

**Krzysztof TRZCIŃSKI**

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

[krzysztof.trzcinski@uj.edu.pl](mailto:krzysztof.trzcinski@uj.edu.pl)

## HYBRID POWER SHARING: ON HOW TO STABILIZE THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN MULTI-SEGMENTAL SOCIETIES<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT** There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. As examples, I will use the political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia. In the first part of the article I explain briefly the nature of PS, and of its two main models; in the second I explain what HPS is; in the third I analyze the emergence of HPS, and give the causes of the inclusion of consociational institutions in political systems in which centripetal institutions are dominant, using the cases of Nigeria and Indonesia; I draw conclusions in the final part.

**Key words:** power sharing, hybrid power sharing, consociational, centripetal, Nigeria, Indonesia

---

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Donald L. Horowitz for offering valuable comments on this paper.

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power and fosters understanding between them and contributes in this manner to the achievement and maintenance of peaceful relations. The literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS-based political systems: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two.

The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. As examples, I will use the political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia. In addition to the introduction, this article is formed of four main parts: In the first I explain briefly the nature of PS, and of its two main models: consociationalism and centripetalism; in the second I explain what HPS is; in the third I analyze the emergence of HPS, and give the causes of the inclusion of consociational institutions in political systems in which centripetal institutions are dominant, using the cases of Nigeria and Indonesia; I draw conclusions in the final part.

At the outset, it is worthwhile to note that Nigeria and Indonesia share many traits. The two countries occupy a vast area, 924,000 km<sup>2</sup> and over 1.9 million km<sup>2</sup> respectively, which is home to large populations, 196 million,<sup>2</sup> and 265 million,<sup>3</sup> respectively, according to estimates from 2018. Nigeria is the most populous country on the African continent, and also the seventh most populous country in the world. Indonesia is the third most populous country in Asia and the fourth most populous in the world. Most significantly, however, both countries are highly diverse ethnically and religiously. Nigeria is home to about 250 ethnic groups,<sup>4</sup> among which the largest are the Hausa-Fulani (about 29% of the country's population), the Yoruba (about 21%), the Igbo (about 18%) and Ijaw (about 10%).<sup>5</sup> It is estimated that over 50% of Nigerians are Muslim, about 40% are Christians of various denominations, and about 10% follow traditional beliefs.<sup>6</sup> In turn, Indonesia is home to at least several hundred autochthonous ethnic

<sup>2</sup> Worldometers, *Nigeria Population (Live)*, 2018, at <<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/>>, 3 March 2018.

<sup>3</sup> Worldometers, *Indonesia Population (Live)*, at <<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/indonesia-population/>>, 3 March 2018.

<sup>4</sup> "Nigeria", *Encyclopedia of the Nations*, at <<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html>>, 3 March 2018.

<sup>5</sup> "Nigeria Demographics Profile 2018", *Index Mundi*, at <[http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics\\_profile.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html)>, 3 March 2018.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. My discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018 indicate that in recent years the number of followers of Islam in Nigeria has been rising steadily.

groups.<sup>7</sup> In keeping with data from the 2010 general census, the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia (a little over 40% of all inhabitants). Other significant groups include the Sundanese (about 15.5%), the Malay (about 3.7%), the Batak (about 3.6%), the Maduro and Betawi (about 3% each).<sup>8</sup> The Chinese form Indonesia's largest group of immigrant population (about 1.2%). The vast majority of Indonesians, as many as 87%, are Muslim (overwhelmingly Sunni); Christians of various denominations make up a little fewer than 10%; and Hindus about 1.7%.<sup>9</sup>

In both Nigeria and Indonesia, the history of territorial unification, and that of the ethnic and religious groups forming their populations following independence (in 1960 and 1949 respectively) has been turbulent. Both countries experienced conflicts in relations between ethnic and religious segments making up their population, as well as between such segments and the central government. In order to normalize those relations, both countries introduced PS-type institutions.

## MODELS OF POWER-SHARING: CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CENTRIPETALISM

There are two basic understandings of the term power-sharing in the literature – in the wide and narrow sense. The term PS in the broad sense can be used in connection with the participation of various groups or institutional entities in some form of power. In the horizontal dimension it can encompass sharing power for example by various political parties; by political parties with institutionalized non-party entities like various social organizations and movements; between the sexes; between the parties to a conflict, such as rebellious organizations and the government; and also between the political elite and citizens. In the vertical dimension the term PS can be used in connection with the sharing of power between the central government and regional governments or local government institutions.

PS in the narrow sense refers to the systemic sharing of power in multi-segmental societies (especially deeply divided ones) by segments (groups, communities), membership in which is based on cultural criteria (such as, for example, common language, religion or celebrations) and ascribed ones (such as, for example, common ancestors, relatives, and racial background),<sup>10</sup> especially such as nations (understood in the sociological, not political sense), ethnic groups and religious and denominational communities.

<sup>7</sup> G. Macdonald, *Election Rules and Identity Politics: Understanding the Success of Multiethnic Parties in Indonesia*, Washington, DC 2013, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> "Indonesia Demographics Profile 2018", *Index Mundi*, at <[https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics\\_profile.html](https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics_profile.html)>, 3 March 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> B. Krauz-Mozer, "Tożsamość – czy to tylko suma spotkań i opowieści?", *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, vol. 26 (2017), p. 14.

In the narrow sense, PS should be seen above all as a type of political system.<sup>11</sup> The notion of 'political system' includes the structures, organizations, consciousness, culture, relations, values and norms that are characteristic of the political community in which it appears.<sup>12</sup> The basic elements of a political system, however, are its institutions as represented by a set of rules. A set of specific institutions, in turn, forms specific PS models. The narrow understanding of PS is mainly reflected in formal institutions. Most theoreticians seem implicitly concordant as to the basic institutions forming PS in a narrow sense. The attribution of given institutions to one of the PS models (types), especially the consociational or centripetal models, depends on which they correspond to in conceptual terms. The term PS in the narrow sense encompasses two main elements: sharing of power in multi-segmental societies by elites of the segments defined using cultural and ascriptive criteria; and the functioning of a specific set of institutions which further the maintenance of peaceful relations between these segments and between the segments and the central government.

Two main types of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism and centripetalism (also called integrative PS) are usually distinguished in the literature. Their conceptual foundations are different. The philosophy of consociationalism rests largely on the recognition of group rights.<sup>13</sup> It is worth repeating that in the context of PS in the narrow sense, groups, or segments, are mostly nations, ethnic groups, and religious and denominational (confessional) communities which form part of multi-segmental societies and often inhabit a given territory in compact settlements. In the spirit of consociationalism, such segments should be entitled to certain particular rights if only by virtue of their possession and articulation of group interests.

According to Stuart J. Kaufman,<sup>14</sup> the most important group interests, distinguished on a cultural and ascriptive basis, include linguistic, religious and economic interests. The first two types of interests are strongly tied with the desire to maintain a separate identity. Economic interests (and de facto political ones at the same time) include

<sup>11</sup> T.D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington, DC 1996, p. 4; B. Reilly, *Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia*, Perth 2011, p. 8, at <[http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political\\_Reform\\_and\\_the\\_Demise\\_of\\_Consociationalism\\_in\\_Southeast\\_Asia.pdf](http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political_Reform_and_the_Demise_of_Consociationalism_in_Southeast_Asia.pdf)>, 14 March 2018.

<sup>12</sup> However, when the political system of a multi-segmental country is not yet marked by a philosophy of thought and action in the spirit of peace and inter-segmental sharing of power, i.e., when PS-type arrangements are being introduced mechanically as an attempt to put an end to conflict or in a post-conflict context (for example as a result of an ad hoc peace agreement ending conflict between two mutually hostile ethnic segments), PS can be considered as a strategy (and a set of political and legal arrangements serving it) aimed at conflict management or resolution. However, even in such a situation, PS-type arrangements can form a significant part of the political system, a consensual political culture should evolve, and the awareness of the necessity for a joint nurturing of compromises attained exists.

<sup>13</sup> Philosophy here is understood as general principles and ideas which form the basis of a given PS model in the narrow sense.

<sup>14</sup> S.J. Kaufman, "Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict", in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, London 2011, pp. 91, 94-95.

those related to the exercise of power over a given territory and the maintenance of land ownership by members of a given segment, which may be particularly important when natural resources exist in that territory.<sup>15</sup> Such interests also include the hiring of segment members in public offices and agencies (parastatals) in keeping with the principle of proportionality through the use of quotas. The task of consociational institutions is to protect and reinforce group interests. The protection of those interests implies the maintenance of a status quo, i.e. most particularly the continued flow of benefits, economic ones, for example. Reinforcing group interests especially means perpetuating them or reaching out for even greater benefits.

The philosophy of consociationalism (in its dominant, classic version,<sup>16</sup> called corporate<sup>17</sup>) entails one's interests are never better served than by oneself. One can thus rest the essence of consociationalism on the assumption that, in a multi-segmental society, especially one that is deeply divided, individual segments, as interest groups of sorts, should have their own representation in the state power structure and a role in political decision making. In consequence, group interests are best served by consociational, ideally formally entrenched,<sup>18</sup> institutions such as: segmental parties<sup>19</sup> (especially ethnic and religious ones) forming grand coalitions; segmental autonomy; proportionality in elections, division of government posts, positions in public agencies or – sometimes – in the army; and a minority veto right. It is best if the decision making process in the consociational system rests on the consensual approach to issues by the segmental representatives, even though this is often difficult and time consuming.

The philosophy of centripetalism has a more limited relationship with group rights. Centripetalism, like consociationalism, as a type of PS is intended to assure members of various segments of a share in power, but not as part of particular institutions protecting and reinforcing the interests of individual segments, but in the dimension of supra-segmental, or inter-segmental institutions, i.e., institutions that are open to individuals

<sup>15</sup> About economic interests as a fundamental component of the economic dimension of group rights see, for example, R. Lemarchand, "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *African Affairs*, vol. 106, no. 422 (2007), at <<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adl041>>, p. 3; K. Gyekye, *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience*, Oxford 1997, p. 90

<sup>16</sup> J. McGarry, "Conclusion: What Explains the Performance of Power-Sharing Settlements?", in A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*, London 2017, p. 281.

<sup>17</sup> In the literature, the so-called liberal consociationalism is also distinguished, which assumes, among others things, the existence side-by-side of institutions nurturing groups rights and supra-group institutions referring to individuals or to society as a whole, and not to ethnic or religious segments. See, for example, A. McCulloch, "Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Distinction", *Democratization*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2014), at <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.748039>>, pp. 501-518; R. Taylor (ed.), *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, London 2009, passim.

<sup>18</sup> At times, however, informal consociational institutions (such as, for example, Nigeria's rotating presidency) can turn out to be more significant than formal guarantees (such as, for example, *Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua*).

<sup>19</sup> Called at times communal parties.

from all segments. Such an approach is intended, above all, to create among the members of the political elite integrative political behavior cross-cutting segmental divisions which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in this manner, reduce their significance.<sup>20</sup> Political activity within the framework of the centripetal PS model is supposed to be focused on state affairs rather than on inter-segmental relations or those between segments and the central government.

Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, does not promote institutional recognition of segmental differences and interests. Quite the contrary, the essence of centripetalism is to foster cooperation not so much between segments as between members of different segments, and even *sui generis* forcing them to cooperate by creating an integrative institutional framework. The principal formal centripetal institutions include supra-regional and inter-segmental parties and, should the need arise, coalitions between them; decentralization leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental states or provinces, thus inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate with one another; the election of a supra-segmental (supported by members of various segments) president through the use of the so-called territorial vote distribution requirement, i.e. the need to win an appropriately large number of votes in presidential elections in the majority of states or provinces (meeting this requirement is indispensable to occupy the presidential office, and merely winning a numerical majority of votes is insufficient),<sup>21</sup> and (at least in theory<sup>22</sup>) the use in elections to the parliament (especially its lower house) of so-called preferential voting, either in the form of a proportional single transferable vote system (in multi-mandate districts), or a majority alternative vote system (in single-mandate districts).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> B. Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific*, Oxford 2007, especially pp. 83-91; B. Reilly, "Centripetalism", in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict...*, especially pp. 291-295; B. Reilly, "Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation and Integration", in S. Wolff, C. Yakinthou (eds.), *Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice*, New York 2011, pp. 57-65.

<sup>21</sup> K. Trzciński, "Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement in Presidential Elections: Cases of Nigeria and Indonesia", *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2017), K. Trzciński (ed.), *Special Issue on Power-Sharing in Asia and Oceania*, pp. 89-107, at <[http://aav.iksiopan.pl/images/AAV/AAV\\_30\\_1/Krzysztof-Trzcinski.pdf](http://aav.iksiopan.pl/images/AAV/AAV_30_1/Krzysztof-Trzcinski.pdf)>, 16 March 2018.

<sup>22</sup> Opinions about the optimal parliamentary election system for centripetalism in the literature of the subjects are hugely different.

<sup>23</sup> Preferential voting, thanks to a ranking of candidates conducted by the voters, makes it possible for them to indicate preferences among candidates from different parties. In the case of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji and in Papua New Guinea, among other places. See B. Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity...*, pp. 115-118; A. McCulloch, "Does Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies", *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2013), at <<https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2012.658002>>, pp. 111-132; A. McCulloch, "The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places", in J. McEvoy and B. O'Leary (eds.), *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*, Philadelphia 2013, pp. 94-111.



## THE NATURE OF HYBRID POWER SHARING

Both consociationalism and centripetalism have their drawbacks. And so, above all, consociationalism can increase the awareness of segment members about the benefits that ensue from belonging to a given segment in conditions in which consociational institutions exist and, in consequence, strengthen segmental identity and politicize ethnicity. Centripetalism, on the other hand, can protect mainly the interests of the principal segment,<sup>24</sup> or segments,<sup>25</sup> in the state. Therefore, centripetalism can serve large segments, which coopt in a limited manner to the participation in power of those members of the political elite of smaller segments which are willing to cooperate. Neither of the two models, in their “pure” form, needs to meet its objective, i.e., limiting inter-segmental conflicts (or between segments and the central government) and, in consequence contribute to building political stability in multi-segmental conditions.<sup>26</sup>

In order to mitigate the above-mentioned drawbacks and some others, institutions proper to both main PS models are sometimes combined in one political system, although this does not happen frequently. At first glance, consociationalism and centripetalism are difficult to reconcile. This does not mean, however, that institutions proper to one or the other model cannot co-exist in one state. Just as, from the perspective of PS in the broad sense, right-wing and left-wing political parties can share power in a state by forming a governing coalition, so, from the perspective of PS in the narrow sense, consociational and centripetal institutions can function side by side in the same multi-segmental society. Together, they form a third PS model in the narrow sense, which I propose to call hybrid power sharing. In short, HPS is a real type of inter-segmental PS system, which includes elements that can be referred to as heterogenic, as they originate with PS models that have different conceptual bases.

---

<sup>24</sup> In Indonesia, for example, there is one main ethnic group – the Javanese, and one main religious community – Muslims, the majority of whom are Sunnis.

<sup>25</sup> In Nigeria, for example, there are three main ethnic groups – the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, and two main religious communities – Muslims and Christians (mainly Protestants).

<sup>26</sup> As the notion of a state’s “political stability” is often understood in many ways, it is worthwhile to recall its usual essence. This notion includes political and economic elements. Taking into consideration the many proposals put forward by scholars or research centers attempting to define or analyze this notion, one can state that it includes, first and foremost, elements such as lasting (i.e., not subject to too frequent change) governments enjoying some form of legitimacy; a state where internal violence is absent (and in international surroundings, if it affects internal security); a low level of social tensions and the existence of public order; the rule of law, strong constitutional mechanisms and accountability of those in power; a competent and efficient administration that is sensitive to the needs of citizens, and other state institutions; the lack of structural changes accompanied by violence and a breakdown in the functioning of state institutions and of the rule of law; a low level of corruption; and a business climate favorable to the development of entrepreneurship and investment. See K. Trzeciński, “Czym jest stabilność polityczna państwa?”, *Przegląd Politologiczny*, no. 2 (2015), pp. 44-45, at <<http://przeglad.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/pp2015-2-037.pdf>>, 18 March 2018.

But as can be seen in practice, the elements of one of the PS models, centripetalism or consociationalism, are always dominant in a hybrid PS, not necessarily in terms of numbers, but rather of importance within the political system (including in terms of its impact and formal status). HPS can be found in Nigeria,<sup>27</sup> and in Indonesia,<sup>28</sup> for example. Centripetal elements are dominant in the political systems of both countries, but they are enhanced by consociational institutions.

The formal institutions of centripetal PS in those states are: a centripetal territorial structure made up of multi-segmental states or provinces; the election of a supra-segmental president through the use of a territorial vote distribution requirement; and supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties.

In Nigeria, centripetal institutions are complemented with consociational ones, and are understood either as a type of grand coalition in Lijphart's understanding of the term (or of so-called "universal participation", or that of a 'cartel of elites'),<sup>29</sup> or an emanation of the principle of proportionality especially in the political representation and in the appointment of employees of public institutions,<sup>30</sup> or type of economic PS.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> K. Trzciński, "How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria", *Politeja*, vol. 42, no. 3 (2016), pp. 53-73, at <<http://akademicka.pl/ebooks/free/c3b7109ec2dbc4b3834ccd59bc1d59d3.pdf>>, 19 March 2018.

<sup>28</sup> K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia", *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2017), pp. 168-185, at <<http://www.czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/pliki/ppsy/46-1/ppsy2017111.pdf>>, 19 March 2018.

<sup>29</sup> See A. Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, London 2008, p. 29; R. Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, Garden City, NY 1967, p. 276. Lijphart thinks that consociationalism does not always need to be a formally institutionalized system, but can be present solely in certain systemic arrangements and, at the same time, be in part reflected in the political custom or practice in place. And so, for example, a government made up of political parties representing members of various ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups is the purest form of the grand coalition based on the consociational model of PS. There can be other consociational arrangements at the level of the legislative and executive branches, such as, for example a coalition defined not in terms of a division of power between political parties formed on the basis of, for example, specific ethnic groups or religious communities, but rather on the maintenance of a measure of participatory proportion between representatives of most ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups of a plural society. Therefore, for Lijphart, the cases of, say, Lebanon or Cyprus (in the past), bear out the thesis that as far as the most important consociational institution – the so-called grand coalition – is concerned, one can use the wider term of "universal participation", or that of a "cartel of elites" to use the notion coined by Ralf Dahrendorf. This position is close to centripetalism.

<sup>30</sup> Although one can't speak, in the second case, of the existence of some set proportions connected with ethnic groups or religious communities.

<sup>31</sup> About economic PS see, for example, K. Miti, E. Abatan, S. Minou, "Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa's Conflicts?", *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2013), p. 2; A. Mehler, "Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship", *African Affairs*, vol. 108, no. 432 (2009), p. 459; K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia"..., p. 179; K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism as a Tactic of the Central Authorities: The Case of Papua", *Hemispheres*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2016), p. 16, at <[http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES\\_31-4\\_2016.pdf](http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES_31-4_2016.pdf)>, 19 March 2018.



These are, above all: the formal requirement of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the cabinet (so-called federal character principle of parity type);<sup>32</sup> the informal principle of rotating presidency between Muslims and Christians or, to be correct, between the North, dominated by Muslims, and the South, inhabited mostly by Christians (the realization of this principle ensures a rotating representation in the office of the president among followers of both religions); the informal principle in keeping with which the vice-presidency falls to a member of a different religious community and ethnic group than that from which the president originates (the realization of this principle ensures the simultaneous representation in the highest executive body of followers of both religions and members of different ethnic groups); and an economic PS institution consisting in the return by the federal government of part of the revenues derived from the exploitation of energy resources to a number of states in the south of Nigeria (the Niger Delta).<sup>33</sup>

In Indonesia, in addition to the main centripetal institutions, the following consociational institutions are in place: special autonomy for the provinces of Aceh, Papua and West Papua<sup>34</sup> (one of the most important elements of such autonomy is the application in Aceh of Sharia Law, which is not in force in other parts of Indonesia); economic PS arrangements, in keeping with which the provinces of Aceh, Papua and West Papua retain the lion's share of the revenues generated by the exploitation of those provinces' natural resources; and segmental parties: religious on the territory of the entire country, and ethnic in the province of Aceh. These institutions are emanations of one of the four main consociational institutions – autonomy for segments, which arises from the recognition of group rights.

The Nigerian and Indonesian HPS systems have mainly consociational institutions which, at the same time, correspond to both ethnic and religious divisions, or such whose point of reference are ethnic divisions alone. There are fewer institutions which are connected only with religious divisions. The best examples of the latter type are the principle of the rotating presidency between Muslims and Christians in the case of Nigeria, and the possibility for religious parties to function in the case of Indonesia.

<sup>32</sup> According to the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999*, at <[http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file\\_id=179202](http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202)>, 16 March 2018, the composition of the federal government and of all federal government agencies should reflect Nigeria's "federal character" and there can't be in them any preponderance of persons originating, as it was formulated, from a "few" states, ethnic groups or segments of another type ("sectional groups") (art. 14 (3)). The above-mentioned state bodies also need to perform their obligations in a manner that doesn't favor any specific Nigerian states, ethnic groups or segments of another type (art. 14 (3)).

<sup>33</sup> R.T. Suberu, "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience", in D. Turton (ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, Oxford 2006, pp. 75-76; S.A. Rustad, *Power-Sharing and Conflict in Nigeria: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes*, Oslo 2008, pp. 19-22.

<sup>34</sup> In the case of the provinces of Papua and West Papua, legally guaranteed special autonomy has been introduced only in part.

## WHY DOES HPS ARISE AND FUNCTION?

It is worthwhile to consider the origins of HPS. B. Reilly notes that, especially at the beginning of the period of independence, institutions that were either consociational or corresponding to consociationalism were the preferred ones in many South-East Asian states.<sup>35</sup> With time, some countries in this region turned toward centripetal institutions, a trend that was especially visible in the evolution of electoral laws and the elimination of segmental parties. Such was the case in Indonesia, for example. The same process took place in sub-Saharan Africa, in Nigeria.

Initially, after gaining independence, both Nigeria and Indonesia introduced certain consociational institutions to their political systems. And so, numerous segmental parties were active in both states – ethnic parties in Nigeria, and ethnic and religious parties in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities considered the introduction of a federal system, while Nigeria had initially been a federation of three administrative regions, in each of which one large ethnic group held the dominant position. The initial period of the existence of both multi-segmental countries was unusually turbulent and the consociational institutions, whose number or influence was limited,<sup>36</sup> were unable to prevent inter-segmental conflicts or conflicts between segments and the central government.

Moreover, the persistence of such conflicts could endanger the unity of the newly emerged states, in which there were centrifugal tendencies, including pro-independence ones that corresponded to segmental divisions. In its restricted version, consociationalism did not guarantee political stability in either Nigeria or Indonesia. In this situation, the two countries' authorities turned to centripetal institutions, but these also turned out to be insufficient. In consequence, with time consociational institutions began to be added to the dominant centripetalism.

The general answer to the question about the reason for the emergence and continued existence of HPS in Nigeria and Indonesia, i.e., the combination of various elements from different PS models in one multi-segmental country is rather simple: It's a combination of need and interest. The elites of a given segment can feel either a strong desire for guaranteed rights to something (to have segmental parties, for example) or the lack of such guarantees. Obtaining the right to something is seen as favorable for the segment in question. For example, it is assumed that segmental parties will better meet the needs of the segment than inter-segmental parties.

In each case, however, the need for HPS can be different, be articulated by the elites of one or more segments and refer to different PS dimensions. The implementation of HPS follows negotiations and is the result of an arrangement, which is satisfactory to different sides to some degree. The introduction into the political system dominated by centripetal institutions of certain consociational elements enhances centripetalism

<sup>35</sup> B. Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity...*, p. 186; B. Reilly, *Political Reform...*, pp. 4, 18-19.

<sup>36</sup> Presumably to some degree on account of lack of acceptance from at least part of the political elites.

in those areas in which it proves insufficient to produce a stabilizing effect. The benefits from the use of, for example, consociational institutions in conditions where centripetal institutions are dominant can also be derived by the central government, because providing to a given segment the PS institutions it needs and demands can put an end to a long-lasting and costly conflict, as was the case in the Indonesian province of Aceh,<sup>37</sup> for example.

The combination of centripetal and consociational elements should thus produce a stabilizing effect where centripetalism or consociationalism alone is insufficient. The combination of institutions of both main PS models may take place at different periods of development of PS in a given country. Late supplementations or adjustments to the system are not easy to carry out, however. The purpose of the PS is to stabilize the political situation, and any changes may bring instability. If, during the functioning of a given political system, certain segments begin to make serious demands for its reconstruction, other segments may see this as signs of withdrawal from the original arrangements, or even of a desire to fundamentally modify the existing system. This may destabilize the political situation in the country. On the other hand, the lack of flexibility in changing the arrangements about the essence of PS can also be dangerous in situations when some important premises forming the basis for the introduction of this system have changed. In each of the aforementioned situations a conflict may either resume or increase in intensity, as was the case in Lebanon, for example. The case of Lebanon shows that sometimes the existing PS model requires corrections, which are difficult to attain otherwise than through the renewal of the conflict. Conflict, especially war and revolution, may also bring about a fundamental change in the political system, including a change in the dominant PS model.

A good example of this process is Nigeria, where, in the first years of independence, there were institutions of a consociational type, including ethnic parties and a territorial structure consisting of just a few administrative regions controlled by the main ethnic groups. In the mid-1960s, Nigeria began to turn to centripetalism, which was one of the causes for the outbreak of the so-called Biafra War, which lasted from 1967 to 1970. After it ended, a political system emerged in which centripetal institutions, including supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties and administrative regions (states) of a multi-ethnic character, were dominant. As the Nigerian example shows, a shift from consociational institutions to centripetal ones may occur especially when the former prove inadequate, e.g. when they hinder the effective governance of a multi-segmental society or amplify some centrifugal forces. Such a shift may be particularly important in the context of attempts to implement a policy of national unification or, in other words, the unification of a multi-segmental society.

On the other hand, as is shown by the example of Indonesia – especially by the introduction of special autonomy in Aceh – even the relatively late addition of institutions of one model to the other (in this case, consociational institutions to centripetal

<sup>37</sup> See: *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, signed in Helsinki on the 15 of August 2005, at <[http://www.acehpeaceprocess.net/pdf/mou\\_final.pdf](http://www.acehpeaceprocess.net/pdf/mou_final.pdf)>, 20 March 2018.

ones) may prevent territorial disintegration of a multi-segmental country, and thus help to achieve a similar unification effect. It is thus difficult to speak of a rule regarding the time when elements of a different PS model are added to the dominant PS model.

As in the current political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia centripetal institutions are more important than consociational ones, it is worthwhile to consider the specific goals for the introduction of at least some consociational institutions in both countries.

### Nigeria's Consociational Institutions

The centripetal institutions established in Nigeria in the 1970s – especially the supra-regional, inter-ethnic and inter-religious political parties – did not ensure a balance of power between the three largest ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo) and the two main religious communities (Muslims, Christians) in government and in appointments to public positions. Nor did they guarantee a measure of participation in power for smaller ethnic groups.

In consequence, the requirement for public bodies in Nigeria to comply with the federal character principle was introduced to the Constitution of 1979.<sup>38</sup> This rule allows members and representatives of different ethnic groups and religious communities to participate in these bodies. In keeping with the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria,<sup>39</sup> the federal character principle is to promote national unity, support national loyalty and to give each Nigerian citizen a sense of belonging to the nation, irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation. Its wider aim is to strengthen the integration of a multi-segmental society, to achieve political stability and to facilitate civilizational development.<sup>40</sup>

The effect of a multi-segmental composition of the council of ministers and other public bodies in keeping with the federal character principle can be sought in concordance with either the consociational or centripetal philosophy. The federal character principle takes on a consociational essence when it introduces parity in the form of quotas in some bodies, as is the case in the Nigerian government. The Nigerian constitution mandates that the cabinet be made up of at least one minister from each of the 36 states.<sup>41</sup> This minister needs to be indigenous to that state.<sup>42</sup> R.T. Suberu notes that Nigeria's division into 36 states, in force since 1996, has led to a situation in which the three main ethnic

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979* (enacted on 21 September 1978), art. 14 (3), at <[http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig\\_const\\_79.pdf](http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig_const_79.pdf)>, 16 March 2018.

<sup>39</sup> *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999...*, art. 318. (1).

<sup>40</sup> In the economic sense, the federal character principle can also refer to the participation of ethnic groups and religious communities in the distribution of state resources between the country's administrative regions (states).

<sup>41</sup> To compare, it is worthwhile to note that, in keeping with the provisions of the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979...*, art. 135 (3) and art. 14 (3), also at least one minister in the government was to originate from each Nigerian state, but the Basic Law set the number of these at 19 (art. 3 (1) and First Schedule).

<sup>42</sup> *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999...*, art. 147 (3).

groups are a majority in 21 states, while 15 states are governed by smaller ethnic groups.<sup>43</sup> By combining the constitutional requirement with the realities of the territorial structure, a formal parity of regional representation in government has been established and, at the same time – and indirectly arising from it – a parity of participation in the government of the main ethnic groups<sup>44</sup> and religious communities,<sup>45</sup> de facto in the form of seats reserved for their members. Simultaneously members of smaller ethnic groups were allowed to take part in the exercise of power. In the case of states in which none of Nigeria's three main ethnic groups is dominant, there is a greater probability of rotation of positions in government between the representatives of the smaller indigenous ethnic groups, for example in successive cabinets, than in the case when in a given state the majority of the population are members of one of Nigeria's main ethnic groups.<sup>46</sup>

The federal character principle, in turn, seems to take on a more centripetal nature when it generally promotes in some public bodies their multi-segmental character, as is the case in the army,<sup>47</sup> for example, without having a parity character. However, the problem lies in how, the federal character principle in the version reminiscent of centripetalism is carried out in practice, without formally guaranteed quotas, as in the case of the army of Burundi,<sup>48</sup> for example.

The Federal Character Commission (FCC), in keeping with the Constitution of 1999, is the guarantor of a just division of positions in Nigerian public bodies.<sup>49</sup> Specifically, the FCC's task is to promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all posts in Nigeria's public bodies.<sup>50</sup> Recommendations issued by the FCC, however, show a preference for representatives of the larger ethnic groups in appointments to positions, and very frequently are of a quota character.<sup>51</sup> Ultimately, the practice of dividing positions is more consociational in nature. Representatives of the smaller ethnic groups are the most disadvantaged by this system.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>43</sup> R.T. Suberu, "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience"..., pp. 73-74.

<sup>44</sup> My discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018 indicate that the situation in which a member of an ethnic group having a dominant status in a given state becomes minister – or the "representative" of that state in government – is typical.

<sup>45</sup> Usually, the majority of members of specific ethnic groups is Christian or Muslim. And so, almost all Hausa-Fulani are Muslims, while the majority of the Yoruba and Igbo are Christians.

<sup>46</sup> These conclusions derive from my discussions with Nigerian political scientists.

<sup>47</sup> *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999*..., art. 217 (3).

<sup>48</sup> See S. Vandeginste, "Power-Sharing in Burundi: An Enduring Miracle?", in A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (Eds.), *Power-Sharing*..., p. 169. Cf. M. Cammett, E. Malesky, *Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2012, vol. 56, no. 6, p. 990.

<sup>49</sup> *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999*..., Third Schedule, Part 1 C, art. 8.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, Third Schedule, Part 1 C, art. 8 (1) (b).

<sup>51</sup> Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "Institutionalising Ethnic Representation: How Effective is the Federal Character Commission in Nigeria?", *CRISE Working Paper*, no. 43 (2007), p. 11. Such conclusions also derive from my discussions with Nigerian political scientists.

<sup>52</sup> The federal character principle gives rise to criticism also on account of the fact that non-professionals are employed in various positions because they have the "appropriate" ethnic and/or religious

Generally speaking, the federal character principle – more consociational than centripetal in nature – satisfies the interests of the main ethnic groups to a greater extent and those of minority groups to a lesser extent. It nonetheless creates a certain balance between large segments and, in this manner, constitutes some form of revision of centripetal institutions. The federal character principle is certainly not perfect in practice and has, therefore, many critics but it is difficult to imagine what relations between Nigeria's largest ethnic groups and religious communities would look like if this principle was totally absent.

The formal federal character principle is supplemented by informal institutions. In Nigeria, the rotation of the presidency between Muslims and Christians, similarly to that of the presidency and vice-presidency for different religious communities and ethnic groups, increases the balance of power between Muslims and Christians and, at the same time, between the main ethnic groups. In consequence, it helps prevent any of the large segments from acquiring a dominant position, and this also indirectly benefits the smaller segments.

Nigeria also has an economic consociational institution consisting in the federal government returning to several southern Nigerian states located in the Niger Delta, part of the revenue earned from the extraction of oil and natural gas in those states. It has been introduced because Nigerian centripetalism has not eliminated the sense of economic injustice among members of segments inhabiting states,<sup>53</sup> which generate greater revenue for the Nigerian central budget than do other states, thanks to the extraction of energy resources. Presently the return by the federal government of part of the income from these resources to the Niger Delta states, namely 13%,<sup>54</sup> mitigates the demands of the elites of the segments inhabiting those states, even if it doesn't satisfy them entirely.

### Indonesia's Consociational Institutions

In the Nigerian HPS system, all segmental parties, including religious ones, are banned. This is not the case in Indonesia, where two types of segmental parties that are typical of consociationalism can exist: religious parties (i.e. those whose political programs explicitly refer to religious values) and, in the province of Aceh, ethnic parties (i.e. those which are supported mainly by members of a particular ethnic group, and whose political programs refer to their needs and interests), often referred to as regional or local parties.

Agreement for the existence of religious parties in Indonesia is a tribute by the central government to the religious majority in Indonesia, i.e. Muslims, and to the

---

affiliation. The allocation of positions in public institutions on the basis of knowledge and experience is called for, for example, by K. Asayu, "Federalism and Federal Character Principle in Nigeria: A Dilution", *Review of Public Administration and Management*, vol. 3, no. 7 (2015), pp. 32-44.

<sup>53</sup> Such as, for example, the Ijaw and Ogoni ethnic groups.

<sup>54</sup> R.T. Suberu, "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience"..., pp. 75-76.



country's largest ethnic group – the Javanese, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. It is therefore not a reaction to the centrifugal minority forces. Muslim parties in Indonesia represent the majority religious segment, so they do not seem to be a threat to the lasting nature of centripetal institutions. The most popular among those parties<sup>55</sup> are able to cross the mandatory 3.5% threshold for election to the lower house of parliament, the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR).<sup>56</sup> These parties can also function effectively in Indonesia because they have a supra-regional and inter-ethnic character, one that is consistent with the centripetal legislation on political parties. The supra-regional character requirement and the mandatory electoral threshold successfully prevent the emergence of Christian parties.<sup>57</sup> These can only count on significant support from Christians, which belong to small ethnic groups living in such Indonesian areas like Papua, the island of Flores, the Maluku archipelago, parts of Celebes and Sumatra.<sup>58</sup>

In consequence, Christian-Democratic parties or those who simply refer to Christian values are practically of no importance on Indonesia's political stage<sup>59</sup>. Conditions in which religious parties operate are beneficial for Muslim parties, and disadvantageous for non-Muslim ones, thus create a situation in which consociational religious parties serve the followers of only the Muslim segment, and this might cause dissatisfaction especially in the Christian and Hindu segments,<sup>60</sup> and could theoretically pose a threat to future relations between the religious majority and the central government which it dominates, and the religious minorities. If, in the prevailing centripetal conditions, a consociational institution strengthens the majority politically, minority religious segments could demand that the activities of their segmental parties at the national level made easier, for example by abolishing the requirement for supra-regional parties,<sup>61</sup> thus undermining the essence of one of Indonesia's principal centripetal institutions.

The possibility for religious parties to operate in Indonesia is a continuation of a tradition going back to the early days of independence. It should probably be considered above all from the perspective of the central government's response to the demands of the conservative clergy and religious activists. The existence of Muslim parties may, by

<sup>55</sup> See K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia"..., p. 180.

<sup>56</sup> Following the 2014 elections to the DPR, representatives of Muslim parties occupy about 31% of the chamber (173 deputies out of a total of 560 seats, in 2016). See Tentang DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, at <<http://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/fraksiz>>, 21 March 2018. Members of three Muslim parties are members of the present cabinet of President Joko Widodo.

<sup>57</sup> See K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia"..., pp. 180-181.

<sup>58</sup> It is worth recalling that, according to data from the 2010 census, Christians are less than 10% of Indonesia's population, and Hindus about 1.7%.

<sup>59</sup> See D.L. Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*, New York 2013, p. 187.

<sup>60</sup> Hindus, who live largely in the province of Bali, do not have any religious party at present.

<sup>61</sup> My discussions with Indonesian political scientists in Indonesia in 2015-16 indicate that such a threat can increase with the intensification of Muslim migration to areas traditionally inhabited mainly by Christians.

channeling their political activity through a constitutional framework, limit the radicalization of Islam.<sup>62</sup> Indonesia has had tragic experiences with the activities of the radical Muslim organization Darul Islam, which attempted to make Indonesia into a religious state (Negara Islam Indonesia) between 1949 and 1962.

On the other hand, the Indonesian government's acquiescence to the introduction of political and economic consociational institutions in the Province of Aceh, or the only partially fulfilled promise to introduce them in Indonesian Papua (now the provinces of Papua and Western Papua),<sup>63</sup> were aimed at stabilizing the situation in provinces where there were (or still are) active pro-independence movements seen by the central government as separatist. Such concessions included special autonomy (allowing, among other things, for Sharia Law in Aceh), ethnic parties (practically only in Aceh), or leaving in those provinces the lion's share of the financial revenues generated by the exploitation of natural resources there – up to 70% of the revenues Indonesia obtains from Aceh's natural gas and oil;<sup>64</sup> and 70-80% of the revenue from the exploitation of natural resources (70% in the case of oil and natural gas) in Papua.<sup>65</sup>

It is worthwhile to note, however, that in those spheres of power in which the Indonesian government hasn't been forced to make far-reaching political concessions with respect to specific segments,<sup>66</sup> the leading role was retained by centripetalism or consociationalism applied toward the majority (Muslim parties), or by consociationalism that was only tactical in nature, as in the case of Indonesian Papua, where promises to introduce consociational institutions were carried out in part only.<sup>67</sup>

A separate case is that of the province of Aceh, where the de facto vertical consociationalism forms an example of a win-win situation. It brings advantages to the minority (it gives ethnic political elites originating from the Free Aceh Movement a share in the regional government,<sup>68</sup> and in decision-making concerning the distribution of funds) and, at the same time, to the central government (its introduction has led to the end of the armed conflict and to the unification of the state, albeit it reduced the revenues flowing to the central budget and originating from the exploitation of that province's natural resources).

Tactical Consociationalism (the partially fulfilled promise to introduce consociational institutions) for Indonesian Papua brings greater advantages to one side, namely the central government (such as greatly curbing the conflict in Papua and the unification of the state) and, at the same time, to the main ethnic and religious segment (the

<sup>62</sup> Such conclusions also arise from my discussions with Indonesian political scientists.

<sup>63</sup> K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", pp. 5-20.

<sup>64</sup> *Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/2006 regarding Governing of Aceh*, art. 181 (1b. 5-6) i (3), art. 182, at <<http://pih.kemlu.go.id/files/UU%2011-%202006.pdf>>, 22 March 2014.

<sup>65</sup> *Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province*, art. 34 (3) (b), at <<http://papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>>, 22 March 2014.

<sup>66</sup> As was the case in the Province of Aceh.

<sup>67</sup> K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", pp. 5-20.

<sup>68</sup> K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia" ..., p. 181.

Javanese and Muslims to whom settling in Papua has brought economic benefits), even if in due course it could also bring economic and educational benefits to the autochthonous population – the Papuans.<sup>69</sup>

Although Indonesian authorities are seeking, in keeping with the centripetal philosophy, to blur the ethnic and religious differences that exist within Indonesia's multi-segmental society and to turn them into an issue of marginal political significance, the formulation and introduction of the HPS system indicates that inter-segmental relations and relations between segments and the central government constitute a very important issue of Indonesian politics and economics because, among other reasons, conflicts in relations between the above mentioned entities occurred and/or continue to occur in areas where there are considerable natural resources.

As the above examples indicate, the implementation and functioning of specific consociational institutions in a PS-type political system in which the centripetal institutions have an advantage is highly justified in each case.

## CONCLUSIONS

Although the main consociational and centripetal institutions have been identified in the literature, in practice full consociationalism can be encountered only rarely, while centripetalism in the pure sense currently doesn't exist at all.<sup>70</sup> Full theoretical models, i.e., those that include all the institutions attributed to them, are usually abstract, or ideal propositions, even if they are in large measure empirically based. In the real-life conditions of multi-segmental societies, all the institutions that characterize any of the theoretical PS models aren't usually present, or only certain of their variants were introduced, and these often depart from pure theoretical premises.

Hybrid power-sharing, on the other hand, is a vibrant model that is firmly embedded in practice. It combines the institutions of centripetalism and consociationalism without predetermined arrangements about what number and which institutions of either model it must comprise. Naturally, institutions of one PS model are always dominant in an HPS system. And so, in Nigeria and Indonesia centripetal institutions are prevalent, whereas in some other cases these may be consociational institutions. Significantly, HPS is effective in that it produces peace and political stability, as opposed to concordance with some pure theoretical requirements, which are few in the case of HPS.

Leaving aside sudden political system changes (caused, for example, by a coup d'état, war or revolution), it may be assumed that every PS model, including HPS, functions as long as it is needed, and especially as long as it addresses the needs of the important segments that make it up. Important segments are those whose elites articulate segmental

<sup>69</sup> K. Trzeciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> Although one may say that pure centripetalism did exist in Nigeria and Indonesia before those states re-introduced certain consociational institutions.

interests actively and want to take part in the exercise of power. It cannot be ruled out, and further research in this respect would be worthwhile, that adding institutions from another model to the dominant PS model is a temporary concession on the part of the dominant model's proponents. But HPS may just as well be permanent in nature and appear where the institutions of centripetalism or consociationalism alone are not sufficient for some reason. Thus, the consociational add-ons in the Nigerian or Indonesian PS system can be seen as a permanent concession on the part of the supporters of centripetalism to certain segments. Perhaps, thanks to such concessions, it was possible to attain in both countries the aims that are served by PS, i.e., to reduce conflicts in relations between segments, as well as between segments and the central government, and consequently to stabilize the political situation. It can't be ruled out, either, that it is the introduction of consociational add-ons in the Nigerian and Indonesian PS systems that enabled PS and its dominant centripetal institutions to become firmly entrenched in the two countries

As I have attempted to demonstrate, HPS was born out of concrete needs and interests and from the need to reconcile them. This system exists because it brings benefits to various political actors in Nigeria and Indonesia: the segmental elites and the central government. But does it truly stabilize the political situation in both countries? Such stabilization in multi-segmental countries can be achieved to a large degree by reducing inter-segmental conflicts and conflicts between segments and the central government (although the latter can also be dominated by a specific segment, for example the Javanese in Indonesia). The problem is, however, that even though the intensity of conflicts between segments and between segments and the central government in Nigeria and Indonesia have been reduced since HPS was introduced in both countries, this fact can't be directly attributed solely to the introduction of such a political system in both countries. The reduction of conflicts may be just as well due to many other factors, such as economic development leading to prosperity for an increasing portion of society; school education programs that promote peaceful relations between members of particular segments and pro-state attitudes; the development of local self-government; and the greater effectiveness of state institutions, including those responsible for maintaining peace.

For the time being, there are few tools for examining the effectiveness of political systems of the PS type. In the opinion of S. Wolff, formulated from the perspective of rational choice, if such stimuli (incentives, motivations) as power, status, security and economic gain are desirable and cannot be obtained otherwise than through the PS, the institutions in place should be accepted by the political elites of the multi-segmental country, and their maintenance desirable, and this increases the probability that they will remain stable.<sup>71</sup> P. Van Houten and S. Wolff believes<sup>72</sup> that the effectiveness of PS can be researched by using empirical indicators, such as the absence of conflict (both

<sup>71</sup> S. Wolff, "Situating Complex Power Sharing in the Conflict Settlement Literature", 2010, p. 2, at <<http://stefanwolff.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CPSbgrd.pdf>>, 24 March 2018.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

with and without the use of violence), which refer back to adopted PS institutions, the absence of infringements on specific aspects of such institutions, as well as the absence of political parties with a high following that contest these institutions. Data from relevant public opinion polls may also be useful.

In my view, in the first question it is possible, with the use of the proposed indicators, to compare the level of political stability following the introduction and consolidation of PS (thus adopting a time frame) with the status quo ante; it is also possible to compare the level of political stability in a country where PS institutions already exist, with an analogous stability level of multi-segmental countries where such institutions were not introduced.

I am, however, skeptical about data from public opinion polls. The masses, to use Lijphart's term, are usually unaware of the existence of PS institutions, or of the possible consequences of their absence. PS institutions represent a compromise and often do not fully satisfy anyone (Bosnia and Herzegovina may be the best example in this respect). Therefore, it does not make much sense to ask the public at large about its opinion about the effects brought by PS. It would be worthwhile, however, to study the views of members of the political elites of the political segments and representatives of the central government in this matter.

In the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there are no serious conflicts in Indonesia related to the introduction of PS institutions. Papua's national independence movement seems to have been effectively pacified, partly thanks to promises to introduce consociational institutions, something which the central government has not fully done. In Nigeria, the conflict in the Niger Delta has been extinguished. Just as the Papuans in Indonesia, the Nigerian Ijaw and Ogoni, and other ethnic groups living in the Delta, are not fully satisfied with their political and economic status. Communal conflicts erupt from time to time in Nigeria, especially in those local communities where Christians and Muslims live together. This fact may support the thesis that HPS remains of little effectiveness in some spheres.

The HPS systems in Nigeria and Indonesia are certainly not perfect political systems, because the smaller segments are not treated as they would like (a good example is the distribution of public positions in Nigeria), or are marginalized (as is the case, for example, with the only partial fulfillment of the promise to introduce consociational institutions in Papua). Therefore, even in this system the needs and interests of minorities are not fully respected. In general, however, there are no serious conflicts in Indonesia and Nigeria having to do with the adopted HPS institutions, infringements on specific aspects of these institutions, and there are no popular political parties contesting HPS. One can state, therefore, that for the time being, HPS at least contributes to political stability in both multi-segmental countries. Some deviations from this situation should not be seen as confirming the political system's low effectiveness, especially given their small scale and the fact that the societies of Indonesia and Nigeria belong to the largest in the world. Skeptics, on the other hand, should give rein to their imagination and consider what the level of stability and territorial integrity in both countries would have been, had they not adopted political systems such as PS.

To end, it is worthwhile to point out why studying HPS is important. Firstly, the identification of HPS shows that combining institutions of different PS models truly takes place, despite the fact that these models are based on distinct conceptual premises. Secondly, the existence of cases of HPS allows us to be convinced that centripetalism or consociationalism alone are often not sufficient to meet the needs and interests of some segmental elites, and that in order to reduce conflicts and achieve political stability in a multi-segmental country it is at times necessary, at least during a certain period, to combine one PS model with some institutions of another PS model. Thirdly, knowledge about HPS is useful in developing PS theory as such. Analyzing HPS has made it plain that pure centripetalism doesn't exist. In the case of the two most advanced examples of centripetalism – Nigeria and Indonesia – each is accompanied by consociational elements, even though it is an asymmetric situation, given that centripetal institutions are dominant in both political systems. Identification of HPS is thus important, although the essence of HPS itself requires further research and conceptualization.

Indeed, it is worthwhile to consider: What elements should entitle a given PS system to be called a hybrid one? In other words, what criteria would a system need to meet for it to be recognized as a system that is hybrid in character? Theoretically speaking, if each PS model had add-ons, even single ones, that are typical of a different PS model, only HPS would exist. Perhaps, therefore, the important criterion of hybridity of a PS system should be the number of elements from a model other than the dominant one that it comprises. For example, if a given PS model had only one element from a model other than the dominant one, it might not make sense to refer to it as a hybrid system. However, a greater number of elements from another PS model would entail hybridity.

Perhaps a better criterion would be the level of the power structure at which an institution from a PS model other than the dominant one is found. For example, if institutions from both models were to be found at the nationwide level, then we could talk of an HPS system. If institutions from a PS model other than the dominant one were to be found at the regional level (e.g. some province of the state with a predominantly centripetal system would have special autonomy and segmental parties could function in it), then using the term HPS would not be justified.

But it would perhaps be worthwhile to apply both criteria – the number of elements of the model other than the dominant one and the level of power at which they occur – simultaneously. For example, a political system in which the dominant PS model has been supplemented by more than one element of another PS model, with at least one institution of the latter having to exist at the nationwide level, could be regarded as an HPS system. This is the case for both Nigeria and Indonesia.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Asayu, Kayode. "Federalism and Federal Character Principle in Nigeria: A Dilution". *Review of Public Administration and Management*. Vol. 3, No. 7 (2015).



- Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province*, at <<http://papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>>.
- Cammett M., Malesky E., "Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 56, no. 6 (2012).
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979* (enacted on 21 September 1978), at <[http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig\\_const\\_79.pdf](http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig_const_79.pdf)>.
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999*, at <[http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file\\_id=179202](http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202)>.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. *Society and Democracy in Germany*. Garden City, NY 1967.
- Gyekye K., *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience*, Oxford 1997.
- Horowitz D.L., *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*. New York 2013.
- Index Mundi. 2018. *Indonesia Demographics Profile*, at <[https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics\\_profile.html](https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/demographics_profile.html)>.
- Index Mundi. 2018. *Nigeria Demographics Profile*, at <[http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics\\_profile.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html)>.
- "Indonesia Population (Live)", *Worldometers*, at <<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/indonesia-population/>>.
- Kaufman S.J., "Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict", in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, London 2011.
- Krauz-Mozer, Barbara. "Tożsamość – czy to tylko suma spotkań i opowieści?", *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, vol. 26 (2017).
- Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/2006 regarding Governing of Aceh*, at <<http://pih.kemlu.go.id/files/UU%2011-%202006.pdf>>.
- Lemarchand R., "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *African Affairs*, vol. 106, no. 422 (2007), at <<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adl041>>.
- Lijphart A., *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, London 2008.
- Macdonald G., *Election Rules and Identity Politics: Understanding the Success of Multiethnic Parties in Indonesia*, Washington, DC 2013.
- McCulloch A., "Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Distinction", *Democratization*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2014), at <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.748039>>.
- McCulloch A., "Does Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies", *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2013), at <<https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2012.658002>>.
- McCulloch A., "The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places", in J. McEvoy, B. O'Leary, *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*, Philadelphia 2013.
- McGarry J., "Conclusion: What Explains the Performance of Power-Sharing Settlements?", in A. McCulloch, J. McGarry, *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*, London 2017.

- Mehler A., "Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship", *African Affairs*, vol. 108, no. 432 (2009).
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, signed in Helsinki on the 15 of August 2005, at <[http://www.acehpeace-process.net/pdf/mou\\_final.pdf](http://www.acehpeace-process.net/pdf/mou_final.pdf)>.
- Miti K., Abatan E., Minou S., "Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa's Conflicts?", *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2013).
- Mustapha A.R. "Institutionalising Ethnic Representation: How Effective is the Federal Character Commission in Nigeria?", *CRISE Working Paper*, no. 43 (2007).
- "Nigeria", Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2018, at <<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html>>.
- "Nigeria Population (Live)", *Worldometers*, at <<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/>>.
- Reilly B., "Centripetalism", in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, London 2011.
- Reilly B., "Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation and Integration", in S. Wolff, C. Yakinthou, *Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice*, New York 2011.
- Reilly B., *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific*. Oxford 2007.
- Reilly B., *Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia*. Perth 2011, at <[http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political\\_Reform\\_and\\_the\\_Demise\\_of\\_Consociationalism\\_in\\_Southeast\\_Asia.pdf](http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political_Reform_and_the_Demise_of_Consociationalism_in_Southeast_Asia.pdf)>.
- Rustad S.A., *Power-sharing and Conflict in Nigeria: Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes*, Oslo 2008.
- Sisk T.D., *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington, DC 1996.
- Suberu R.T., "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience", in D. Turton (ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, Oxford 2006.
- Taylor R. (ed.), *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*. London 2009.
- Tentang DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2018, at <<http://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/fraksiz>>.
- Trzciński K., "Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement in Presidential Elections: Cases of Nigeria and Indonesia", *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2017),
- Trzciński K., "Special Issue on Power-Sharing in Asia and Oceania", at <[http://aav.iksiopan.pl/images/AAV/AAV\\_30\\_1/Krzysztof-Trzciski.pdf](http://aav.iksiopan.pl/images/AAV/AAV_30_1/Krzysztof-Trzciski.pdf)>.
- Trzciński K., "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism as a Tactic of the Central Authorities: The Case of Papua", *Hemispheres*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2016), at <[http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES\\_31-4\\_2016.pdf](http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES_31-4_2016.pdf)>.
- Trzciński K., "Czym jest stabilność polityczna państwa?", *Przegląd Politologiczny*, no. 2 (2015), at <<http://przeglad.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/pp2015-2-037.pdf>>.
- Trzciński K., "How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria". *Politeja*,

vol. 42, no. 3 (2016), at <<http://akademicka.pl/ebooks/free/c3b7109ec2dbc4b3834c-cd59bc1d59d3.pdf>>.

Trzciński K., "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia", *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2017), at <<http://www.czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/pliki/ppsy/46-1/ppsy2017111.pdf>>.

Vandeginste S., "Power-Sharing in Burundi: An Enduring Miracle?", in A. McCulloch, J. McGarry, *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*, London 2017.

Wolff S., "Situating Complex Power Sharing in the Conflict Settlement Literature". 2010, at <<http://stefanwolff.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CPSbgrd.pdf>>.

---

**Prof. Krzysztof TRZCIŃSKI, Ph.D.** – a political scientist, an Africanist, a historian of ideas, and a scholar of contemporary political philosophy; a lecturer and research fellow at the Institute of the Middle and Far East of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. He analyses various formal and informal concepts of institutional arrangements that may contribute to the emergence of an optimal political organization in fragmented societies, especially those of multi-ethnic Sub-Saharan Africa. He studies the democratization process and the effectiveness of the institutions of power in the so-called developing countries, the theory and practice of democracy and the correlation between democracy and civilizational development. He is a tutor of the Collegium Invisibile and a Life Member of Clare Hall, University of Cambridge. He has conducted fieldwork in several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.