Modus operandi of Qatar Resistance Policy against “Anti-Terror Quartet”
Why Sanctions Have Failed?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.17.2020.64.16Keywords:
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, sanctions, anti-sanctions policyAbstract
An effective resistance policy by Qatar against sanctions imposed by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain (called the Anti-terror Quartet or ATQ) surprised many analysts, journalists and politicians as well. The asymmetry in power between parties of this conflict was huge with a clear advantage with the sanctioning states. However, a wide range of actions applied by the Qatari government effectively countered the ATQ effort to portray Qatar as a threat to international peace and security and forced it to change its policy. The objective of the article is to explain the mechanisms of economic sanctions to show the conditions of its effectiveness and mistakes made by the ATQ. The research objective is also to evaluate a defensive policy applied by Qatar in reaction to the sanctions.
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