Wpływ procedury współdecydowania na wyniki reformy wspólnej polityki rolnej Unii Europejskiej 2014-2020

Abstract

Impact of Codecision on the 2014‑2020 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

The article attempts to assess the impact of co‑decision procedure (ordinary legislative procedure) on the shape of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform for the period 2014‑2020. First, procedural models used in the analysis of decision‑making in the European Union are discussed. The second part of the article highlights the process and the results of recent reforms of the CAP. Legislative proposals of the European Commission and the negotiations between the EU Council, the European Parliament and the Commission concerning the CAP after 2013 are analyzed. The final part of the article evaluates the CAP reform from the perspective of procedural models. The analysis indicates that the new decision‑making procedure has not fundamentally affected the results of the reform. The European Parliament’s role in the process of reforming the CAP has been limited both due to inadequate institutional preparation and insufficient expertise in agricultural policy matters. In some areas, the results achieved under the co‑decision procedure were closer to the status quo point than the results predicted by the model of consultation procedure. The inclusion of the European Parliament to the decision‑making process has not broadened the range of represented interests. On the contrary, one could observe an increased dominance of agricultural interest groups in the decision‑making process. In conclusion, the introduction of co‑decision procedure has not increased the chances for a fundamental reform in the CAP. Also, it has not strengthened the democratic legitimacy of the policy.