Stanowisko Niemiec wobec reformy Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE (2016-2022)

Abstrakt

GERMANY’S POSITION TOWARDS THE REFORM OF THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (2016-2022)

The aim of this article is to analyze Germany’s position towards the development of CSDP between 2016 and 2023, that is, from the enactment of the EU Global Strategy to the publication of the Strategic Compass. For the CDU/CSU-SPD (2013-2017 and 2017-2021) and SPD-Green-FDP (2021-2022) coalition governments, deepening security and defense integration was a means to advance European integration. The reasons for Germany’s increased interest in developing CSDP from 2016 onwards, regardless of the international context (Brexit, Trump’s presidency), were linked to the political elite’s growing aspirations to develop a more influential international role for Germany. However, hesitation was evident. European defense was seen as an instrument for aiding European integration and as a factor for activating the Franco-German engine. However, France – in strong contrast to Germany – saw the development of a common defense as a means to achieve strong European autonomy in the sense of independence from the US. In Germany, it was feared that this would damage the traditional relationship with NATO. Acceptance of strategic autonomy was therefore limited by the primacy of the Atlantic orientation, which was even revitalized because of the war in Ukraine. Berlin’s ambivalent position on CSDP was also due to the lack of political will to act militarily, constitutional constraints, that is, the strong role of parliament and the influence of a restrained political-military culture.