Dlaczego konsocjonalizm zawodzi w Libanie? Rola elit politycznych w systemie power-sharing

Abstract

WHY CONSOCIATIONALISM FAILS IN LEBANON? THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ELITES IN THE POWER-SHARING SYSTEM

Power-sharing agreements have been the leading programs for resolving ethnic conflicts around the world for several decades. This solution has been applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Burundi, Tyrol and Lebanon. However, many researchers and observers believe that power-sharing solutions are short-term and do not stabilize countries in the long run. The most frequently cited example is the Lebanese political system, which has been struggling with political instability, sectarian divisions, institutional paralysis, and external intervention for thirty years. Today’s Lebanon is an example of a religiously divided and undemocratic state, and the cause of its collapse are seen in consociational mechanisms. This study aims to show that the sources of the state’s inefficiency and instability lie in the Lebanese ruling class, not in the model itself. They have used power-sharing mechanisms to appropriate state institutions and resources, reinforce segmental divisions, build their own patronage empires, and, as a result, weaken the state and block the transition to full democracy. The case study of Lebanon shows how consociational tools can be abused in the interests of political elites to maintain their dominance.