Identity of Political Players in Game Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.17.2020.68.06Słowa kluczowe:
identity, political strategies, games, models, political semanticsAbstrakt
The process of modelling political phenomena, subject to the methodological principles of science, creates problems at various levels of reconstructing reality. The problems result from the application of these principles in isolation from the basic goal, which is the adequacy of the model in relation to real phenomena. This adequacy is considered primarily from the point of view of the possibility of explaining the observed phenomena. The presented analysis concerns the problem of assumptions made in relation to players in game theory and their relation to the social world, but first of all, from the point of view of the relationship between subjectivity, identity and the ability to make decisions by political players based on the semantic interpretation of the world of politics.
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Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.
