The Erection of the Berlin Wall (1961), as Perceived by Dean Rusk and Anatoly Dobrynin, in their Memoirs

Abstract

The Berlin Wall has become a symbol of Soviet power, arrogance, and militarism, while US policy at the time is often perceived as flexible and conciliatory. Nevertheless, neither portrayal is entirely accurate. Memoirs by Secretary Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin reveal that the Soviets were initially hesitant about the idea, which was primarily driven by East German communists pursuing their own agenda. In contrast, Washington’s response seemed slow and indecisive. Consequently, the US approach to the 1961 Berlin Crisis was ineffective and counterproductive; the memoirs suggest that more could have been achieved had American leadership demonstrated greater resolve. The article examines decision-making during the Berlin Crisis from the 1940s to 1961. An analysis of events and their interpretations by Rusk and Dobrynin reveals that a divided Germany and Berlin aligned with the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, the conventional view of the USSR as the key driver of the Cold War status quo and the US as its staunch opponent is misleading. Germany and Berlin were locked into the arrangements of the 1945 Yalta Conference, which remained unchanged until the fall of communism in 1989. The East German communists persuaded the Soviets to build the Wall, while the US had no intention of altering the Yalta agreement. The primary sources confirm this perspective unequivocally.