, no. 7 (2006), pp. 1811-1824; D. McCaughey, N.S. Bruning, "Rationality versus Reality: The Challenges of Evidence-Based Decision Making for Health Policy Makers," *Implementation Science*, vol. 5, no. 39 (2010), pp. 1-13.

2 J. Lavis, H. Davies, A. Oxman, J.-L. Denis, K. Golden-Biddle, E. Ferlie, "Towards Systematic Reviews that Inform Health Care Management and Policy-Making," *Journal of Health Services Research & Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35-48.

3 K. Buse, N. Mays, G. Walt, *Making Health Policy*, Maidenhead 2012.

4 M.A. Hajer, H. Wagenaar (eds), *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, Cambridge 2003.

5 M.G. Marmot, "Evidence Based Policy or Policy Based Evidence?," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 328 (2004), pp. 906-907.

6 C. Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London–New York 1993.

7 M. Mazur-Bubak, "A Few Problems with Mouffe's Agonistic Political Theory," *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2019), pp. 307-318.

8 J. Brennan, *Against Democracy*, Princeton 2016.

9 J. Boswell, "What Makes Evidence-Based Policy Making Such a Useful Myth? The Case of NICE Guidance on Bariatric Surgery in the United Kingdom," *Governance*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2018), pp. 199-214.

feeling-based arguments that involve passions, emotion and ethical, religious, or strongly held values.[10] She insisted on the rehabilitation of those 'modes of modern discourse', even though, at the time (2010s US healthcare reform), they seemed to only cause policy paralysis by fueling political polarization. She advised that in policy-making *we need all forms of discourse: principled reason, instrumental bargaining, and, in addition, feeling-based claims involving the recognition, if not acceptance, of the passions and emotions of others*.[11] This rehabilitation of emotional rhetoric and of self-interest took place within the deliberative-democratic theory, reinforced by the theory's systemic turn.

While the rehabilitation of these inputs is justified – with multiple examples of their constructive contribution in the deliberative system – caution is advised. This is because these inputs, as Billingham observes in reference to emotions, can equally invoke *stories that run in the opposite direction, and it is not clear which we should consider more likely to be accurate*.[12] We find this call for skepticism justified – extending it to self-interest as well as expertise – since *the [deliberative] system might wash away apparently troubling phenomena or it might amplify them*.[13]

These developments call for a comprehensive synthesis that does away with the outdated assumptions and accommodates recent, often ambivalent conclusions. To fill this gap, we present and expand on an integrated framework of 'three inputs of governance' – entailing: expertise, self-interest, and emotions. Our proposal is rooted in normative deliberative-democratic theory and uses insights from health policy analysis.[14] The framework also provides a toolbox for a systemic role assessment of other, non-deliberative types of discussion, especially: debates, bargaining and expert panels. The upshot is that all three inputs should be included in democratic deliberation since they all are intrinsic for governance (politics and policy). However, they all inherently carry a risk of undermining deliberation, thus they require specific, deliberative-democratic treatment. Also, when it comes to debates, bargaining and expert panels – even though they are non-deliberative in themselves – they can contribute constructively to the deliberative democratic system.

We start by briefly reviewing the most important recent developments in deliberative-democratic theory, notably the notions of 'deliberative systems' and 'deliberative stance' (section 2). Following this, we review the literature concerning the three inputs' roles for public discussions and systematize deliberative and non-deliberative

[10] C. Menkel-Meadow, "Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution in Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 74, no. 3 (2011), p. 3.

[11] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[12] P. Billingham, "Sharing Reasons and Emotions in a Non-Ideal Discursive System," *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2023), p. 310.

[13] Ibid.

[14] M. Zabdyr-Jamróz, "'All They Want Is Money!' The Deliberative Theory Approach to the Inclusion of Nurses' Self-Interests in the 2016 Strike in the Children's Memorial Health Institute in Warsaw," *Social Theory & Health*, vol. 19 (2021), pp. 68-91; M. Zabdyr-Jamróz, *Wszechstronniczość. O deliberacji w polityce zdrowotnej z uwzględnieniem emocji, interesów własnych i wiedzy eksperckiej*, Kraków 2023.

ways of considering them (section 3). Next, we explore the analytical potential of the proposed three inputs framework (section 4).

2. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Deliberative democracy holds a special relation to expertise, self-interests and emotions since handling these three inputs in public deliberation has been its implicit focal interest from the start. The notable shift in the treatment of these inputs can be better understood on the backdrop of the history of deliberative democracy.

2.1. Deliberation and deliberative systems

Mansbridge defines *deliberation in the public sphere* minimally and broadly as *mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values and interests regarding matters of common concern*.[15] Such deliberation aims at enabling well-informed and fair policy-making. This is also applicable when public deliberation is consultative or advisory only – where final decision-making (weighing and reflecting) is entrusted to public authorities or professional bodies: either in internal deliberations or in the solitary deliberation of a single decision-maker. The latter is particularly noteworthy, since – after careful and open-minded listening to others – there is an *internal-reflective* dimension of deliberation.[16]

Deliberation is the focal point of deliberative democracy – a broad theory and practice that includes an emphasis on the educational aspect of democracy.[17] Earlier empirical deliberative-democratic approaches focused on individual instances of deliberation within a limited time and space, most notably within 'minipublics', i.e., specific methods of ensuring good quality deliberation by involving a representative sample of citizen-lay-people. The recent systemic turn[18] broadened the interest of deliberative democracy to a wider 'deliberative system' – i.e., an entirety of multiple, interconnected sites or instances of communicative actions that shape the world-view of the general public over time (*k*nowledge creep) and may eventually impact decision making (decision by accretion).[19]

[15] "A Minimalist Definition of Deliberation," in P. Heller, V. Rao (eds), *Deliberation and Development: Rethinking the Role of Voice and Collective Action in Unequal Societies*, Washington, D.C. 2015, p. 27.

[16] R.E. Goodin, "Democratic Deliberation Within," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2000), pp. 81-109.

[17] J.M. Bessette, "Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government," in R.A. Goldwin, W.A. Schambra (eds), *How Democratic Is the Constitution?*, Washington, D.C. 1980, pp. 102-116.

[18] J. Mansbridge, J. Bohman, S. Chambers, Th. Christiano, A. Fung, J. Parkinson, D.F. Thompson, M.E. Warren, "A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy," in J. Parkinson, J. Mansbridge (eds), *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*, New York 2012, pp. 1-26.

[19] C.H. Weiss, "Knowledge Creep and Decision Accretion," *Science Communication*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1980), pp. 381-404; G. Mackie, "Does Democratic Deliberation Change Minds?," *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, vol. 5, no. 3 (2006), pp. 279-303.

What matters in the systemic approach is not whether every communicative act is a deliberation but whether elements perform their role so that the whole system delivers on its 'deliberative functions': truth-based preference change (epistemic function), democratic inclusion (democratic function), and mutual respect (ethical function).[20] The implication here is that individual cases of deliberation do not have to yield preference change immediately to be considered impactful. It also means that certain practices that are not 'deliberative' in themselves – such as protests and strikes – can yield 'deliberative results' to the entirety of the system: e.g., by bringing attention to crucial yet previously ignored issues. In policy-making, this approach re-evaluates even the unstructured forms of public engagement: from an intrusion or an obstruction into an opportunity to learn and adjust.

2.2. The deliberative stance

The systemic approach expands the deliberative democratic theory's interest to all forms of conversation, even to everyday talk.[21] However, as Owen and Smith emphasize, deliberation is still a unique form of conversation. In their view, it is a *special kind of talk* that requires striving for what they call a *deliberative stance – a relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reasons oriented as if to reach a shared practical judgment*.[22]

Following and specifying this view, we define the deliberative stance as a willingness to learn from others or a type of open-mindedness that implies readiness to change position in reaction to arguments and reasons, without expecting to receive something in return. This does not mean that such a position change is obligatory. The point is rather that deliberation is organized in such a way that it facilitates preference change. As Elster notes, changing one's mind should not be considered a demanded end-goal but an *essential byproduct* of deliberation.[23] It is *a goal that can be intentionally achieved only as a consequence of aiming at some other objective*.[24]

3. THREE INPUTS OF GOVERNANCE

In its early years, deliberative democracy was very skeptical of emotions and self-interests. Both were considered inconsistent with quality deliberation, as the former make people susceptible to rhetorical manipulation and the latter leads them to

[20] J. Mansbridge, J. Bohman, S. Chambers, Th. Christiano, A. Fung, J. Parkinson, D.F. Thompson, M.E. Warren, "A Systemic Approach...".

[21] J.J. Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System," in S. Macedo (ed.), *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*, Oxford 1999, pp. 211-239.

[22] D. Owen, G. Smith, "Survey Article: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2015), p. 228.

[23] J. Elster, *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 43-108.

[24] M. Fuerstein, "Democratic Consensus as an Essential Byproduct," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2014), p. 282.

egocentric bargaining. With time, however, through the reception of external critique and internal discussions, deliberative democracy reconciled with these two inputs while also becoming less uncritical towards expertise.

We synthesize these developments in the three inputs of governance framework,[25] based on the distinction of three general types of inputs relevant for consideration in governance (in politics and policy): expertise, self-interest, and emotions. The key premise of the framework – derived from the state-of-the-art – is that, while each of these inputs bears the risk of deteriorating the deliberative stance, all of them are indispensable in public deliberation and there are specific strategies to ensure their deliberative consideration.

Particularly illustrative for this premise is the design of the British Food Standards Agency or the FSA – which has been *post hoc* recognized by Hajer, Laws, and Wersteeg, as an example of *deliberative governance*.[26] The Agency was established in 2001, largely in response to a dire authority crisis of the UK government during the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or the 'mad cow disease'), which was associated with Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease among humans. The key element of the FSA's institutional design was its Board in which a variety of stakeholders were given an opportunity to engage in deliberation (scientists who were core personnel of the Agency; food industry representatives; and consumers, including laypeople) and their implicit role was to bring certain crucial inputs to the deliberation on the issue at hand. The FSA's 'deliberative governance' adhered to, or even anticipated, developments in the deliberative-democratic theory: most notably, an inclusion of self-interest and emotions into deliberation, alongside less naïvely viewed expertise.

In this part, we discuss reasons for this shift in approach towards each of the three inputs and enumerate various forms of their expression: those that foster deliberative-democratic values and those that do the opposite, while not necessarily being illegitimate in the broader deliberative system. We systematize our conclusions in the section 4.1 (see: references to table 1 in parentheses).

3.1. Expertise

Expertise is a body of scientific, professional or academic knowledge governed by a scientific or other scholarly method involving systematization and the authority of peer recognition.[27] Expertise is usually a well-grounded knowledge on what the reality *is*. However, it is rarely exercised in complete detachment from what we *ought* to

[25] M. Zabdyr-Jamróz, *Wszechstronniczość...*

[26] M.A. Hajer, D. Laws, W. Versteeg, "Authority Through Deliberative Governance: The British Food Standards Agency in Action," in M.A. Hajer (ed.), *Authoritative Governance: Policy Making in the Age of Mediatization*, Oxford 2009, pp. 125-169.

[27] F. Fischer, *Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry*, New York 2009, p. 17; C. Holst, A. Molander, "Epistemic Democracy and the Accountability of Experts," in C. Holst (ed.), *Expertise and Democracy*, Oslo 2014, pp. 20-21.

do (values and norms).[28] This holds especially in disciplines relevant to policy-making (public administration, law, medicine, public health, ethics, etc.), which have their own normative commitments.

It is also possible to identify normative expertise, though such expertise would be 'ethical' (context-dependent) rather that 'moral' (universal).[29] Its methodological coherence and systematization distinguishes it from the usual sets of moral or political stances that are driven primarily by spontaneous intuitive judgements (emotions, see: 3.3).

Non-deliberative aspects of expertise

Expertise is a notably distinct type of input as compared to emotions and self-interest. While the latter two were traditionally excluded from deliberation, expertise was even identified with deliberation to the point of being considered its essence. Typical reservations towards expertise in policy-making concern its contamination by other inputs: by the 'human element', or bias. The ideal of evidence-based medicine or policy-making (EBPM) is jeopardized by the prevalent instrumentalization of science (see tab.1: A4), in service to 'policy-based evidence.'[30] Preventing this traditionally involved erecting a 'positivist firewall' between policy-making and politics[31] – where expertise is insulated from politicians and special interests by being compartmentalized in various forms of 'expert panels' (A3): within professional civil service or in dedicated bodies (institutes, agencies, etc.) kept at 'arm's length' from the government.

Such was the case with the FSA – in order to ensure experts' independence the Agency was established as an ALB (arm's length body). However, the deliberative design of the FSA did not rely only on compartmentalization of expertise in its purest, supposedly unbiased form. Another goal was to avoid experts' *hubris* – overconfidence and insulation from *real lives* (A2).

What was rejected for the Agency was the frequent claim that policy should be based solely on science. Guhin called this latter claim a *myopia of scientism* – a shortsightedness, rooted in the quasi-religious cult of science.[32] Usually, it is even more narrow-sighted, taking the form of 'expert tunnel-vision' within the given expert's field. This occurs when stakeholders, laypeople and even experts themselves become infatuated with the authoritative power of one indicator or a single approach/school within a discipline – especially when it imposes a single 'optimal' solution (as in the famous slogan: TINA or 'there is no alternative'). They fall into the sort of 'scientific facts fetish', ignoring the complexities and shortcomings of any given research or theory.

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[28] H.E. Douglas, *Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal*, Pittsburgh 2009.

[29] Cf. C. Holst, A. Molander, "Epistemic Democracy..." , pp. 27-28.

[30] M.G. Marmot, "Evidence Based Policy...".

[31] M.A. Hajer, H. Wagenaar, "Introduction," in M.A. Hajer, H. Wagenaar (eds), *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, Cambridge 2003, p. 13.

[32] J. Guhin, "A Rational Nation Ruled by Science Would Be a Terrible Idea," *New Scientist*, 6 July 2016, at https://www.newscientist.com/article/2096315-a-rational-nation-ruled-by-science-would-be-a-terrible-idea/, 30 March 2017.

Experts' hubris is a fertile ground for the instrumentalization of science (A4). It often makes scholars – even the most renowned – *particularly bad at identifying their own fallibilities*,[33] thus replacing evidence-based with *eminence*-based policy. When pride, convictions, or vested interests come into play, expertise does not prevent biased interpretation of evidence.[34] Studies on motivated numeracy indicated that people with higher competences might be even better at rationalizing their cognitive dissonance to their own advantage.[35] As Rushefsky observed: *science, in its regulatory incarnation, is used to forward political goals by all sides*.[36]

A related issue is the popular assumption that science on its own will resolve all political controversies, at least when they relate to facts. The problem with such a claim is that the very context of policy-making changes the conditions of exercising science.[37] As Collingridge and Reeve explain: *The low cost of error in pure science gives scientists there the blessing of time in which opinions can be tested out and changed, unlike most applications of science where delay is expensive*.[38] The burden of political accountability or even legal liability discourages expert policy-advisors from admitting errors and changing their minds.

Collingridge and Reeve distinguished two models of interaction between science and public policy: 'under-critical' and 'over-critical.'[39] In the under-critical model, the starting point is the preexisting expert consensus that rationalizes and legitimizes already adopted policies, even if they show signs of dysfunction. Scientists who dispute this consensus face double resistance: from 'traditional political adversaries' as well as from their distinguished colleagues. In the over-critical model, scientific research is initiated in response to the controversy surrounding a given problem. Here, the political polarization fuels a seemingly *endless technical debate – effectively destroying the conditions under which technical consensus may be expected*[40] (at least until evidence for one side is overwhelming).

Sarewitz concludes that – with enough cherry-picking – *science is sufficiently rich, diverse, and Balkanized to provide comfort and support for a range of subjective, political positions on complex issues*.[41] This leads him to the counterintuitive conclusion that *we are not*

[33] S.A. Bandes, "Emotion and Deliberation: The Autonomous Citizen in the Social World," in J.E. Fleming (ed.), *Passions and Emotions*, New York 2013, p. 212.

[34] Ph.E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?*, Princeton 2005.

[35] D.M. Kahan, "Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection," *Judgment and Decision Making*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2013), pp. 407-424.

[36] M.E. Rushefsky, *Making Cancer Policy*, Albany 1986, p. 5.

[37] L. Salter, E. Levy, W. Leiss, *Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards*, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1988.

[38] D. Collingridge, C. Reeve, *Science Speaks to Power: The Role of Experts in Policymaking*, London 1986, p. 30.

[39] Ibid., pp. 29-33.

[40] Ibid., p. 32.

[41] D. Sarewitz, "Science and Environmental Policy: An Excess of Objectivity," in R. Frodeman, V.R. Baker (eds), *Earth Matters: The Earth Sciences, Philosophy, and the Claims of Community*, Prentice-Hall 2000, p. 90.

suffering from a lack of objectivity, but from an excess of it.[42] We set too high expectations for science in how it should serve policy and how much certainty it should provide. This is due to our shallow, linear understanding of how *science extracts truth from nature*.[43] Latour observes that the high standard for a single scientific truth can be strategically exploited in public debates whenever technical disputes are exposed,[44] causing dismissal of scientific recommendations as *just a theory* often in favor of some ungrounded pseudo-scientific alternatives that represent what Feynman described as *cargo cult science*.[45]

This can be observed in 'deliberate obfuscation' by scholars associated with particular industries or ideologies, whom Oreskes and Conway dubbed *Merchants of Doubt*.[46] The resulting 'endless technical debate' influences public opinion and decision-makers, leading to *paralysis by analysis* (tab.1: A5) – inaction due to the dismissal of well-grounded or developing scientific consensus.

An interesting manifestation of this was the strategic exploitation of 'nonknowledge' when the gaps in information regarding the risks and potential profits of the new shale gas mining technology were used as arguments for its immediate approval, delayed regulation, and greater tax benefits for mining companies.[47] Exploitation of nonknowledge relies on the myth of scientific incompetence in regulatory policies, i.e. the impression that restrictions imposed by expert regulatory agencies and motivated by caution are excessive for being insufficiently evidence-based.[48]

This misses the fact that the task of public authorities – much like physicians – is to operate in the realm of uncertainty and the lack of information: to respond to threats and save lives even when there is a lack of evidence. Of course, such decisions should be based on evidence to the extent that it is available. However, its lack cannot paralyze necessary actions or restrictions, especially when waiting for research could cost lives. Public policy-making often requires decisiveness even in the absence of knowledge. The COVID-19 pandemic invoked demands to wait for randomized controlled trials before undertaking policy interventions (medical and public health). Insistence on this approach, in the context where immediate intervention was deemed necessary to save lives – together with persistent non-specificity on the matter of effectiveness of homeopathy – was dubbed by Gorski as *methodolatry*.[49]

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42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 92.

44 B. Latour, *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*, Cambridge 2004.

45 R.P. Feynman, "Cargo Cult Science. Some Remarks on Science, Pseudoscience, and Learning How to Not Fool Yourself," *Caltech's Commencement Address*, 1974, at https://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.htm, 26 February 2025.

46 N. Oreskes, E.M. Conway, *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Climate Change*, New York 2011.

47 A. Wagner, "Shale Gas: Energy Innovation in a (Non-)Knowledge Society: A Press Discourse Analysis," *Science and Public Policy*, vol. 42, no. 2 (2015), pp. 273-286.

48 T. Greenwood, "The Myth of Scientific Incompetence of Regulatory Agencies," *Science, Technology, and Human Values*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1984), pp. 83-96.

49 D. Gorski, "The Cochrane Mask Fiasco: How the Evidence-Based Medicine Paradigm Can Produce Misleading Results," *Science-Based Medicine*, 13 March 2023, at https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/

Deliberative expression of expertise

Science is never 'just about facts'. It is about connecting facts in causal relations and presenting them in context. That is why Pielke argues against claims that experts in a democracy must *merely present facts*.[50] This supposedly unprejudiced approach is actually more prone to cherry-picking and misinterpretation. A much more valuable contribution for democracy is when experts put 'facts' in the proper perspective. This includes expanding the field of available policy options and presenting the fullest possible (and most comprehensible) picture of the relevant determinants and impacts. It should also enable informed decision-making when there is a lack of evidence – especially in situations demanding urgent action.

The original challenge for the FSA was potential media spin – misinterpretation of evidence or its instrumentalization and biased framing by mass media (e.g., leading to unnecessary panic or outrage). In this case, exorbitant public expectations toward scientists posed another challenge, by making honest conclusions about the lack of evidence ('We simply don't know') unsatisfactory and unpopular. That is why the FSA's practice included a strategy of *spinning politics of anti-spin* through careful narrative contextualization.[51]

Deliberative expression of expertise (A1) is knowledge that is not only evidence-based, but is also delivered in a *meaningful way*[52] as well as being comprehensive and contextualized (to prevent 'expert tunnel-vision') – by confronting alternative approaches/schools within a discipline and presenting the full range of relevant determinants. That requires a significant degree of interaction and feedback between various experts and stakeholders (incl. laypeople), most notably in cases where evidence requires interpretation or is insufficient for clear policy guidance.

Communicating science should avoid exclusionary expert jargon and adapt to the discursive sensibilities of the specific audience to prevent misinterpretation or manipulation. The deliberative approach requires moderation of how scholars and other experts engage with decision-makers and other stakeholders in order to encourage deliberative expression of expertise. The task is to expect plain language, demand contextualization, and require clarity, thus enabling better comprehension and risk assessment.

These are some of the most important challenges in processing expertise. We must find balance between 'under-critical' and 'over-critical' approaches to regulatory science. On the one hand, we should recognize signs of groupthink among experts and themselves. On the other, we must avoid 'paralysis by analysis'. All this while not following the president Truman's preference for only 'one-handed' experts (i.e., those that will not cast doubt on a recommendation, by statements starting with: 'But on the other hand...'). And we must always remember the famous warning attributed to

the-cochrane-mask-fiasco-how-the-evidence-based-medicine-paradigm-can-produce-misleading-results/, 20 May 2023.

50 R.A. Pielke Jr, *The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics*, New York 2007.

51 M.A. Hajer, D. Laws, W. Versteeg, "Authority Through Deliberative Governance...", p. 135.

52 M.A. Hajer, *Authoritative Governance: Policy Making in the Age of Mediatization*, Oxford 2009, p. 22.

Mark Twain: *It ain't what you don't know that gets you in trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so*.

3.2. Self-interest

Deliberative-democratic theory eventually has become more open to self-interest, including material self-interest. This type of interest relates to existential needs, is particular for a group or an individual, and can potentially collide with the self-interests of others or with the common or public interest. Mansbridge et al. observed that self--interest excludes *other-regarding and ideal-regarding interests*, such as *when a representative is arguing against the interests of others for the 'self'-interest of a constituency or an individual for the 'self'-interest of her or his family or other subgroup with which she is deeply identified*.[53]

Non-deliberative aspects of self-interest

When parties focus on their own self-interest the result is hard bargaining (tab.1: B3). Bargaining is a non-deliberative expression of self-interest as it is a discussion in which the deliberative stance is replaced with benefit-seeking (B2). It is a process of coordination and decision in which cooperating antagonists modify their positions through reciprocal exchange of concessions or benefits.

Here a change of position depends not on a better argument or reason (as in deliberation), but on *receiving something in return. Each party fears the other's exploitation*,[54] thus falling into the trap of the 'negotiator's dilemma'. They cooperate, but antagonistically, making excessive demands (in anticipation of mutual concessions) and 'strategically controlling information' (i.e., lying about actual needs and abilities) to gain as much as possible at the other party's expense (in a presumed zero-sum game). Bargaining unlike broader negotiations reduces the conversation to just one criterion – self-interest – allowing one to ignore other inputs (as in: 'it's not personal; it's strictly business'). This includes ignoring issues of mutual justification and honesty; thus its parties prefer to compartmentalize the process behind the closed doors, to avoid external judgement.

Deliberative expression of self-interest

Self-interest was rejected in the classic definition of deliberation for inevitably leading to an *egocentric viewpoint* instead of striving for the common good.[55] However, later Mansbridge et al. observed that any search for fair terms of cooperation should

[53] J.J. Mansbridge, J. Bohman, S. Chambers, D. Estlund, A. Føllesdal, A. Fung, C. Lafont, B. Manin, M.J. Luis, "The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy," *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2010), p. 68.

[54] J. Forester, D. Stitzel, "The Beyond Neutrality: Possibilities of Activist Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1989), p. 252.

[55] J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?," *Northwestern University Law Review*, vol. 83 (1988), pp. 38-53.

include the recognition and pursuit of [suitably constrained] self-interest, including material self-interest.[56]

Firstly, since conflicts of self-interest are common in public life, narrowing deliberation to situations in which such conflicts are absent makes deliberation either almost useless or provokes the concealment of self-interest and the instrumentalization of expertise. Secondly, self-interest is an essential component of the common interest and its proper consideration is crucial in making decisions fair in terms of the benefits and burdens they distribute.[57]

That is why the inclusion of food industry representatives within the proceedings of the FSA (as producers and employers) went beyond just the financial interests of for-profit companies. It also involved the issue of protecting the self-interests of vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities who specialized in certain types of traditional food production.[58] In their case, an unwarranted, stigmatizing media panic could have been a threat to their livelihoods. This legitimate self-interest was challenged by the unchecked principle of 'consumer-safety first' that dictated extreme precaution even in the case of minor health risks.

For the very same reasons, Warren and Mansbridge introduced the idea of *deliberative negotiation* (B1) wherein the expression and clarification of self-interests fulfils the deliberative ideals of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, fairness, and non-coercion.[59] The premise here is that self-interest is not to be 'won at someone else's expense' (as in bargaining) but to be considered fairly. Moreover, as Afsahi observes, properly moderated self-interests might even facilitate deliberation by invoking a sense of reciprocity.[60] Thus, 'deliberative negotiation' is a valuable tool for the deliberative-democratic treatment of self-interests.

3.3 Emotions

Emotions are affectual states or passions related to strong convictions, but also include fears that drive commitments, apathy, or even desperation in political action. Depending on the theoretical approach, emotions either determine only affectual judgements or dictate judgements in general, including rational ones.

According to dual-aspect theory in psychology, emotions represent *the interests and values of actions while intelligence constitutes the structure*.[61] In this model, cognitive pro-

[56] J.J. Mansbridge, J. Bohman, S. Chambers, D. Estlund, A. Føllesdal, A. Fung, C. Lafont, B. Manin, M.J. Luis, "The Place of Self-Interest...", p. 64.

[57] Ibid., pp. 72-73, 75.

[58] M.A. Hajer, D. Laws, W. Versteeg, "Authority Through Deliberative Governance...", p. 157.

[59] M.E. Warren, J. Mansbridge, "Deliberative Negotiation," in J. Mansbridge, C.J. Martin (eds), *Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, Washington, D.C. 2013, pp. 86-120.

[60] A. Afsahi, "The Role of Self-Interest in Deliberation: A Theory of Deliberative Capital," *Political Studies*, vol. 70, no. 3 (2022), pp. 701-718.

[61] J. Piaget, *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood*, New York 1951, p. 220.

cesses – including moral reasoning – are disturbed whenever emotions become too strong.[62] Alternatively, in the social intuitionist model, emotions primarily determine all judgements.[63] In the three inputs framework, either theory could apply – as, in both, the non-deliberative consequences of emotions are similar, while their input remains indispensable and potentially valuable for deliberation. Emotions can enable evaluative knowledge by incorporating new evidence and reasoning about it, and facilitating the understanding of evaluative concepts.[64]

A relevant question concerns the relation between 'normative' or 'ethical expertise' (mentioned earlier) and the potential emotional foundations of moral judgements. The difference is apparent whenever a complex 'hard case' invokes an intuitive judgement that breaks away from any expert ethical systematization. On this occasion, it should be emphasized that when people accept a given ethical system deeply they may internalize it to such an extent that it will function more as moral intuition.

Non-deliberative aspects of emotions

A strong level of emotional involvement is usually associated with the antithesis of the deliberative stance (C1): persistence, stubbornness, *motivated reasoning*[65] and *affective polarization*[66] – an *uncompromising mindset*[67] or *positional politics*[68] (as it is described by the 'discourse quality index').

An example of this impact of emotions was observed in the proceedings of the FSA's Board in the dogmatic stubbornness of consumer organization representatives. It was observed that they *held their point not for scientific [...] but for theological reasons*.[69] They had no regard for the legitimate self-interest of others or for the state-of-the-art, and they employed expertise instrumentally, with a strong confirmation bias. That is why consumer organization's involvement was eventually downplayed and replaced with other, more constructive forms of laypeople participation and emotional considerations.

An *uncompromising mindset* is a stance typical of *affective debate* (C3). Landwehr and Holzinger note that the term 'debate' is derived from the French word *débattre*,

62 A. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, New York 2005.

63 J. Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review*, vol. 108, no. 4 (2001), p. 825.

64 J. Deonna, F. Teroni, "Why Are Emotions Epistemically Indispensable?," *Inquiry*, vol. 68, no. 1 (2022), pp. 91-113.

65 D.M. Kahan, "Ideology, Motivated Reasoning...".

66 J.N. Druckman, E. Peterson, R. Slothuus, "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 107, no. 1 (2013), pp. 57-79.

67 A. Gutmann, D.F. Thompson, *The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It*, Princeton 2012, p. 3.

68 M.R. Steenbergen, A. Bächtiger, M. Spörndli, J. Steiner, "Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality Index," *Comparative European Politics*, vol. 1 (2003), pp. 21-48.

69 M.A. Hajer, D. Laws, W. Versteeg, "Authority Through Deliberative Governance...", p. 159.

meaning *to defeat, to strike down*, and its origin *(figuratively) points to the goal of participants [...]. Groups are pre-defined, and they present rather than exchange arguments*.[70] Debates flourish in an atmosphere of *stubborn partisanship and blind loyalty of a sort*.[71] Their participants are oriented on winning the discussion – 'defeating' the opponent rather than convincing them. Evidence does not sway opinions in debates; there, it is an ammunition in eristics – *the art of always being right*.[72]

Deliberative expression of emotions

In the past, emotions were perceived with suspicion and associated with rhetoric antithetic to rational deliberation. The term 'emotion' was reduced to non-deliberative 'quick, preconscious automatic impulses'[73] and contrasted with the rational deliberation of elites and experts. Representatives of 'traditional political theory from Plato to Habermas' equated rhetoric with irrational persuasion, propaganda, and demagoguery.[74] The goal was to purge rhetoric and emotions from deliberation. This simplistic vision fails the scrutiny of modern cognitive sciences and might even be *a way of dressing up preconscious intuitions with post hoc reasons, allowing attitudes to harden and become more polarized*.[75]

Bandes observes that *deliberative thinking does not operate free from intuition or emotion. On the contrary, the emotions that help shape preconscious appraisals pervade more conscious, effortful appraisals as well*.[76] Intense emotions do not always precede rational evaluation, often being the result of a diligent, scholarly exploration of the subject. Afterwards they do function as *quick, immediate reactions* or appraisal short-cuts, but in this way they facilitate popular mobilization in support of a legitimate cause. Thus, Krause argues that the inclusion of emotions addresses the motivational deficit within the deliberative theory.[77]

Nevertheless, emotional appraisal short-cuts (especially when not sufficiently well grounded) still undermine the deliberative stance. Yet, while some emotions clearly strengthen non-deliberative attitudes, others can help prompt the deliberative stance. According to the social intuitionist model, opinion change is rarely a consequence of rational argumentation and is instead rather invoked by social 'reasoned persuasion' – by generating a new set of emotions/intuitions in the appraisal of a situation.[78] This

[70] C. Landwehr, K. Holzinger, "Institutional Determinants of Deliberative Interaction," *European Political Science Review*, vol. 2, no. 3 (2010), p. 383.

[71] S.A. Bandes, "Emotion and Deliberation...", p. 195.

[72] A. Schopenhauer, *The Art of Always Being Right*, London 2005.

[73] S.A. Bandes, "Emotion and Deliberation...", p. 5.

[74] J.S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, New York 2002, pp. 52, 66-67.

[75] S.A. Bandes, "Emotion and Deliberation...", p. 12.

[76] Ibid., p. 9.

[77] S.R. Krause, *Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation*, Princeton 2008.

[78] J. Haidt, "The Emotional Dog...", p. 825.

approach emphasizes framing,[79] i.e., appealing to emotions that animate the convictions of the other.[80] This is the essence of the *bridging rhetoric* (C1) when a speaker *takes seriously the outlooks [...] of an intended audience that is different in key respects from the speaker*.[81]

Thus, the social intuitionist model not only does not preclude preference change (as was sometimes claimed by its deliberative-democratic critics) but reinforces the indispensability of dialogue in generating such change – since the best way to invoke a new intuition (and to change one's mind) is to be introduced by others to a new angle or interpretation. This convergence between the dual-aspect theory (favored by deliberative democrats) and the social-intuitionist model is evident in the fact that Martin Luther King's speeches are prized within both approaches as examples of – respectively – *bridging rhetoric*[82] and intuitive *reasoned persuasion*.[83] Moreover, even if such persuasion does not result in an immediate preference change, it may start a process where individual change will occur over time, and this might even have a wider impact for the entirety of a deliberative system.

The aforementioned 'bridging rhetoric' is an example of the deliberative treatment of emotions. Another would be *testimony*[84] or s*torytelling*.[85] They are particularly useful whenever a grievance over systemic injustice is difficult to express in the terms of abstract 'rational public discourse' – especially by the vulnerable, the disenfranchised, those lacking in social capital and political leverage.[86] Their grief and misery may lead to anger or to apathy – to rage or silence rather than articulate activism. That is why community moderators must advocate for people in such situations and help them to be heard in their own voice and understood.

Within the FSA's Board, such an inclusion of emotions created transformative 'critical moments' between stakeholders. As Hajer et al. explain:

Emotions are often seen as hindering proper deliberation, but this misses the social-psychological significance of such incidents in the institutionalization of norms and routines. In this case the shared experience of having seen people express intense emotions leads to a definitive move away from old routines, brings about a change in discourse, and enacts new institutional commitments. [...] The testimonies by the family members of the CJD

[79] J.N. Druckman, K.R. Nelson, "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 47, no. 4 (2003), p. 730.

[80] M. Feinberg, R. Willer, "From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments Facilitate Political Influence?," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 41, no. 12 (2015), pp. 1665-1681.

[81] J.S. Dryzek, "Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation," *Political Theory*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2010), p. 328.

[82] Ibid.

[83] J. Haidt, "The Emotional Dog...", p. 823.

[84] L.M. Sanders, "Against Deliberation," *Political Theory*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1997), pp. 347-376.

[85] I.M. Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," in S. Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton 1996, p. 131.

[86] I.M. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford 2002, p. 72.

[Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease] victims allow Board members, stakeholders, and staff to experience that they are 'talking about lives here'.[87]

Despite problems with the inclusion of consumer organizations, the representation of emotions remained an essential value in the FSA's deliberative design and proved to be indispensable in transforming opinions and developing the Agency's authority. It showed that deliberative expressions of emotions can and should be encouraged by public authorities in their role as community moderators.

There are multiple examples of the potential epistemic value of emotions – even anger, dogmatism, etc.[88] – not only as a trigger for raising awareness of overlooked issues[89] but also as a source of normative insight.[90] For traditional political theory, with its rationalist approach, any *post hoc* reasoning – i.e. reasoning induced by an emotional or intuitive judgement – was by default considered as merely a 'rationalization'. In the psychoanalytic theory, rationalization is an ego-defense mechanism *in which apparently logical reasons are given to justify unacceptable behavior*;[91] a reaction that serves to conceal the true unconscious motives. Simply put, the traditional approach unfairly deemed any *post hoc* reasoning as suspicious and self-serving.

The social intuitionist model, on the other hand, indicates that intuitive judgements might actually express certain valid normative reasons – in a way that is automated, preconscious and internalized (e.g. through socialization). An emotional judgement with its internal logic is triggered by an eliciting situation and the following conscious *post hoc* reasoning will discover this logic and reveal its reasons. This is very different from what psychoanalysts deem a 'rationalization' and much closer to an honest introspection and self-discovery.

Emotions, moral or political intuitions often function in a way similar to preconscious cognition. They are automated, often schematic and sometimes mistaken, but that does not mean they are always wrong. Intuitions register normatively relevant events and relations before we realize they are there. Some may even be so subtle that – as the saying goes – 'you may not have even noticed; but your brain did'. Relying on the initial intuition can be problematic, especially when its automated reasoning is inadequate to the actual situation by being based on wrong premises or through fixation on only one dimension of the issue (similarly to 'expert tunnel-vision'). But even in such cases these initial emotions can be valid elements of the comprehensive judgement when juxtaposed with a wider range of inputs through deliberation.

87 M.A. Hajer, D. Laws, W. Versteeg, "Authority Through Deliberative Governance...", p. 146.

88 M. Lepoutre, *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*, New York 2021, pp. 39, 41, 83.

89 B.R. Hertzberg, *Chains of Persuasion: A Framework for Religion in Democracy*, New York 2019, pp. 44-47.

90 J. Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 14, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1-25.

91 "Rationalization," *APA Dictionary of Psychology*, 19 April 2018, at https://dictionary.apa.org/rationalization, 26 September 2023.

4. THE THREE INPUTS OF GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

A notable conclusion from the review of the contemporary deliberative democratic theory, especially after the systemic turn, is a significant change in attitudes towards the three inputs. Emotions and self-interests have been rehabilitated (in both, descriptive and normative perspectives). Expertise has lost much of its undisputed dominance due to its own challenges and limitations. A growing consensus is that, on its own, expertise does not guarantee a good political judgment.

What we conclude from the state-of-the-art is that, democratic deliberation can no longer be limited to expertise and should be open, and even welcoming, to other inputs. This brings us to the proposition that deliberation should be conceptualized as a discussion (guided by open-mindedness) that is 'a joint consideration of the three inputs'. Interestingly, this approach suggests that any attempts at strictly reducing democratic deliberation to expertise alone should be deemed as 'non-deliberative' – even though expertise is not 'non-deliberative' in itself (and, in fact, is still essential for good policy-making), and even though such 'compartmentalization' (in 'expert panels') has its own place in the wider 'deliberative system'.

In this part we synthesize earlier consideration and systematize ways of expressing the three inputs: which are deliberative?; which are non-deliberative but constructive for the deliberative system? and which are non-deliberative and detrimental to the system? Below, especially in the table 1, we present a synthetic summary of the remarks from the section 3.

4.1. Deliberation and other types of discussion

As explained in section 2, 'deliberation' is a discussion arranged and moderated to facilitate a 'deliberative stance' among its participants. We can now articulate it through the inputs discussed above: it enables – but does not require – position change in response to others' arguments and reasons (unlike in affective debate), but without the expectation of receiving something in return (unlike in bargaining). In other words, 'deliberation' is a joint consideration of 'expertise', 'self-interest', and 'emotions' but in a way that prevents these inputs from becoming a detriment to the deliberative stance.

The three inputs also inherently carry potential 'spoilers of the deliberative stance'. Each prevents deliberative preference change in their own way. Expertise can lead to *hubris* – the arrogance of a specialization tunnel-vision and myopia of a *just facts* approach (see: tab. 1, A2). The introduction of self-interest bears a risk of making changing one's mind dependent on receiving benefits in return (B2). Emotions, alongside strong moral or political judgements, can make people stubborn, invoking an *uncompromising mindset* (C2) that focuses on a single set of intuitions even to the exclusion of other emotional reasons. These 'spoilers' cause the inputs to be introduced into discussion in a non-deliberative way (tab.1, rows 3-5).

The *compartmentalization* of inputs (row 3) is a division of the deliberative system into pure 'modes of discourse' dedicated for a contained processing of each of the input types: in *expert panels* (A3), *hard bargaining* (B3), and *affective debates* (C3). Is a traditional normative standard in the contemporary models of democracy, exemplified by the *positivist firewall* (see: section 3.1) between 'politics' (politicians, interest groups, etc.) and 'policy' (professional non-partisan civil service). It is supposed to prevent the politicization of the latter by insulating its expertise – as a particularly vulnerable input – from the contamination by the other two: by vested interests and biases. The compartmentalization of inputs relies on making only one of them a decisive criterion in each discussion type – allowing to ignore and reject others – thus, it is also intended for decision-making to be more manageable when confronted with limited resources, time constrains, overwhelming polarization, information overload, etc.

Table 1. The three inputs of governance: with their deliberative and non-deliberative forms of expression[92]

INPUTS		EXPERTISE	SELF-INTEREST	EMOTIONS	
DELIBERATIVE FORMS OF EXPRESSION:		MEANINGFUL AND CONTEXTUALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DELIBERATIVE NEGOTIATION	TESTIMONY, STORY-TELLING, BRIDGING RHETORIC	**1**
SPOILERS OF THE DELIBERATIVE STANCE		EXPERTS' HUBRIS Myopia of scientism & expert tunnel-vision	BENEFIT-SEEKING Demanding benefits or cost-reduction in return	UNCOMPROMISING MIND-SET	**2**
Non-deliberative expressions:	**Compartmentalization:***	Expert panels	Hard bargaining	Affective debates	**3**
	Instrumentalization:	Manipulation of evidence	Appeal to particular self-interest	Emotional blackmail	**4**
	Officious exclusion:	As 'just a theory' (paralysis by analysis)	As 'selfish'	As 'irrational'	**5**
* Note: While compartmentalization is non-deliberative in itself, it still can be functional to the deliberative system.		**A**	**B**	**C**	

In their most comprehensive forms, traditional democratic systems tend to arrange compartmentalization in a sequenced way so that policy-making processes involve tackling all input types but in stages. For instance, affective debates in the public sphere lead to a political will formulation and majoritarian decisions; certain details are established

[92] Based on: M. Zabdyr-Jamróz, *Wszechstronniczość*..., p. 206.

via hard bargain between interests groups; and all that is supported by expertise: either by providing evidence-based information (e.g. through monitoring agencies and academia) or through implementation by the professional managerial class in public service.

Compartmentalization is a method of containing and moderating 'spoilers of the deliberative stance' by simplifying and reducing complexity. Thus – while it is non-deliberative in itself – if properly arranged, it aims at assisting the deliberative system in its functions. That is unlike other non-deliberative types of expressions of inputs: *instrumentalization* (row 4) and *officious exclusion* (row 5), where the 'spoilers' are uncontrolled and jeopardize the epistemic, ethical and democratic functions of the deliberative system.

In deliberation proper all the three inputs ought to be taken into consideration together in accordance with deliberative-democratic values:

- (A1) Expertise should be presented in a way that is comprehensive/contextualized (various disciplinary approaches), humble (acknowledging unknowns), and meaningful (using plain language).
- (B1) Self-interest should be considered in accordance with the idea of deliberative negotiation, as honest communication and reciprocity concerning existential needs.
- (C1) Sincere exploration of emotions via storytelling or testimonies enables a better understanding of our own values and moral intuitions. Bridging rhetoric serves a vital role in reasoned persuasion. Exploration of emotions should be a joint and charitable process of mutual assistance in making sense of one's passions, grievances, and sensibilities.

The key point of this proposition is not just to accept all three inputs in deliberation 'as they go', but to be particularly conscious about which of them is being considered and – while discussing them jointly – to treat each adequately to their character to prevent the risk of invoking 'spoilers of the deliberative stance'.

4.2. Untangling narratives and opening up the black box of science

In common discourse, emotions, self-interest, and expertise are usually in an interplay with each other. Combining, mixing, and merging our feelings and needs with what we consider facts is actually a fully natural, spontaneous way of participating in a conversation – especially in public debate. For example, emotions are most frequently invoked whenever someone's self-interest is at risk, prompting the impulse to reinforce one's position with evidence (instrumentalization, A4).

Merging inputs creates stories that arrange the 'facts' to fit our own self-interest and emotions. As Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman observe:

Individuals tend to assimilate information by fitting it to pre-existing narrative templates or schemes that invest the information with meaning. The elements of these narrative templates – the identity of the stock heroes and villains, the nature of their dramatic struggles, and the moral stakes of their engagement with one another – vary in identifiable and recurring ways across cultural groups.[93]

[93] D.M. Kahan, H. Jenkins-Smith, D. Braman, "Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus," *Journal of Risk Research*, vol. 14, no. 2 (2011), p. 170.

Such narratives are 'mental models' or even ideologies: superficially coherent beliefs about 'facts' that play a performative role of substantiating values and norms – thus driving social action. Deliberation is about deconstructing and untangling narratives into their key threads in order to evaluate them together. It requires analytically distinguishing the inputs out of which they have been built. While compartmentalization aims at focusing on only one of the inputs at a time, in deliberation they are considered together while accounting for their specificity.

Here lies the notable advantage of the three inputs framework in relation to approaches that study only one of those input types. Since inputs are usually narratively intertwined ('facts' are linked with emotional value judgements and self-interests), dealing with each of them separately in policy analysis (e.g., studying only the role of emotions) – just as in compartmentalization – might lead to incomplete, reductive conclusions. Considering the inputs together – yet with a clear analytical distinction – enables a better understanding of their interplay in different contexts.

Unlike in everyday conversation or in common political discourse, in deliberation each type of input should be treated uniquely – adequately to its character and specifically in regard to its potential risk to the deliberative stance. Deliberation requires constantly asking ourselves questions such as *To what extent is this theory really well grounded in evidence or is it just convenient for my self-esteem and personal experience?* or *What is my actual self-interest: have I not emotionally attached myself too much to this solution?*

Deliberation helps break down narratives into separate inputs. These inputs can then be evaluated, sifted or reconciled. In the best-case scenario, by deconstructing pre-existing, entrenched and partisan narratives, deliberation might lead to the development of a new, converging narrative – one that synthesizes the reworked and selected inputs. This would lead to the *discursive coalition* as described by Hajer[94] – a lasting commitment bolstered by a shared emotional motivation to a policy implementation. Alternatively, deliberation can enable the modification of existing narratives so that they can support a common solution even if for different reasons, as in an *incompletely theorized agreement*.[95] If not – if the divide is too deep – deliberation can at least serve a better understanding of the conflicted interests.

As mentioned above, the use of 'pure' scientific excellence in policy-making can yield ethically problematic results. In such cases, other inputs serve a positive role by invoking re-evaluation and self-reflection. This is best illustrated by the shift in pharmaceutical policies in the context of HIV/AIDS treatments – an issue studied by Maguire.[96] As Greenhalgh and Russell explain:

Whereas the scientific community had traditionally set the gold standard as placebo controlled trials with hard outcome measures (such as death), the AIDS activists successfully

[94] M.A. Hajer, "A Frame in the Fields...", p. 107.

[95] J.J. Mansbridge, J. Bohman, S. Chambers, D. Estlund, A. Føllesdal, A. Fung, C. Lafont, B. Manin, M.J. Luis, "The Place of Self-Interest...", p. 70-72.

[96] S. Maguire, "Discourse and Adoption of Innovations: A Study of HIV/AIDS Treatments," *Health Care Management Review*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2002), pp. 74-88.

persuaded them that placebo arms and 'body count' trials were unethical in AIDS research, spurring a shift towards what is now standard practice in drug research – a new drug is compared with best conventional treatment, not placebo, and 'surrogate outcomes' are generally preferred when researching potentially lethal conditions.[97]

This example shows how self-interest and emotional motives can 'open up the black box of science' – exposing the unethical dimension of the 'methodolatry' and of the 'myopia of scientism'. It also shows that the goals of pure science (expected accumulation of knowledge) are technically not the same as the goals of policy or medicine (saving and improving lives). Finally, this reinforces the notion that proper deliberation on public issues definitely should go beyond expertise and that evidence-based policy-making can greatly benefit from a more charitable, deliberative-democratic inclusion of other inputs.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The proposed three inputs of governance framework is well-suited to serve a descriptive role in policy analysis, including non-deliberative practices. It acknowledges that public policy-making is destined to deal with emotions (as roots of value judgements), as well as expertise and self-interest (existential needs, material or otherwise). All of them are problematic, but none can be ignored. In actual political discourse, these inputs rarely exist in separation. Rather, they intertwine with 'facts' to form narratives – stories that merge the three inputs to provide meaning and a coalesced political will.

The framework highlights that the evolution of deliberative democratic theory consisted of rehabilitation and inclusion of emotions and self-interest, but also entailed a growing skepticism towards expertise. The latter aspect is particularly notable because it means that democratic deliberation could no longer be identified with and limited to just 'expert deliberation'.

The framework's advantage over approaches that focus on one type of input is that it factors them in conjunction, highlighting the composite nature of political discourses and cultural narratives – as an interplay between 'facts', 'self-interest' and 'passions'. The three inputs framework assists in untangling these narratives without reducing them to just one input – precisely because it shows what kind of dedicated treatment these inputs require. Thus, aside from its descriptive role in scholarly analysis, the framework may serve a prospective role by providing guidelines for processing inputs from various communicative actions.

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[97] T. Greenhalgh, J. Russell, "Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Critique," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, vol. 52, no. 2 (2009), pp. 312-313.

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