Identity of Political Players in Game Theory

Piotr  Łukomski

doi:10.12797/Politeja.17.2020.68.06

Authors

Piotr Łukomski University of Wrocław

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.17.2020.68.06

Keywords:

identity, political strategies, games, models, political semantics

Abstract

The process of modelling political phenomena, subject to the methodological principles of science, creates problems at various levels of reconstructing reality. The problems result from the application of these principles in isolation from the basic goal, which is the adequacy of the model in relation to real phenomena. This adequacy is considered primarily from the point of view of the possibility of explaining the observed phenomena. The presented analysis concerns the problem of assumptions made in relation to players in game theory and their relation to the social world, but first of all, from the point of view of the relationship between subjectivity, identity and the ability to make decisions by political players based on the semantic interpretation of the world of politics.

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Author Biography

Piotr Łukomski, University of Wrocław

Assistant professor at the Department of Political Theory of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Wrocław. He deals with the theory of political behaviour in the context of various research paradigms, with particular emphasis on the problem of rationalities functioning in various models of the social and political world.

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