Poland's Ability to Build Blocking Coalitions after Brexit
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.16.2019.63.03Keywords:
Brexit, blocking coalitions, Council of the European UnionAbstract
The article presents the results of research on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union on Poland’s ability to build small, minimalblocking coalitions in the Council of the European Union. To this end, the theory of voting games was used, but departing from the assumption that the creation of each possible coalition of players is equally likely. It was also assumedthat they do not necessarily make decisions independently of each other, and the analysis focuses on the ability to build minimally blocking coalitions. The obtained results indicate that after Brexit, for Poland to build a blocking coalition in opposition to the German-French tandem will be a very difficult task, and the loss of the United Kingdom as a potential coalition partner in the Council may be irreplaceable in some matters.
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Narodowym Centrum Nauki
Grant numbers SONATA 12 UMO- 2016/23/D/HS5/00408
