Seweryn Krzyżewski

INSTRUMENTALIZATION AS A SIN OF UNTRUTH

Whoever has been cheated
turns into an object.
M. Bakhtin

But where have we strayed to? We are questioning concerning technology, and we have arrived now at alétheia, at revealing. What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The answer: everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing.
M. Heidegger

Abstract

The reconstructions, analyses and discussions concerning various broadly understood instrumentalized objects available in the subject literature allow one to distinguish and identify at least two interrelated forms of instrumentalization – a weak and a strong form. The former consists of using a particular object for fulfilling an aim in its unspecific functions. Thus, it can be treated as opposite to the phenomenon of functional fixation. The essence of the latter is a change in the position of the instrumentalized object, both in the ontological and axiological order – one which is a degrading change. It is this form of instrumentalization which allows the possibility of its reinterpretation in the categories of a sin of untruth. Such reinterpretation makes use of the multitude of forms of truth and their interrelationships, as well as of the distinction between a “great and small truth.” Thus, the heuristic value of the rhetoric of sin used here enables one to emphasise some important factual aspects. Firstly, referring to many possible dimensions in which instrumentalization can be subjected to evaluation, sin will be treated here metaphorically (due to taking into account all dimensions together) and literally (in order to highlight in consequence its moral, conscious and intended character). Secondly, this rhetoric can reflect

1 Independent researcher; ORCID: 0000-0003-4707-9660; sew82@pozcta.onet.pl.
the complex structure of instrumentalization, expressed in the categories of a sin committed “in thought, word, deed and omission,” of a light or heavy nature, with violation carried out on the nature of the instrumentalized object as its extreme form. Thirdly, rhetoric allows one to understand the perpetrator of instrumentalization’s activation of disguising, justifying or even absolving his activities. Fourthly, this results in seeking out the psychological mechanism of “being led into temptation.” Its complex character can be clearly seen in many cases, especially in the case of political instrumentalization of religion, where, on the one hand, the profanation of religion takes place, while on the other, the legitimisation, ennoblement or even sacralisation of politics occurs.

Keywords: destitute time, instrumentalization, self-assertion, sin of untruth, strong form of instrumentalization, technology, truth of being, weak form of instrumentalization

INTRODUCTION

The rhetoric of sin used in the title of this study is meant to emphasise the constitutive moment of instrumentalization, i.e. a violation committed on the nature of an object used as a means to achieve an intended goal (purpose, end). I will use these categories interchangeably – as appropriate to the context. It should be stressed that this concerns rhetoric and not metaphorics, as sin is to be understood here literally and not metaphorically. This sin is the sin of untruth, which is guided by the two essays of Martin Heidegger used in this text, namely: The Question Concerning Technology (1977) and What Are Poets For? (1971). These works should be read in the context of his concept of ontological truth. In this context, it does not seem completely absurd to reach also for Mikhail Bakhtin’s thesis, referring to the category of epistemological truth – in his view, a lie turns a deceived man into an object. It is therefore also a sin against his nature and, finally, his truth.

The part of the first of Heidegger’s texts (The Question Concerning Technology) quoted above as one of the mottos of this paper, not only justifies the use of this rhetoric, but also determines the structure of these considerations. These will actually constitute a presentation of Heidegger’s argument for the very strong “everything” used here, regarding the relationship between technology and truth (alētheia). It seems that the relationship between technology and truth cannot be expressed more strongly than this motto does. As it turns out, this “everything” concerns relationships with
the truth of a strongly and weakly understood concept of instrumentalization. Although this distinction is present in the subject literature, it does not use these characteristic epithets. Political science talks about the necessity of making instrumental decisions and then their implementation in a situation where there are no “ready-made” connections regarding (intended) goals and methods, or the means of their implementation, focusing mainly on their rationality/irrationality (Borkowska-Nowak 2012). There is a phrase “means-end readiness” in neobehaviorism, a distinction that can also be found in everyday language and everyday life: although we know what we want to achieve, we need to decide on the ways or means – a kind of instrumentarium – that must be used to achieve the intended goal.

This does not always have to mean the case of a nefarious or unworthy, even sinful “use” of what constitutes this instrumentarium, contrary to its nature – mainly an ontic state – and axiological position. In the extreme case, there does not always have to be a violation of the nature of the object. In other words, it is not always the sin of untruth that is committed by “thought, speech, deed and neglect.” This “not always” suggests the usefulness, and maybe even the need to reach for heuristic values regarding the analysis of these two forms of instrumentalization, using Heidegger’s two texts. It is impossible to overestimate even the possibility of showing, thanks to such a comparative analysis, or more precisely, a contrastive analysis, the specific nature of the strong form of instrumentalization in order to display the sinful nature in all its doubtful splendour.

The comparative analysis of two forms of instrumentalization set out here imposes a three-part structure on the text. Firstly, I will use Heidegger’s first text to present the weak form of instrumentalization, focusing on its relationship with the truth. The second text will then serve to show its strong form, also with a focus on its relationship with the truth. For understandable reasons, everything that is not directly related to the title question must remain aside; it is a pity that there will be no room for such beautiful things as the role of poetry, specifically that of Rainer Maria Rilke. In the third part I will show the heuristic values that are proper to the rhetoric of sin used in the conceptualization of the strong form of instrumentalization. Of course, here I will not develop the problems by Heidegger just signalled and not further developed in this context – for example:

- the origin of causality problem (Heidegger 1977, 308);
- the problem of the usefulness/uselessness of religion in explaining the position and role;
– of the human and non-human, i.e. the instrumental factor (Heidegger 1977, 302);
– the problem of an actor or agent who directs a challenge to man before man challenges nature (Heidegger 1977, 299);
– in the problem regarding the distribution of emphases in the understanding of causality – it seems that this idea can be best expressed by distinguishing between effective control and cognitive control, in which there is nothing of agency (Heidegger 1977, 304).

More important than the answers to them is the fact that these questions were asked at all, as without them all the analyses are somewhat suspended in a vacuum. I hope, therefore, that the whole text will provide sufficient justification for the multitude of quotes and their length, concerning the language analyses dictated by Heidegger, mainly etymological, in the field of Greek and German. Although he compared Plato’s dynamics of meanings of the category of “idea” with his own actions regarding the category of “enframing,” he kept his distance from them. In addition, Heidegger himself, wrote that: “(...) the use of the word *Gestell* as the name for the essence of modern technology, which we are venturing, is almost harmless” (Heidegger 1977, 301).

Thus, these categories allow us to capture such moments and threads that have been absent up to now in the conducted analyses, and which turn out to be particularly important.

In Heidegger’s texts, I will try to look for arguments both for the general approach to instrumentalization in terms of the sin of untruth, and for examining its possible internal differentiation, and thus the possibility of distinguishing some of its forms. Therefore, it can be said that the former is a general goal, while the latter is a specific objective.

1. WEAK FORM OF INSTRUMENTALIZATION – RECONSTRUCTION OF SELECTED TOPICS HEIDEGGER’S THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY

Heidegger’s starting point for his analysis of technology is a naive or then contemporary view of it: “The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.” (Heidegger
The author thus distinguishes two topics – instrumental and anthropological. Within this first topic, two parts can be clearly distinguished – one concerning technology *per se* and the other concerning modern technology. Modern technology should be analysed separately, as in Heidegger’s view this first proposition can raise doubts as to the scope of its validity due to its too strong links with the tradition of Greek thought and not be adequate to the approach of modern technology. In this context, a separate analysis of modern technology can serve as a kind of test of the overall validity of the view expressed here.

The possibility of such analyses by Heidegger seems to be confirmed by the structure of relevant arguments. Both in the first part, concerning technology *per se*, and in the second part, concerning modern technology, we first deal with the presented definition, followed by the presentation of various forms of the analysed technology, in order that the same disturbing question is finally posed. Indeed, this question appears for the first time in the form of “Where have we strayed to?”, or do we only think that we have strayed? In a moment, it will turn out that what looked like a straying was actually discovery. The second time this question appears in a slightly weaker form, namely “Where are we?”. We receive an answer to these questions – in the first case, one so strong that the stronger “everything” is gone, and in the second, one slightly weaker, indicating the starting point. Finally, we receive a justification for this response – one which is strong in the first case, and slightly weaker in the second.

1.1. Although this initial contemporary definition is generally considered correct, Heidegger himself has reservations about such an assessment due to the ambiguous connections between correctness and grasping the essence of things. This is because, according to Heidegger, instrumentality is based on various types of causal relationships, including the “means-end” relationship. As long as we do not know the essence of causality and the essence of instrumentality, one’s sense of validity of the initial contemporary understanding may prove to be unfounded. Therefore, Heidegger’s natural and expected development of the issue of causality is best summarised in a register of the categories he subsequently introduced, a commentary on their interrelationships and how they relate to the four types of causes proposed by Aristotle (Heidegger 1977, 290–294). Indeed, they are simply used to articulate them.
Here are some examples:

The modes of occasioning the four causes, are at play, then, within bringing-forth. Through bringing-forth the growing things of nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to their appearance.

But how does bringing-forth happen, be it in nature or in handwork and art? What is the bringing-forth in which the fourfold way of occasioning plays? Occasioning has to do with the presencing [Anwesen] of that which at any given time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings out of concealment into unconcealment. Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we call revealing [das Entbergen]. The Greeks have the world alétheia for revealing. The Roman translate this with veritas. We say “truth” and usually understand it as correctness of representation. (…)

For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing. Bringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning – causality – and rules them throughout. Within its domain belong end and means as well as instrumentality. Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, the we shall arrive at revealing (...).

Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth (Heidegger 1977, 293–294).

This long quote seems to summarise and confirm perfectly Heidegger’s understanding of the aforementioned categories for the articulation of causation. It also shows this direction of reflection, which at some point seems to arouse surprise and even anxiety. Therefore, it shows:

– how the fundamental question arises, namely “What does the essence of technology have to do with discovery?“;
– what is the strongest possible answer to it? (“everything”);
– what are the reasons for this answer?

This type of approach was confirmed by other Heidegger’s analyses referring to the special relationship between techne and episteme present in the Greek tradition (to Plato). These were then treated as different
forms of widely understood cognition, namely understanding, insight or discernment.

1.2. The starting point for a separate analysis of modern technology is the posing of an explicit question and an immediately given answer promising to show unambiguously the novel nature of this technology: “What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern technology show itself to us” (Heidegger 1977, 298). Heidegger’s further argumentation focuses on the precise presentation of this novel nature: “The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth” (Heidegger 1977, 297). The context of this view and further arguments concerning the relationship between modern technology and natural sciences seem to justify talking about this challenge as somehow laying charges against nature. This can occur in various forms. Heidegger has two sets of these forms. One set includes unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about (Heidegger 1977, 298). In the second set, they are placed in the categories of setting upon, ordering, and standing-reserve (Heidegger 1977, 299). To this must be added another category with a highlighted position in both sets: “The essence of modern technology shows itself in what we call enframing” (Heidegger 1977, 305). These all have two characteristic qualities, namely regulation and protection: “Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the revealing that challenges” (Heidegger 1977, 298). Although the distinguished position of this item is associated with the fact that this characteristic is the essence of modern technology, it is, paradoxically, nothing technological in itself. It leads to two forms – producing and presenting – which are ways of discovering truth: “Both are ways of revealing, of alétheia.” (Heidegger 1977, 302).

In this context Heidegger’s question: “What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that which results from this setting upon that challenges?” (Heidegger 1977, 298) must naturally appear. Equally natural is another question and its answer, namely: “Where do we find ourselves if now we think one step further regarding what enframing itself actually is? It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself (...)” (Heidegger 1977, 305).
1.3. The subject of anthropology in Heidegger’s analyses is focused on the extraordinary complexity of the man-technology relationship and, ultimately, on the unconcealedness of truth. This dialectical complexity can already be seen in the very structure of the argument – subsequent statements correspond to these particular “butts,” while the contradiction of these theses and antitheses refutes the final synthesis.

This dialectic is already visible in the first question and the answer to it. The starting point for these analyses is the question:

Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing reserve? Obviously, man. (...) But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws. (...) Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged (...). Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e. into the process of ordering (...) as a way of revealing (Heidegger 1977, 299–300).

The next question concerns the circumstances, conditions, measures and ways all this occurs:

Where and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork of man? We need not look far. (...) Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives himself over to mediating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he finds himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed. The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to him. (...) Modern technology, as a revealing which orders, is thus no mere human doing. Therefore we must take the challenging, which (...) gathers man into ordering. (...) We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as (...) “Ge-stell” [enframing] (Heidegger 1977, 300–301).

And further on, Heidegger describes what technology is not:

This work is therefore neither only a human activity nor a mere means within such activity. The merely instrumental, merely anthropological definition of technology is therefore in principle untenable. And it may not be rounded out by being referred back to some metaphysical or religious explanation that undergirds it (Heidegger 1977, 302).

At this point I have to return to a passage already quoted, which talked about this special relationship of man with technology and truth, for Heidegger to ask once again:
Does such revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But neither does it happen exclusively in man, or definitively through man. (...) Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he (...) becomes one who listens, though not one who simply obeys (Heidegger 1977, 305–306).

And then on to a final conclusion:

But when we consider the essence of technology we experience enframing as a destining of revealing. In this way we are already sojourning within the open space of destining, a destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil. Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology we find ourselves taken into a freeing claim (Heidegger 1977, 307).

More specifically, Heidegger states that there are two possibilities, namely:

(...) the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence the requisite belonging to revealing. (...) The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger (Heidegger 1977, 307).

Therefore, the human situation in relation to technology is complicated by the fact that mortal danger belongs to the essence of technology:

The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus where enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense (Heidegger 1977, 309).

All of these complex human relationships with technology are summarised in the following statement: “(...) we consider, finally, that the coming to presence of the essence of technology (...) needs and uses man (...
one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the essence of truth.” (Heidegger 1977, 314). Indeed, an excerpt from Rilke’s letter of November 13, 1925 seems to be the affecting and thrilling concretisation of these: “(...) our task is to impress this preliminary, transient earth upon ourselves with so much suffering and so passionately that its nature rises up again ‘invisibly’ within us” (Heidegger 1977, 130).

Coping with this danger reconstructs the characteristic syllogism:

“To save” is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing. If the essence of technology, enframing, is the extreme danger (...) The essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power (Heidegger 1977, 310).

This syllogism clearly shows that the focus on the essence of technology can be associated not only with fears, but also hopes, as its premises suggests.

The excerpts analysed above show that within the framework of the general approach to instrumentalization, it is possible to distinguish its form, which does not necessarily and/or does not always come down to denial of the truth of being, carried out in the mode of “violation.” By limiting himself “only” to the use of an object in a function not specific to it, he gives it (at least sometimes) a creative character. Distinguishing this form of instrumentalization seems to be at the same time an affirmative answer to the question concerning the implementation of the specific objective.

2. STRONG FORM OF INSTRUMENTALIZATION – RECONSTRUCTION OF SELECTED TOPICS HEIDEGGER’S WHAT ARE POETS FOR?

The title of this section not only suggests, but also explicitly imposes the need to recall and paraphrase the above-quoted motto: Where have we gone wrong? Where are we? We ask the question about instrumentalization, and we have reached the vanity of time, the role of poetry and poets in destitute time. What connects instrumentalization with destitute time? The answer is “everything.” The first signals of this relationship can be found on the introductory pages of this essay. Heidegger wrote:
The time remains destitute not only because God is dead, but because mortals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality. Mortals have not yet come into ownership of their own nature. 

(...) The time is destitute because it lacks the unconcealedness of the nature of pain, death, and love. This destitution is itself destitute because that realm of being withdraws within which pain and death and love belong together. (...) That realm is the truth of particular beings (...) (Heidegger, 1971, 96–98).

These statements remain valid not only in relation to human nature, love, pain and death, but also to the nature of virtually all things and their relationships. Similarly, mortals will be able to exit destitute time when they find their way to their nature and the relationships between them. In this way, both their nature and their relationships become – because they must become – the subject of ontological analyses. Without these analyses, this way out or break out is simply impossible. This is the summary of excerpts of Heidegger’s ontology that are significant for all further analysis. It contains categories in which comparative analysis will be conducted, on the one hand, on the world of things, plants and animals, and, on the other, the world of human beings – their status and functioning, within which their specific nature is associated with different degrees of consciousness:

Like all beings, we are in being only by being ventured in the venture of Being. But because, as the beings who will, we go with the venture, we are more venturesome and thus sooner exposed to danger. When man entrenches himself in purposeful self-assertion, and by means of absolute objectification installs himself in the parting against the Open, then he himself promotes his own unshieldedness (Heidegger 1971, 119–120).

It is with these degrees of consciousness, and more precisely with the increase of consciousness in man, that the difference between them is associated:

(...) that the animal’s degree of consciousness set it into the world without the animal’s placing the world over against itself at every moment (as we do); the animal is in the world; we stand before it by virtue of that peculiar turn and intensification which our consciousness has taken. (...) that belongs to representation that Nature is brought before man. Man places before himself the world as the whole of everything objective, and he places himself before the world. Man sets up the world toward himself, and delivers Nature over to himself. We must think of this placing-here, in its broad and multifarious
nature. Where Nature is not satisfactory to man’s representation, he reframes or redisposes it. (…) By multifarious producing, the world is brought to stand and into position. The Open becomes an object, and is thus twisted around toward the human being (Heidegger 1971, 108–110).

Heidegger’s further reasoning comes to instrumentalization in a few steps. The first of these introduces the category of self-assertion termed as willing:

Over against the world as the object, man stations himself and sets himself up as the one who deliberately pushes through all this producing. To put something before ourselves, propose it, in such a way that what has been proposed, having first been represented, determines all the modes of production in every respect, is a basic characteristic of the attitude which we know as willing. The willing of which we are speaking here is production, placing-here, and this in the sense of objectification purposely putting itself through, asserting itself. (…)

The willing of which we speak here is the putting-through, the self-assertion, whose purpose has already posited the world as the whole of producible objects. This willing determines the nature of modern man, (…). By such willing, modern man turns out to be the being who, in all relations to all that is, and thus in his relation to himself as well, rises up as the producer who puts through, carries out, his own self and establishes this uprising as the absolute rule. The whole objective inventory in terms of which the world appears is given over to, commended to, and thus subjected to the command of self-assertive production. Willing has in it the character of command (…) (Heidegger 1971, 110–111).

The next steps are focused on the consequences of this desire in the environment and the world. The first concerns more or less direct consequences:

Correspondingly, human willing too can be in the mode of self-assertion only by forcing everything under its dominion from the start, even before it can survey it. To such a willing, everything, beforehand and thus subsequently, turns irresistibly into material for self-assertive production. The earth and its atmosphere become raw material. Man becomes human material, which is disposed of with a view to proposed goals. The unconditioned establishment of the unconditional self-assertion by which the world is purposefully made over according to the frame of mind of man’s command is a process that emerges from the hidden nature of technology (Heidegger 1971, 111).
The second step, however, concerns further consequences:

In place of all the world-content of things that was formerly perceived and used to grant freely of itself, the object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not only does it establish all things as producible in the process of production; it also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth as a world market, but also, as the will to will trades in the nature of Being and thus subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers (Heidegger 1971, 114–115).

And now quite specifically, Heidegger declares: “Self-assertive man, whether or not he knows and wills it as an individual, is the functionary of technology” (Heidegger 1971, 116).

Finally, he describes the human condition in the world as follows:

Self-willing man everywhere reckons with things and men as with objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed about into new orders. The parting against the pure draft establishes itself within the unstilled agitation of the constantly balancing balance. By its objectification of the world, the parting, contrary to its own intention, promotes inconstancy. Thus ventured into the unshielded, man moves within the medium of “businesses” and “exchanges.” Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives essentially by risking his nature in the vibration of money and the currency of values. At this constant trader and middleman, man is the “merchant.” He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. Nor does he ever know what in himself is truly weighty and preponderant (Heidegger 1971, 135).

As a consequence, Heidegger then tells us:

What has long since been threatening man with death, and indeed with the death of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything. (...) It is not only the totality of this willing that is dangerous, but willing itself, in the form of self-assertion within a world that is admitted only as will. (...) But above all, technology itself prevents any experience of its nature. (...) The danger consists in the threat that assaults man’s nature in his relation to Being itself, and not in accidental perils. This danger is the danger (Heidegger 1971, 116–117).
The seriousness of this threat or danger naturally directs one’s attention towards seeking rescue. The reconstruction of its course, conditions that would have to be met, and significant mechanisms in this respect all go in different directions. At the very beginning of the essay it is said:

Long is the time because even terror, taken by itself as a ground for turning, is powerless as long as there is no turn with mortal men. But there is a turn with mortals, when these find the way to their own nature. That nature lies in this, that mortals reach into the abyss sooner than the heavenly powers. Mortals, when we think of their nature, remain closer to that absence because they are touched by presence, the ancient name of Being (Heidegger 1971, 93).

Later, there are further significant moments in this respect: “The salvation must come from where there is a turn with mortals in their nature. Are there mortals who reach sooner into the abyss of the destitute and its destituteness?” (Heidegger 1971, 118). It is characteristic that certain partial questions are formulated, while sometimes answers are formulated and the conditions included therein: “Can there, however, be a heightening of this willing beyond the absolute of purposeful self-assertion? No.” (Heidegger 1971, 119). The most interesting question seems to be formulated at a high level of generality and announcing the answer at the level of generality appropriate for ontology:

(...)

what is there still to be dared that would be still more daring than Life, which is itself the daring venture, so that it would be more daring than the Being of beings? In every case and in every respect, what is dared must be such that is concerns every being in as much as it is a being. Of such a kind is Being, and in this way, that it is not one particular kind among others, but the mode of all beings as such.

If Being is what is unique to beings, by what can Being still be surpassed? Only by itself, only by its own, and indeed by expressly entering into its own. Then Being would be the unique which wholly surpasses itself (the transcendens pure and simple). But this surpassing, this transcending does not go up and over into something else: it comes up to its own self and back into the nature of its truth. Being itself traverses this going over and is itself its dimension (Heidegger 1971, 131).

The analysis of the excerpts cited above proves that apart from the poorly understood concept of instrumentalization (understood as a creative attitude to an object), its strong form can also be distinguished. Indeed,
this is what it can (and even should) be understood as in terms of denying the truth of being. Thus, once again, the question about the implementation of the specific goal of the discussed considerations can be answered in the affirmative.

3. HEURISTIC VALUE OF THE RHETORIC OF SIN

The title of this paper calls for a new look at the otherwise (apparently?) well-known phenomenon of instrumentalization in its two forms in context, as well as from the perspective of two of Heidegger’s texts. As a result, instrumentalization, and more specifically its strong form, appears as the outcome of reinterpretation. It is therefore appropriate to look first at the reinterpretation itself undertaken here, and then at its result. I will do this by using two distinctions commonly used in scientific studies (from the “meta” level), and then I will take a closer look at instrumentalization from the perspective of cognitive science, and more precisely its subject matter, i.e. cognition. This is because instrumentalization – in both its strong and weak forms – has been included as a specific way of cognition.

A meta-theoretical reflection on the reinterpretation procedure itself and its result in terms of immanent and transcendent criticism can show whether this procedure was performed in accordance with the rules of art, and thus whether it was, as it was supposed to be, a reinterpretation (from the position of immanent criticism). This is because gaining a new approach to instrumentalization is no better procedure than reinterpreting it (from the position of transcendent criticism). It seems to me that what I have done here complies with the essence of reinterpretation.

While formulating the question concerning the status and value of this operation in terms of the context of discovery and justification, one should check whether this new look at instrumentalization and its reinterpretation is “merely” a discovery. This is because it has turned out here that even an accidental reading of Heidegger’s texts meant that instrumentalization can be described differently (a new possibility was discovered in this respect), or whether it not only “merely” discovered, but also justified enough that it can no longer give rise to any doubts as to its value. In other words – is this reinterpretation merely acceptable in discovering, within which “anything goes,” or does it require additional, special justifications? Although in this study
I would like to stay within the order of discovery as it seemed important to confirm the value of this discovery, it was possible to “spot” these two forms of instrumentalization in Heidegger’s texts and to identify them clearly.

In the analysis and assessment of the reinterpretation presented here and its result, carried out at the subject level, one must start from the distinction in cognitive science between cognitive behaviour and effective behaviour and – by analogy – cognitive control and effective (behavioural) control and ask if the adopted rhetoric of sin allows us to describe the strong form of instrumentalization as a procedure that allows one to know something about an instrumentalized object, or as its mere use. The same applies to the weak form of instrumentalization, although it is not clear at this time what the negative (non-sin) would be, but also some positive and appropriate rhetoric.

Therefore, the question is: does the rhetoric of sin allow us to treat strongly understood instrumentalization as learning about an instrumentalized object, and not only as unworthy of using it in a non-specific function? One way or the other, the answer is complicated by two factors. Firstly, it is known that cognition is provided not only by cognitive behaviour but also by effective behaviour (as a result of changes in reality). Secondly, it is not known whether instrumentalization must be performed first in speech and thought, and then in deed, or just neglect, that is, “ignorance” or “disrespect” in all the meanings of these words – that is also thought, speech and deed. This complexity is also confirmed by the fact that, like some cases of weakly understood instrumentalization, they can be treated as creativity (they have then primarily a cognitive sense), and by analogy, some cases of strongly understood instrumentalization – the sin – can provide cognition. In some of its concretisations, strongly understood instrumentalization is the discovery of the possibility of using an object in a non-specific function. As an example of this specific form of instrumentalization, military reconnaissance can be used. In this case, we are dealing with the fulfilment of all conditions of instrumentalization in the strong sense of the term: non-specific use of a battle as reconnaissance and the unworthy using of scouts. Whoever sends scouts into battle counts on this, and maybe even assumes that none of them will survive, even doing so to learn a lot about the enemy.

The example given is a sign of the special complexity of our situation in which we analyse, including comparative and contrasting analysis, these two forms of instrumentalization – weak and strong. This leads to the
need to treat cases precisely, which collectively is called “blessed guilt,” although – as it turns out – not only such. There are also so-called situations without a solution – both prudent and ethical (Chyrowicz 2008). In analysing them, there is a thread of two/many effects, as well as their diverse position and importance – if we consider them due to an agent trying to get out of a dead end. When we try to analyse cases of blessed guilt using the multi-effect category, the question immediately arises whether this refers to the whole situation in which this blessed guilt takes place, or only to some of them (and which ones?). This in turn makes it possible to make the subject of analysis – otherwise clear – all cases that are located in the central area of the continuum, one pole being weak instrumentalization and the other being strong instrumentalization. By way of example, one can ask whether the category of “consuming religion” terms any actions as instrumentalization at all. Furthermore, if it is really instrumentalization, is it just a weak or already a strong form, and even whether there is only a danger that it can transform into strong form of instrumentalization (not even knowing when this occurs). Another interesting example is Pascal’s triangle, which I will not discuss in detail here, as it would go beyond the scope of these considerations. With some objections, however, I have decided to mention as an example a very special case of instrumentalization. This concerns the cook described in the classic Polish novel, Pan Tadeusz, who instrumentalized a rapier by using it as a spit. Although, she was described as “godless” just because she made a spit of a rapier, which has always been more than a weapon of war for its owner, it was, of course, never considered something divine. This case is interesting in the context of these considerations, that the sin of ungodliness attributed to the cook was practically absent.

At this point, I would like to interrupt these general considerations and get to the specifics, in the context of which the analysed cases are much clearer and may even appear to be completely unambiguous. However, I will limit myself only to their indication. These include the following matters:

- the circumstances in which instrumentalization takes place (weak, strong or maybe none at all);
- the motivation behind the decisions of the agent of instrumentalizing activities (weak, strong or maybe none at all?).
- the presence of masking activities on the one hand, and, on the other hand, justifying instrumentalizing activities (weak, strong or maybe none at all).
The last point requires a brief comment. The type of activity is significant for its assessment – concealment confirms that the agent knows that he is doing wrong more strongly than justification, because justifying the agent implies that there are some “mitigating circumstances.” These are significant for assessing the agent’s activity in terms of “what led him into temptation and in which direction.”

Finally, let me return to the level of general consideration, even at the risk of stating the obvious. Whether instrumentalization took place at all, whether it was its strong or weak form, also depends largely on “matter” or the area of activity, which fundamentally determines whether sin occurred, whether it was venial, serious or even mortal, but does not go as far as so-called situational ethics.

I think that in the end I can show that one can successfully defend, or at least try to defend, the statement that the adopted rhetoric of sin allows us to see sharper, more clearly in delight, to use the expression of Jan Błoński – the truth of the subject; first of all, an instrumentalized object, and perhaps also itself as an instrumentalizing subject (maybe without delight?). Let me add to the great figures and words already mentioned in different places here the figure and words of Thomas à Kempis. I will do this for the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden, and through him for his teacher, Kazimierz Twardowski, who quoted Kempis’ *The Imitation of Christ* in the last sentence of his inaugural lecture at the University of Lviv by saying: “The whole world will not make him proud whom truth has subjected to itself” (Kempis).

In placing a strong form of instrumentalization in the foreground of these considerations, one characterised in terms of a denial of the truth of being and that of a kind of violence against it, I see in the above-analysed excerpts of Heidegger’s texts a suggestion, or even encouragement to adopt the rhetoric of sin in order to describe it.

CONCLUSIONS

In attempting to make a concise and comprehensive assessment of the results of the above-mentioned analyses of excerpts of Heidegger’s texts, and to answer the question whether the intended research goal has been achieved, I allow myself to answer in the affirmative. Thus, it is possible to perceive instrumentalization in terms of the denial of the truth of being,
to distinguish at least two forms of instrumentalization, and, additionally, to use the rhetoric of sin for this purpose. Finally, in allowing myself a slightly playful tone, I cannot help but feel that the texts I have chosen for analysis were written especially for me...

BIBLIOGRAPHY


