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THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF TECHNOCRACY IN THE ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE[1]

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the threats and opportunities of technocracy in the context of present-day technological development. In the first section, the concept of technocracy is defined, followed by a discussion of the history and changing characteristics of the technocratic movement, mainly in the US. The second section is devoted to analyzing the negative impact that technocracy can have on democratic systems, human values, and morality. This section discusses threats such as the deepening of social divisions, non-democratic tendencies, the self-reification of humans, and the lack of alignment between human and algorithmic values. The remainder of the article discusses the positive impact of the technocratic mindset on democratic systems. It is exemplified by methods of integrating expert knowledge into democratic processes and the 'technocratic style' of policymaking.

Keywords: technocracy, technocratic mentality, artificial intelligence (AI), power-seeking behavior

INTRODUCTION

In the era of rapidly developing technology, especially Artificial Intelligence (AI), its relation to power and existing political and social systems has been intensifying. Recently,

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there have been more and more cases in which advanced technology has entered the world of politics. Looking at the United States alone, one can find many examples of blending technological and political domains. For instance, in January 2025, Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, Inc. and SpaceX, became a US Special Government Employee, whose task is to advise and collaborate with the US federal government. The growing importance of technology can also be observed in international relations. In the final days in office, the Biden administration proposed *a new framework for exporting advanced computer chips used to develop AI that aims to balance national security concerns about the technology with the economic interests of producers and other countries*.[2] Furthermore, China and the US have been engaging in a technological rivalry by developing their large language models (LLMs) – DeepSeek and ChatGPT. This strengthening relationship between technology and politics has sparked a discussion on technocracy and its impact on democratic systems and societies. On the one hand, technocracy is viewed as a destructive force that endangers societies and political regimes. On the other hand, it is also perceived as a chance to improve policy-making and decision-making processes by incorporating advanced technologies and technical expertise in them.

This paper will examine the two perspectives on technocracy. The aim of the analysis in the following sections is to answer two research questions: (1) What are the political and social threats of technocracy? and (2) How can technocracy be beneficial for current social and political systems? To answer these questions, an overview of the current discussion on the threats and opportunities of technocracy will be provided. The remaining part of this section will provide a theoretical background for further analysis by defining technocracy, describing the history of the technocratic movement in the United States, and analyzing the changing features of this form of governance. The second section of this paper will be devoted to the analysis of social and political threats of technocracy. Starting with the risk of deepening social divisions, through non-compliance with democratic principles, to the changing definition of humanity, this section will show that the question of threats posed by technocracy goes well beyond politics. Finally, the discussion will turn to the opportunities of technocracy. This section will analyze ways of including elements of technocracy, mainly the experts and their know-how, in democratic systems.

THE HISTORY AND MAIN PREMISES OF TECHNOCRACY

The term 'technocracy' denotes a form of rule by experts – especially technicians representing STEM branches – who are *guided solely by the imperatives of their technology*.[3] In other words, it is *a system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by*

[2] "Biden Administration's New Rules on Exporting AI Chips Provoke Industry Pushback," *Euronews*, 14 January 2025, at https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/01/14/biden-administrations-new-rules-on-exporting-ai-chips-provoke-industry-pushback, 10 February 2025.

[3] "Technocracy," in *Britannica*, at https://www.britannica.com/topic/technocracy, 10 February 2025.

virtue of their specialist knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions.[4] The earliest mentions of governance by experts can be traced back to Plato's discussion on philosopher-kings in *The Republic* and Francis Bacon's conception of scientific utopia in *New Atlantis*.[5] However, the first use of the term 'technocracy' is often attributed to William Henry Smyth, who defined it as *Science, Technology, and specialized Skill coordinated in National Industrial Management*.[6] According to Sadowski and Selinger,[7] technocracy can be treated as a subset of paternalism policy due to its tendencies to control society through pragmatic alternatives, i.e., optimization and objectivity, to inefficient political mechanisms. Furthermore, many researchers agree that technocracy is strictly connected to technological development. Although it has not always been tied to achievements in the field of artificial intelligence, present-day politics requires advanced strategic reasoning and data analysis to solve complex problems, making the link between AI and technocracy inextricable.[8]

Technocracy, as we understand it today, began to develop in America in the 1930s and the 1940s. According to Segal,[9] the early technocratic movement was inspired by Thorstein Veblen's *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921), which described *a strategy (...) for ridding American society of the waste and extravagance*.[10] The main assumptions presented by Veblen included the voluntary abdication of all absentee owners of big businesses and their replacement by reform-minded technicians and workers. In the 1930s, based on these premises, Howard Scott founded Technical Alliance and Technocracy Inc. Technocratic governance back then was promoted as a cure for the Great Depression in America.[11] The main demands of the movement, which were expressed in a handbook of sorts – *Technocracy Study Course* (1934) – and *The Technocrat* magazine, assumed expert control over all areas of human life. Failed by early-20th-century capitalism, technocrats of the 1930s opted for a centrally governed system with an energy, rather than currency-based, economy. In such a system, instead of market forces of supply and demand determining the price, citizens would receive energy certificates that they could spend on goods and services priced according to the amount of energy

4 H.S. Sætra, "A Shallow Defense of a Technocracy of Artificial Intelligence. Examining the Political Harms of Algorithmic Governance in the Domain of Government," *Technology in Society*, vol. 62 (2020), 101283, p. 2.

5 J. Sadowski, E. Selinger, "Creating a Taxonomic Tool for Technocracy and Applying it to Silicon Valley," *Technology in Society*, vol. 38 (2014), p. 161.

6 W.H. Smyth, *Technocracy. First, Second, and Third Series. Social Universals*, Berkeley, 1921, p. 20, at https://ia902608.us.archive.org/32/items/technocracyfirst00smyt/technocracyfirst00smyt.pdf, 13 December 2024.

7 J. Sadowski and E. Selinger, "Creating a Taxonomic Tool for Technocracy...," p. 162.

8 H. S. Sætra, "A Shallow Defense...," p. 1.

9 H.P. Segal, *Technological Utopianism in American Culture*, Syracuse 2005, p. 121.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 122.

used to produce them.[12] Additionally, technocrats treated technology as a means of mass surveillance and control.[13] With the ideology and new economic perspectives, the members of Technocracy Inc. developed some characteristic elements, for instance, hierarchical structure, special insignia and salute, or militaristic demeanor. These features, together with the alleged anti-Catholicism, bore too much resemblance to fascism and determined the failure of the movement.[14]

In the following decades, technocratic thought changed substantially. The 'old technocracy' of the 1930s aimed to *substitute democratic decision-making procedures with a supposedly more rational approach based on scientific analysis and planning by experts*.[15] Whereas, heavily influenced by the ideas of scientism and Taylorism, the contemporary technocrats believed that politics should be replaced by technics and that political decisions should be made pragmatically, with no consideration of morality and ideology.[16] The ideological transformation of technocracy commenced in the mid-20th century. The 'new technocracy' involved the reorientation of administrative and policy reform toward a network approach to governance. It emphasized that policies and public services are the consequences of the interaction of multiple actors. Thus, the bureaucracy of the welfare state was substituted by governance networks; neoliberalism took over welfarism.[17]

Although some of the elements of technocratic ideology evolved over time, there are some qualities – constituents of 'technocratic mentality'[18] – which remained unchanged. As described by Putnam,[19] these qualities of technocratic thinking can be summarized in the following points:

1. *Depolitization of politics.* Technocrats believe that technics should replace politics. Social problems should be solved apolitically, based on rationalism and the scientific method.
2. *Skepticism toward politicians and political institutions.* According to technocrats, political decisions should be made based on technical knowledge, which makes politicians incompetent in making them.
3. *Lack of compatibility with democratic systems.* The technocratic way of thinking and decision-making is unfit for democratic systems. Expertise-based governance is the most compatible with authoritarian and absolutist regimes.

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12 D.A. Hughes, "Permanent Counterrevolution, Technocracy, and World War III," in D.A. Hughes, *"Covid-19," Psychological Operations, and the War for Technocracy*, Cham 2024, pp. 15-16.

13 G. Robson, *Virtually Lost. Young Americans in the Digital Technocracy*, London 2023, p. 47.

14 H. P. Segal, *Technological Utopianism...*, p. 124.

15 S. Rummens, "Technocracy as a Thin Ideology," *Constellations*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2024), p. 178.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 177.

18 R.D. Putnam, "Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies. An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1977), p. 385.

19 Ibid., pp. 385-387.

4. *Rational analysis and interpretation of facts as a remedy to social and political conflict.* For technocrats, most conflicts are an effect of misinformation and can be resolved by reasoning.
5. *Practicality and pragmatism as a base of debate on policy.* The technocratic focus on expertise and technical solutions implies that analyzing public issues should be free from ideological and moralistic criteria.
6. *Commitment to progress and productivity.* Technological progress and material productivity rank higher in technocratic values than distributive questions of social justice.

It is essential to note that these qualities do not classify technocrats as representatives of a specific segment of the political spectrum. *[T]here can be both leftist and rightist technocrats*,[20] as some of them represent a more reformist attitude, while others tend to be more conservative.

The ideological shift from 'old' to 'new' technocracy has pushed it somewhat to the background of public debate. Over the years, technocracy has become a rather marginal, near-utopian idea. However, along with the recent development of advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, these ideas of technocracy have been revived. Many influential technological figures, including Raymond Kurzweil and Elon Musk, have brought into the public debate questions of technological development, human-computer and human-AI collaboration, and new ways of technology-aided governance. The increasing use of AI algorithms to replace human effort in decision-making processes further fuels debate on the advantages and disadvantages of AI governance and AI technocracy.[21] The following sections of this paper will analyze the threats and opportunities of the rule by experts.

THREATS OF TECHNOCRACY

The notion of technocracy is strictly connected to technical and technological development. *[T]echnical expertise is the defining characteristic of the technocrat, and (...) technical training is an increasingly important credential for contemporary elite recruitment*.[22] As advanced technology becomes more and more present in our lives, the threats and risks stemming from the relationship between technology and governance have become an important topic for analysis by many researchers. In the era of rapid development of artificial intelligence and widespread algorithms, it is more important than ever to look at technocracy from the perspective of threats of present-day technology. This section will analyze threats of technocracy on the basis of Hendrycks and Mazeika's set of eight *speculative hazards and failure modes*[23] of AI, which have been described within

[20] Ibid., p. 388.

[21] H. S. Sætra, "A Shallow Defense...," p. 5.

[22] R.D. Putnam, "Elite Transformation...," p. 384.

[23] D. Hendrycks, M. Mazeika, "X-Risk Analysis for AI Research," *arXiv*, 2206, 05862, p. 5.

the existential risk (X-Risk) Analysis for AI research.[24] One of the threats that they describe is power-seeking behavior. This risk can be described as a two-way problem. On the one hand, the desire to attain power can be a domain of highly advanced artificial intelligence. In this case, *AIs that acquire substantial power can become essentially dangerous if they are not aligned with human values*,[25] which may result in the overpowering of less intelligent agents. On the other hand, power-seeking tendencies refer to humans that could use AI for *the strategic advantage in having the most intelligent, most powerful AI systems*.[26] In this scenario, whoever has the best Artificial Intelligence will hold a great source of power. Both interpretations of the problem of power-seeking behavior can be linked to technocratic thinking. This section will analyze the influence of AI over power and governance, which can lead to deepening social divisions, promotion of non-democratic governments, and self-reification of the human.

The question of deepening social divisions in a technocratic system can be described using the example of Kurt Vonnegut's 1952 novel *Player Piano*, which engages in a debate with the ideas of the movement. Inspired by the author's time working at General Electric,[27] the book describes Ilium, New York, an imagined city in the unspecified future, in which production and political decisions have been progressively surrendered to machines and the omniscient computer EPICAC XIV. From the very beginning of the novel, one can tell that the city and its people are organized according to ideas of technocracy. Ilium owes its existence and democracy to know-how.[28] It is the place where *all the power lies in the hands of the privileged managers and engineers [and where] economics has marginalized politics*.[29] Although at first the reality created by Vonnegut seems to be a perfect utopia, it soon becomes a critique of technocratic governance, especially its tendency to deepen social divisions.

The separation of society in Ilium is illustrated by the city's topography. The space described by Vonnegut is divided into three parts, with the Iroquois River as the main divider. In the northwest are the managers and engineers and civil servants and a few professional people – the privileged class; in the northeast are the machines. In the south, across the Iroquois River, is the area called Homestead, where almost all the remaining people of lesser professions and lower IQs, live. The groups do not have much contact with one another; *Not many people on either side have reasons other than*

[24] Hendrycks and Mazeika's X-Risk analysis for AI research was inspired by Nick Bostrom's Existential Risk Analysis (cf. N. Bostrom, "Existential Risks. Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," *Journal of Evolution and Technology*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2002), and N. Bostrom, "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority," *Global Policy*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2013), pp. 15-31).

[25] D. Hendrycks, M. Mazeika, "X-Risk Analysis...," p. 14.

[26] Ibid.

[27] B.M. Stableford, J. Clute, "Vonnegut, Kurt, Jr.," in J. Clute, D. Langford (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*, Ansible Editions, updated 18 November 2024, at https://sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/vonnegut_kurt_jr, 11 February 2025.

[28] K. Vonnegut, *Player Piano*, New York 2010 [1952], p. 18.

[29] P. Freese, "Kurt Vonnegut's 'Player Piano'; or, 'Would You Ask EPICAC What People Are For?," *AAA: Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik*, vol. 27, no. 2 (2002), p. 128.

curiosity for crossing [the river].[30] The society in the novel is *organized by economic-technical coordination of vested interests*,[31] and any form of cooperation between the groups is hardly necessary. A city planned in this way becomes an image of *a hierarchically organized and computer-controlled society in which machines have gained dominance over human beings*.[32] It is a 'technocratic-totalitarian society'[33] in which giving more power to specialists means giving more privilege to certain groups.[34] This, in turn, might fuel racial, gender, and class bias.[35] The ideas presented in Vonnegut's *Player Piano* complement Hendrycks and Mazeika's concept of power-seeking behavior by providing an account of society governed and divided by machines. Thus, it can be said that the introduction of algorithms into the political sphere contributes to social divide because more power is given to the private sector (e.g., Vonnegut's managers, engineers, and professionals of the northeastern Ilium), but marginalized individuals (e.g., inhabitants of Homestead) remain in the same unprivileged position.[36]

As mentioned earlier, deepening social divisions is only one of the threats of technocracy. The strategic dimension of power-seeking behavior can take a form of control over the will of the people and their entire lives. For many researchers, technocracy poses a challenge to democratic systems. As Rummens states, *[t]echnocracy considers political decisions legitimate to the extent that they are made by experts on the basis of their expert knowledge regarding the common good*.[37] This claim implies three important aspects of technocracy that are in opposition to democratic rule. Firstly, *the source of power and legitimacy is not popular selection, but knowledge and expertise*.[38] Secondly, for technocrats, reason becomes an overarching criterium of decision-making, contrary to the will of the people in democratic systems.[39] Finally, the common good is defined by technocrats based on the experience and expertise of a narrow group rather than through the process of citizens developing a common definition of it. Having these three aspects in mind, it can be said that *technocracy and liberal democracy represent mutually incompatible views about the source of political legitimacy*.[40] Thus, turning to technocracy is equal to abandoning the ideals of democracy. Furthermore, the solutions

30 K. Vonnegut, *Player Piano...*, p. 18.

31 M. Gannon, "Player Piano, the One-Dimensional Society, and the Emergency Brake of History," *The Vonnegut Review*, 2013, at http://www.vonnegutreview.com/2013/06/player-piano-one-dimensional-society.html, 11 February 2025.

32 P. Freese, "Kurt Vonnegut's 'Player Piano'...," p. 127.

33 M. Gannon, "Player Piano...".

34 H.S. Sætra, "A Shallow Defense...," p. 3.

35 Ibid.

36 H. Bloch-Wehba, "Algorithmic Governance from the Bottom Up," *Brigham Young University Law Review*, vol. 48, no. 1 (2022), p. 82.

37 S. Rummens, "Technocracy as a Thin Ideology...," p. 175.

38 Ibid., p. 183.

39 Ibid., p. 175.

40 Ibid., p. 176.

proposed by technocrats can be treated as a *novel, biodigital form of totalitarianism*.[41] Hughes[42] claims that introducing the rule by experts results in the eradication of private property, dependence on the state for food, shelter, healthcare, transportation, etc., the abolition of previous political systems (including democracy), and 'scientific dictatorship' – restricting access to scientific knowledge to the governing class. This demonstrates that governance based on expertise can have serious implications for the ideals of democratic rule and thus can pose a threat to human freedom.

The threats of technocracy are not limited to social and political questions. Important aspects of the debate over the influence of advanced technologies on human lives include the alignment of human and technological values and the changing understanding of humanity. As pointed out by Robson,[43] an AI-technocratic mindset can result in a possible misalignment of human and algorithmic values and ultimately put progress and the achievements of technological development over humanity. The first step leading to AI superiority is the gradual 'self-reification' of humans.[44] Its main premise is that people start to conceive themselves 'in the image of machines' – the human mind is treated solely as a huge amount of complex neural processes and the human person becomes nothing more than just *a product of data and algorithms*.[45] In light of such claims, a technocratic-transhumanist discourse emerges. It assumes not only the need for technological enhancement of human nature and its potential to become the next stage of human evolution but also the inevitability of human-computer relations.[46] For present-day technocrats and transhumanists, technologization of the human seems to be the only solution to the growing importance of advanced technologies and their potential power-seeking behavior. For example, one can count Raymond Kurzweil and Elon Musk as proponents of human technological advancement.[47] Kurzweil's idea of 'software-based humans' whose brains will supposedly be uploaded to computers by mid-century to prolong their lives infinitely is just one example of fighting human disadvantage toward technology.[48] For Musk, the way to protect humanity from the existential threat posed by AI is to equalize human and computer 'mental' capacity. To do so, he proposes enhancing human brains with Neuralink implants, which eventually will prevent *runaway, unstoppable AI-driven machine civilization*.[49] Technocrats and transhumanists alike promote the idea that emotions, feelings, and intuitions are just biological mechanisms similar to algorithms. They view humans and the world in

41 D.A. Hughes, "Permanent Counterrevolution...," p. 1.

42 Ibid., p. 16.

43 G. Robson, *Virtually Lost...*, p. 138.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., pp. 138-139.

47 Ibid., p. 142.

48 Ibid., p. 143.

49 Ibid.

practical and pragmatic terms, as complex machines. This line of thinking legitimizes the belief that humans can and should be altered, enhanced, and AI-augmented.

As mentioned earlier, the algorithmic approach to the human is what ultimately translates to the 'self-reification' of humanity and the reconsideration of what it means to be human. The pursuit of compatibility with advanced technologies, promoted by Raymond Kurzweil and Elon Musk, among others, is no longer the question of survival or balancing the power between man and technology. It threatens the perception of humans and may result in a reduction in the thinking of man as a machine. This shift is probably the most noticeable in the way the perception of the human body has changed. *Our bodies have become largely meaningless irrelevancies, replaceable props or hindrances rather than being integral to our full-spectrum experience of ourselves*.[50] Overall, the technocratic mindset, which results in misalignment of human and algorithmic values, puts technological progress over humanity, and leads to the gradual 'self-reification' of humans, is the force *downgrading of our common humanity*.[51]

OPPORTUNITIES OF TECHNOCRACY

As discussed in the previous section, technocracy poses threats of deepening social divisions, introducing ideas that conflict with democratic systems, and leading to the 'self-reification' of humans. Despite these concerns, some researchers argue that it is possible to incorporate elements of technocratic thinking without making radical changes to our social and political reality. It is also claimed that certain aspects of democracy and technocracy can coexist within a single system. The opportunities of technocracy lie precisely in the potential to combine it with a democratic framework. Examples of this include the methods of integrating expertise with democracy described by Olson,[52] as well as the 'technocratic style' of politics defined by Rummens.[53]

According to Olson,[54] there are three methods of combining expertise and the democratic system. The first one focuses on incorporating certain aspects of the technocratic mindset into already existing institutions. For instance, the structural approach of the European Union delegates experts, *which are almost completely separated from political processes*,[55] to formulate and implement policies in some relatively narrow domains (e.g., the establishment of monetary policy or the establishment of radiation exposure standards for workers in nuclear facilities). At the same time, in broader areas, elective

[50] Ibid., p. 152.

[51] Ibid.

[52] R.G. Olson, *Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century*, Lanham–Boulder–New York–London 2016.

[53] S. Rummens, "Technocracy as a Thin Ideology".

[54] R.G. Olson, *Scientism and Technocracy...*, pp. 162-168.

[55] Ibid., p. 162.

bodies have a greater role in shaping policy.[56] The remaining two methods are based on the premise that citizen participation in decision-making processes is crucial for integrating technocracy into a democratic framework. Citizen participation in technological assessment is one of the ways in which citizens can be included in decision-making. *One of the most important functions of experts is to inform the public about policy-relevant issues so that the public can both play an informed and significant role in setting policy and hold administrators responsible for efficient implementation of those policies*.[57] For instance, the Danish Board of Technology organized 19 Consensus Conferences in the 1980s and 1990s to promote discussions on scientific and technological topics of broad social significance between experts and citizen groups. Several Q&A sessions, presentations, and discussions were held to include Danish citizens in the debate over topics such as genetic engineering, food irradiation, air pollution, human infertility, and sustainable agriculture.[58] Similar processes were organized in Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.[59] The final method of combining technocracy with democracy proposed by Olson is community-based participatory research (CBPR).[60] It is a strategy for integrating scientific expertise and democratic participation in which scientists, institutions, organizations, and members of a community cooperate in all aspects of a research project. Such an approach aims to introduce policies that are more responsive to actual needs and have a higher citizen approval rate. For example, between 1998 and 2003, the US National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) organized 16 Town Meetings to *provide a context in which state, local, and federal health professionals, the public, and advocacy groups could establish common interests and potential collaborations*.[61]

Similar ideas can be traced in Rummens' concept of the 'technocratic style' of policymaking. The style can be simply defined as *democratic use of expertise*,[62] or, in more detail, as a type of political action based on a technocratic mindset that falls within the principles guiding a democratic system. The 'technocratic style' involves entrusting policymaking to independent specialized agencies headed by experts in specific fields.[63] In this case, recourse to expertise is a policy tool, which makes it more than the creation of advisory bodies. Another manifestation of the 'technocratic style' in politics is illustrated in the appointment of experts as members of the government, provided that the democratic legitimacy of power is preserved.[64] This means that, as long as the appointment of experts is democratically mandated, one can speak of the 'technocratic style' in

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 163.

58 Ibid., pp. 163-167.

59 Ibid., p. 167.

60 Ibid., p. 168.

61 Ibid.

62 S. Rummens, "Technocracy as a Thin Ideology...," p. 183.

63 Ibid., p. 183.

64 Ibid., p. 183.

politics. Importantly, the 'technocratic style' of policymaking is not synonymous with technocracy. The two concepts differ substantially in terms of the source of legitimacy of power. The former remains true to the democratic mandate and popular election, whereas the latter considers competence and/or expertise the source of legitimacy of power.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, this paper analyzed the main assumptions of technocracy and their implications for societies and politics. It firstly examined the history and changing approach of the technocratic movement. This part introduced the most important characteristics of the 'technocratic mentality', which remained unchanged despite the ideological transformation of the movement. It was argued that recent developments in artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies have revived the debate on using expertise in governance.

The following section of this paper was devoted to the discussion of three threats of technocracy from the perspective of AI existential risk analysis, particularly power-seeking behavior. This involved an analysis of the risk of deepening social divisions, using Kurt Vonnegut's 1952 novel *Player Piano* as an example. It was stated that concentration of power in the hands of experts can deepen social divisions by granting privileges to certain groups, especially those in the private sector. Secondly, the analysis focused on the incompatibility of technocracy and democracy. As discussed, committing to technocracy means rejecting democratic norms, such as popular elections, taking into account the will of the people, and joint establishment of the idea of the common good. Additionally, this section briefly presented the totalitarian tendencies of technocracy, which can be observed in its drive to eradicate private property, subjugate citizens to the state for basic needs, and introduce 'scientific dictatorship'. Finally, the analysis turned to the threats of value misalignment and the 'self-reification' of humans, which can lead to the redefinition of humanity and become an argument for technological interference in human evolution.

In the final section of this paper, two perspectives of combining certain elements of technocracy and democracy were discussed. Olson's methods of incorporating technocratic values in democratic systems and Rummens' 'technocratic style' of policymaking both demonstrate that it is possible and beneficial to find common ground between the two systems. It is worth noting, however, that the opportunities that both researchers are looking for in technocracy concern only the broadly understood political dimension. They focus on ways to apply selected elements of the technocratic system to preserve existing principles guiding democratic regimes. Their application, especially in terms of meeting with civic groups and community-based participatory research, can be a good starting point to fight the deepening of social divisions. However, if we take into account the discussed threats of changing attitudes toward the understanding of the human and humanity, the solutions proposed by Olsen and Rummens have little

relevance. It is thus necessary to define the priorities that should guide humanity in the face of accelerating technological progress. These priorities should approach the topic of the possible threats of technocracy more broadly and include more than just its political dimension.

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